Official Report: Minutes of Evidence

Committee for Culture, Arts and Leisure, meeting on Thursday, 30 April 2015


Members present for all or part of the proceedings:

Mr N McCausland (Chairperson)
Mr Gordon Dunne (Deputy Chairperson)
Mr L Cree
Mr David Hilditch
Mr William Humphrey
Ms R McCorley
Mr B McCrea
Mrs K McKevitt
Mr O McMullan
Mr C Ó hOisín


Witnesses:

Mr Paul Scott, Safety Technical Group



Casement Park: Safety Technical Group

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Mr Scott, you are very welcome to the meeting. I suggest you make an opening statement, and, after that, we will have the opportunity for questions. I remind members that the Committee agreed to seek a briefing from the chairman of the safety technical group (STG) with regard to the role and the remit of the STG in the redevelopment of the stadia, in particular Casement Park.

Mr Paul Scott (Safety Technical Group): Thank you, Mr Chairman and members, for the opportunity to give you the information. I issued some packs and maps and, indeed, there is probably a bundle. Did you get a bundle, sir?

Mr Cree: Not as bad as that.

Mr Dunne: We got a folder.

The Committee Clerk: That is coming next, Chair.

Mr Scott: My apologies. I have had less than a week to prepare for the meeting, and there will be some typos and some spelling errors. Sadly, that is a reflection of being up to all hours trying to get the information to the Committee. My apologies also that I was really only finished last night. As I say, it was really only last weekend when I was asked to attend. I have some information, but believe me, there is a pile that high.

I had hoped to go right through, but this would probably take half an hour, and I hope we would have answered most of the members' questions and certainly —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): If you want, you can go ahead with whatever presentation you have.

Mr Scott: OK, thank you. I am presently employed by Sport Northern Ireland as the manager of the safety compliance unit. It was previously known as the overseeing body or, on occasions, the overseeing function, so whenever you see "overseeing body" or "overseeing function", it refers to what is now called the safety compliance unit. The unit oversees the implementation of the safety of sports grounds legislation in Northern Ireland, and we do so on behalf of DCAL.

I have a primary degree in environmental health science, a postgraduate certificate in health and safety law and practice, a postgraduate diploma in acoustical engineering and a postgraduate certificate in safety training. I was a health and safety inspector for 21 years and, during that time, I was seconded to the Health and Safety Agency. At that time, it was the body that provided advice to government. I was seconded for a year to prepare a report on a review of the legislative controls at sports grounds in Northern Ireland, which is the basis of the safety of sports grounds legislation. I was also one of the consultees in assisting with the drafting of the guide to safety at outdoor events, which is the document that is the bedrock guidance for outdoor entertainment events in the United Kingdom. I was also a consultee in the drafting of the legislation relating to entertainments licensing in Southern Ireland. I am a member of the Core Cities Group, which is a body that meets twice per year and involves those who regulate and are involved in the management of the larger stadia in Great Britain.

I was seconded to work with Sport Northern Ireland to assist with the drafting of the Safety of Sports Grounds (Northern Ireland) Order 2006 and associated implementation arrangements before commencing permanent employment with it as the manager of the safety compliance unit. I was the chairman of the working group that developed the 'Northern Ireland Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds', known as "the red guide". I have acted as the event controller of and safety adviser to many of the larger events hosted in Northern Ireland, including the MTV awards, the Tall Ships festival, the Giro d'Italia, the Carl Frampton fight at the Titanic slipways and, latterly, the Crashed Ice event outside the Assembly. My apologies to those of you who were held up going to work.

There is the red guide and there is the green guide. The green guide is the bedrock document for the safety at sports grounds in GB. It was developed by the Football Licensing Authority, now known as the Sports Grounds Safety Authority (SGSA). The Northern Ireland guide was introduced just as our legislation was kicking in. There are some differences, but the two guides are mostly very similar. This was based on the fourth edition of the green guide, but a fifth edition has subsequently been issued. There are not a lot of changes, but there are some subtle changes.

At this point, I would like to explain the concept of an eight-minute emergency exiting time to a place of reasonable safety. It is believed that, during exiting a large event, after eight minutes, if people are not in a free-flowing situation, they become agitated and panic sets in. This has come from work throughout the world, a lot of it done on the London Underground system. Eight minutes is the time when everybody should be able to reach a place of relative safety at a stadium. A place of relative safety could be outside the stadium, or it could be in a protected corridor or concourse, which is free-flowing. Essentially, that means that people are moving at 82 persons per metre per minute. The figure used to be 109, but it was seen that that would only work for stadia of about 5,000 to 8,000. Once you go much over that capacity, there seems to be a tipping point, and 82 persons per metre per minute seems to be preferable. Whenever you are calculating an emergency exiting capacity, you multiply eight by 82 by the width of the exit.

Perhaps I could refer you to the drawings, which I thought I had copies of. If you look at the top drawing, you will see a schematic of Casement Park, and you will note that there is practically 45 metres of exiting onto the Andersonstown Road. That will provide an exiting capacity of people who can leave the venue of 29,000 — almost 29,500. At present, and in the proposals that we have seen to date, there are two side exits: one to the Owenvarragh or country side of the ground, which is approximately 10 metres wide with an emergency exiting capacity of 6,560; and, on the other side — the city or Mooreland side — it is slightly bigger, and there is an emergency exiting capacity of 7,216. Now, many people would say to that — I would agree — that, if there is a protected corridor going to one of those exits, that will increase the exiting capacity probably by about 2,000 or slightly over that if the concourses are properly designed.

Whenever we are looking at a venue, somewhere like Casement Park, there are really three issues. The first two are linked. The guidance would say that there should be a sufficient number of exits in suitable locations. For a venue, that would generally mean that the exits are distributed around the perimeter, as far as possible. There should also be an outer circulation zone outside the venue. It is all referenced in the green guide. There should be an outer circulation zone. At many venues, and particularly in an urban environment, the outer circulation zone has proved hard to attain. Thus, it is much more important that we have appropriate exits set at suitable locations all around the venue. The guidance also says that the pitch should not form part of emergency exiting calculations, so we cannot put people on the pitch and leave them there. That is because, once we hit eight minutes, there is the potential for panic to set in. You have a lot of people in an uncontrolled area and, if they panic, they will head towards the exits, which are already at capacity. If we look at many of the disasters at sports grounds, concert sites, or wherever, we see that it is the crushing and panic that kill people, rather than the fire, fight or structural collapse. We need, very much, to be mindful of that.

I am now going to address the first of your questions: the background to the establishment of the safety technical groups. After the Northern Ireland Executive decided not to proceed with building a stadium at the Maze/Long Kesh site, a decision was taken to build or renovate three separate stadia for soccer, rugby and Gaelic. Approximately £110 million of DCAL funding was earmarked for the programme. The preferred options for the venues were the refurbishment of Windsor Park, the refurbishment of Ravenhill and the demolition and rebuilding of Casement Park.

In 2009, Sport Northern Ireland was asked to prepare a business case, and so engaged McClure Watters to develop an outline business case in respect of the regional stadia development. I was one of the consultees to the outline business case and was asked to comment on the ability of the existing Casement Park site to accommodate a venue with a capacity for approximately 40,000 people. I advised that there would be enough space for the structure but there would be problems with exiting and emergency exiting. I advised that houses would have to be demolished to facilitate those issues and noted that, in other stadia in Great Britain, the purchase of adjoining properties had been problematic.

I refer to a document that, sadly, you have not got. It is on page 23 in my bundle. I will give you an extract from the outline business case. In that, we looked at the current deficiency at the ground, and stated:

"All the entrances and the majority of exiting is at Andersonstown road end".

The recommendation was that we should:

"Explore maximising widths of the exit routes to Owenvaragh and Mooreland Park."

I was asked about the impact of the impending safety at sports grounds legislation, and I advised that a reduction in capacity was likely because of the exiting issues. I will continue with the current deficiencies. I said that the location would always be a challenge with a large number of people discharging onto the Andersonstown Road at the end of a fixture. New stadia require 360 degree exiting, but existing old stadia can stay as was. I then commented that there would be the potential for capacity reduction due to the safety factor and resulting congestion.

I did not receive a copy of the finalised report. I would not have expected to; I was brought in just to provide comment on potential safety issues. As you see, my advice was reflected. I subsequently spoke to one of the consultants involved in the drafting of the outline business case, and he clearly remembers that I expressed concern regarding exiting and emergency exiting and that I advised that houses would have to be demolished to facilitate exiting and emergency exiting. That gentleman is prepared to confirm that to the Committee or to any other body as necessary.

In the summer of 2012, I was asked by Noel Molloy, the programme director of the regional stadia development project, to provide advice to DCAL regarding the design proposals submitted by the respective architects in relation to the safety and operational issues. I was also told that my point of contact would be the DCAL architect Carl Southern.

I refer the Committee to my bundle. My apologies; there is only one bundle, so you will not be able to see it, but what I am saying can all be referenced back to documents, emails, statements, meeting notes etc.

Under the section entitled "Casement", Carl Southern states:

"In due course, we will seek a written sign off (as a key conditional approval) by the Sport NI Overseeing Function to the stage design reports. This is in recognition of its specialist role in leading the integrated view on safety, public order issues and licensing on behalf of the PSNI and BCC respectively."

That document is in the bundle, which I have left. The Sport NI overseeing body is now the safety compliance unit. BCC refers to Belfast City Council.

Due to the size and scope of the stadia projects, it was agreed with DCAL in late 2012 that I would establish a safety technical group for each of the three venues. This was to ensure that the technical expertise of the key statutory bodies was considered before any sign-off on the design.

You wanted some information on the composition of the STGs, Chair. At present, I chair the safety technical groups for the three stadia, and the groups include representation from the PSNI, which sends an operational planning officer; the Northern Ireland Ambulance Service, which sends another ops planning officer; the Fire and Rescue Service; and Belfast City Council, which sends certifying officers as the certifying authority. We also involve the safety officer from each of the stadia that were going to be renovated. Finally, there is the technical officer from Sport Northern.

Initially, DCAL attended the STG meetings as observers. However, in and around the spring of 2013, DCAL advised that it no longer wished to attend and no longer required the minutes; it only wanted the interim report and the final report. Each stadium has its own safety technical group, as different individuals were involved in each project. At that time, for example, there were different police officers involved with east and south Belfast and north and west Belfast, as well as different safety officers for each of the stadia.

I go on to the role of the safety technical group, which I think the Chairman had also asked a question about. Whilst no formal terms of reference were provided by DCAL on the establishment of the STGs, it was agreed that their role was to review the design drawings and provide confirmation that the design proposal had the potential for the safe capacity of the venue to reflect the design capacity. I was asked by DCAL how I would go about setting up an STG. I came back the next day with the proposals. They agreed and said they would send us terms of reference. Then, they asked to be an observer, which they were for a time, before deciding that they no longer wished to be involved, other than to receive the reports. We asked for terms of reference from the Department on two occasions, but they never materialised.

Again, I refer you to comments from DCAL at page 61 of the bundle, and, again, I apologise that, due to time and resource constraints, I could not progress further. There was an understanding that the process would be as follows: the design architects would prepare drawings for each of the respective venues and forward them to DCAL; DCAL would forward these documents to me at Sport NI; the documents would be distributed to the respective members of a particular STG electronically; an STG meeting would be convened to discuss the drawings; we would provide comment to DCAL based on the technical and professional advice around the table; DCAL would forward the comments to the design team; the design team would amend the drawings based on the feedback from the STG, before forwarding the revised drawings to DCAL; and, finally, DCAL would forward them to the safety technical group. This process would continue until resolution was achieved. Once DCAL had been advised of the comments by the STG, the notes or minutes of the previous meeting became somewhat redundant because there were now new drawings. So, there was no point in raking over the comments on the previous set of drawings, because we now had revised drawings before us for our consideration. We were then advised that, once design had been agreed, planning permission would be sought. Once planning permission had been granted, a design and build contractor would be appointed. They would be permitted to make changes to the design with the approval of DCAL, but DCAL would once again rely on the technical expertise of the STG to agree any changes to the design from a safety aspect.

I refer you again to a letter that is contained in the bundle. It is from Rosalie Flanagan, who, at the time, was the permanent secretary of DCAL. It is dated 8 October 2012. The letter thanks me for my professional input during the design development of the stadium. With respect to Windsor Park, the letter states:

"It is essential that when the department approves this design to go forward for planning we have confirmation from SNIOB, PSNI and BCC that all relevant and reasonably foreseeable safety scenarios have been considered and anticipated within the design and, importantly, that the overall physical design is capable of achieving full spectator capacity within future venue certification."

SNIOB was the Sport Northern Ireland overseeing body, now the safety compliance unit. Again, BCC is Belfast City Council. I assert that Ms Flanagan's statement in this letter applies equally to the design of Casement and, indeed, Ravenhill.

