Official Report: Minutes of Evidence

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I welcome to the meeting Andrew Sloan, who is the director of sports management services, and Nick Harkness, who is the director of participation and facilities. I remind members and witnesses of their obligation to declare any relevant financial or other interests in relation to today's business. I invite the officials to make their opening statement.

Mr Andrew Sloan (Sport Northern Ireland): Thank you, Chairman. I thank the Committee for the opportunity to brief members on the regional stadia programme. Throughout the briefing, we hope to provide members with an overview of Sport Northern Ireland's specific involvement in the regional stadia programme, with a particular focus on issues relating to the redevelopment of Casement Park and communications that Sport Northern Ireland has had with our parent Department, DCAL, in relation to the work of the safety technical group, with a particular focus on emergency exiting. I am joined today by my colleague Nick Harkness, the director of participation and facilities, who has had varying levels of involvement in the regional stadia programme before and since its formal transfer to the Department on 30 April 2012.

Before providing further information on Sport Northern Ireland's specific involvement, I will make members aware that the outline business case (OBC) for the three regional stadia was developed by McClure Watters in 2009-2010 and signed off in March 2011 by the Department's then deputy permanent secretary, Dr Edgar Jardine. The OBC contains reference to site limitations, safety legislation and the potential for a reduced safe capacity.

In September 2012, the director of the regional stadia programme at DCAL requested that Paul Scott, the safety compliance unit manager at Sport Northern Ireland, establish a safety technical group (STG) to review the design proposals for Windsor Park, Casement Park and the Ravenhill rugby football ground, all of which were to be redeveloped using funding from the regional stadia programme. The purpose of the STGs was to provide assurance that the stadiums would be designed and built in accordance with recognised guidance to ensure that the design capacity for each of the stadia would equate to the safety capacity as contained in the safety certificate. That safety certificate would be issued by the respective councils under the provisions of the Safety of Sports Grounds Order 2006 using guidance issued by Sport Northern Ireland on behalf of DCAL. Sport Northern Ireland's safety compliance unit manager, Paul Scott, met the director of the regional stadia programme, Noel Molloy, to provide advice on the proposed composition of the STGs and to explain the significant difference between the role of an STG and a safety advisory group (SAG), which is that an STG advises on safe design and an SAG advises on safe operation.

The director of the regional stadium programme agreed to all the advice offered and to the proposed composition of the STG. The group would be chaired by the safety compliance unit manager at Sport Northern Ireland, and the other membership would include the technical officer of the safety compliance unit, a representative of the Police Service of Northern Ireland with operational responsibility for the respective venue, a representative of the Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service with experience in fire-safety compliance issues, a representative of the Northern Ireland Ambulance Service with responsibility for emergency planning issues, representatives of Belfast City Council with responsibility for the implementation of the Safety of Sports Grounds Order 2006, and the safety officer for the respective venue, with other members being co-opted as required. It was agreed that the Department would attend meetings of the STG as observers, and Mr Molloy advised that the Department would issue terms of reference for the STG in due course. Terms of reference were not provided, but Mr Molloy agreed to the following procedures with Sport Northern Ireland's safety compliance unit manager: design proposals as drafted by the design team would be forwarded to DCAL, which, in turn, would forward them to Sport Northern Ireland. Sport Northern Ireland would circulate the design proposals to the members and arrange a meeting of the STG. The STG would comment on the design, referencing it against the recognised guidance and the experience and competencies of the members. The findings would be communicated to DCAL, which would pass the comments to the design team. The design team would then make amendments and forward the revised drawings to DCAL. The process would continue until agreement was reached. Interim reports and a final report would be issued by the STG to DCAL.

On 8 October 2012, Sport Northern Ireland's safety compliance unit manager received a letter from the then permanent secretary, Rosalie Flanagan, thanking him for his professional input in connection with the safety at sports grounds-related design reviews on the regional stadia programme. The letter states:

DCAL attended early meetings of the STG, but in August 2013, the regional stadium programme architect, Carl Southern, who was the Department's nominated point of contact, advised that the Department was very busy, did not have time to attend the meetings and did not require any meeting notes. He also advised that the STG could have the autonomy to contact key stakeholders directly but that it would require reports as and when required. More recently, on 29 April 2015, the Department circulated an email to members of the STG, attaching draft terms of reference for the group. Those have now been signed off for consideration at the next meeting of the STG. The correspondence also confirms that DCAL sports branch will provide secretariat support to the STG. The terms of reference propose that the STG will be chaired by the DCAL stadium team technical officer.

Essentially, there are three concerns relating to the redevelopment of Casement Park, two of which are interconnected: emergency exiting capacity; the lack of an outer circulation area; and the provision of open seating. When the regional stadium programme architect left the Department in July 2014, the Sport Northern Ireland safety compliance unit manager was advised that the Department's main point of contact would be the regional stadium programme manager, Ciarán McGurk. When he left in the winter of 2014, the Sport Northern Ireland safety compliance unit manager was advised that his point of contact would be Rory Miskelly. That remains the case. Following the decision of the Department not to attend the STG meetings, key officials in DCAL were regularly kept informed of all discussions and decisions made by the STG.

I will now ask my colleague Nick Harkness to provide a summary of the key communications between Sport Northern Ireland and DCAL on the matter.

Mr Nick Harkness (Sport Northern Ireland): Thank you, Chairman and Andrew. The Clerk of the Committee contacted Sport Northern Ireland in recent days to ask for relevant papers. In the light of the Committee's particular interest in the communications between Sport NI and DCAL on these matters, Sport NI provided a summary table of the range of communications, which go back as far as March 2013. That is provided in the summary table, and the supporting documents have been provided and tabbed at the request of the Clerk. In particular, the summary and the background papers illustrate that the risk of potential panic or crushing, the need for the provision of additional emergency exiting, the potential impact of the current design on S factor and P factor, and, therefore, the safe capacity of the ground, the potential need for any structural changes, and the potential significant impact on the S factor were all communicated over a series of months and years in relation to Casement Park. Those were communicated to a range of officers in DCAL, including two directors, the deputy secretary and the permanent secretary. There was an offer made from Sport Northern Ireland via the Sports Grounds Safety Authority (SGSA) in relation to an independent review of the plans from a health and safety perspective.

I am happy to talk members through the summary table if they would like that, but that might impact on time, so I am happy to just take questions if that is more appropriate.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Do members wish the witnesses to go through all the papers, or do you want to ask questions?

Mr Dunne: Questions, I think, Chair.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): OK. People have had the opportunity to read them through. If that is the case — there are no dissenting voices — we will go to questions.

Mr Ó hOisín: Thanks, Chair, and thanks, gentlemen, for coming.

Reference was made throughout your presentation and in various papers to risk issues and concerns. Can you define exactly what a risk is?

Mr Harkness: Terms that are used in some of the report to identify risk talk about things such as emergency exiting, where the risk is that there will be panic or crushing if sufficient emergency exiting is not provided. They talk about the need for the provision of an emergency exiting plan so that that can be assessed. Obviously, the assessment of a safety certificate is really an assessment of the relevant risks, and that impacts on the number of people recommended as the safe maximum capacity for the grounds.

Mr Ó hOisín: So when does a risk become an issue and when does an issue become a concern? Is there a descriptive escalation in the language that is being used?

Mr Harkness: If you go back to the theory of risk management, you find that an issue is the crystallisation of a risk. In the event that something goes wrong on the day, an issue starts to emerge out of a risk, which is what you want to avoid.

Mr Ó hOisín: So there is an escalation in the terminology.

Mr Harkness: Yes. An issue emerges from the crystallisation of a risk, so if the stadium was built and there was an emergency and things started to go wrong, that would be an issue, because it would be the crystallisation of a risk. That is in risk management theory.

Mr Ó hOisín: I just wonder about the use of the wording.

Mr Harkness: That is obviously where you do not want to be. You do not want to have an issue on the day. You want to avoid that.

Mr Ó hOisín: Or a concern.

Mr Harkness: That is another term thrown into it.

Mr Ó hOisín: Yes, but those terms are used liberally throughout. That is why I was asking.

Mr Harkness: OK.

Mr Ó hOisín: The STG initially was operating without terms of reference.

Mr Harkness: That is correct.

Mr Ó hOisín: Yet you came to an agreed membership without any terms of reference.

Mr Harkness: As Andrew said in his opening comments, the membership was agreed in meetings between the safety compliance unit manager in Sport Northern Ireland and the then director in the Department, Noel Molloy.

Mr Ó hOisín: When did you become aware that there were no terms of reference?

Mr Harkness: The terms of reference were requested on a number of occasions.

Mr Ó hOisín: Right. Was that what you did to rectify the situation? Did you request them?

Mr Harkness: Yes. The request was made on a number of occasions. The reports were provided, and there was no indication from the Department that the terms of reference were an issue at that time.

Mr Ó hOisín: Right. Reference is made to an email from Rosalie Flanagan, where she states that the design development will "ultimately be compliant".

Mr Harkness: I think that that was in a letter from Rosalie Flanagan dated 8 October 2012.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Can you tell us what page, or tab, that is on so that we can see it?

Mr Harkness: I do not think that it is in the main body of the text.

Mr Ó hOisín: But the use of the word "ultimately" is —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Sorry, just bear with me so that other members can get the actual letter. That is always helpful.

Ms McCorley: It is on page 4 or 15 of the presentation, depending on what you are looking at. It is item 11.

