Official Report: Monday 20 October 2014


The Assembly met at 12:00 pm (Mr Deputy Speaker [Mr Dallat] in the Chair).
Members observed two minutes' silence.

Assembly Business

Mr Weir: I beg to move

That Standing Orders 10(2) to 10(4) be suspended for Monday 20 October 2014.

Mr Campbell: On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. It is not related to this item of business. It is not a challenge to the ruling at all but purely for clarity. Last Tuesday, the Principal Deputy Speaker announced the outcome of an investigation into the honourable Member for North Antrim Mr Allister and curtailed his oral contributions in the Chamber over the next few weeks. Just for clarity, I want to establish whether it is the intention of the ruling to prevent Mr Allister putting down incisive, forensic and analytical written questions like the ones he did about the cost and condition of mint imperials in the Chamber.

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Dallat): I understand that Mr Allister has been informed of what the situation is, and, yes, his speaking opportunities will be curtailed.

Before we proceed to the Question, I remind Members that this motion requires cross-community support.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved (with cross-community support):

That Standing Orders 10(2) to 10(4) be suspended for Monday 20 October 2014.

Ministerial Statement

Mrs O'Neill (The Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development): Go raibh maith agat, a LeasCheann Comhairle. With your permission, I wish to make a statement in compliance with section 52 of the 1998 Act regarding the 23rd meeting of the North/South Ministerial Council (NSMC) in the agriculture sector, which was held in Armagh on Wednesday 1 October. The Executive were represented by Minister Simon Hamilton and me, and the Dublin Government were represented by Simon Coveney TD, Minister in the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine (DAFM), and Alan Kelly TD, Minister in the Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government (DECLG).

I chaired the meeting on this occasion and have agreed the statement with the accompanying Minister, Minister Hamilton.

Ministers had a discussion on potential priorities for the agriculture sector and noted that those will be contained in a report to be considered at a future NSMC institutional meeting as part of the ongoing review into sectoral priorities.

On current sectoral priorities, Ministers noted the progress made in addressing key issues affecting the beef sector and agreed to continue to work together to secure a sustainable beef industry in both jurisdictions.

The Council noted that implementation plans have been adopted by DAFM and DARD for the common agricultural policy reforms agreed in 2013. Ministers agreed that officials from DAFM and DARD will monitor the development of the implementation process for pillar I and pillar 2 decisions. Ministers also noted that both Administrations are in the process of seeking approval from the European Commission for their respective rural development programmes 2014-2020, with DAFM having submitted its draft programme in July 2014 and DARD due to submit its programme later this month.

Ministers noted that DARD and DAFM have developed a protocol for the cross-border movement of larch logs infected with Phytophthora ramorum. It was noted that an all-Ireland Chalara/ash dieback conference took place in May 2014 and that DARD and DAFM are in the process of summarising stakeholders’ responses to key questions. That should assist in informing future policy development.

Ministers welcomed the continued work on the delivery of the all-island animal health and welfare strategy action plan, including the completed review of common disease surveillance priorities and the commitment to cooperation in areas of mutual benefit; the agreement by DARD and DAFM of a common chapter dealing with control arrangements for African horse sickness; the coming into operation of the Welfare of Animals at the Time Of Killing Regulations 2014; the progress made by DARD towards officially brucellosis-free (OBF) status, with DAFM now considering an appropriate OBF monitoring regime following the expiry of the mandatory five years; the progress made by DAFM officials to develop a code of practice for wild animals in circuses; and the achievement of an agreement in principle to a joint contingency approach on rendering facilities.

Ministers agreed the provision of proactive support by DARD and DECLG for LEADER cooperation activities, including a specific focus on North/South cooperation. The Council welcomed the intention of the steering committee on cross-border rural development to proactively promote the development of rural recreation as a key driver in successful rural regeneration. It noted that the rural development projects funded through EU INTERREG IVa are nearing completion and that a synopsis of the impacts and achievements of the rural development theme will be presented to the Council at a future meeting.

Ministers welcomed an event taking place later that day to mark the success of the Clones Erne East Blackwater project and the redevelopment of the canal stores building.

The NSMC approved the appointment of Mr Raymond Dolan as the new chief executive officer of the Food Safety Promotion Board (FSPB) with effect from 1 October. The Council also approved the appointment of Ms Margaret Hearty as acting CEO of the Trade and Business Development Body — InterTradeIreland — on an interim basis.

The Council agreed to hold the next agriculture sector meeting in spring 2015.

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Dallat): Before calling the next Member to speak, I welcome Mr Maurice Devenney as a new Member for the DUP. I had the opportunity to meet Maurice earlier when he signed in. I hope that you have a long and happy career in the Northern Ireland Assembly.

Mr Irwin (The Chairperson of the Committee for Agriculture and Rural Development): I thank the Minister for her statement. She referred to the key issues affecting the beef sector and said that there is an agreement to work together to secure a sustainable beef industry. Will the Minister expand on that, please?