The STG was under the impression that planning permission would not be sought on the designs until after they had been agreed with the group. Whilst the officers of Belfast City Council, who will draft the safety certificates for the three stadia, are on their respective STGs, the role of these officers is somewhat distinct and separate from the safety certification processes that they will engage in later. One of the primary purposes of embarking on the STG process is that DCAL would be provided with reasonable assurance that the design capacity will be, or will be close to, the safe capacity, and that it would get that assurance at an early stage in the design process. That is to ensure that the stadia are fit for purpose at an early stage before significant public funds are spent, for example, on planning permission or on further design costs.

I go on to how we calculate the capacity of the stadia. Last week, DCAL advised how the capacity is calculated. This does not accurately set out how you undertake this process. The first step in the process was not explained to the MLAs. It was explained to you about the S-factor and the P-factor. The S-factor is the safety management factor, which relates to stewarding, the CCTV, etc; and the P-factor relates to things like the strength of railings, height of steps etc. However, before you do any of this, the first step is to calculate the entrancing capacity, the viewing capacity, the exiting capacity, and the emergency exiting capacity, which you do based on guidance in these two documents, which are essentially one and the same. Then, you take the lowest of those figures, and that becomes your baseline.

Mr B McCrea: Can I just check the reference? What are those two documents?

Mr Scott: One is called the 'Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds', which is the UK version, and the other is the 'Northern Ireland Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds'. This document is based on the fourth edition of that one. We will catch up. There are differences but not terribly many.

Before we do anything, we take the lowest of those figures and, as will be explained later, we have been unable to obtain information from DCAL, despite asking for it for well over a year. However, based on our observations, we regard the emergency exiting capacity as being somewhere between 14,000 and 18,000. It will depend on some of the finer detail. That is the base for assessing, and it can be confirmed in annex A of both the red guide and the green guide. So, there may be further reductions, hopefully not because of the P-factor or the S-factor, if that was considered to be less than optimal. The safe capacity can also be amended subject to observations made on match days.

Again, I advise that, using the guidance and referencing that against drawings submitted to us, three things really struck us: there was not a sufficient number of exits in suitable locations; there was not an outer circulation zone, which, although not a game stopper, meant that we had to pay more attention to the exiting; and there was a proposal to have somewhere in the order of 7,000 to 8,000 uncovered seats to the north end of the ground, a practice that is greatly discouraged in these two documents.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Sorry, could we just pause for a moment? It has been brought to my attention that there is some live broadcasting. I am advised that that is not permitted, so please turn that off. Sorry, Paul, for the disruption.

Mr Scott: My apologies for the length —

Mr Scott: — but I think it this sets out everything in an orderly fashion.

Last week, DCAL equated the certification process for the safety certificate of Casement with that for Ravenhill. At Ravenhill and at Windsor, the STG could always see how emergency exiting could be achieved for the design capacities. This is not the case for the Casement Park proposal. I and the safety technical group are concerned that, if the Andersonstown Road exits become unavailable due to an emergency situation — for example, the occurrence of a road traffic accident, a serious criminal incident, a gas leak, a fire in a building to the front of the road or a security alert etc — 38,000 spectators at a capacity match would be required to exit via the two relatively small exits to Owenvarragh and Mooreland Drive, which ultimately leads to Mooreland Park. These side exits are small and, in many cases, lead back onto the Andersonstown Road itself. If we are trying to get 38,000 people out through exits that are really suited to only 14,000 to 18,000 people, we have a problem.

These concerns have been shared with DCAL from a very early stage. The first meeting of the Casement Park safety technical group was held on 11 February 2013. Our concerns on this issue were shared soon after this meeting. I refer the Committee to documents in the bundle, which include an email dated 20 February, emails exchanged around 5 March, an email sent on 11 April 2013, and notes of an STG meeting on 12 April at which DCAL was in attendance.

The first interim Casement Park STG report was forwarded on 12 September 2013. The report advised that, if 72% of the exiting was to be located on the Andersonstown Road, care must be exercised in the development of an exiting/emergency exiting strategy. The report highlighted that a carefully worked emergency exit plan must be developed and detailed in the management plan. It recommended that consideration be given to the provision of an additional exit route to the south-east of the stadium. If you look at the bottom right of the map, you will see that there is a cul-de-sac that goes right to the edge of the property of Casement Park. I am told that there used to be a gate there. It certainly would not involve knocking down houses; it would be merely part of a wall. That would provide some additional exiting. It would not address the problem, but it would be useful and would help. This was highlighted in a revised Casement Park STG report that was issued to DCAL at a meeting on 16 October.

Key extracts from the report are as follows:

"As stated above the layout of the stadium has required considerable thought to be expended in developing the exiting arrangements. Given the distribution of the exits a carefully worked emergency exiting plan must also be developed. This should be detailed in the Management Plan. Should a situation arise resulting in the 'loss' of the exits to the Andersonstown Road at a larger fixture there will be limited exiting available via the exits to Owenvarragh Park and to Mooreland Drive. Although there may be an extended period of time available to effect the emergency exiting process there would be the potential for panic or crushing. It is therefore important that crowd management procedures are in place and that suitable and safe exit routes are identified to facilitate the process.

Consideration should be given to the provision of an additional emergency exit route to the south east corner to increase the emergency exiting capacity of the venue.

The emergency exiting arrangements have the potential to impact on the 'S factor' and/or the 'P factor' of the stadium.

The Emergency Exiting Strategy should be developed as soon as practicable and submitted to the STG for comment. The Strategy would identify if any structural changes were required to increase the flow capacity of the emergency exiting system. This is of particular importance as the Strategy will have a significant impact on the 'S-factor' and thus the safe capacity of the stadium."

That document is also in the bundle.

After the Casement Park STG report in October 2013, further drawings were provided to Sport Northern Ireland on 11 April 2014. These drawings were actually prepared some months before that. They showed that houses would have to be demolished and additional land purchased to facilitate additional emergency exiting. However, even with those additional measures, the emergency exiting capacity would appear to be significantly less than the design capacity. In any event, I am led to understand that there is a reluctance to purchase the houses and land that would be necessary to implement these further design changes. To date, no further drawings have been forthcoming on the Casement Park project from the design architect Populous.

Last week, DCAL advised the Committee that the design proposals would provide for a venue in compliance with recognised guidance in normal operation and suggested that the STG's concerns related to an escalating emergency situation with numerous incidents, a to e, occurring. That is not the case. It is agreed that exiting can be achieved under normal operation conditions. However, it would take only one incident around the stadium, not five. If that incident were to be on the Andersonstown Road to the front of the stadium, that would render all or some of the exits in that area unusable. At a well-attended fixture, that could lead to an extremely dangerous situation placing spectators at risk.

DCAL also proposed that a risk-based approach should be adopted to the design of Casement. DCAL advised that last week on 23 May. The Casement Park STG agrees that there is merit in adopting a risk-based approach to the design of the stadium; it is possible to deviate from the contents of the green guide or the red guide. However, an equal or greater degree of safety must be provided; that is contained in the green guide at paragraph 1.7 and in the red guide introduction part G. Sadly, DCAL has failed to provide the STG with an emergency-exiting strategy, despite repeated requests. The bundle contains samples of these requests, such as emails on 5 March 2013, 11 April 2013, 22 April 2013 etc.

An emergency exiting proposal recently forwarded to Sport NI by the design and build contractor shows a much lower degree of safety than that advocated in the green guide. Bear in mind that, without the outer circulation zone, it is even more important that the exiting be suitable. These are just some current observations of the STG on Casement. Should the stadium be constructed in accordance with the present design proposals, it would not, in the view of the STG, be in compliance with the content of the red guide or green guide. There are issues about emergency exiting, absence of an outer circulation area and also issues with regard to uncovered seating. Again, I refer particularly to the emergency exiting, which presents a serious risk to spectators in certain circumstances. It is, of course, accepted that these circumstances may never come to pass or that they could happen at the first match. You just do not know. There was one Hillsborough incident, and we have seen the consequences of that. It is better to design properly rather than to hope.

As I say, based on my calculations, the exiting to the two sides would provide capacity somewhere in the order of 14,000 to 18,000 collectively, which is significantly below the design capacity of 38,000. These figures assume that the roadways in and around Casement Park are kept free from parked and, indeed, moving cars. A roadway with moving traffic cannot be considered a place of reasonable, or even final, safety. We have raised concerns about parking and the need for parking not to be permitted for larger matches. DCAL advised us that no one should be made aware of this until planning permission was received.

The Populous design team shares the STG concerns about safe capacity. I refer the Committee to another document in the bundle. This comes from Charles Cooke —CC —, the design architect. He provides the following comments to minutes of a meeting that was held on 11 April.

"CC queried the suitability of the site based on the assumption that Andersonstown Road was closed and the site would need to be evacuated via the 2 narrow rear side exits... Based on the 21 m of exit width provided to by side exits, regardless of the stadium design, the site could accommodate 13776 people. Or if the site accommodates 38,000 people it would take 22 minutes for those people to evacuate through those exits".

I believe that he is perhaps being a little bit conservative, but certainly this is the design architect, again, showing that accommodating 38,000 people would be very challenging.

There was a dispute as to whether those comments were made at the meeting, but Mr Cooke is clearly concerned about safe capacity. The comments do not actually appear in the meeting record, but they do appear on Mr Cooke's comments with regard to the meeting record, so he is clearly concerned.

On 17 June, our technical officer Laura Strong and I attended a meeting with DCAL, the GAA and Mr Oran McCloskey from Heron Buckingham JV, who are the design and build contractors for the Casement project. Mr McCloskey asked whether the pitch could be used as a place of safety. He was advised that it could not be included in the calculations for the safe capacity as this would clearly be in contravention of the green guide, chapter 10, including 10.9, which is on pages 5 and 6 of the bundle, and indeed in contravention of chapter 9 of the red guide. Those documents are available.

On 15 October, Sport Northern Ireland again met the Heron Buckingham JV group to discuss proposals for emergency exiting. They suggested that, in an emergency, exiting could be controlled through holding arrangements or phased evacuation. That would mean picking stand 1, for example, and evacuating it now but saying that stands 2, 3 and 4 must, please, wait their turn. All the documents that you read on crowd psychology tell you that people do not wait. Particularly with social-media information and, on occasions, wrong information, people will see that and panic. As I said before, the incident provides problems, but the bigger problem is panic and the resulting crushing. That has been shown time after time.

The bundle also contains an extract from a report issued by Heron Buckingham JV on 26 November, saying, basically, that, should the exits on the Andersonstown Road not be available, the evacuation of the stadium may require up to 29 minutes. Interestingly, at this meeting, Heron Buckingham JV advised Sport Northern Ireland that it had been advised by DCAL to meet all the organisations represented on the safety technical group separately and not as a group. That advice was confirmed by a senior DCAL official to Sport NI on 12 November 2014. I hope that DCAL is not attempting a strategy of divide and conquer.

On 23 April, DCAL advised the Committee that there was a possibility of the GAA agreeing to a stadium design with reduced capacity. The safety technical group and I were unaware of this development. I understand that the GAA was insisting on a 38,000-seater stadium. I refer you to an 'Irish News' article from 24 April 2015, which is also in the bundle. If the GAA agreed to a stadium with reduced capacity, a new design proposal would need to be submitted to the STG. To avoid a situation as before, I recommend that the STG agree the design proposal before planning permission is sought or any revised designs forwarded.

I come to the re-energising of the Casement STG. On 23 April, DCAL advised the Committee that it would like to re-energise the Casement Park safety technical group. The director of participation in Sport Northern Ireland has advised me that DCAL proposed to appoint a new chairman — I would be removed as chair — and extend membership to include more DCAL officials. As I understood it at the time, the proposal was that the DCAL stadium team technical officer would chair the STG. Further, it is proposed that the appropriate quorum be three STG members plus DCAL. First, I do not believe that there is any justification for DCAL seeking to remove me as chair; I consider that I have acted appropriately throughout. The STG is a reactionary body. We respond to —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Sorry, can you pause for a moment?

Mr McMullan: Sorry, but that is deviating from what we are here for; that is a personal opinion.

Mr Hilditch: The question was asked last week.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We have asked someone to make a presentation.

Mr McMullan: Yes, but that is a different from the presentation, Chair; that is personal opinion.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Lots of things that we are told are opinions.

Mr Dunne: We are getting the truth.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): It is just a matter of hearing it; we will interrogate it afterwards.

Mr McMullan: We are being drawn into something here. We should stick to the presentation.

Mr Hilditch: You are beginning to sound a wee bit like DCAL over there.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): — is hugely important. We have been reminded already of one tragedy in GB where there was serious loss of life. We want to ensure that any stadium development in Northern Ireland is safe; therefore, it is important that we hear all the evidence. I will ask Mr Scott to continue.

Mr Scott: New drawings or robust emergency exiting demonstrating how the current design plans can meet the safe capacity need to be submitted to the team before it can review documents and provide an opinion. These have not been forthcoming for Casement Park.

Secondly, I have concerns that the new arrangements would affect the independent nature of the STG; we are supposed to provide independent advice to DCAL. Further pressure may be brought to bear on members of the STG to sign off designs that are not in keeping with the green guide and which have the potential to place spectators at risk.