Mr Harkness: I can read from the letter if that is helpful, Chairman.

Ms McCorley: It is not the letter; it is a reference to it.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Yes, it is helpful to know what tab it is at so that we can see it.

Mr Harkness: I do not believe that the letter is in the pack, Chairman, but I have a copy of it here.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): OK. That is fine. Thank you.

Mr Harkness: The letter was written on 8 October 2012, and it was essentially relating to work ongoing on Windsor. At the top of page 2, it states:

The SNI overseeing body refers to the safety compliance unit, and, in truth, some of the main members of the STG are from DCAL.

Mr Ó hOisín: But Nick, that is in reference to Windsor.

Mr Harkness: It goes on to say:

That is a clear indication that the same process is expected for Casement Park.

Mr Ó hOisín: So, you are applying the same criteria that there are for Windsor.

Mr Harkness: That is what I interpret from that letter.

Mr Ó hOisín: OK. It is suggested there that Carl Southern, on behalf of DCAL, advised the Department that he was too busy and did —

Mr Harkness: By Sport Northern Ireland.

Mr Ó hOisín: OK. Is there any written evidence of that?

Mr Harkness: There is no written evidence of it, but Carl desisted from attending from that point on.

Mr Ó hOisín: OK. How did he tell you that?

Mr Harkness: He communicated it to Paul Scott verbally, I am advised.

Mr Ó hOisín: So, he said he was not attending. It was just a verbal message.

Mr Harkness: Yes, and he no longer attended. They were there as observers, rather than as full members.

Mr Ó hOisín: Right, OK.

How were you informed and kept up to date on the contact that was kept between officials in DCAL and the STG?

Mr Harkness: I had the opportunity to review documents emanating from the STG, and it became apparent to me towards the end of 2012, when I was aware of a letter of intent to a contractor to start the construction process, that the reviews and recommendations of the STG had not made it into the design. At that time, December 2013, I understood that the design approval and planning permission were imminent. So, at that stage I became concerned that the review by the STG had not been accommodated in any updated designs and that, with construction imminent, there was the potential for the stadium to be built in a way that did not support adequate emergency exiting.

Mr Ó hOisín: The STG "minutes" that are referred to are not, as even Paul Scott said, minutes; they are notes from meetings.

Mr Harkness: There were three reports produced. There were seven meetings. The STG for Casement Park met on seven occasions and produced three reports in 2013.

Mr Ó hOisín: Right, and were they based on these notes?

Mr Harkness: No, those were the reports that were produced.

Mr Ó hOisín: From notes of meetings?

Mr Harkness: From the conversations, discussions and measurements that took place in meetings. They are provided in your pack.

Mr Ó hOisín: Moving on to the point at which DCAL withdrew from STG process, did I hear you talk about an email from Peter May on 28 March acknowledging the work of the STG?

Mr Harkness: The Sport NI chief executive emailed Peter May on 18 March 2014 and confirmed conversations a while ago over issues affecting safety at Casement Park that had the "potential to cause delays" and confirmed that DCAL accepted that consistent SNI advice on these matters for some time. It also reinforced the:

and suggested that SNI should be on each of the three project boards to verify the advice that was being given and to seek solutions.

Mr Ó hOisín: Was there some mention of the work on an emergency exit in there as well?

Mr Harkness: Yes, the detail of the emails is included in your pack at tabs 15 and 16.

Mr Ó hOisín: So, through this, was the Department working along with Sport NI?

Mr Harkness: Certainly, the chief executive emailed the permanent secretary on that date, and he replied by acknowledging the good work of SNI via the STG, acknowledging work on an emergency exiting programme is ongoing; and, after consultation with the stadium team, declined our proposal to sit on the three project boards but accepted that Sport NI, in relation to safety and comfort matters should attend parts of the three steering groups, which are technical groups below each of the three project boards.

Mr Ó hOisín: But there was cooperative work there.

Mr Harkness: Yes, there was.

Mr Ó hOisín: OK, thanks.

Mr B McCrea: Let us go back to the first letter, which was to do with Windsor and said that you should consider the design details before they were approved by the committee.

Mr Harkness: The letter is primarily focused on Windsor Park, but the penultimate paragraph draws attention to the fact that the Casement Park project was mobilising and proposing arrangements for the first safety at sports grounds review of those plans.

Mr B McCrea: Just to be clear on that, you read out the first paragraph on the second page, which is a confirmation that the Department would not go forward until it had sign-off from the relevant authorities — the police, Belfast City Council and SNIOB, is that correct?

Mr Harkness: It suggests to me that the process would be that the Department would approve the plans before they went for planning permission and would do so only after confirmation that a full safety certificate was foreseeable.

Mr B McCrea: Although that was for Windsor, did such a stipulation actually occur for the Casement Park project?

Mr Harkness: No, I am not aware of it. My interpretation of the following paragraph is that that same principle would be applied to Casement Park.

Mr B McCrea: Why do you think it was not?

Mr Harkness: I do not know.

Mr B McCrea: OK. One of the issues that we are interested in finding out about is who knew what and when. The stadium sponsor board is the top level of oversight, is that correct?

Mr Harkness: That is correct, yes.

Mr B McCrea: Is it chaired by the Minister?

Mr Harkness: It is chaired by the Minister, although not always. On occasions, it is chaired by officials.

Mr B McCrea: Can you tell me when it was first brought to the attention of that body that there was a problem with the emergency exiting plan?

Mr Harkness: As I said, around December 2013 I became concerned, because I became aware that a letter of intent to a contractor was imminent. Our only involvement at that stage was offering safety advice, so we were no longer running the programme. I was also aware that a meeting of the sponsor board was taking place on 18 September. I briefed our chief executive prior to that, and the minutes of the programme board meeting illustrate that there was discussion, that there were different interpretations of the red and green guide and that, therefore, further discussions were required to resolve any issues. It was agreed that the programme director and our chief executive would meet to discuss it.

Mr B McCrea: That is on page 162.

Mr Harkness: I have that. It is in tab 10. I think it is the final page. It is section 5.10 of the minutes.

Mr B McCrea: What does section 5.10 say?

Mr Harkness: It says:

There was an action point for Noel Molloy and Antoinette McKeown to meet to discuss.

Mr B McCrea: What does that mean in English?

Mr Harkness: It could be a soft way of describing that there were concerns that safety requirements as described in the red and green guides were not finalised within the design.

Mr B McCrea: I will take you to the point just before that, paragraph 5.9, which states:

Is that supporting the same case?

Mr Harkness: The red guide provides for deviations from the guide as long as the alternatives provide for at least equal safety. Not every stadium across the UK complies to the letter, but there are always alternative provisions that will provide for at least a similar safety standard.

Mr B McCrea: That is the minute of the meeting on 18 December 2013. From then on and in meetings after that, was the matter of the emergency evacuation plan raised?

Mr Harkness: The papers for all the sponsor board meetings from 10 April to 19 March, of which there were five, have the phrase:

Mr B McCrea: How seriously was it raised? It seems to be at every meeting. One of the things that I am keen to get to the bottom of, Mr Harkness, is that some people have said, "This was all news to me", but —

Mr Harkness: As I described, our chief executive's email to the permanent secretary raised the point at the highest levels of the Department that there was a potential for risk on this critical level of responsibility.

Mr B McCrea: Was it recognised as being a serious problem by the sponsor board? Was it recognised that there was a possibility of it derailing the whole project?

Mr Harkness: There are phrases in the reports that talk about the potential for panic or crushing; the need for the provision of additional emergency exiting; the potential for impact on the safety factor and physical factor; the potential for the need for structural changes; and the significant impact on the S-factor. I cannot think of words that would express that more seriously.

Mr B McCrea: Are you saying to me that it was properly brought to the attention of the sponsoring board and that it should have been aware of the concerns?

Mr Harkness: I cannot think of words that would express more seriously a concern about emergency exiting than the words "risk of panic or crushing".

Mr B McCrea: I will turn to the safety technical group report on the redevelopment of the Casement Park stadium, reviewed on 4 June 2013.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): What page is that on?

Mr B McCrea: I have it at page 21 to —

Mr Harkness: It is in tab 3, I think.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): That is it, thank you.

Mr Harkness: Sorry, the date is?

Mr B McCrea: The one that I am looking at is 4 June 2013. There are handwritten notes from somebody. Who provided the handwritten notes?

Mr Harkness: I believe, having been a former colleague, that those are the handwritten notes of Carl Southern, the programme architect.

Mr B McCrea: There are issues that are a bit concerning. One of them is a note at the end. I note the point you make about "potential for panic". At the end, on my page 49, it says:

There is also a handwritten note that says "Explored but unfeasible". What does that mean?

Mr Harkness: I do not know, as I did not write the note, but it suggests to me that the Department and/or the design team explored using the existing exit, which I understand has been closed for quite some time, as a possible exit route in the event of an emergency and, for some reason, came to the conclusion that it was unfeasible.

Mr B McCrea: Below that there is an asterisk to do with the same point, and it says:

What interpretation would you put on that?

Mr Harkness: It appears from that that whoever wrote the note, who I believe was Carl Southern, believed that the report was unacceptable, for whatever reason, I cannot imagine.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): For information, we have put in motion some work to locate Carl Southern so that he can be brought to the Committee. It has not yet been possible to locate him, but that work is ongoing.

Mr B McCrea: That would be helpful.

Help me, because the timelines are a little bit difficult. In your opening statement, you mentioned, although you could not substantiate, that Carl Southern decided or had informed you that —

Mr Harkness: Or Paul Scott.

Mr B McCrea: — through Paul Scott, that the Department no longer wished to be on the STG or to receive minutes or notes. Is that correct?

Mr Harkness: Yes, but it wished to receive reports.

Mr B McCrea: How does that tie in with the timescale for this report?

Mr Harkness: It was in the opening remarks. It was August 2013. At paragraph 12 it says:

Carl Southern advised that they were too busy. The comments were made on a report of June 2013.

Mr B McCrea: So this —

Mr Harkness: Comments made on a report of June 2013. I do not know the date on which they were handwritten.

Mr B McCrea: The report was from June 2013. The comments were obviously written some time after that.

Mr Harkness: That is correct.

Mr B McCrea: The indication that Mr Southern did not wish to attend was in August 2013.

Mr Harkness: That is correct.

Mr B McCrea: So it is conceivable that Mr Southern was fed up with not getting the response that he wanted and decided that he was not going to go any more.

Mr Harkness: You would have to ask Mr Southern about that.

Mr B McCrea: That would not be an unreasonable question to ask Mr Southern. I have one last question. I know the Chair wants to let other members in, although he might let me come back if time permits. I want to talk about the issue of the letter from Antoinette McKeown, who was chief executive. She wrote a letter to Peter May —

Mr Harkness: An email.

Mr B McCrea: Sorry, an email, yes. She talked about issues affecting Casement Park. She was quite insistent that DCAL colleagues accepted that Sport NI had provided consistent advice on these issues for some time. Why did she feel the need to send that email?

Mr Harkness: I am aware of comments that Sport NI brought this issue up late in the day. I think that was to address that. The same point was brought up in a number of meetings with Antoinette, me, Paul, Ciarán McGurk and Carl Southern. That series of meetings was followed up by emails, where the issue of consistent advice in those meetings was accepted by Department officials.

Mr B McCrea: Finally, Mr Harkness, I want to check what that is. Just to finish this point, I note that there is an email in reply from Peter May, accepting that there was consistent advice but declining to put Paul Scott on a particular committee. What is the significance of that?

Mr Harkness: Reference has been made already to the stadium sponsor board, which is the high-level board that oversees the development of the three stadia. Below that, there is a project board for each stadium project, chaired by a representative for each of the three sports. They consider the high-level risk register for each independent project. Below that, there is a steering group, which is attended by engineers and architects and looks at technical matters to do with the design and eventual construction of the site. The reply gave Sport NI the opportunity to have a representative at each steering group.

Mr B McCrea: That seems to me to be a downgrading of the position, but we will check that with others. Given that there is a very real problem with the emergency evacuation plan and that there are discussions about new proposals or plans, has the STG been engaged in relation to the new proposals, which I think will go in before August?

Mr Harkness: No.

Mr B McCrea: Do you not find that rather strange?

Mr Harkness: I refer to the last two sections of the table I provided. In light of DCAL's presentation to the Committee, I believe in January, there was confirmation that a new planning application was expected in August and an indication that it was largely a similar application, although I am aware of recent suggestions in the media that it might be reduced. At that time, I emailed the programme director in DCAL to say that I was very keen to reengage the STG in consideration of new plans. That was an effort to ensure that we do not end up in a similar position with safety concerns.

Mr B McCrea: Rosalie Flanagan's original letter said that, before there was sign-off, it was expected that this would be consulted and agreed on. Would you not expect there to have been communication with the STG?

Mr Harkness: The plans that went in for Casement Park were not signed off by the STG in the same way as for Windsor. My concern at that stage, having heard that new plans were about to be submitted after the judicial review had made the old planning permission redundant, was that the same thing might happen again. So, that was my effort both in February and May: to ensure that the STG was re-engaged.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): OK. Basil —

Mr B McCrea: This is my last question, Chair. I just want to conclude on this point. We heard that we were going to get independent advice on stadium design. The Committee Clerk told us that, unfortunately, we could not get the person we wanted.

The Committee Clerk: Locally.

Mr B McCrea: Is there any independent authoritative body that could provide advice at a relatively modest cost to the public purse?

Mr Harkness: Absolutely. My pack of papers at tab 21 includes an exchange of emails and refers to conversations that I had with Ruth Shaw, who was the then CEO of the Sports Grounds Safety Authority, which had either an English or a GB-only remit; I am not quite sure which. It is the UK if not the world authority on safety at sports grounds. Further to a meeting that Antoinette and I had with the GAA on 24 October 2014, at which we offered to the GAA that we would attempt to secure the SGSA to review the plans, I made contact with Ruth Shaw and she confirmed that she was willing to do that on a cost-only basis. The SGSA does not have a remit in Northern Ireland —

Mr B McCrea: What does "cost-only" mean?

Mr Harkness: I took that to mean that it would be the cost of flights, hotels and a direct, possibly daily, salary rate. It is a non-profit organisation.

Mr B McCrea: That might be somebody that we might want to consider.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Indeed. That is helpful. In Andrew's presentation, he mentioned that the formal transfer of the project from Sport NI to the Department took place on 30 April 2012. That was quite a significant transfer of responsibility and role. Was there any correspondence or documentation around that transfer?

Mr Harkness: Our chairman at the time wrote to the Department in relation to the aspiration to expedite the project and the time risks associated with a project of that scale. Every capital project has a cost contingency, and the recommendation was that the project needed a sufficient time contingency to deal with the potential for such things as ground conditions, Japanese knotweed, and planning and procurement challenges. Those are the sorts of things that are typical in large capital projects. You can foresee that they might happen, but you are not sure whether they will happen. There were communications at that time about the risks to time. At the handover stage, the Sport NI stadium team, led by me, made a handover presentation to the new programme director and I had written confirmation at that time that Noel Molloy was content with the handover and that he had all the information and files that he required to take the programme forward. I specifically contacted him at that time to ascertain that he was content with the handover.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): It might be helpful to get a copy of the letter from the then chairman, Dominic Walsh.

Mr Harkness: That is correct, yes.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Could we get a copy of the letter from Dominic Walsh to the Department at the handover?

Mr Harkness: I will attempt to find it. A lot of the files were transferred. I will do my best to find it.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): In passing, I want to thank you for the amount of documentation that you have provided and for the speediness with which it was provided, which contrasts significantly with the delays that we are experiencing in getting material from the Department. It was very helpful to have the six-page summary that you have provided, which picks out the key points. It can be difficult to go through so many hundreds of pages. You and your Sport NI colleagues and others in the Department know this issue intimately, so that has been extremely helpful and I want to put on record my thanks for that.

Mr Hilditch: Thanks for coming along this morning. The papers that have been produced have been very helpful. They go against some of the evidence that has been produced to date from officials. The Committee will have to make a few decisions as to how to proceed, and we will have to ask some people to come back to answer some of our questions, certainly on timelines. Some people opposite were leaning that way and will have to refocus their attention on those questions. There appears to be reference throughout the table and the documents that have been provided, Mr Harkness, about some feedback, particularly from Carl Southern, in relation to rewording and the description of some things not being the way they should be. I know that Basil touched on some of the main points, but could you give us some indication of what your thoughts are on some of the feedback from Mr Southern in relation to what was expected of Sport NI?

Mr Harkness: The key phrases that I have highlighted in the summary were about additional exits being "explored but unfeasible" and suggestions that:

Further, in relation to an email trail between Carl and Paul in September 2013, there was the phrase that the report must be "definitive in its endorsement" — I presume that that meant of the plans; I think that that was what the discussion was about — and that:

In October 2013, there was an email from Carl Southern to Paul, after Paul had raised two major concerns on uncovered seating and emergency exiting, declining to meet and saying:

That is a flavour of some of the comments. I leave others to draw conclusions, but that is a flavour of the comments made.

Mr Hilditch: Some of them are certainly concerning.

Antoinette McKeown attended for part of the meeting on 13 February 2014, and you and Paul Scott met with Ciarán McGurk and Carl Southern —

Mr Harkness: Sorry, could I have the date again?

Mr Hilditch: It was 13 February 2014. It is on your table at tab 12. Can you give us a flavour and a run-through of that? There are a number of bullet points. Some matters have been raised before, and we have got different answers from some of the officials who appeared before this inquiry started, which is interesting. Could you run us through some of those bullet points in relation to the discussions and your understanding of them?

Mr Harkness: The first bullet point was really about Sport Northern Ireland and Antoinette confirming from the officials that the advice had been given consistently, and that was accepted. There was also an acceptance from DCAL officials that there had been a time imperative to secure planning permission, other factors had the potential to upset that timeline, and their focus had been entirely on achieving the planning permission within the anticipated timeline.

Mr Hilditch: What does "at all costs" mean?

Mr Harkness: Other issues at that stage had not been fully explored or bottomed out, and their view was that that would be bottomed out later.

There was an acceptance that there was an issue with emergency exiting and, again, it was reassuring that the advice that we had been given was, in fact, understood. We actually got out plans, rulers, calculators and the red guide, and did some calculations around the scribbled notes about the shortfall in numbers for emergency exiting based on the advice in the red guide. There was confirmation that there was some exploration going on that some of the exits needed to be widened and, to achieve that, there may be a requirement to acquire property in the area.