I also understand that there has been a suggestion from DCAL that all members of the STG must sign a confidentiality agreement. Such an agreement has never been required before. I would be concerned about why DCAL feels at this juncture that such a measure is now required.

Last week, there was some talk about a second opinion on Casement Park. Sport Northern Ireland has spoken to the Sports Grounds Safety Authority (SGSA), formerly the Football Licensing Authority, on Casement Park. The organisation is an arm's-length body of the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in Great Britain and is internationally respected; it is the author of the green guide and related documents and, as I said, the red guide is based on the green guide. Sport NI works closely with that organisation, and it has offered to provide a second opinion on the design proposals for Casement Park.

The GAA was offered the opportunity, by the Sports Grounds Safety Authority, to review the drawings. The GAA wrote to Sport NI on 5 December 2014 advising that it had not agreed to an independent assessment of the design proposals for Casement Park. I am at a loss as to why the GAA or DCAL appear reticent to take such a move. If DCAL, and/or the GAA, has concerns about the STG's opinion on Casement Park, then a second opinion from the Sports Grounds Safety Authority is the most logical and appropriate step. They are experts in their field, have knowledge of the green guide, are independent, and are outside the local jurisdiction.

Last week there was a comparison drawn between Casement Park and the Titanic slipways. DCAL noted, during its address to the Committee, that large numbers of patrons have attended concerts and other events on the Titanic slipways, and thus a similar approach should be taken with spectators attending events at Casement Park. It is not correct for DCAL to draw comparisons from these two very different venues. First, the Titanic slipways is an open site; it is not surrounded by seated viewing decks. Indeed, a different guidance document — the guide to outdoor events that I referred to earlier — is the applicable document. Secondly, the safe capacity for the Titanic slipways is approximately half that proposed for Casement Park. Finally, there are four exit routes, each of similar capacity, to provide exiting from the Titanic site.

DCAL advised the Committee on 23 April of its concerns regarding the delay in receiving minutes or meeting notes from the STG. Initially, DCAL was present at the STG meetings and received minutes in a timely manner. DCAL then advised that it would not be attending STG meetings and did not require meeting notes to be forwarded to it — only interim and final reports. I can confirm that, apart from the November 2014 meeting, the meeting notes were provided to DCAL in the summer of 2014, and the November document was forwarded at the time of the meeting or immediately after it. These notes were provided to DCAL at its request in the summer of 2014, prior to the judicial review proceedings into the planning permission for Casement Park.

There is an administrative error in relation to one set of meeting notes. The DCAL official at the safety technical group was incorrectly identified. We had a new member of staff who was taking notes at the time. We were told that member A would be attending, but they were unable to do so. Member B attended. I apologise for the error in the document. I was advised that the Committee had not got the meeting notes. I do not know whether you have received them yet, but they are in the bundle if members want to see them.

I will talk about political pressure being applied to the Casement Park STG and Sport NI. Pressure from both the GAA and DCAL has been applied to me and to another Sport NI representative who approved the design proposals for Casement Park. The first incident of undue pressure occurred in September 2013 when the first interim STG report on Casement Park was forwarded to DCAL. The report included concerns regarding an emergency exit. A copy of the interim report was returned by email with a number of comments made by senior members of the stadium team at DCAL, including:

"suggests full capacity may not be possible — unacceptable".

The full text and all the comments are in the bundle.

An email was received from DCAL stating:

"The report must be definite in its endorsement and in its present form is at odds with the departments requirements".

Sport NI endeavoured to meet the Department to explain the concerns of the STG regarding emergency exiting from the venue and, in particular, the mathematics that underpinned the projected rates of flow and resulting capacities, but was advised by email:

"We've met and I think we all know what the issues are"

The offer of a meeting was not taken up. I refer the Committee to documents in the bundle. A series of telephone calls and meetings followed when Sport NI was told to withdraw the concerns of the STG regarding the design proposals. Sport NI met the GAA on 15 October and suggested the option of the route to the south-east, but the proposal was rejected. Members of the STG attended a meeting called by DCAL on 16 October 2013 at Causeway Exchange at which DCAL was given the final report of the STG. That is in the bundle.

At the meeting on 16 October, DCAL and the GAA accused the STG of only raising concerns regarding emergency exiting in "recent days" and advised that PSNI officers had no concerns regarding the design proposals. DCAL again requested a report that would state that the STG agreed to the design proposals. The meeting was very robust and, despite assurances from DCAL that minutes would be provided, including an email to that effect, we are still waiting for the meeting notes or the minutes. I believe that an application for planning permission was lodged and that the process to appoint the design-and-build contractors commenced shortly after the meeting, despite previous assurances that agreement with the STG would be required before those processes proceeded.

On 18 December 2013, I was advised by Ms McKeown, the then recently appointed CEO of Sport NI, about the concerns of the STG regarding the design proposals for Casement Park, prior to a meeting that she was to have with DCAL. Ms McKeown contacted the then programme director in DCAL and was advised that the issue of emergency exiting had only recently been raised. It had actually been raised orally since December 2014, and in writing since spring —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): For the record, it was 2012.

Mr Scott: — orally since December 2012, and in writing since spring 2013. He then went on to say that the issue had only been raised in passing — the written correspondence, which is in the bundle, will disprove that — and that the stadium should be built as per the current design, with tweaks applied after completion. The shortfall in emergency exiting capacity was in excess of 20,000, which could not possibly be addressed by tweaks. Ms McKeown was also advised of the "unprofessionalism" and "irresponsibility" of the chair of the STG.

Further meetings and telephone conversations took place when more pressure was applied, including assertions that influence could be applied to senior police officers by DCAL and the GAA and that the PSNI opinion on emergency exiting would be overturned. DCAL also advised that the other emergency services would follow the lead of the PSNI and that Sport NI would be left isolated and that it would be seen as holding up over 2,000 and preventing the development of a major project.

Following a meeting in April 2014 — the meeting was requested by DCAL, but an hour before it they phoned to advise that they would not be attending — involving Sport NI, the GAA and the design team, who attended via conference call, revised proposals were discussed, including the purchase of land and the demolition of houses. Although the drawings were dated May 2013, this was the first time that they were presented, so almost a year had elapsed. The proposals significantly increased the emergency exiting capacity, but there was still a shortfall.

Minutes and meeting notes were distributed, and a dispute arose regarding the content. Sport Northern Ireland and DCAL were on the same side and did not agree with the version of the design team. The design team did, however, state in an email that I will repeat:

"Based on the 21 metres of exit width provided by the side exits, regardless of the stadium design, the site could accommodate 13,776 people. Or if the site accommodates 38,000 it would take 22 minutes for those people to evacuate through those exits."

The email also stated:

"the GAA had confirmed that PS was consulted with regard to the suitability of the site prior to the appointment of Populous and that PS had agreed that the site would be suitable for a 40,000 seat stadium, larger than the current proposed capacity of 38,000."

First, I explained what it actually says in the outline business case and what were the recollections of the people who developed the business case. Baffled and concerned at the above statement, I spoke to the acting CEO, as the CEO was on holiday at the time, and he sent a letter to the GAA asking whether it had, in fact, made such a statement and, if so, on what it was based.

I refer the Committee again to pages in the bundle. The GAA's response did not answer the questions but referred to the business case discussions of 2009. The response also made a number of accusations about Sport NI officers on the STG. Those accusations included stating that the officers had treated the Casement project differently from the projects at Windsor and Ravenhill. I was very hurt by that comment. I have worked with GAA officials and have found very many of them to be excellent people with a good safety ethos. I have worked with these people for many years. I have given presentations on safety at Croke Park on several occasions, and I actually appeared on a video for the GAA on the safety arrangements at Casement Park.

Again, I refer members to the bundle. Ms McKeown and Mr Harkness of Sport Northern Ireland met the GAA to discuss these allegations in October 2014. However, you will see from the correspondence from the GAA in response to the minutes of the meeting that it does not seem to wish to engage in proper consultation in a meaningful manner.

Again, I refer the Committee to documents in the bundle. The pressure exerted upon me has been so significant that I felt in December 2014 that I had no choice but to raise a complaint of bullying and harassment against DCAL officials with the CEO of Sport Northern Ireland and to make a formal protected disclosure to the board of Sport NI.

At a meeting in December 2014, the CEO advised my colleague Laura Strong and me that she was meeting the acting permanent secretary, Cynthia Smith, to challenge DCAL on the allegations involving DCAL officials and stated that the minutes would be provided to the officers, which is to say Laura Strong and me.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Can I just pause for one moment?

Mr Scott: I have made some corrections to this document, as I said. It was raced out, and there were some typos and spelling mistakes.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): My only concern is that, in this part, we might be going into an area where there is an ongoing process.

Mr B McCrea: If the person who is making the complaint wishes to make it public and it is in a written statement that I have, I would like to hear it. All these things are for the individual's protection. The individual is here making comments that I think raise really serious questions. I am just saying to you that I think it is appropriate that we hear it, and I want to hear it.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): It may be that we would be better going into closed session for that small element of it, if members were agreeable to that.

Mr McMullan: Chair, I think I already raised this. You suggest going into closed session now, but we have already been through this in open session, including some matters that I raised a concern about. I state again that this report goes into areas at a very early stage that we should not be listening to. We are not saying that what the gentleman is saying is wrong, but we asked for a report on the stadium, not on personal things. This report mentions names, and other parts of it refer to "A" and "B". Those were the sorts of things l meant. Why stop the report now at practically the last page and go into closed session after listening to 11 pages of it? You should go into private session for it all or stay in open session for it all.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): First, there are large elements that simply directly respond to things that we asked for. We wanted clarity on the remit of the STG, it membership, how it was set up, how it operated, what it said and what it recommended. We wanted clarity on all those things and everything about the STG, because it is the core entity for decisions about the safety of the ground. As I said, I hope that we are always conscious that our priority has to be to ensure that the patrons of whatever is built at Casement Park are not endangered in any way and are given the proper protection.

It would be an indictment on everyone involved, including us in our role, if you got to a situation where a stadium was built that did not meet all the proper recommended requirements and something happened and a life was lost. That would be disastrous. We need to make sure that everything around the STG is done properly and is in order. If we are to do that, we need to understand how it operates. What we have had up to now has been in that regard.

I paused simply because we got the document only this morning. There is a section at the end that takes us into an area that I am not entirely sure about, because I have not had a chance to read it fully yet.

Mr B McCrea: Chairman, the point, as my colleague made —

Mr McMullan: Mr McMullan.

Mr B McCrea: Sorry, Oliver. I do not have my glasses on. As Oliver said, we have been through this. We have about four paragraphs to go, and we might as well hear the whole lot. Mr Scott would be quite entitled to talk to the media and to make his presentations and statements, and we would get to read about it then. It is in a written submission, it is germane to what is going on and it raises a lot of questions. I think that it was right for you to raise that for our consideration, but, if you want my view, it is entirely appropriate that we carry on in open session. There are issues that we need to discuss.

Mrs McKevitt: I acknowledge that we only received the bundle; Ms McCorley stated that at the very beginning of the meeting. The whole way through the presentation, we have been referred to a bundle that we have not seen, and you allowed that to continue. So, I would like to hear the last couple of paragraphs from Mr Scott. He might not get another chance to come back to address the Committee with his concerns, so I would like to hear them today.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): If members are of the view that we should proceed, I am certainly —

Mr Humphrey: Chairman, can I make a point? A number of members referred to the bundle and made the point, which is valid, that we have not seen it. Let us make the bundle public so that everybody can see it.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We will receive copies.

Mr Humphrey: In due course.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): The copy is there. It is now with the Committee Clerk, and at the end of the meeting it can be copied and given to all members. I do not know what is in the bundle, but whatever is in it has been presented to the Committee and will be distributed to members. That is absolutely correct. I appreciate the difficulty that we have not seen it, that it is a very large bundle of documentation and that it will take time for members to read and digest the information.

Having gone around the room, members seem to be of the view that we should proceed. I have not heard any dissenting voices. I apologise for stopping you, but I just wanted to make sure that there was agreement on that.

Mr Scott: Again, my apologies. I am afraid that Laura Strong has been unable to attend work for the past number of weeks due to stress, and with the incident with the stand at Windsor Park, the Gran Fondo and the cup final being moved to the Oval, I am sure that you can appreciate my workload. I apologise for not being able to get it to you sooner.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): No problem at all. Go ahead.

Mr Scott: Our chief executive asked for a file and supporting documentation, which was provided to her. A document of almost 100 pages was prepared and provided as requested.

After 20 December, Laura Strong and I were advised that Cynthia Smith and Antoinette McKeown agreed that the meeting would be informal and that no notes or minutes should be taken, even though it was to address bullying in the workplace and that that was at variance with the policies on bullying. We were, however, given a set of action points, which included my removal as chair of the STG.

Before Christmas, I received a call from a DCAL official. He advised me that he was aware that the Northern Ireland Ambulance Service had received a freedom of information request about Casement Park. He asked me to ensure that neither the Northern Ireland Ambulance Service nor any of the other emergency agencies would answer that request, and he indicated that it would reflect very badly on me if they did. I believe that that was yet another example of the undue pressure that DCAL is exerting on me about Casement Park. Further, I believe that it was at DCAL's request that a decision has been made to remove me as the chair of the Casement Park STG.