Mr Hilditch: Sorry, just to go back to that other point about rulers, slides, numbers and whatnot, to a lay person like me on the Committee, was it down to being as close, potentially, as moving a bit here and a bit there? What was being discovered? Was it quite substantial?

Mr Harkness: The plans that emanated from the design team via the Department at that time very clearly showed big red arrows where emergency exiting would happen, and those red arrows were over the top of narrow exits that would require to be widened. The numbers are quite a bit smaller. The follow-up letter that went to the Department on 17 February — four days after the meeting — summarised the three key opportunities that we had discussed to achieve emergency exiting. One was to increase the width of exits. The second one was to provide additional exits and, in particular, the one that we were looking at there was the exit to south-east corner of the ground, which had a gate on it.

The other was to maximise areas of relative safety in the ground.

In his presentation to the Committee, Mr Scott described how people on the way to a place of safety are actually considered to be safe, as long as they are moving at a certain rate. If you could open up the concourses to a larger scale, you could get more people moving, so they would be considered to be moving at a certain rate to a place of relative safety. Therefore, they are counted in your safe numbers. However, achieving that would have required access to strips of garden etc.

Mr Hilditch: Was there potential to buy property or houses in the area?

Mr Harkness: That was discussed, although as a sensitive matter. There was also the option of accessing strips of gardens that could open up the size of the concourses, which, as I have just described, would increase the number of people who could safely be accommodated in the ground. However, I am not as technical as Paul Scott, so the details beyond that are not my area.

Mr Hilditch: It would appear that, not only having flagged up concerns or whatever at an early stage, from at least a year ago, potential solutions were being given from Sport NI.

Mr Harkness: That is correct. That is my view.

Mr McMullan: Good morning. Who selects the membership of the STGs?

Mr Harkness: The membership was discussed with Noel Molloy, who was the programme director at the time. Then, Sport NI would have gone to the relevant organisations and asked for appropriate representatives with the relevant skills and expertise.

Mr McMullan: You referred to the draft terms of reference for the STGs —

Mr Harkness: The new ones, yes.

Mr McMullan: — which were circulated on 29 April 2015. Was this the first time that Paul Scott was aware of these, as evidence presented to the Committee? It is clear that Sport NI was party to the proposed changes in the structure of the STG, no?

Mr Harkness: No. The proposed changes emanated from a meeting that Antoinette, me and our HR manager had with the Department on 12 December 2014. They were discussed at that stage.

Mr McMullan: Is there any documentary evidence to support the allegation that DCAL no longer wished to attend STG meetings?

Mr Harkness: No, there is not, apart from the fact that its representatives no longer attended. They attended previously; then they did not. However, there is no email trail or letter trail to say that they no longer wanted to attend.

Mr McMullan: Should there not be a paper trail to support that?

Mr Harkness: The paper trail is in the attendees of the subsequent meetings. The fact that the representatives were not at the meetings is a paper trail, in my view.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I think that we will have the opportunity, Mr McMullan, to question Carl Southern about this, if we can find him.

Mr McMullan: You talked earlier about the green guide and said that there were opportunities to step outside it.

Mr Harkness: The green guide is the equivalent guide in England. For various reasons, it is called the red guide in Northern Ireland.

Mr McMullan: Say that again.

Mr Harkness: When it was rewritten for Northern Ireland, we felt that it might be more appropriate to have a red guide in Northern Ireland.

Mr McMullan: Do we not have a red guide and a green guide here?

Mr Harkness: No. The green guide is the guide for GB and, when DCAL sponsored the Safety of Sports Grounds (Northern Ireland) Order 2006, it was appropriate that Northern Ireland should have a guide. It was based on the green guide and updated, because we were aware that further editions of the green guide were coming forward. So we took advantage of those edits and updates.

Mr McMullan: Yes.

Mr Harkness: But they are more or less the same.

Mr McMullan: There is room to stand outside them.

Mr Harkness: As long as the safety provision is equal or better than what would be provided by strict adherence to the guide.

Mr McMullan: And who would decide that at the time?

Mr Harkness: Eventually, it would be the district council, which would offer the safety certificate, because it is responsible for confirming the safe capacity of the ground through a safety certificate and the conditions attached.

Mr McMullan: And, in this case, it is Belfast City Council.

Mr Harkness: Yes, Belfast City Council would eventually offer the safety certificate. However, the same Belfast City Council officers who would consider the safety certificate are those who sit on the STG for Casement Park.

Mr McMullan: I have one more question, Chair. In preparation for the stadium programme board meeting of 4 June 2014, Nick Harkness prepared a brief for the Sport NI chief executive in which four options were put. Why would Sport NI have considered the need to change?

Mr Harkness: Well, it is like any option appraisal; you consider a long list of options. At the end of the day, you consider that long list. It is like a business case. You consider a long list of options, some of which you know are irrelevant, and then you disregard them. The idea to change advice was one of the options that were quickly discarded because you would not do it; your advice is your advice. Actually, the detailed reference referred to discussions potentially with the PSNI in relation to its advice. That was immediately disregarded as a non-option.

Mr McMullan: Why would Sport NI have wished to consider, for example, an option to relocate the project?

Mr Harkness: It would not be our decision to do that, no. This is, again, a long list of options, some of which would be disregarded. As regards where you are with making decisions about safety exits, you could, in fact, change your advice if you thought it was wrong. You could reduce the capacity; you could widen the exits, primarily by knocking down houses; or you could move somewhere else. It is just a long list of options, some of which will be unpalatable to a range of people for a range of reasons, but those are all options.

Mr McMullan: Yes, but do you agree that consistency would be a good thing in all of this?

Mr Harkness: Absolutely. I think that the more recent meetings that Antoinette and I had with DCAL officials confirmed that consistency of advice was what emanated from Sport NI throughout our engagement on the project.

Mr McMullan: OK. Thank you.

Mr Dunne: Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today. First of all, could you clarify the role of the STG again for everyone's information? What was its role in the Casement Park project?

Mr Harkness: It was what was agreed at paragraphs a to f on page 4 of the opening remarks. Design proposals would be drafted by the design team. We would forward them to DCAL, which would in turn forward them to Sport NI. Sport NI would circulate the design proposals to the members of the STG. The STG would comment on the design, referencing it against the recognised guidance. The findings would be communicated to DCAL, which would pass them on to the design team, and the design team would make amendments. So, it is an iterative process: get plans, look at plans, comment on plans, and get updated plans.

Mr Sloan: Essentially, the STG advises on the safe design of the stadium.

Mr Harkness: To be honest, the meeting or the note that you have is immediately redundant as soon as you have a new set of plans because you hope that those have been accommodated in design changes.

Mr Dunne: The drawings would be amended on an ongoing basis.

Mr Harkness: That is correct.

Mr Dunne: On 8 October 2012, who was Sport NI's safety compliance unit manager?

Mr Harkness: Paul Scott.

Mr Dunne: Paul Scott received a letter from the then permanent secretary. It stated:

Mr Harkness: That is correct.

Mr Dunne: Last week, we were told by the acting permanent secretary, I believe, that the planning permission had been received, yet the design was an ongoing process.

Mr Harkness: OK. What basically happens is that, in a design and build construction like this, you have an initial design team that brings the plans to planning permission stage. After that, they go to a design and build team. It brings in its own design team, which can design in efficiencies and enhancements, but the original design team is often retained to protect the design integrity of the original design, almost as light-touch consultants — just as a touchstone. Designs develop beyond planning. If you are designing a house, you design it to planning application stage. Once you get that, the architect brings it to construction stage, so exact dimensions and exact finishes are included. That would not be at the stage where it goes to planning application.

Mr Dunne: Had the STG full involvement right through to the planning stage?

Mr Harkness: They had referenced and created reports that continued to express concerns, about emergency exiting in particular.

Mr Sloan: They had not signed off the plans.

Mr Dunne: They had not?

Mr Sloan: The STG had not signed off the plans.

Mr Harkness: They had issued concerns that it may fail to achieve its full safe capacity.

Mr Dunne: So, the plans were approved by the planning authority. The other important thing that I think is worth mentioning is all the other consultees who will be involved with the planning application: were they fully involved in the planning process?

Mr Harkness: The consultation was entirely a matter that was disconnected from Sport NI. The consultation with local residents etc was a matter for the stadium team.

Mr Dunne: There are a lot of other public bodies and government agencies that have to be consulted.

Mr Harkness: In fairness, the Ambulance Service, the PSNI and the Fire and Rescue Service were all on the STG, so they had an opportunity to comment. They were contributors to the reports that expressed concern about emergency exiting.

Mr Dunne: To summarise, the planning approval went through and, finally, was challenged through the legal process. Are you satisfied that the STG was not fully involved to that level?

Mr Harkness: The STG was fully involved but my view, and it is apparent from the ongoing concerns, is that the recommendations of the STG around measures to provide sufficient emergency exiting were not reflected in the design. That was not bottomed out.

Mr Dunne: At that stage.

Mr Harkness: At that stage, prior to planning, in the same way that it was for Windsor.

Mr Dunne: So it did not follow the same procedure as Windsor.

Mr Harkness: They continued to receive plans and to consider plans, but the STG was not content that emergency exiting could be adequately achieved with the plans as submitted and eventually approved, and subsequently withdrawn.

Mr Dunne: OK. I have just one other point. In relation to the capacity, will you clarify the planned capacity for the stadium, as you understand it, which was approved by the planning authority?

Mr Harkness: It is 38,000.

Mr Dunne: Obviously, games continue there on a regular basis. What numbers attend regular games?

Mr Harkness: The ground is in a state of disrepair —

Mr Dunne: Prior to that.

Mr Harkness: Those were the subject of detailed debate at the judicial review, and I am not entirely au fait with the content of that, but I understand that, in recent years, attendances have been significantly below that. However, there is evidence that, when you have a new stadium, there is a sparkle effect and, when it is much nicer, cleaner and more comfortable, more people will want to go. Those are well-known scenarios. I believe that the recent history was discussed in detail at the judicial review, and I do not have all the detail of that.

Mr Dunne: Your concerns were around the 38,000 capacity.

Mr Harkness: No. Our concerns, in event of an emergency, in particular an emergency in and around the Andersonstown Road, were about the emergency exiting of 38,000, not 38,000 per se. It is about the emergency exiting.

Mr Dunne: OK. Thank you.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I will come to Dominic in a moment. I am just curious about something. In the presentation that you initially gave, there was reference to the email that was circulated to members of the STG on 29 April 2015. That is in paragraph 13 of Andrew's presentation. I cannot quite put my hand on that at the moment, but who did that come from within DCAL?

Mr Harkness: I think that I may have a copy of it here. This is about the draft terms of reference, is it?

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Yes. We have a thing that has "Terms of reference" at the top, but it does not have the accompanying email. It looks like an attachment.

Mr Harkness: Bear with me. I received a copy of it on Friday 17 April from Rory Miskelly. Sorry, no; that was my response back on the draft. I received a draft of it from Rory Miskelly on Tuesday 14 April, and I replied with some comments on it. That was not the date it was issued to Paul Scott; it was subsequent to that. I do not have that date with me.

Mr Sloan: 29 April.

Mr Harkness: 29 April.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): The correspondence and the toing and froing around the terms of reference was with Rory Miskelly.

Mr Harkness: Yes, I had received copies and gone back with comments on it. Subsequently, on 29 April, a final version was circulated to the members of the STG and to me.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): By Rory Miskelly?

Mr Harkness: It may have come from another official in the Department.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Would it be possible to get that?

Mr Harkness: Yes.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I would be grateful for that.

Mr D Bradley: Good morning, gentlemen. Paragraph 12 of your presentation states that the point of contact was Carl Southern from DCAL. I believe his position within DCAL was departmental architect, is that correct?

Mr Harkness: Yes.

Mr D Bradley: Do you consider that it was unusual for the departmental architect to withdraw from the safety and technical group, since he would be the person in the Department most knowledgeable on technical and safety issues?

Mr Harkness: He was not a member of the group from the outset; he was an observer. That had been agreed with Noel Molloy. My understanding of the conversation he had with Paul Scott on his decision to withdraw is that he did not require the notes but that he would require reports, and the reports were provided.

Mr D Bradley: It seems from that paragraph that he informed the safety and technical group that it could have autonomy to contact the stakeholders.

Mr Harkness: Yes, as paragraphs A to F on page 4 suggest, the original agreement had been that all material would be issued through DCAL and all comments would go back through DCAL. Again, my understanding was that, as a result of the pressures of the work involved in the three big projects ongoing, the Department was content that we would receive the plans directly from the design team and that comments could go back directly there, and the Department would continue —

Mr D Bradley: You said that he was not a member of the team, but he was the key person in the Department with expertise in safety and technical issues.

Mr Harkness: That is good, but, in all honesty, I think it is appropriate that they are not full members because —

Mr D Bradley: I am not arguing about that.

Mr Harkness: I think the independence —

Mr D Bradley: He was the key person within the Department with that expertise. Even though he was only an observer, he withdrew from the group on the basis that he was very busy and could not attend the meetings. He gave the group autonomy to contact the stakeholders. He said that he would accept reports as and when required, is that right?

Mr Harkness: Yes.

Mr D Bradley: How many reports did he seek from the STG?

Mr Harkness: Three were provided. Tab 5 of my papers illustrates that Paul, obviously, had provided the report in and around that time of August 2013, because Carl came back in September 2013 and reported that the report must be definitive in its endorsement. On 30 September 2013, there was a Casement Park meeting. Sport NI, DCAL, the Ulster Council of the GAA and the design team were there. Paul Scott advised that meeting on 30 September that the management plan should be drafted as soon as practical. The unique nature of the site was an issue; the exiting arrangements, especially if there was an incident on the Andersonstown Road, were giving a concern; there were concerns that structural amendments may be required; and the need for emergency exiting was stressed. It is clear that those communications were being provided to Carl, as the technical person in the Department.

Mr D Bradley: Yes, I never said the contrary, nor was I suggesting that. It seems from paragraph 12 that there was a flurry of activity in the Department around the end of April 2015. The Department seemed to have left the STG —

Mr Harkness: April 2015 or April 2013?

Mr D Bradley: April 2015. This is paragraph 13. The Department seems to have left a sort of tenuous arrangement between the architect and the STG in place. You say that there were communications and that issues were flagged up, but there seemed to be a flurry of activity from the Department towards the end of April 2015, when:

Previous to this, DCAL had withdrawn and left the STG more or less to its own devices. Laissez-faire might be a good term; I think that that means non-interference in the business of others. The Department seems to have left the STG in that position. Then, suddenly, there was a flurry of activity before the end of April, when the terms of reference were provided, a secretariat was provided and a chair was provided. One wonders what precipitated that flurry of activity. It just happens to be the day before the chair of the STG, Paul Scott, gave evidence at this Committee. Is there a connection between the flurry of activity and the chair arriving at the Committee here?

Mr Harkness: The first knowledge that I had of plans to possibly restructure or repopulate the STG or manage in a different way was when it was made known to me on 12 December 2014 at a meeting in DCAL that related to some HR matters, which Paul has referred to in this room. Around that time, the judicial review found that the planning permission was no longer valid, and, obviously, I can surmise that there was work going on to work out what to do next in the Department about the new planning application. In January, you got evidence that a new planning application was coming forward that would be broadly the same. First, the meeting in December and, secondly, the aspiration to move forward and submit a new planning application could have contributed to those reconsiderations, but I do not have all the detail as to why.

Mr D Bradley: You could not comment.

Mr Harkness: It would not be my place to comment.

Mr D Bradley: Did the judicial review precipitate those changes coming in?

Mr Harkness: I am not aware of the judicial review. My knowledge of the judicial review is that the findings were based more on the baseline attendance figures, and my understanding is that, when Judge Horner referred to safety, he confirmed that it was a separate matter and was not a planning matter. That is my understanding.

Mr D Bradley: There certainly was a sea change in the Department in its attitude to the STG between August 2013 and April 2015. As I said, previously, there was a laissez-faire attitude to the STG, and it was left largely to its own devices. Suddenly, there was almost a sort of clamp of control placed around it in April 2015 on the day before the evidence was given here. Anyway, I am sure that the Committee will draw some conclusions about that, and perhaps we will get more detailed information from elsewhere.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): You make a very important point in your question, Dominic. Perhaps that question would be better directed to the Department. We should ask it directly why there was such a flurry of activity.

The end of paragraph 13 states:

There is a series of changes of personnel. People come in and move out. We had a presentation at one stage — I think it was either December last year or January this year — where Rory Miskelly and Ciarán McGurk were in the room together. People move and it is difficult for us to keep track of all that. We will ask for the timeline of who was the permanent secretary at what point and who was the programme manager or whatever the titles were, so that we can get a clear understanding of that, because it is complex. On that point, would you happen to know who the DCAL stadium team technical officer is?

Mr Harkness: That is the new Carl Southern, who I understand is before you today. I cannot remember —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Is this the gentleman who is coming with Rory Miskelly?

Mr Harkness: Yes, I believe so. The name escapes me just at the moment.

The Committee Clerk: Andrew Dadley.

Mr Harkness: That is correct.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): OK. Thank you.

Ms McCorley: Go raibh maith agat, a Chathaoirligh. Thanks very much for the presentation. I want to explore a number of points on your comments about the processes that were followed. Safety is the big concern, and the central hub of the issue is when it was known. Do you think that the stadium could have been built without the safety concerns being addressed? I think that that is what you were saying: that there were attempts to sidestep safety concerns. I want to be clear about that. Do you think that that could have happened and it could have proceeded?

Mr Harkness: Well, the truth of the matter is that Belfast City Council would have been required to give a safety certificate for any construction on the site. I have no reason to believe that Belfast City Council officers would in any way give any inappropriate safety certificate. I have no concerns on that. However, I am aware of the fact that planning permission was due in December 2013, and there was a letter of intent to a contractor that came through a procurement exercise for a design and build team. The emergency exiting concerns of the STG had not yet been bottomed out in terms of whether the design was accommodating the —

Once you get planning permission, it locks down the main footprint, height and some principles. If those were subsequently changed, you would have to go back to planning permission, which would obviously have a negative impact on timeline and spend. Capital spend timelines are important matters. In my view, if there is a risk of any structural changes being required, it would be better to have those bottomed out at pre-planning application stage, so that once you get your planning application, you are not having to go back for structural changes.

Ms McCorley: You say that it would be better, but are you saying that it is required and that something then was wrong? Has this happened in other —

Mr Harkness: I am sorry; can you have another go at the question? I am not sure that I am getting you right.