Following the issue of a protected disclosure and grievance proceedings, an independent investigator was appointed. The outcome of the investigations, which was communicated to me on 10 March 2015, ruled in favour of Laura Strong and me. I enclose a copy of the investigator's report for the Committee's attention.

On 10 March 2015, some four months after raising my protected disclosure, my employer, Sport Northern Ireland, acknowledged that the issues that I raised about Casement amounted to a protected disclosure. I enclose for the Committee's attention a copy of the letter from the board, as it shows how it intended to take the matter forward. I wrote to it on 8 April 2015. My suggestion was that Sport NI should prepare a briefing paper for the CAL Committee, and for the Committee's attention, I enclose a copy of that letter from me to the board.

Finally, I am very glad to have this opportunity to voice my concerns before the Committee today. With potential health and safety issues to the public at stake, this is not a matter that should be overlooked or comprised on. Whilst I accept that the probability of an incident, together with a full capacity attendance at Casement Park is low, should such an incident occur, the potential consequences for spectators' safety is huge, and any reasonable person with an open mind to the issue would see them. I say that in the light of the present Hillsborough inquiry.

Only yesterday, we were advised that the terms of reference for the safety technical group are to be implemented. That will involve me being removed as the chair and a DCAL appointee replacing me. The committee will have several DCAL appointees on it, and measures will be put in place so that freedom of information requests cannot be aired.

Mr Dunne: That sounds good.

Mr Scott: Bear in mind that it was through a freedom of information request that the Committee learned of the issues.

Thank you very much for your patience. I appreciate that my presentation was maybe longer than you had hoped and that I included quite a lot in it.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We will go to questions. A number of members have their names down for questions. There was reference to the bundle of papers, which we have a copy of, and the various documents that are in it. It would be helpful if you could confirm afterwards that everything and all the documents that you referred to are in the bundle. I am sure that they are, but —

Mr Scott: No. Two or three documents are not. It was late last night that we were going through it. I can supply the documents that are not there within a relatively short period, but 95% of the documents are there.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I am sure that all members appreciate that, with the issues with Windsor Park and the difficulties there, as well as with all the other issues that there are in the field, there is a tremendous pressure on time. We welcome what you have done.

Mr Ó hOisín: I am conscious that, as other members already expressed, this is an ongoing process. We have received information today that we have not had before. Of course, other parties have yet to do a presentation to us. I am very cognisant of all that. Even in the bundle that was referred to, there are documents that are not in it. I think that this is a process that we have to be incredibly careful about. We do not want to stray into ground that should not be strayed into, which I believe has maybe happened thus far today. I had a number of questions, but I am going to hold on to them. I want to see a fuller picture, rather than go into some of the stuff here that may be taken out of context when we are not working with the entirety of the information.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): That is fine. We can ask questions again on some other occasion.

Mrs McKevitt: I am similar to Cathal. At the beginning of the meeting, by your own admission, you said that you had only a week to prepare. It is not too often that one individual attends the Committee; they are usually accompanied by others. If that has put any additional pressure on you, that is something that we, as a Committee, need to look at.

We have only just got this information. Thanks very much for it. At the beginning, you gave your whole history, which is quite plausible. I am just a layperson sitting on the Committee; I know very little about health and safety. You said that you worked for Sport NI and that you are the current chair of the STG. Are you here as the chair of the STG? Are you here for Sport NI? What capacity are you here in?

Mr Scott: I am here as the chair of the STG, but I am also mindful that I am a Sport NI employee. As I said, I am the manager of the safety compliance unit, so it is a bit of a chicken and egg.

Mrs McKevitt: As Cathal was saying, we have not had an opportunity for clarification. Are all the views expressed here the views of the entire STG corporate body?

Mr Scott: Yes.

Mrs McKevitt: That is fair enough.

There was some talk in the press about the seating capacity of Casement Park. Could you give me Casement's previous seating capacity?

Mr Scott: There were proposals for 42,500 and then 40,000. That was way back in 2009, during the outline business case.

Mrs McKevitt: No, sorry. Before this, what could Casement hold? What was the number?

Mr Scott: Could hold or could safely hold?

Mrs McKevitt: Safely hold. When you build a house, you have building regulations to follow. It is similar to safety regulations when you are building a stadium. Before the proposals came in, Casement Park was there.

Mr Scott: It was.

Mrs McKevitt: OK. What was the number that could exit Casement safely then?

Mr Scott: It had a capacity of 32,500 —

Mr Scott: — but there were significant differences. At that time, as I said, the guidance that was used indicated that 109 people could pass a given point in a minute, as opposed to 82, which is more than a 20% decrease. In addition, it was largely in the open air. There was a stand with approximately 1,500 seats, but the rest was open air with wide concourses so that the people making their way to those concourses in the open air were in a relatively safer situation than if they were in a concourse enclosed by two walls and a roof above them.

Mrs McKevitt: OK. So, previous to 2009, 32,500 were seen to gain access to and exit Casement safely.

Mr Scott: No. I could be wrong, but I believe that the biggest attendance was 24,000 for a Cavan v Down match some years ago.

Mrs McKevitt: OK. Another one —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Just to clarify, my understanding is that you can have a ground that has seating capacity for 10,000 people but that the certificate might say only 8,000.

Mr Scott: Indeed. You look at the entrancing capacity, the holding capacity or the number of seats or standing places, the exiting capacity and the emergency exiting capacity. The lowest of those four forms the baseline.

Mrs McKevitt: I hope that I have not lost my train of thought. I live in County Down, and I am a Down supporter. I think you will find that in 1994 there were 41,000 in Casement for the Down v Derry game, but I stand to be corrected. I would just like to point that out. It was the last time we won the All-Ireland.

Mr Cree: Who won it?

Mrs McKevitt: Down won it that year.

Mr Scott: Knowing the areas available, etc, I think that that figure may be optimistic.

Mrs McKevitt: What did the safety certificate state could enter and exit at that time?

Mr Scott: Thirty two and a half thousand, as per the open nature of the site.

Mrs McKevitt: So, are we saying today that that was wrong? It is like saying 14,000 to 18,000 in your —

Mr Scott: Not at all, because —

Mrs McKevitt: What is the difference?

Mr Scott: There are several requirements. You have to reach a place of relative safety within an eight-minute period. That can be outside the ground, so you may have already exited the venue, or it might be that you are making your way to an exit in an area that does not present a fire risk and that you can keep moving, at that time, at 109 persons per metre per minute. Revised guidance puts us in line with European standards, which means 82 people per metre per minute. So, you are in the open air, and basically you had an outer continuous circle around Casement Park.

The other requirement is that the exit route does not narrow. If we look at the current design proposals, we see that there would have been narrowing in the routes, which would have had an impact on the numbers making their way to the exit. By developing the stadium, you introduce a lot of good things, but not everything is better, because you are now inside and not in the open air.

Mrs McKevitt: OK. Before we receive the bundle and what you referred to in your presentation, are they minutes that have been passed by the group, are they notes, or is it a mixture?

Mr Scott: They are meeting notes, except for the last meeting. After DCAL requested all the meeting notes prior to the judicial review, it advised that it wanted minutes as soon as the meetings were over.

Mrs McKevitt: So, the meeting notes have been signed off by the full safety group.

Mr Scott: Yes. However, as I explained, we act in response to drawings. We make notes on the drawings at the time. They would be discussed very briefly, to be perfectly honest, at the start of the next meeting, because they were on a design that was no longer operative. We now had a new design, so the bulk of the meeting was spent looking at the new ones because the others were virtually redundant at that point.

Mrs McKevitt: Chair, I do not wish to ask any further questions. I have a suspicion that there will be a variance in what was claimed here today and what others claim. For that reason, I do not wish to pry any further. Thanks very much for your time.

Mr McMullan: Thank you for your presentation. If the Andersonstown Road was closed, how would that sit with the roads outside Ravenhill? Can they —

Mr Scott: At Ravenhill, first of all, we are dealing with a much smaller number; we are dealing with less than half the number.

Mr McMullan: But the exiting time —

Mr Scott: There are three large exits of similar size to different parts of the ground. Therefore, Ravenhill can —

Mr McMullan: Can they exit in eight minutes?

Mr Scott: They can either have exited the ground or be making their way to the exit at a rate of 82 persons per metre per minute in a fire-sterile route.

Mr McMullan: Would you call that relative safety?

Mr Scott: To be perfectly honest, Ravenhill is just about OK. We recommended a fourth emergency exit.

Mr McMullan: So Ravenhill is just borderline.

Mr Scott: Yes, it just about gets in.

Mr McMullan: Would "borderline" be the right word, or is that too strong a word?

Mr Scott: It complies. We would have liked a fourth exit. We were asked whether it was absolutely necessary. We said no, and we were told that it was not happening.

Mr McMullan: So, you have leeway. You would have liked a fourth door, but you were asked whether it was necessary and you did not say that it was, so there is leeway there.

Mr Scott: We are saying that 18,000 people can get out through the existing three exit routes, albeit that there is not a lot of fat. It would not have taken many more —

Mr McMullan: Who asked for the fourth exit?

Mr Scott: Nobody asked for it. We recommended it because it would future-proof the stadium if there were to be —

Mr McMullan: What, in your opinion, is the GAA's safety record in stadiums?

Mr Scott: The GAA puts great store by safety. I have spoken to many committees and worked with many officers who are very safety-orientated.

Mr McMullan: Can you think of any stadium that deviates from your green-and-red code book?

Mr Scott: If a stadium deviates, its capacity would be reduced.

Mr McMullan: Are there any?

Mr Scott: Well, their capacity goes down. Yes, there are deviations: either a stadium operator can show an equal or higher level of safety; or a stadium might have the potential to hold, say, 20,000 people, but its safe capacity is regarded as being, for example, only 17,000. There are many stadia like that.

Mr McMullan: Have none of them been asked to do that?

Mr Scott: I am sorry, will you say that again? I do not understand the question.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): There is some interference with the broadcasting. Presumably, someone's phone is on or something.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): It is not me, I can assure you. I ask that you all switch off your phone.

Mr McMullan: Basil is at it again.

Mr Scott: We were told by one of the designers in a very robust and terse meeting that he was aware of 17 stadia with an emergency exiting capacity in excess of eight minutes.

Mr McMullan: That would be outside the red-and-green book.

Mr Scott: Yes. We asked him to name them, and he advised that he would not name any of the stadia.

Mr McMullan: Let me get this correct: what is the figure that you stated?

Mr Scott: The contractor said that he had built 17 stadia in GB with an emergency exiting capacity well in excess of eight minutes. I asked him to name one, but he refused to name any of them. I then contacted Ruth Shaw, who is the chief executive of the Sports Grounds Safety Authority and asked her whether that was the case. She looked very surprised and said that it had better not be. She then contacted all of her inspectorate. They went round the larger stadia in GB and confirmed that all showed that the eight-minute emergency exiting time could be achieved.

Mr McMullan: Given that, and other questions that I have in mind, I am reluctant to go any further. There are other questions there, but we are in a position now in which we need, I think, to be very careful.

Mr Hilditch: Thanks, Mr Scott, for your presentation today. It has been enlightening, bordering on revelatory, to be honest, because of what we questioned DCAL officials about last week and the answers that we have received this afternoon. It is quite unbelievable, I have to say. This Committee should take cognisance of it and be quite worried about the situation. Chair, Mr Scott has answered a lot of the questions that I had in the very detailed paper that he presented. I know that we have to move on at some stage to try to compare the answers with some of the other information that we have.

In relation to the process and where the STG sat in that, for planning permission to be given for a 38,000-seater stadium, although it went to a judicial review and so on, is it right to say that the safety certificate would not have been anywhere near the total?

Mr Scott: If Belfast City Council followed the content of the Department's own guide — I have no reason to think that it would not — and the advice given to the council certifying officers by Sport Northern Ireland on behalf of DCAL, the safe capacity would have been well, well below the design capacity, yes.

Mr Hilditch: I would like clarity on something: last week, in answer, I think, to a question from me, we were told that it would take five or six incidents in that particular area to cause a problem. I think that you refer to one incident. Is that correct?

Mr Scott: That is one. If you look at Google Earth, you will see that the Andersonstown Road runs along the top of the stadium. Therefore, if there was a serious incident — incidentally, a young student had been knocked down outside Queen's Elms the night before one of the days that the design and build team arrived, and the traffic was chaotic. The police closed that section of the road, as they do as a matter of course. If that were to happen during a big game, the problem would not only be the exits being blocked but possibly the adjoining Owenvarragh and Mooreland roads being blocked. In that case, everybody would be confined in the street outside, with the only way of getting away from the area being to go down towards the slip roads to the roundabout on the M1, which are at the middle of the Google Earth images that you have. It would not take five minutes. With a smaller incident, only part of the exits might be blocked, but that would still take the exiting time to way over eight minutes, and the whole lot could be blocked by, for example, something as simple as a house fire.

The other thing to remember is that the rendezvous point for the emergency services for any incident in that area is marked by the red dot. Can you see that?

Mr Scott: That is the rendezvous point for the emergency services in any type of incident in that area of west Belfast.

Mr Hilditch: Dear me. I questioned officials last week about re-energising the STG. Obviously, looking at this as an independent bystander, that rings alarm bells for me. Is the document that you showed us on what will happen a recent one?

Mr Scott: It arrived with us about lunchtime yesterday.

Mr Hilditch: So any allegations in that document have now happened.

Mr Scott: They are in the process of happening, yes.

Mr Hilditch: Chair, I have asked a number of questions and, potentially, have others, but I think that, at some stage, given the seriousness of the situation, we will probably have to sit as a Committee to discuss how to take it forward. I am sure that others want to ask questions.

Mr B McCrea: A theme running through all of this, Mr Scott, is the suggestion of undue pressure being put on you. Would you like to expand on that?

Mr Scott: My colleague has not been able to come into work. She has been seeing consultants, stress experts etc —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): The one difficulty with that is referring to somebody and their personal circumstances.

Mr Scott: OK. My apologies.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I appreciate that it is done out of sympathy for the individual, but —

Mr Scott: I can comment about myself. I have spent many a sleepless night and am also seeing a stress counsellor. I have worked for Sport Northern Ireland for something like 13 or 14 years and not had a single sick day in that time. I had not even seen a doctor in that period. I have been to my doctor on several occasions because of the sleeplessness and — I was going to say loss of appetite, but, sadly, it is the opposite. I constantly feel hungry and agitated, and I forget things. Some days, there is not a problem. Days and weeks can go by, but when something happened, I —

Mr B McCrea: I understand that there is great pressure. You feel that undue pressure has been put on you.

Mr Scott: Absolutely.

Mr B McCrea: Is anything underlying in this? Did you draw up a memo, or anything to try to summarise this, that is not in members' meeting packs?

Mr Scott: There is the bullying file, for example, which is part —

Mr B McCrea: There is a memo dated around November 2014 that you pulled together about what was going on, and, when that came up, maybe there was an FOI request for that document.

Mr Scott: The major document was done in December —

Mr Scott: — but we had spoken, too. I have never been involved in anything like this stress situation. Bizarrely, even in the big concerts or events that I have managed, I do not feel stressed because I know that I have the backing of those who should be supporting you. Here, I feel very isolated and very alone.

Mr B McCrea: I understand that that is your concern, and we are sympathetic to any personal circumstances, but the document in your submission does not miss certain people and hit the wall — it is fairly forthright. As Mr Hilditch said, it is really useful that we get to hear this information. I want to tease out with you whether you had any interactions with other people, such as the residents' committee or anything like that.

Mr Scott: The residents put in an FOI request prior to the judicial review. However, Sport NI talked to DCAL and was advised that the information was DCAL's and the residents could not obtain it. The residents subsequently sought a meeting with me and my director and asked about the content of the green-and-red guide. They specifically did not reference any stadium anywhere; they asked only about flow rates.

Mr B McCrea: If you were having meetings with residents, would it be normal for you to inform people —

Mr Scott: We do not meet residents; we deal primarily with the major stakeholders — fire, police, ambulance, district councils, the clubs and governing bodies. It would be very unusual for us to meet residents.

Mr B McCrea: OK, and, if you did, would you take a note or open a file and let people know?

Mr Scott: Yes.

Mr B McCrea: That would be the case.

I have a final question. Like Mr Hilditch, I could come back with more, but others want to ask you questions. There was some discussion, when we were hearing from the Department, about the safety certificate process being separate from the planning process. In fact, I think that they told us that the stadium at Ravenhill got its safety certificate only a few days before —

Mr Scott: Indeed, and that is correct, but we were working with Ravenhill and DCAL throughout that process. We could always see, with Ravenhill and, latterly, Windsor Park, how the entrancing, holding capacity, exiting capacity and emergency exiting capacity could be achieved.

Mr B McCrea: Your concern with Casement is that you thought that that could not be achieved in the future.

Mr Scott: For over a year, we have been asking for proposals. We cannot see how it can be achieved. That does not mean that it cannot be, but there are some people who are very experienced in looking at stadia. In addition, we, of course, would not show architects' drawings to people from the Sports Grounds Safety Authority or the Core Cities Group, but we showed them schematics and asked what they thought. To a man, or lady, all said that this just would not be allowed in Great Britain because, if this structure were built, its capacity would be so far below the design capacity.

Mr B McCrea: I will finish by saying that we have built up a picture of what is going on piece by piece —

Mr Scott: Surely.

Mr B McCrea: — so we have more of an idea over the past two or three meetings.

On a personal basis, I appreciate that you have come forward to inform us. Regardless of how things work out, it is good to understand what issues are at stake, and we will certainly go through those.

Mr Scott: If members want a talk on flow rates, I am more than happy to give that.

Mr B McCrea: I am quite sure that the Chair will have another session. We have only this information, so we will want more, but this is very useful.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): In fairness, today has been helpful, even the short part of the presentation that focused on the issue of flow rates. For those of us who have no technical knowledge, which applies, I think, to most members of the Committee —

Mr Cree: I do not know about that.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I will speak for myself. At least we have some understanding now of the sorts of factors that feed into whether a ground is compliant, and that has been very helpful.

Mr Humphrey: Mr Scott, thanks for your presentation, which raises more questions than answers, quite frankly. Mr Scott, why were you appointed chair of the STG?

Mr Scott: First, my background is as a health and safety inspector who was seconded to prepare for government a document on the legislative controls that are in place at present in Northern Ireland. I was initially seconded to Sport Northern Ireland and then given a full-time post. I was a health and safety inspector who was seconded for a day a week, then a couple of days a week and, finally, became a full-time employee. I was then looking after the safety compliance unit, although it was called the overseeing body. It was called a variety of names, but it is now called the safety compliance unit.

Mr Humphrey: Who appointed you?

Mr Scott: I was asked by Noel Molloy, the stadia director for DCAL at the time.

Mr Humphrey: The paper before us refers to a consultant who was involved in drafting the outline business case and is willing to come to the Committee. May I ask who that consultant is?

Mr Scott: I can give you a name, if the Chair is happy for me to do so.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): If the person is happy to be named —

Mr Scott: His name is Mark Watters, although he is not the Watters of McClure Watters.

Mr Humphrey: Your paper states:

"Initially DCAL attended the STG meetings as observers. However in and around the spring of 2013 DCAL indicated that they no longer wish to attend."

Why do you think that was?

Mr Scott: DCAL would have to answer that, but, at that time, DCAL was hearing a lot of things that it did not want —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We can put that to DCAL.

Mr Humphrey: Having looked at the minutes of your organisation from 23 June last year, I see, Mr Scott, that you joined the meeting for the agenda item under the heading "Presentation on Sport Northern Ireland input into the Stadium Programme". You then addressed the meeting. It is agreed in your minutes, it is on the Sport NI website and is public knowledge that:

"Members noted that there are some challenges on the design aspect of Casement which centred on emergency exiting. Board members noted that DCAL have been made aware of the issues.

Following in-depth discussion on Casement it was agreed that:
Members would be kept informed of developments ... The Board are supportive of Sport Northern Ireland advice in relation to Casement, as presented by staff".

Was that the advice that you gave at that point in the meeting?

Mr Scott: I gave advice. I was told that I had to stick to the issues regarding exiting in an emergency. We were not to get into anything else. I gave a presentation to the board, the board made a couple of comments, and I then left the meeting.

Mr Humphrey: The final point in the minutes was the agreement that:

"Consideration of Casement issue as a corporate risk, taking into account the specific advice and role of Sport Northern Ireland".

The fact that this was agreed by the board following your presentation gives rise to a number of questions that cause me concern. They are the cause of concern not just for the Committee but in terms of health and safety, which is what we are talking about here. As Mr Hilditch identified, it is 25 years after the disaster that was Hillsborough and only weeks after a potential disaster at Windsor Park, so this is hugely important to how things are taken forward. I think that you made this point earlier: rather than hoping, let us deal with the facts in order to provide the safest accommodation for the patrons who pay to watch Gaelic sports or, indeed, any concerts that may be held in the venue.

Mr Scott: This venue is funded substantively by public money. That puts a greater onus on us to make sure that we get it right and in accordance with the Department's guidance.

Mr Humphrey: I asked last week whether there were one or three safety technical groups.

Mr Scott: There are three.

Mr Humphrey: I think that the Committee was told that there was one.

Mr Scott: That is correct.

Mr Humphrey: But there are three.

Mr Scott: There are three.

Mr Humphrey: DCAL officials did not know that there were three.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): He cannot comment on that. You are comparing what was said last week with what is being said this week. That is fine.

Mr Scott: The reason was that, at that time, the police had two districts in Belfast: east and south, where Windsor Park and Ravenhill are located; and west and north, where Casement Park is located. Also, we invited safety representatives from the stadia and could not have someone from Ravenhill commenting on Windsor Park or vice versa.

Mr Humphrey: The deputy permanent secretary mentioned the re-energising of the safety technical groups last week. I have to say that I am appalled to hear that there will be a new make-up, which seems to have a weighted majority in favour of DCAL officials. I am shocked at the level of secrecy that seems to surround it. That worries me, not least because minutes and papers that we have asked for as a Committee have been redacted by the Department, yet others who have asked for those same documents from, for example, Belfast City Council —

The Committee Clerk: The only redactions to the minutes in the tabled papers are the names of clerical staff who passed things on and are not germane at all, and of individuals who were on the committee but who have now retired from service and asked not to be identified. That was not necessarily the Department's choice.

Mr Humphrey: I welcome that clarification, but —

The Committee Clerk: The previous ones that we had were redacted, but not these.

Mr Humphrey: I should point out, Chair, that the people serving on these committees represent public bodies and are public servants or civil servants. I do not understand why those names should be redacted. When Belfast City Council put them into the public domain, it did not do that.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): For clarification: when minutes were put out from Belfast City Council —

The Committee Clerk: Are you talking about minutes generally?

Mr Humphrey: No. I am talking about minutes relating to this issue.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We will check that out.

Mr Humphrey: We have heard what you said about the re-energising of the STG, so do you believe, Mr Scott, that you are being sidelined?

Mr Scott: Sidelined and gagged.

Mr McMullan: Chair, that is very —

Mr Hilditch: Gagged — is he not allowed to say that, Chair?

Mr McMullan: That is not giving protection to the Committee.

Mr Hilditch: The document is there.

Mr McMullan: Chair, a line has to be drawn somewhere.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): There are a couple of points.

Mr Humphrey: With respect, Chair, no such criticism was raised last week when I asked civil servants whether they were being politically pressurised. No such query or question was issued from across the way.

Mr McMullan: The reason for that was that we have a different scenario today. There are statements in this report today that were not there last week, and, dare I say it, we are in a different —

Mr Humphrey: Chair, I will deal with what is in front of me. I did not have this paper last week.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): First, in response to Oliver McMullan, an account was given last week; another account has been given this week.

Mr McMullan: I understand that, Chair.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We will have to look at both accounts and then draw conclusions accordingly.

Mr McMullan: My point goes back to page 12 of the submission. I ask Mr Humphrey to look at page 12, which is totally different from last week. I refer to the wording in paragraph 53.

Mr Humphrey: I asked searching questions of the civil servants last week, and that is what I intend to do today. Members have had an opportunity to ask questions and may well wish to ask further questions. I have a question on paragraph 45, which states:

"Pressure from both the GAA and DCAL has been applied to me and another Sport NI representative".

Are you referring to the lady who is off with stress?

Mr Scott: Indeed.

Mr Humphrey: It goes on to say:

"A copy of the Interim Report was returned by email with a number of comments made by senior members of the Stadium Team at DCAL including: 'suggests full capacity may not be possible ... '"

What do you take from the comment that you have drawn attention to.

Mr Scott: I took it as an attempt at coercion.

Mr Humphrey: That you were being pressurised.

Mr Scott: Being pressurised into signing off something that we were singularly uncomfortable with.

Mr Humphrey: That is exactly how I read it too.

Mr Scott: Incidentally, one of the gentlemen, who has since left DCAL, sent me a text more or less apologising for his behaviour at some of the meetings. I can provide a copy of that text.

Mr Humphrey: Who is the programme director whom you mention by position in paragraph 50?

Mr Scott: That was Noel Molloy.

Mr Humphrey: Who has since left the post.

Mr Scott: He subsequently left as well.

Mr Humphrey: Although there are many more questions to be asked, my final one is about appendix A, which is an explanatory note. It is on page 12 of our tabled pack. It refers to actions agreed at a meeting on Friday 12 December 2015 of DCAL and Sport NI. It lists the people who were present. Why were you not present at that meeting if you are the chair of the STG?

Mr Scott: Is this the meeting on 12 December?

Mr Humphrey: Yes, the meeting on 12 December 2015.

Mr Scott: Hopefully, it is 2014.

Mr Humphrey: It says here:

"Actions agreed at meeting of Friday 12th December 2015 of DCAL & Sport NI".