Ms McCorley: Yes, OK. I am trying to establish whether you are suggesting that this could have gone ahead and been built without safety concerns being addressed. We got assurances last week, because I was very concerned, as were other members, that safety concerns are addressed. They are paramount. I am not putting words in your mouth, but I get the impression that you are saying that this could have gone ahead and been built without those being addressed.

Mr Harkness: Well, there was a letter of intent to a contractor on the first planning application and first planning approval around December 2013, and the safety exiting concerns of the safety technical group had not yet been resolved.

Mr Sloan: Essentially, you could build a stadium for 38,000 people, in this case, but, when it comes to Belfast City Council certifying that stadium for its safe capacity, that number could be much lower. You could end up with a stadium — I use this just by way of example — with a 38,000 capacity but only 15,000 people would ever be allowed to be in that stadium.

Ms McCorley: What would be the point in building it?

Mr Sloan: You end up with a white elephant.

Ms McCorley: Who would want to do that? Why would anybody want to do that?

Mr B McCrea: Exactly. That is the question.

Ms McCorley: Can I ask about the planning and safety processes? I have felt and been led to believe that those are dual processes. It is an ongoing process in which concerns get addressed. You mentioned that, throughout notes of various meetings, safety issues are on the agenda, and anybody would fully expect that. Is it not the case that safety concerns would be worked out as a matter of course and then, at some point before sign-off on the design stage, the safety concerns would have to be tied down? We were told that it could not proceed.

Mr Harkness: This is a hugely challenging site to locate a 38,000-seater stadium on. I am not saying that it cannot be done, but it is hugely challenging. As far back as June 2010, the outline business case stated that location:

That is a significant challenge on the site. The view of the STG was that those challenges should be resolved at pre-planning-application phase so that the design submitted from planning can maximise safe exiting. There is a danger that subsequent replanning could mean that some of your design work is nugatory, or it could mean that, if construction had started and the resolution of the issues came at a later date, some of your construction costs might be nugatory.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Thank you.

Ms McCorley: I am not finished. How long have you been involved with the project?

Mr Harkness: I have been involved since its outset. I was looking after it, along with the portfolio of other responsibilities, until it left Sport NI to go to the Department. That was 30 April 2012.

Ms McCorley: You are telling us about the concerns. How serious would you say your concerns are?

Mr Harkness: I am not concerned that people will be put at risk, because there is a safety certification process. The stadium is not built, and, if it is built, there will be a safety certification process. I have confidence in Belfast City Council issuing appropriate safety certificates, as it does for venues across the city.

Ms McCorley: There is reference to the letter from Rosalie Flanagan, but it is not in the pack.

Mr Harkness: Apologies. That can be provided.

Ms McCorley: Are there any other documents that are not in the pack?

Mr Harkness: There would be documents from when the stadium project was in Sport NI. All the paper files and a lot of the electronic files were taken by the stadium team at that stage. I have provided what I believe to be relevant to the discussions at the Committee in recent meetings about the chronology of communications between Sport NI and — As the Chairman mentioned, it was prepared at fairly short notice, but I can certainly provide the Clerk with a copy of that letter. There is no problem.

Ms McCorley: That would be useful. Thank you.

When Carl Southern told you that he was no longer going to attend the meetings, should that not have raised concerns?

Mr Harkness: At that period, we were continuing to supply reports and have meetings. That was August 2013, if I remember correctly. We had meetings with Carl on 30 September 2013, 8 October 2013 and 16 October 2013. That is an indication that communications were ongoing. He may not be at the meetings, but he was certainly getting relevant information, in my view.

Ms McCorley: OK. There is also a reference to a conversation that you had with Cynthia, the SRO, at a Long Gallery event. You raised concerns at that. When was that?

Mr Harkness: That was 20 May, I believe. That was subsequent to Antoinette's email exchange with the permanent secretary and meetings and conversations.

Ms McCorley: Can you give us a flavour of that conversation?

Mr Harkness: The conversation in May? It was on the subject of a celebration event in the Long Gallery, and I took the opportunity to say that I felt that the emergency exiting concerns were not yet resolved and that that concern was ongoing.

Ms McCorley: You were not raising it as a matter of huge concern.

Mr Harkness: I was aware of previous correspondence with Antoinette and Peter May that addressed it at permanent secretary level, and I was taking the opportunity to reinforce that.

Ms McCorley: How concerned were you? I am asking this because the first time I knew that there were huge concerns — to the point that a Hillsborough-type disaster was looming — was when Paul Scott came to the Committee. It frightened me, to be honest.

Mr Harkness: The stadium is not built, and the safety certificate has not been issued. No one is at risk. It is important, in the view of the STG, which I am reflecting today, that the programme should be designed in a way that provides for the safe exiting of the number of people that the stadium is designed to accommodate. There is the physical accommodation, and then there is the safe capacity. It is obvious, in my view and in the view of the STG, that the safe capacity and the physical capacity should be the same. That is where we want to get to.

Ms McCorley: That is absolutely accepted. Do you feel that you had fulfilled your requirement to raise concerns in that conversation, or did you follow that up with an email or letter? Did you follow it up with anybody else in the Department?

Mr Harkness: I did not subsequent to that, but I re-engaged when it became apparent that the new planning application was ongoing. I re-engaged with Rory Miskelly to say that the STG needed to be involved. I attended a meeting on 12 December 2014 with the Department at which technical issues to do with emergency exiting were discussed. I talked to Ciarán McGurk, who was project officer at 25 July. I had a range of engagements at a range of levels, but I have to say that I was conscious of the fact that Noel Molloy was fully aware of the concerns about safe exiting.

Ms McCorley: How official did you make all these concerns? Is there a paper trail?

Mr Harkness: I raised them with my chief executive, who emailed Peter May on 18 March, and from that communication it is apparent that there was a range of discussions.

Ms McCorley: I am not convinced, I suppose. Conversations may be between two people, and you will have one person's view and another person's view; we get this all the time. In your position, as a person with senior responsibility — you are part of the sponsor board as well — how officially did you make your concerns about safety known?

Mr Harkness: Subsequently, I made a presentation to the board of Sport Northern Ireland, which Paul Scott attended, highlighting the concerns about uncovered seating, sufficient numbers of exits, the outer circulation area and the need for an emergency exiting strategy that had not yet been provided.

Ms McCorley: Was that any different from those appearing as normal agenda items, or was this elevated to a level of serious concern?

Mr Harkness: I subsequently had a conversation with Ciarán McGurk on 25 July 2014, when he said that matters in Casement Park will not progress until the GAA provide DCAL with an emergency exiting plan. That was confirmation from the Department that it was not going ahead. I also referred to a dispute — I do not know the detail of it — between the GAA and the design and build contractor that had stopped payments being issued, and, apparently, that had stopped work on the emergency exiting plan. But I had got confirmation directly from a departmental official that matters in Casement Park will not progress until the GAA provide DCAL with an emergency exiting plan.

Ms McCorley: Is there a current safety certificate for Casement Park?

Mr Sloan: The ground is closed.

Ms McCorley: I am just asking.

Mr Harkness: I do not know. If there is, it is redundant, because the ground cannot be used.

Ms McCorley: Do you know what the capacity on the last one was?

Mr Harkness: I imagine it is the twenties, but I do not know. I do not have the detail.

Mr Cree: Good morning, gentlemen, and thank you for your evidence so far. In tab 4 we are told that, on 10 May 2013, the plan — you referred to it, Mr Harkness — was to demolish houses in Owenvarragh Park for emergency exiting.

Mr Harkness: The exiting arrows on that plan are overlaid on the top of properties.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We have that.

Mr Harkness: There are assumed new boundary lines, which are over the top of properties, so I imagine that could only be achieved with demolition.

Mr Cree: That tab clearly shows that all parties knew of the need to increase emergency exiting arrangements from as far back as May 2013, so it is not something that has come out of the air, as it were.

Tab 7 clearly identifies:

In tab 14, there is a report to DCAL from the — I am not quite sure what this is — safety at sports grounds monitoring group. Is that an important group?

Mr Harkness: Yes. As DCAL is the sponsor of the safety of sports grounds legislation, it convenes a meeting twice a year with Sport NI, which the accounting officer and technical officer attend to feed back on the implementation of that legislation, in terms of whether ground owners are complying and whether the district councils are effectively delivering the certification process etc.

Mr Cree: So that is an important group.

Mr Harkness: Yes, but it is separate from stadium development.

Mr Cree: That was in March 2014, if I am correct. It states that the STG — the safety technical group — has been requesting emergency exiting plans since spring 2013.

Mr Harkness: That is correct. That is what the report states.

Mr Cree: They still have not appeared.

Mr Harkness: Correct.

Mr Cree: At tab 15/16, there is confirmation of previous conversations about issues affecting safety at Casement Park having the potential to cause delays. Do you think that was a warning to the Department, or an acknowledgement of fact?

Mr Harkness: I do not know because I did not write the note, but it refers to previous conversations and issues affecting Casement Park. Later on, it talks about:

Mr Cree: Yes. There is reference to Mr Southern, again in respect of the two major areas, saying:

In your opinion, is that not a bit blasé?

Mr Harkness: I understand that that was in relation to an invitation for Mr Scott to meet with Carl and others to consider options to resolve the issues.

Mr Cree: Right. In tab 19, which takes us to 23 June last year, it says:

one of which is:

Exiting is again flagged up as a major, unresolved issue.