Mr Scott: That should be 12 December 2014. Sorry, it is one of the —

Mr Humphrey: For the record, is it 2014?

Mr Scott: Yes.

Mr Humphrey: OK. The question remains the same. Why were you not at that meeting?

Mr Scott: Our chief executive advised that she was going to challenge DCAL on the allegations of bullying. She asked me to prepare —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Stop there, because we could get into difficult territory.

Mr Humphrey: I agree with what Ms McCorley said earlier. We have been presented with a mountain of paper today, and we have touched only the edge of the issue. More meetings and in-depth discussions are required on the "bundle", as Mr Scott referred to it. We need to go through the bundle, and we may need to bring Mr Scott back at some point.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): There is a general view across the Committee that there are issues and matters that need to be addressed. That will be done at another meeting. I accept that entirely.

Mr Dunne: Thank you, Mr Scott, for coming in. We all commend you for your courage, openness and transparency about what has gone on. We on this side of the room certainly appreciate what you have done. We are here to see that there is openness, accountability, honesty and truth in the business that is done here. We want to see it carried through.

You are aware of project management. Can you confirm who the project manager is for this project?

Mr Scott: That is DCAL and the contractors.

Mr Dunne: That is not clear.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): It is outside his remit.

Mr Dunne: It is outside your remit.

Were you not brought in as part of the project team? Would it not have been important that the safety group was brought in at the early stages of the design?

Mr Scott: It would have been useful. In many ways, DCAL was getting safety advice from the safety technical group. After concerns were expressed, we were invited to the project steering group, but we had to sit outside and were brought in for a short period. Generally, those meetings were fairly confrontational. We would state that we had concerns about the safety design. It was fairly robust. We were told repeatedly that we were holding back the project and that, for example, the police may change their mind and leave us isolated and we would then be dismissed.

There is also a body called the project sponsor board, which our chief executive attended. Before her first meeting in December 2013, she asked for a report, and that was the last time that she required information before attending one of the meetings. We have been endeavouring to get the minutes of those meetings and, after many, many requests, we still have not got them. We are concerned that the safety issues were not being properly —

Mr Dunne: It is my understanding that a public project like that, where public money is involved and where the safety — In fact, in most projects that I have been involved in, an integrated project team is put in place right at the start that brings in all the parties involved. Obviously, safety will be part of that. The safety group that you were part of should have been, in my understanding, involved right from the design and the concept of the project. Are you satisfied that that has not been the case? And have you felt isolated, almost?

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Sorry, just pause. Cathal?

Mr Ó hOisín: No, go ahead. I am just indicating.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Sorry, I thought that it was something else.

Mr Dunne: You indicated that you felt isolated and have been left out, not included, and certainly not part of a project team. Is it fair to say that?

Mr Scott: First, I need to differentiate. Sometimes, the health and safety aspect is to do with health and safety on the site while the project is being built. Our remit was spectator safety.

Mr Dunne: So it was important that you were in there at the design stage.

Mr Scott: Indeed, yes.

Mr Dunne: And you feel that you were not.

Mr Scott: Well, we were, but we were passing —

Mr Dunne: Not fully integrated.

Mr Scott: We were giving comment.

Mr Dunne: But not accepted.

Mr Scott: Not accepted.

Mr Dunne: You were not part of any integrated team. Finally, the plans went through, got planning permission and were then rejected through the courts. Is it fair to say that they were not signed off by the safety technical group at any stage?

Mr Scott: Not at all. No.

Mr Dunne: Thank you very much. We appreciate the work that you have put into today, and we will certainly do our best to fully investigate all the issues that you have raised. Personally, I think that you are very courageous, and I hope that you are successful, treated properly and equally, and that business is done in such a manner, because it is important that it is and that we see transparency and openness carried out in every Department that the Assembly is responsible for.

Ms McCorley: Go raibh maith agat, a Cathaoirligh. Thanks very much for the presentation. I would just like to say that, on this side of the table, we are equally interested in openness and transparency.

Mr Dunne: That is new.

Ms McCorley: What is new?

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): No. We will leave that.

Ms McCorley: You might not know too much about that.

I am an MLA for West Belfast and Casement is in my area, so I am hugely concerned about safety issues. I would like to see standards upheld. That is a given.

Mr Scott: We are supportive of a good stadium for the GAA. We want a good stadium, but we want a safe stadium where GAA spectators are not placed at risk.

Ms McCorley: Are your views reflective of the STG in its entirety? Reading through some of the paperwork, there are notes that did not seem to reach the standard as minutes. There were inaccuracies and people there who —

Mr Scott: Yes, there was an inaccuracy.

Ms McCorley: It was a wee bit difficult to detect authority from them.

Mr Scott: Sure. As I said earlier, the notes were at a period in time. We commented on these drawings, they went to DCAL and the design consultants and then came back to us. We then held a meeting, but the notes were then irrelevant because we had a new design to discuss.

Ms McCorley: That is something that occurred to me. I wondered whether those were your views or the views of the whole group.

Mr Scott: The views of the group.

Ms McCorley: The views of the whole group?

Mr Scott: The views of the group.

Ms McCorley: That is OK.

Mr Scott: There would have been differences from time to time and discussions, but that was the emerging consensus in the group.

Ms McCorley: OK. When you were talking about possible scenarios when an emergency might arise, you said that it could be as simple as a house fire. Describe how a house fire might affect all the exits.

Mr Scott: Looking at the Google Earth map, if there is a house fire here, the Fire and Rescue Service will come and endeavour to extinguish the flames and rescue anybody. They cannot have what would be effectively 27,000 people going through a major incident scene. That just will not happen.

Ms McCorley: If, say, it was in Mooreland, it might affect Mooreland.

Mr Scott: Absolutely. If it was over here, you might be able to exit half, but that still means an emergency exiting time of in excess of eight minutes. It will not be as bad as 29 minutes, which one set of consultants said, but it might be 15 minutes. Eight minutes has been fairly accurately — It is a universal figure when it comes to the point at which people panic. The tipping point seems to be around eight minutes. Even if it goes to 11 minutes, in those situations a minute is a very long time.

Ms McCorley: So if an emergency occurred somewhere else, like Ravenhill —

Mr Scott: We believe that the stadium could be safely exited using the other two exits.

Ms McCorley: Right, and you are sure of that? So if some incident happened somewhere that affected that — You were talking about all three exits being affected here. If all the exits were affected at Ravenhill, could it —

Mr Scott: No, just one exit; just one exit block. At Ravenhill, you have three exits at separate locations. Indeed, there are four exits actually, at separate locations, although two of them are quite adjacent. If there were an incident at one of those, we believe that the other two exits would enable the stadium to be emergency exited in safety.

Ms McCorley: Who signs off on the certificates?

Mr Scott: Which certificates, sorry?

Ms McCorley: The safety certificates.

Mr Scott: The safety certificates are drafted and issued by Belfast City Council, but they are based on the information contained in the red guide and on guidance material issued by Sport Northern Ireland on behalf of DCAL.

Ms McCorley: OK, so that is where the final decision would be made.

Mr Scott: That is where the final decision would be made. If we had concerns about the terms and conditions on the safety certificate, that would be referred by us to DCAL.

Ms McCorley: OK. As other people have said, a huge amount of information has arrived with us today.

Mr Scott: My apologies. I really only knew on Friday that I might be called. I think the actual invitation only arrived — I have been trying to get as much information for the members as I could. I think some of it is reflected in typos and in referring to 12 December 2015. Quite a lot of midnight oil was being burned.

Ms McCorley: From our point of view, there is still an awful lot of reading and absorption to happen.

Mr Scott: Absolutely.

Ms McCorley: Something struck me when you made reference to Hillsborough. That was a most tragic event, but that was due to somebody closing a gate. It was a human error.

Mr Scott: No, opening a gate. There were several aspects to the Hillsborough disaster. First and most important was the bad design of the stadium. There was a back-loaded terrace at Leppings Lane that was subdivided into pens, and then there was an outer gate. There was no way of getting onto the pitch from the Leppings Lane terrace because, at that time, the big focus was on security and, unfortunately, some soccer fans' poor behaviour. Therefore, people died because they were crushed, albeit that a gate was opened and there were a lot of other aspects to it.

Here, if we did have an incident and there was panic and people tried to exit the two small exits, there would be crushing. Panic and crushing are maybe more of a problem than the fire, the suspect device, the gas leak or whatever it may happen to be. The people who would suffer particularly are the elderly, children and ladies. GAA matches are very much family affairs.

There are other aspects to remember. A stadium in England, say the Emirates, which is Arsenal Football Club's stadium, has a capacity of 60,000. At every match, there will be, give or take, 60,000 people. More importantly, probably about 70% of the audience will be regulars at Highbury. All of the stewards who work at Highbury — sorry, the Emirates; Highbury was the former ground of Arsenal; my apologies — and all the safety personnel are very familiar with the layout, and the majority of the patrons are very familiar with the layout. If there is an Ulster final here, potentially we will have different teams each year, so many people will be strangers to the area and to the new Casement Park, which is a complex and big stadium holding 38,000. I know that there are bigger stadiums in GB, but 38,000 is a big, big stadium. Many of the people who will go there will be going for the first time, and many of the safety personnel will be drafted in from Fermanagh, Down or wherever. It is not feasible that the number of stewards needed would be provided by the Antrim board. As with the championship matches that the GAA runs, and runs very well, the stewards come from various counties.

Ms McCorley: Would you not agree that, when you walk out of an exit, you go right or left usually, and if there is need, there is signposting? I am not familiar with Croke Park, but when I come out of it, the signposting is very clear.

Mr Scott: It is important that there is good signage, and that helps. PA announcements will also help. However, not everybody follows the signs; not everybody follows the PA announcements, and that is when the problems arise.

Ms McCorley: I have a different experience. I find that people all herd together and tend to move —

Mr Scott: OK. And that is fine, as long as the leader of the herd is going in the right direction.

Ms McCorley: Well, if the signposting is good — I do not see that as a major point.

Mr Scott: I think that unfamiliarity certainly plays a part, particularly when it comes to where people are parked. Even somebody making a decision about where they are parked — this way or that way — can take two, three or four seconds, and if enough people do that, it causes a backup.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): It has been brought to my attention that there is a website named www.casementpark.ie. From the way in which it has been put together, it looks as though it is the responsibility of the GAA. It is about personnel; it tells you everybody who is on the project board and everybody who is on all the different committees and subcommittees, and one thing and another. After the meeting, if you are trying to get your head around all the different groups that seem to be involved with sponsor boards and steering groups, some of the information is on that website. It tells you the various functions, objectives and so on. I mention it as it might be helpful for information purposes. I had not seen it before.

Ms McCorley: I am just on the last bit. What is your current role, Paul?

Mr Scott: I am still the manager of the safety compliance unit at Sport NI. I do not know what my role is at present with the safety technical group.

Ms McCorley: And your other remits? You do private work as well.

Mr Scott: I do some private work, yes.

Ms McCorley: Who do you do that for?

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I do not think that his private life, his private business, is for this Committee.

Ms McCorley: I am just conscious that you do private work with Belfast City Council.

Ms McCorley: I am just trying to say this: do you think that there might be a conflict of interest?

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Sorry, no. Sorry, Rosie. We are dealing here with difficult issues, and I have had to be quite firm on some points with people. When it comes to someone's private life and what they do outside, I could go round everybody here and ask them what they do in their private life.

Ms McCorley: Chair, it was in the context that Belfast City Council issues the safety certificates.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I am sure that Belfast City Council behaved absolutely properly.

Mr Humphrey: I am sure that the member is not in any way trying to impugn the integrity of the witness in front of the Committee.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I am sure that that is not the case.

Ms McCorley: Of course I am not.

Mr B McCrea: Hold on a tick. Chair, I do not think that it is an inappropriate question. It is OK to ask the question, and Mr Scott can come back and explain what his position is. If there is no conflict of interest, he will just say that there is no conflict of interest.

Mr Scott: Let us take a non-sporting event. I do some work for Belfast City Council's events unit. If there is a sporting event, however, I do that on behalf of Sport Northern Ireland. For example, I worked on the Carl Frampton fight and the Giro d'Italia through Sport Northern Ireland. Yes, you are working all weekend and we do get an enhanced rate of pay, but we do not get overtime. Where there is a conflict, as with the boxing, I declared to Barry McGuigan that I was more than happy to help him but that I could not be involved unless Sport NI approved it. Working for Sport NI, no money changes hands.

If it is something like the Tall Ships, which has no sporting context at all, I will take leave or work in the evenings, and do that work. I find that Sport Northern Ireland has benefited from my experience because each event you do adds to your experience and knowledge. Likewise, the stuff I learn with Sport Northern Ireland helps as a reciprocal thing. But, no, I would not and have not worked in a private capacity at a sporting event in Northern Ireland.

Ms McCorley: Thank you. It was a valid question.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): It was interesting the way the thing unfolded. This is obviously a very specialised field. There must be a very small number of people in Northern Ireland with —

Mr Scott: There are very few anoraks.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Yes. You used a word that —

Mr Scott: There are very few of us anoraks in all of Ireland. It is a fairly specialist role. In all of Ireland there is a relatively small number of people. I also get asked to work at Slane Castle and various events in Southern Ireland. If it is a sporting event, I say no, I cannot do it. They can, however, ask my employers and, if they say yes, I do it. There is no payment and I am happy to do that, and I have done it.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): That is fine. In response to Rosie McCorley, yes, in the end, it was helpful to get the thing clarified.

Ms McCorley: Of course.

Mr Cree: Good afternoon. I also want to thank you for the report. A lot of work has gone into it, and you are clearly under a lot of stress. We appreciate that, and there is a lot of information. You have raised very serious issues and, obviously, the Committee will take some time to get behind that, and we have other papers to look at. It is a pity, though, that you got involved in some dealings on the likes of anecdotal examples earlier on with some members of the Committee instead of sticking purely to the facts.

Mr Scott: OK, sorry, which —

Mr Cree: You were talking with Mr McMullan about what may or may not have happened or what may or may not have happened in another case. You also had some equivocation about the actual sizes of entrances and exits at Casement Park. I would like you to state clearly that there is no compromise in this situation: you either comply with the guide rules and regulations or you do not. Is that true?

Mr Scott: You either comply or, if you do not comply, you may get the safe capacity of your venue reduced.

For example, in theory, your stadium may be able to hold 10,000, but, if you do not have enough exits, the safety certificate will say 8,000, but you will still have a safety certificate.

Mr Cree: There is no equivocation on the numbers. That is the point I wanted to hear from you. You cannot say it is nearly right; it either complies or it does not.

Mr Scott: Yes, but you — Yes.

Mr Cree: That is what I would expect. Thank you.

Mrs McKevitt: I forgot to ask something in the first round of questions about the business case. When it was submitted — either of them — was health and safety part of either business case or does that come after?

Mr Scott: I am not an expert at all on business cases. I was brought in for some meetings and parts of some meetings and was asked to give views on the ability of the site at the old Casement Park to accommodate a stadium for approximately 40,000 people.

Mrs McKevitt: So you do not know if health and safety is part of the business case, because I do not.

Mr Scott: In the business case itself, there are —

Mrs McKevitt: Which one?

Mr Scott: The one for the three stadia.

Mr Scott: As I said, I gave evidence. I have heard it said that I approved the 40,000 site. That amazes me; I do not know where that came from. However, it does show that I raised the issue of exiting and emergency exiting. That is annotated in the outline business case. Indeed, one of the authors of the business case will advise that he clearly remembers me rattling on about exiting and emergency exiting.

Mr Scott: The site is big enough, but getting out of it is the problem.

Mrs McKevitt: So health and safety is part of the business case.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): That was an outline business case.

Mrs McKevitt: An outline business case. OK.

Mr Scott: The first time I saw this was probably in August of last year.

Mrs McKevitt: Saw the business case?

Mr Scott: Yes. I would have no reason to see it. I went and gave my advice. The business case then moved from Sport NI to DCAL, was accepted and, I think, was signed off by DFP on the advice of DCAL. I am not an expert on business cases. Hopefully, I know a little bit about exiting and emergency exiting flow etc. There are some things that I am —

Mrs McKevitt: OK. The eight-minute rule that is in the red and green book: where does that come from? I were to call an ambulance, it would have a response time of eight minutes. I know that, a lot of the time, that is not met. Most of the time it is, thank God, but when you are in a situation that is an emergency, which is what you are concerned about happening at Casement, where does that eight-minute guideline come from?

Mr Scott: Initially, it came from the then Football Licensing Authority, now the Sports Grounds Safety Authority. It is based on observations at events, concerts, football matches, rugby matches etc, as well as work on crowd modelling on the London Underground. Essentially, after eight minutes, people start to panic. Usually, up to eight minutes, they may be getting a wee bit anxious, but somewhere in and around eight minutes the average person starts to panic and may behave in a manner that you would hope they would not behave in. That is where the figure comes from.

Mrs McKevitt: What about in an emergency situation? That is guidance given for people leaving safely.

Mr Scott: That is for people in a stadium that is composed of concrete and steel and where there is perceived to be a very low fire risk. Where the fire risk is medium, I think it is six minutes, and 2·5 minutes where there is, for example, a wooden stand like the old Bradford stand. All stadia now are designed to be a low fire risk, thus the eight-minute figure. It is reviewed from time to time when the green guide is issued, and it will be reviewed when they are doing the sixth edition of the green guide. However, eight minutes seems to have stood the test of time.

Mrs McKevitt: Is there any variation on the figure of eight minutes in an emergency situation?

Mr Scott: No.

Mrs McKevitt: No, it is eight minutes and that is it. I am thinking about unforeseen circumstances, such as an accident. To refer back to your Google Earth picture, if anything unforeseen were to happen when that stadium is full, is there a variation in being able to hold people back because it is safer?

Mr Scott: No, absolutely not.

Mrs McKevitt: I am not talking about inside the stadium. If there were a bomb scare on one side, holding people back, what about the other side? I am just trying to get my head around it.

Mr Scott: Yes. What you are trying to do is to get people to a place of reasonable safety. You want to do that within an eight-minute period. It is fully accepted that, because of the construction of many of our stadia and, for example, fire spread, there will be a fire rating of probably an hour or more. The fire, then, will not be the problem; it will be the panic and the crushing that results from panic. That is where the eight minutes comes from. Where there is a higher fire risk, the actual fire risk takes over from the eight minutes, and thus you get a figure of two and a half minutes, or six where the risk is deemed medium.

Mr Ó hOisín: My reticence earlier to ask any questions was based on what I view to be some of the quite subjective views that we have heard today. Without the benefit of the views of others who are involved, there were some allegations about the reluctance to purchase land, political pressure, bullying and all the rest of it. That was why I was reticent about asking questions earlier.

Maybe you have clarified this for Mrs McKevitt, but did you have any sight, input, act or part in the inclusion of the initial figure of 42,000 in the original business case in 2012?

Mr Scott: No. Various figures were discussed, and the figure of 40,000 came from a strategy document from the GAA, which hoped that, including Casement Park, there would be a stadium holding 40,000 in each of the four provinces. The GAA showed at the time that, from an economic point of view, that was a sustainable capacity. I was asked at the time whether a 40,000-seater stadium or even a 42,000-seater stadium would fit into that site. The answer is yes it will, but the problem is not the stadium; it is in the exiting, emergency exiting and in being able to get people away in a suitable time in the case of an emergency.

If there is not an emergency, everybody in that stadium should — I say "should", but never say never — be able to be in a place of reasonable safety within eight minutes, going out onto the Andersonstown Road. Even if there were an emergency at either of the side exits, it would not really be a problem because there is enough slack in the system to get everybody away. That applies to both Owenvarragh and Mooreland.

However, if the problem is on the Andersonstown Road — it is good practice to evacuate away from the emergency, not towards it — we will have problems. Those problems would be alleviated somewhat, but not fully addressed, if we were to utilise our estimates of emergency exiting from in or around 16,000 or 17,000, possibly up to 23,000, if there is appropriate internal design, but we cannot really say because we have not seen an emergency exiting strategy. We have asked for it, but have never been able to get one.

Mr Ó hOisín: You told the Committee that, in your opinion, there was a reluctance to purchase land, which may have accommodated that.

Mr Scott: Some of the drawings prepared by Populous showed land being purchased, houses giving up some of their gardens and, in some cases, being demolished, but you also have to consider where people go when you get them out of the ground. Again, I refer you to the Google Earth picture. If the problem is severe enough on this part of the Andersonstown Road, they will all be stuck in the Owenvarragh region or down at Mooreland, with a relatively small exiting point — I do not know whether you are familiar with the area — just down at the slipway to the M1 motorway.

Of course, by that time the police would have stopped the motorway traffic, but potentially you would have a heck of a lot of people trying to get out of a relatively small space. It is therefore important that we think about more than just the immediate 20 or 30 metres outside the stadium. The people have all got to go somewhere.

Mr Ó hOisín: Chair, I perhaps should have declared at the start that I am a member of the GAA. I want to put that on record. I have been at big matches all over Ireland, and I realise the dynamic of crowds.

Mr Scott: Particularly a GAA crowd, as it is so family-orientated.

Mr Ó hOisín: Can you clarify what the Sports Grounds Safety Authority is? That is the British —

Mr Scott: That is correct. It used to be called the Football Licensing Authority. It was set up after Hillsborough to oversee safety arrangements and is now sought after worldwide. It is at all major tournaments giving advice beforehand to the local organisers —

Mr Ó hOisín: Did you prepare a memo in November 2014 listing issues to do with the work of the STG going back two years? Was that your work or was that an agreed memo from the STG?

Mr Scott: What was the date, sorry?

Mr Ó hOisín: November 2014.

Mr Scott: The last proposals that we got as the safety technical group were in April of that year. There had been much talk, and, indeed, you will be aware of the judicial review. The members wanted an update on where we were at and on whether there had been any progress. There had been some progress made, in that a design-and-build contractor had been appointed. The contractor came and showed us some proposals, but it asked Sport NI to comment separately, not as part of the STG.

Mr Ó hOisín: That was your report. It was from you.

Mr Scott: No, it was minutes of a meeting. If you are referring to the meeting of 13 November 2014, that was a meeting of the STG —

Mr Ó hOisín: Which traced the issues back over the previous two years. Did DCAL or the GAA feed into that?

Mr Scott: No.

Mr McMullan: I will be very quick. Earlier, you said that you were told about 17 stadiums. Are there any here in the Six Counties?

Mr Scott: Stadiums that people cannot exit in eight minutes? I hope not, and I do not believe that there are.

Mr McMullan: Do you know?

Mr Scott: Yes, we have seen the safety certificates as produced by the district councils, and we agree with the rationale behind the terms and conditions.

Mr McMullan: They are all OK.

Mr Scott: Yes.

Mr McMullan: You referred to the Emirates Stadium in England. I have been in it a few times. You talked about crowds going to Casement Park and the stadium bringing in different people who would not know their way around it. Would it not be the same scenario at the Emirates Stadium when there is a match? You are bringing in different people —

Mr Scott: You are bringing in 5% of the audience, or for some matches, 10%.

Mr McMullan: It would not matter. Do you agree with me that 5% is the same as 1% if something happens?

Mr Scott: No. The more people who are unfamiliar with the ground, the more difficult the situation is to manage. Take the Emirates. I think, from memory, something like 35,000 or 36,000 of those attending are season ticket holders and therefore likely to attend on a very regular basis. Others will be in supporters clubs and, as such, get first call on tickets. Another 5% are visitors, and there will be some who manage to get a ticket and are going to the Emirates for the first time. The point that I am making is that a significant number of the people at the Emirates are there on a fairly regular basis, whereas we are really only going to get 38,000 at an Ulster final. The teams in the Ulster final may be different year in, year out. Some people will be familiar with Casement Park from having been at National Football League matches, McKenna Cup matches or even compromise rules matches. The proportion, however, at the Emirates is likely to be much smaller than would be the case at a stadium of similar size.

Mr McMullan: Do you not agree that those coming to an Ulster final, as you talked about, are a small percentage of the GAA family across the Six Counties and that supporters who come to stadiums will be well versed on the makeup of those stadiums?

Mr Scott: No.

Mr McMullan: Would you not? Was there a study done on that at all?

Mr Scott: No, but it stands to sense. It is unusual to get 11,000 or 12,000 at a National Football League game these days.

Mr McMullan: Why would that be unusual for the GAA?

Mr Scott: I know, because I attend the safety advisory groups for the various stadia's meetings. Those include county grounds, such as Healy Park —

Mr McMullan: Therefore, you have discussed GAA pitches, then.

Mr Scott: Those safety advisory groups are chaired by the local council. They will have the emergency services and the stadia management on them. The stadia management will tell us the biggest matches that have been played or that are forthcoming.

Mr McMullan: Did the GAA ever tell you that it could not manage the crowds at Casement Park?

Mr Scott: We never really got as far as that in the discussions.

Mr McMullan: You never —

Mr McMullan: Sorry, but this is important.

Mr McMullan: The gentleman wants to answer. If you feel that you do not want to answer —

Mr Scott: I am more than happy to answer. As I explained before, when assessing the safe capacity of a stadium, you look at the viewing capacity, exiting and emergency exiting. Your base figure is based on the lowest of those.

Mr McMullan: Yes, we know —

Mr Scott: If the stewarding is good, an 18,000 capacity is entirely possible. If the stewarding is not so good, that figure of 18,000 will be reduced. Let us say that the stadium gets a factor of 0·8. That will take you down to 15,000, give or take.

Mr McMullan: Do you not agree that, in the absence of a report, study or whatever from the GAA that states that it could marshal that ground or put stewards in to look after it, the presumption —

Mr Scott: No, because we do not get to that stage.

Mr McMullan: We have not got to that stage. Right.