Mr Harkness: That was a presentation to the Sport NI board, rather than a presentation to DCAL.

Mr Cree: Would that board not report to DCAL and to the Minister?

Mr Harkness: They do report, yes.

Mr Cree: So it would seem reasonable that the Minister should have been told.

Mr Harkness: The truth of the matter is that that issue was added to the Sport NI risk register and considered on 27 January. The stadium programme is not a Sport NI programme. It is a DCAL programme. Paul, as one of a range of his duties in relation to the implementation of the safety of sports grounds legislation, convenes the STG and advises on safety compliance matters in relation to the stadia. The board considered, at its meeting on 27 January, the risk to relationships but decided that the health and safety risks belonged to DCAL and the Ulster Council. They felt that the risk to relationships was a low-level matter in comparison with the risk to safety, and they decided that Sport NI should continue to give the appropriate advice, irrespective of whether that relationship issue was a reality.

Mr Cree: Finally, tab 22 refers to the meeting:

Interesting. Of particular relevance is that:

I find that absolutely amazing. Is it not true that safety has to be designed in from the start? Only a fool would build something and then try to apply for a certificate, to find out that they could only be allowed half the number they had planned for. Is it not a fact that safety has to be designed in?

Mr Harkness: I think it is illustrated if you go back to Rosalie Flanagan's letter about Windsor Park and about confirming the contentment of the STG prior to a plan being submitted for planning application. I think there is a principle set there.

Mr Cree: Yes, but I will push you on that a bit more. In a different world I used to be involved a little bit in that sort of area, but it would have been a cardinal sin to leave something like safety until the end, and, in fact, as Rory Miskelly did, to argue that it could be dealt with during construction. Is that not, at the least, naive?

Mr Harkness: I think that is particularly relevant to the development of a safety exiting plan. As the STG has repeatedly said, on such a challenging site, it is important to bottom out a safety exiting plan which can illustrate that that number of people can come out safely within the required timescale, before designs are locked and planning permission applied for, never mind construction.

Mrs McKevitt: Thanks very much. I am just going to touch a wee bit more on that, following on from Mr Cree. The design is not signed off yet, is it?

Mr Harkness: There is no design at the minute.

Mrs McKevitt: But it never was signed off, so anything going on internally within Casement could still be changed, because it was never signed off.

Mr Harkness: It was signed off by the Department to go for planning.

Mrs McKevitt: No, that is different. I mean the design and build. When you go into a couple of different stages within an application, in order for you to spend public money you go into design to see if it will fit in. Once planning permission is granted, then you go into design and build. The design and build takes in a more detailed plan than the outline planning for the stadium that was granted, so that you take in emergency exits and stuff, is that right?

Mr Harkness: When planning permission is granted, some aspects of the plans are then locked down in that.

Mrs McKevitt: Like the red line.

Mr Harkness: No, the red line is just the development line. Its shape, its height, and the significant measurements are all locked down. If you subsequently need to change some of those big measurements you have to go back through planning and go through consultation, and that has the potential to require redesign and a new planning application.

Mrs McKevitt: I understand that, but when a design team was organised you would assume that some detail and discussion would have taken place on health and safety issues, like the width of the exit onto Andersonstown Road and how many would fit in. Surely that was taken into consideration.

Mr Harkness: Can I explain? The concourses within a sports ground are a bit like a river. High up in a river it is very narrow and there is very little water in it, but, as tributaries arrive, the river gets wider and wider to accommodate the volume of the water. In the same way, the concourses in a stadium get wider towards the exits, because more people come out of the stands to join them, so, to keep the flow rates going, those need to get wider.

If, for example, the emergency exiting plan identified a need to use the exit at the south-east corner of the ground, which is the opposite end to the Andersonstown Road, you could not put people back through the river going to the narrow end, because you would create panic and crushing. On such a challenging site, it appears sensible to work out the emergency exiting flows and the flows of people around the ground in the event of an emergency, and to design those in so that you do not have narrowing concourses with people going through them. That is one example.

Mrs McKevitt: Was that done, in your opinion?

Mr Harkness: No.

Mrs McKevitt: OK. You spoke earlier about the judicial review and about capacity. Was that a factor in the judgement?

Mr Harkness: My understanding, from reading BBC reports, is that the judge made a comment that safety was an issue outside of the planning consideration. That is only my understanding, and that is from the media reports that I read.

Mrs McKevitt: It was outside of planning matters.

Mr Harkness: That is what I understand, yes.

Mrs McKevitt: Yet and all, then, we are looking at the design of a stadium and safety being joined together, but it is my understanding that Belfast City Council signs it off separately and does not have anything to do with the process. There are conversations along the way before a health and safety certificate is issued, but Windsor Park's certificate was issued only two weeks prior to its opening.

Mr Harkness: In order to maximise the likelihood of a safety certificate that reflected the physical capacity of the ground as being the safe capacity, Belfast City Council officers were invited to be on the STG, the idea being that once the plans were considered and approved by the STG, the people likely to be responsible for issuing a safety certificate were already content that the safe capacity would match the physical capacity.

Mrs McKevitt: There was talk of a management plan. Would that be the case for a lot of applications or stadiums?

Mr Harkness: Emergency exiting would be an element of the management plan. It would be a chapter in the management plan. You obviously have to have crowd management plans in normal circumstances. As I understand it, the view of the STG is that the stadium works in normal circumstances to its current design, or its former design. The big issue, however, is in an emergency, and the management plan would contain plans for dealing with a range of emergencies.

Mrs McKevitt: My understanding was that the certificate that was issued by Belfast City Council and used in the past was for a capacity of 32,000. You said that you did not know, and that you thought it was around 20,000.

Mr Harkness: I do not know the answer to that.

Mrs McKevitt: I thought it was 32,000. I think that was what it was, from previous presentations. In your opinion, can an exiting strategy be accommodated?

Mr Harkness: I am not a technical person. Sport NI relies on the STG, which is chaired by Paul Scott with contributions from the PSNI, the Ambulance Service, the Fire and Rescue Service and Belfast City Council. I am content that compliance with the opinion of that group is likely to maximise the chance of a safe capacity matching the physical capacity of the ground.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Just in respect of the question that Karen asked there, we had Rory Miskelly, Ciarán McGurk and Steven Trainor with us on 11 December 2014, four days before the final judgement in the judicial review. Rory Miskelly, in the anticipation that they would get a positive outcome from the judicial review, said that construction work would then start in January. Taking the Christmas holidays out of it, there would not have been much done to change the building between 11 December or 15 December and figures on the ground in January. It is obviously the case that at that point the intention, from the information that Rory Miskelly gave us, was that they intended to start work before the scheme had been amended, taking account of all the —

Mr Harkness: There is no guarantee that physical amendments would be required, but we need an emergency exiting plan that considers all the people flows and all the issues.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Thank you, yes. The difficulty for some of us is the terminology and all of these things. You folks have all the correct terminology, and we are not always quite spot on.

Mr Ó hOisín: Thanks for letting me back in, Chair. Is it not the case, Nick, that in January 2015 the board decided that safety matters were not an issue for it? Does this not indicate that Sport NI was taking a more passive role and avoiding any real accountability?

Mr Harkness: The presentation to the board happened in June 2014. At that stage, the board asked to be kept informed and to treat it as a corporate risk. The issue was then put on the corporate risk register. However, since Sport NI does not manage or fund the programme — we give advice on the programme — it went forward. The advice continued to be given, as illustrated by the events. Between those dates, it was on our risk register as a relationship risk. The board considered this in detail and considered that the health and safety risk belonged to DCAL and the Ulster council. It considered that the relationship risk was not relevant in these matters and should not be a consideration, and that SNI should continue to give the appropriate health and safety advice irrespective of relationship considerations. It therefore decided to remove the risk.

Mr Sloan: The board sought assurance from officers at that meeting that the appropriate advices were being given to DCAL, and that assurance was provided to the board.

Mr Ó hOisín: So you washed your hands of it.

Mr Sloan: Those are your words.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I think that that comment is inappropriate.

Mr Ó hOisín: OK, Chair. Was any formal question ever submitted to the SRO regarding the serious safety concerns to the extent that they were raised here by Paul Scott? Was there any formal correspondence at any point?

Mr Harkness: There was no formal correspondence —

Mr Ó hOisín: At no point.

Mr Harkness: — with the SRO, but I refer members to the correspondence between Antoinette McKeown and Peter May on 18 March and his reply on 28 March.

Mrs McKevitt: What tab is that at?

Mr Harkness: That is at tabs 15 and 16.

Mr Ó hOisín: Do you not find it a bit unusual that the SRO was not even copied in to any correspondence regarding serious safety concerns?

Mr Harkness: In Peter May's response, he confirms that he has been in consultation with the stadium team on the matter. I assume that that includes the SRO.

Mr Ó hOisín: But there is no formal written correspondence of that nature.

Mr Harkness: Not to Cynthia on the matter, but to Peter May.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): It went to the permanent secretary at the very top of the Department.

Mr Harkness: That is correct.

Mr B McCrea: Have any stadiums been built recently where the build capacity is greater than the safety certificate capacity?

Mr Harkness: I am not aware of any.

Mr B McCrea: Has there been any concern raised about the capacity of the Ulster Rugby stadium?

Mr Harkness: My knowledge of it is that Ulster Rugby has a safety certificate for 18,000, but it has not been populated to that level. It has been populated to around 16,000 or 16,500.