Mr Scott: We have not got to that stage. Let us say that the safe capacity is 16,000. Although there are 38,000 seats, the safe capacity is set at 16,000, because of the emergency exiting. We do not get into that, as it comes way down the line. The important thing is to maximise the safe capacity for that stadium.

Mr McMullan: What role does a business case play in the whole thing?

Mr Scott: It was to determine —

Mr McMullan: For the stadium project, is the business case important?

Mr Scott: It is to determine what the safe capacity of the stadium is likely to be. We look at the four factors that I mentioned, and it will be the lowest of those.

Mr McMullan: You saw the business case only last year.

Mr Scott: Yes.

Mr McMullan: Only last year.

Mr Scott: That is right.

Mr McMullan: Did you never ask for it before that? Did you not need to?

Mr Scott: No.

Mr McMullan: You did not need the business case.

Mr Scott: I spoke at the concept stage and gave an opinion. I had no reason to believe that that opinion would be misrepresented, or whatever.

Mr McMullan: Indeed not.

Mr Scott: Therefore, why would I ask?

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): For the record, I think that two member, Cathal Ó hOisín and Karen, have —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Is it membership or an association?

Mrs McKevitt: An association.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): They have an association with the GAA.

Mr McMullan: My apologies, Chair. I am a member of the GAA.

Mr Dunne: Interesting.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Does anyone else want to declare membership of —

Mr B McCrea: I just want to speak.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I thought that you were about to declare your membership.

Mrs McKevitt: Basil, you attend matches.

Mr B McCrea: Yes.

You have had some very sustained questioning here. I think that you have responded admirably. I have no doubt that you are an expert. Sorry, but I am having a wee bit of difficulty hearing myself here.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Sorry, we are clarifying something.

Mr B McCrea: I want to ask you for clarification to help us. The problem is that so much of the exit capacity is at the Andersonstown Road level.

Mr Scott: That is correct. A modern stadium — for example, in Derby, Sunderland, Southampton or Leicester — will be 36 degrees. Therefore, if there is a problem at one area, everybody —

Mr B McCrea: I am not sure that that is fully understood.

My second question is on risk analysis. I understand that your hypothesis for why the case fails is this: what happens if Andersonstown Road is in some way involved in an incident so that you cannot use that exit?

Mr Scott: That is right, but you also look at the likelihood. If you are saying that a space station could crash down on the Andersonstown Road, that is way, way out there. However, a road traffic accident or a gas leak —

Mr B McCrea: That is exactly the point that I am coming to. Given your expertise, if it is only an Ulster final that might be getting close to 34,000 or 38,000, to resolve the issue, could we not have specific emergency preparation for that one event? In other words, you could say that, for that one event, we will block off the road completely or the police will have some sort of emergency plan that goes above and beyond. That is line with your point about taking additional safety measures. Would such an emergency plan not be possible to allow such a game to go ahead?

Mr Scott: It would be a very brave man who would sign that off.

Mr B McCrea: Therefore, there is an issue with that. You then come back and say —

Mr Scott: Design a stadium correctly. Do not shut roads and do —

Mr B McCrea: There is an issue, in that we are where we are. I listened very carefully to what you said. The stadium itself is not the problem. The problem is the exiting from the stadium, the lack of circulation around the stadium and the fact that the exits are polarised to the north of the stadium. You could look at whether we can increase the circulation around the building by taking garden space or suchlike.

Mr Scott: That would start to help, but, as I said before, we have to think, once we get them out, where the people go.

Mr B McCrea: OK. It seems to be that, on the south side of the stadium, about three houses would need to be demolished.

Mr Scott: Yes, but we would probably need to be looking at widening here.

Mr B McCrea: Where is "here"?

Mr Scott: My apologies. On the country side — the Owenvarragh side. If that exit could be widened, you could take a house out there. Sport Northern Ireland has spoken to Belfast City Council about this. If you were take one of the houses on the opposite side of the road — it might take two — that would get everybody on to the council playing fields. The council would be supportive of that. Better still —

Mr B McCrea: That the council playing fields on —

Mr Scott: At the Andersonstown Leisure Centre, which is to the country side of the stadium. If you really want to put icing on the cake, taking out another house would get people right into the Riverdale complex and would eventually get everybody out on to Finaghy Road South.

Mr B McCrea: You could be talking about four or five houses to get this sorted out.

Mr Scott: Four or five. Perhaps six.

Mr B McCrea: Perhaps six houses. If there are problems with getting the houses bought, because, for some reason, the residents do not want to sell, would it be safe in any shape or form to have underground tunnelling? [Laughter.]

This is a serious issue.

Mr Scott: Underground tunnelling would not be a problem, provided that it was well managed. There was an incident with tunnelling. You move fast as you go into the tunnel, then you go along a flat bit and then you go up. As such, you have a slowing-down, so the people who are in the tunnel get trapped, because they are coming in faster than they can get out. However, if that were properly managed, it would be an option.

Mr B McCrea: A number of things therefore could be looked at to see whether the stadium could go ahead. It has been a mistake for people to ignore the safety advice that you have given. Having heard about this over a number of Committee meetings, I understand what you are saying. When you present the case to people, there is definitely a safety issue there that in some way needs to be managed.

What has not happened is that management. At any time, has anybody — DCAL, the GAA or anybody else — come to you with an alternative exit plan?

Mr Scott: No. There is an exiting plan but not an emergency exiting plan.

Mr B McCrea: No emergency exiting plan.

Mr Scott: Under normal conditions, the stadium will exit fine, provided that there is no parking or traffic movements on the road.

Mr Humphrey: Therefore, the question comes back to this: given that you are an expert, both in your employment and in the wider area — you are one of the few people in this part of the world who is an expert — looking at the situation now, is there a way in which you could advise somebody to get an emergency exiting system passed, whether that be by buying houses, building tunnels or doing something else? Can it be done?

Mr Scott: It can be done. If you have enough money, you can do anything. You can put a man on the moon. However, it will be very costly.

Mr B McCrea: I suppose that we do not really know the cost of it. However, the question is whether it is realistic to do it.

Mr Scott: It certainly can be done, and it certainly will involve the purchase of some houses. Then you would put gates on the area where the houses had stood so that there would be no bad behaviour by teenagers or whomever. That could be done. Those gates could be opened on the day, and only on the days, of big matches. Ten thousand people is a fairly big crowd, to be honest, but it could be done.

Mr B McCrea: In conclusion, you presented a very detailed paper, in which there are certain issues that we will want to talk to the Department about. However, to facilitate the GAA and other people, I urge all interested parties to get together to try to find a resolution that is satisfactory.

Mr Scott: Absolutely. Sport Northern Ireland would be delighted to facilitate that.

Mr B McCrea: I think that open and honest discussion is needed, and you have been most useful in bringing that about. I will conclude on that. Thank you very much, and we will talk further, hopefully.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I have two more members down to speak, and we will call it a day after that. In fairness to Mr Scott, we have been discussing this for two and a half hours. We ourselves also need a short break.

Mr Humphrey: Mr Scott, I am glad that you are here to introduce clarity and certainty into some of the issues, through dealing with facts and from your considerable experience. We are talking about hugely significant health and safety implications, and, if incidents were to happen on the scale that you mentioned, they would be very serious indeed. They would be life-threatening incidents, and we are well aware of that.

To be honest, there can be no compromising on the issues. I am not interested in the views of the Irish Football Association (IFA), the Ulster branch of the Irish Rugby Football Union, the IFA's committees or the GAA. I am interested in your opinion, as you are a health and safety expert, and in whether a safety certificate can be gained through Belfast City Council, as the authority that delivers certificates.

I was fundamentally opposed to the development of the Maze as the site of the national stadium. As a Linfield supporter and a block-booker with the Northern Ireland football team, I wanted Windsor Park upgraded. Had the issue around Windsor Park been that the ground could not be upgraded because of health and safety concerns, I would have withdrawn my opposition to the Maze, not least because I would not want to jeopardise my life, that of my nephew who goes to games with me or that of anybody else in the stadium. I want to put that on the record.

I turn to paragraph 49 of your paper. A meeting was called by DCAL at Causeway Exchange to deal with the final report of the STG. It states:

"At the meeting on 16th October, DCAL and the GAA accused the STG of only raising concerns regarding emergency exiting in 'recent days' and advised that other PSNI officers did not have any concerns regarding the Design Proposals."

You continue:

"The meeting was very robust and despite assurances from DCAL that minutes would be provided these have still not appeared."

You go on to state:

"I believe that an application for Planning Permission was lodged and the process to appoint Design and Build contractors commenced shortly after this meeting despite previous assurances that agreement with the STG would be required before these processes would proceed."

In your considerable experience and based on your professional opinion, how on earth could planning permission be applied for, lodged and even approved, given what you said there?

Mr Scott: The planning process deals with planning issues, such as light, road traffic issues, and so on. As Judge Horner said, safety relates to the Safety of Sports Grounds (Northern Ireland) Order 2006 and the outworking of that legislation —

[Proceedings from 1.55 pm until 1.56 pm were not recorded due to technical difficulties.]

The Committee Clerk: The recording equipment is back on.

Mr Humphrey: Can you shed some light on the subject?

Mr Scott: We were advised by the permanent secretary at the time that, until there was sign-off — well, it happened, and we could not stop it.

Mr Humphrey: That was done despite your advice.

Mr Scott: It was the process that the Department had told us that it would follow —

Mr Humphrey: Ignoring the STG's advice.

Mr Scott: No. The permanent secretary said that the Department would not apply for planning permission until we agreed. We did not agree, but it broke process and went ahead.

Ms McCorley: Go raibh maith agat, a Chathaoirligh. Is it not true that the planning process and the safety process are separate?

Mr Scott: That is my understanding. I am not a planning expert. My understanding is that planners deal with —

Ms McCorley: Planning issues.

Mr Scott: Yes. In many ways, there is not a big interaction between the two.

Ms McCorley: The way in which it is perceived is that there is a process of working out the safety issues. In the case of Ravenhill, the certificate was signed off on shortly before the first game.

Mr Scott: As I have said on a number of occasions, with Ravenhill, we were working with the other agencies and could always see how the design capacity allowed for safe exiting of the stadium, either under normal circumstances or in a foreseeable emergency.

Ms McCorley: OK, but the planning process would still go ahead regardless.

Mr Scott: Planning for Ravenhill was actually secured before the work started.

Ms McCorley: Yes, that is what I mean.

To go back to some of the issues that Basil raised, in the unlikely event of an emergency, it might be only once a year that you would have a capacity crowd —

Mr Scott: That is right.

Ms McCorley: — if at all. We do not know. Would the most feasible solution not be to close the road on that one day, rather than knock —

Mr Scott: That would certainly lessen the risk. I would be very doubtful whether it would lessen it enough, however. Things such as gas leaks, even packages —

Ms McCorley: I understand that you are a safety expert and that you have to take on board all those kinds of things, but you would probably close airports and things like that because there might be a gas leak.

Mr Scott: No. There are systems within airports and other buildings that can address when something goes wrong. That is part of the design process. This is what I am saying: design the stadium correctly. Do not design it incorrectly and then hope that we can manage it.

Ms McCorley: I am not suggesting that. Safety is paramount, and it is not worth risking anybody's life. As I said earlier, that is a given. I am just thinking about being reasonable. To close the road on one day a year would probably make for the best solution.

Mr Scott: As I said before, it would be a brave person who would sign that off as safe. Why not start opening the exit down at that corner and why not look at how we can maximise —

Ms McCorley: Yes, but —

Mr Scott: Our problem is that we have asked and asked the Department for an emergency evacuation strategy, and, over a year later, no one has come up with any proposals.

Ms McCorley: You need that. I am just saying that it seems —

Mr Scott: We will certainly look at anything and try to work with the GAA, DCAL, the PSNI — with anyone. We want to see a stadium there. It will be a great thing for the area and a good thing for the sport and the spectators, but it will not be a good thing if it is unsafe.

Mr Ó hOisín: On the other two STGs, it is my recollection that, at one time, there were egress strategies and plans for Windsor and the Kingspan. When I was last in the Kingspan, its strategy was to have a one-way system. That is a change of plan, even since it opened.

Mr Scott: Indeed. These things do evolve. A safety certificate gets reviewed at least annually or when further proposals are made. If Ulster Rugby is hoping to do something, it will come to us first and might say, "What effect would this have on our safety certificate and our capacity?". It may improve it, it may leave it as is or it may be just not on. There have been changes at GAA county grounds, Irish League grounds and, indeed, at Ravenhill. It is a dynamic process, and, as I said, we would be happy to work with whomever to make sure that the people of west Belfast get a good stadium but a safe stadium.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I thank Mr Scott very much for his presentation.

I suggest that we take a comfort break for a couple of minutes. We have been here since 9.30 am, and it is now after 2.00 pm. Do you want to have a discussion prior to having a break on how we handle things? Will we go into — sorry, Paul, I forgot about you: you can go now.

Mr Scott: I again thank the Committee very much for having the opportunity to speak to you. My apologies for the errors and the typos in the documentation. Please accept that it was an honest effort to get as much information as possible to members.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): If you leave the bundle with the Committee officials, they will do what needs to be done.

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