Mr B McCrea: I just want to take time to get this straight in my mind. There are two processes: one is the planning process, and the other is the safety process.

Mr Harkness: The certification process.

Mr B McCrea: Although these are two parallel processes, it would be usual to consider, in the first instance, whether a safety certificate is likely to stand some chance of being granted. Is that correct?

Mr Harkness: That is certainly the inference in the former permanent secretary's letter.

Mr B McCrea: Why would that be the case? Why would you want to check your emergency exiting safety certificate scheme, even though you do not have to do it until the last minute?

Mr Harkness: It is apparent that an emergency exiting plan for Ravenhill was not developed until later in the day. That was a result of the fact that there was a high level of confidence within the STG that the layout of the ground and the layout of the exits and the road infrastructure away from it could accommodate an emergency easily and that a safety management plan would illustrate that. In this case, right as far back as June 2010, there was an illustration of the challenging nature of this site. That concern was not alleviated in any way by the emanating plans. At one stage, the plans showed widening exits and using an exit at the south-east corner to get people away in an emergency. To some degree, there was a level of confidence that this matter was being dealt with.

Mr B McCrea: What are the unique characteristics of the Casement Park proposition that make it different from Ulster Rugby, for example?

Mr Harkness: It is the lack of circulation space around the ground, the number of exits and the constriction that exists in the exits other than the exits onto the Andersonstown Road.

Mr Sloan: That is due to the number of houses that back onto the perimeter of the stadium.

Mr B McCrea: So, no matter what stadium you build there, you will have serious challenges about emergency exiting schemes.

Mr Harkness: It is a challenging site. It is not an impossible site; it is a challenging site.

Mr B McCrea: OK. I now understand that the issue is really that some 75% of people were expected to enter and exit through the Andersonstown Road facilities, and that if they were not available you would have a problem. You have put in your pack here some plans that are stamped by the GAA that show increased flows. However, those flows indicate that you would have to knock down some houses.

Mr Harkness: In that design at that time, yes.

Mr B McCrea: If you were to go through that type of exercise — because one way of resolving this is to have more exiting at the bottom end of the stadium — would you have to redesign the plans for the stadium itself?

Mr Harkness: Yes. As I explained earlier, if you are going to reverse the flow of people through a concourse, you cannot reverse flow them into a concourse that narrows in width.

Mr B McCrea: Just to be clear, you are saying that it is significant that, although you can have an expanding funnel — in other words, it is wider as you go further down — and that is OK and, in fact, it is a good thing —

Mr Harkness: Especially as more people arrive, yes.

Mr B McCrea: If you have to go the other way because you have to exit from the opposite end, your funnel actually becomes a negative, because it leads to crushing.

Mr Harkness: Constriction; yes.

Mr B McCrea: So even if any new plan that is being brought forward and talked about for now, August or whenever were to adopt the different emergency exiting schemes outlined in this, it would need to have some redesign work done to account for flows and widening or narrowing of the concourse.

Mr Harkness: I believe that that is likely, yes.

Mr McMullan: You state that the minutes and reports of STG meetings in 2013 that were provided to DCAL repeatedly raised concerns about the potential for crushing. In how many of these notes or reports is that specifically mentioned? How much was mentioned about Casement Park specifically? Or was it a generic —

Mr Harkness: No, this was specific to the emergency exiting sections of the reports to do with Casement Park.

Mr McMullan: And nothing else.

Mr Harkness: That is correct.

Mr McMullan: We talked about stepping outside the green book, etc. How many times did we step outside the green book?

Mr Harkness: I do not have the detail of the technical compliance with the green book and how many. However, emergency exiting, uncovered seating and perimeter circulation space are three significant deviations from the red guide.

Mr McMullan: Yes. Did Belfast City Council see the plans when they were put in?

Mr Harkness: Yes, it did.

Mr Sloan: Through its membership on the STG.

Mr McMullan: Was it happy with them going forward to planning?

Mr Harkness: No. It contributed to the reports that raised the concerns as summarised at the bottom of page 1 at tab 3 of my summary. It contributed to those concerns.

Mr McMullan: Did it specifically say in that that it would not like to see the plans going forward?

Mr Harkness: It was not the STG's decision as to when and if the plans went forward. It is asked for a reference point in relation to compliance with the red guide or not.

Mr McMullan: Sorry, the red guide?

Mr Harkness: The red guide, yes. The Northern Ireland guide is the red guide. The green guide is the GB guide.

Mr McMullan: We do not go by the green guide, then.

Mr Harkness: The green guide is what the red guide was based on. The green guide existed beforehand, and the red guide was developed in relation to the legislation in Northern Ireland.

Mr McMullan: We only deal with the red guide?

Mr Harkness: That is correct. The red guide is the guide that is relevant to Northern Ireland, but it is based primarily on the contents of the green guide. It is updated, actually.

Mr McMullan: We do not need the green guide.

Mr Harkness: That is correct. The red guide is the relevant one here.

Mr McMullan: So, anywhere along the line, did Belfast City Council raise concerns about this going forward for planning?

Mr Harkness: Belfast City Council was part of the STG that, in summary, requested that:

— with the current design in the event of an emergency —

Belfast City Council was part of the group that considered that and gave those opinions.

Mr McMullan: Yes, but nowhere did it say that planning should not go ahead.

Mr B McCrea: Is that not its role?

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I think that the point that has been made by Mr McCrea is important. We cannot expect the city council to do somebody else's work for them; it is the applicants who make the application, and they make the decisions.

Mr McMullan: This is what we are trying to tease out here. I appreciate that.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): The city council was not an applicant.

Mr McMullan: Basil was talking about the changes to the plans — this widening out and all. That has to do with the flow times.

Mr Harkness: Yes, it has to do with the flow time. However, the point I am making is that you just cannot decide, later in the day, that you are going to use the exit in the south-east corner in the event of an emergency. There is a very steep bank to it, so that would need to be designed in, with a ramp or steps or whatever. As well as that, the flows to get to that need to be designed in. You just cannot decide, after a plan is locked down, to reverse the flows of people. That does not work.

Mr McMullan: Would it be a fair assumption that the original plans were flawed, and that this flow time was not correct? From what you say, Belfast City Council raised those concerns on the numbers going out of the concourses, etc. So, therefore, the flow time —

Mr Harkness: The flow time worked in normal circumstances. That is correct.

Mr McMullan: No, but the flow time on the original drawing must have been flawed, then.

Mr Sloan: The STG had not signed off the plans that were submitted for planning.

Mr McMullan: Then the original plans were flawed.

Mr Harkness: No. The truth of the matter is that there are no safety management plans which illustrate whether they are flawed. The STG has come to the conclusion that it cannot see how a safety management plan would get people out in eight minutes in the event of an emergency close to the Andersonstown Road. In my view, the STG was stepping back and saying: "There may be something that we have not thought about. There may be some imaginative way that we have not come up with. Maybe the design team has some other way. Set it on a piece of paper and let us consider it, and then we will get our slide rules and calculators and we will work it out." However, since that was asked for as far back as 2013, it has never appeared, so that work cannot be done. Maybe there is a magic wand somewhere that will make it work, but it has not yet been brought out from under the table.

Mr McMullan: Surely the words "maybe" and "might" do not come into safety. This is the whole point: the original drawings that were put in for planning did not have the proper flow times in them.

Mr Harkness: In the event of an emergency, I have no evidence to say that they have the correct flow times. In the event of an emergency on the Andersonstown Road, the STG is not confident, and has no evidence to conclude, that the flow times would be appropriate — no evidence to suggest that.

Mr McMullan: So flawed plans were put forward.

Mr Harkness: There is no evidence that unflawed plans have been put forward. That is slightly different.

Mr McMullan: Do you agree, then, that part of the system that we are looking at today — the whole system of putting forward stadiums for planning and safety — is flawed and needs to be looked at for the future?

Mr B McCrea: Fair point.

Mr McMullan: That is the point that I am making. Do you agree with that?

Mr Harkness: The indication at the early stage from Rosalie Flanagan that the Department would sign off the plans for submission to planning permission only when the STG was content is an important and valuable principle to apply.

Mr McMullan: Yes. I think that, if anything comes out of this inquiry, this could be one of the main things: the system we have of going forward with plans for stadia needs to be looked at. In some of these cases, in parts of it, the cart seems to go before the horse.

Mr Harkness: I do not disagree with that.

Mr B McCrea: That is a good point.

Mr Dunne: Thank you very much, gentlemen. You have been very informative. I think that Oliver has covered most of it. Andrew, you have not said an awful lot, but you have mentioned this a couple of times in relation to the drawings that got full planning permission for Casement Park. I just want clarification that the STG as a group — the group that has been working on the project — did not sign off the plans prior to submission to the Planning Service for approval: is that correct?

Mr Sloan: It is correct

Mr Dunne: Why was that?

Mr Sloan: Because it had not been provided with any emergency exiting plan that it could assess as being compliant with the red book.

Mr Dunne: Thank you very much.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Again, I thank you for your useful presentation today, the answers to questions and the paperwork that was provided. The material between pages 19 and 24 of our documentation — the detailed timeline of all the exchanges with the Department — has been extremely helpful. It makes absolutely clear that the issue of emergency exiting was one that Sport NI raised repeatedly throughout the process. The question that we have then to answer from elsewhere is whether people were listening. Thank you. That has been excellent.