Mrs O'Neill: There are current and real issues affecting the beef sector, and the Member will be acutely aware of the issue of nomadic cattle. We had quite a lengthy discussion on how we can work together on that issue. From the discussion, it was very clear that we need to engage continually with the retailers to accept such cattle. It is a long tradition of trade right across the island. We have agreed to hold a number of meetings with the Retail Consortium to discuss those issues. I have agreed a voluntary label, and we want the industry to accept that. We are awaiting some more confirmation on some more discussions on that. The principal underlying issue affecting the beef sector is profitability. Even when prices were good, profitability was still an issue. There are real issues to tackle, and I look forward to being able to work with Minister Coveney, particularly on our new rural development programmes and on how we can support the beef sector in particular through all the programmes that we have outlined.

Mr McMullan: Go raibh maith agat, a LeasCheann Comhairle. I thank the Minister for her statement. Minister, you referred to the development of a code of practice for wild animals in circuses. Will you outline what progress has been made to date?

Mrs O'Neill: I am keen to take that forward. We have set up a working group to look at the issue. As I have said previously, it is important to note that there are no circuses based here; however, there are circuses in the Twenty-six Counties that travel, and it is important that we work together to agree a clear protocol and have that in place. To date, DARD has agreed a protocol with DAFM that provides for an inspection of animals from those registered circuses before they move back into the Twenty-six Counties. I have raised the issue of wild animals in travelling circuses over the last number of NSMC meetings, and we have had regular updates from officials. Our officials continue to work within the auspices of the North/South animal welfare and transport working group. Officials will report back to Minister Coveney and to me when they have considered all of the information available to them, but we are making progress towards having a protocol and ensuring that we are providing inspection. DARD will provide that inspection where it is needed.

Mr Byrne: I thank the Minister for her statement. Will she further enlighten us on what progress has been made on the beef situation? Is legislation being seriously considered to provide cost-of-production pricing plus some profit margin for farmers? She will be aware that there are some lobbying groups who want legislation, and they want this Assembly to deal directly with Brussels in order to see what can be explored in that regard.

Mrs O'Neill: Absolutely. I support that principle in concept, and I am aware of the lobby. We are trying to scope out what we can do. I am very happy to go to Brussels and ask for a change in legislation where needed. The core issue affecting the beef sector is the fact that it is not profitable. Even when prices were high, profitability was an issue. That is what we need to grasp and tackle. We need to have a serious focus on the issue of efficiency in the beef sector. The core of the new rural development programme will be the new grants schemes and such, and we need to put a lot of emphasis and effort on supporting the beef sector so that it can become more efficient and profitable as a result.

Mrs Dobson: I also thank the Minister for her statement. I noted with interest the reference to circus animals, as was pointed out by Oliver McMullan, but will the Minister expand on what is meant by:

"agreement, in principle, to a joint contingency approach on rendering facilities."?

Furthermore, what agreement has been made?

Mrs O'Neill: It means just what it says; that we have agreed, in principle, for officials to do the work and bring forward proposals for us to be able to have plans in place when we come to deal with rendering facilities. Really, that is what it is: there is political agreement for that to happen. Officials have been tasked to go ahead and do the homework on it and then bring that work to the next NSMC meeting.

Mr McCarthy: I thank the Minister for her statement this morning. Her statement references the all-Ireland ash die-back conference, which took place in May 2014. Will the Minister advise the Assembly whether this disease has been overcome throughout the island and whether an assessment has been made of the financial cost to both parts of the island as a result of that disease?

Mrs O'Neill: It certainly has not been overcome, and we continue to deal with it. We have a strategy across the island to work together and to tackle it. One benefit of that strategy is that it is moveable, depending on the disease status and how things change. We continue to put significant resources into tackling the outbreak of P ramorum. Tree disease is high up the agenda in the work that the Forest Service is taking forward. Forest Service also works very closely on the ground with, and is very dependent on the cooperation of, landowners. We are very grateful for that cooperation. I do not have the figures, but there is a cost there in revenue loss, and I am happy to provide that to the Member in writing.

Mr Buchanan: I also thank the Minster for her statement. In her response to the Chair of the Committee, she mentioned nomadic cattle. When will this matter be resolved, as it is a huge issue for the beef finishers here in Northern Ireland?


12.15 pm

Mrs O'Neill: I am very keen for it to be resolved ASAP. For my part, I have done what I can do, which was to approve a voluntary label. It is now in the hands of the industry as to whether it accepts that label. I have made it very clear to all the big players that I want the label. The label is acceptable and is fully compliant with EU legislation. It is now up to them to accept it. Minister Coveney and I are meeting the key retailers to ask them to accept the approved voluntary label.

As I said, there has been a long tradition of trade, and quite a number of cattle have been traded in that way over the years. We do not want to disrupt that trade, so I am very keen to get it resolved ASAP.

Mr Poots: I see that you discussed animal disease at the North/South Ministerial Council meeting. What are the figures for TB in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland? What is the comparison? What steps are they taking in the Republic of Ireland and what can we learn from them to eradicate and reduce TB in Northern Ireland?

Mrs O'Neill: That is a regular item for discussion at NSMC meetings. I do not have the figures for their levels of TB, but I can tell you what our figures are. I am glad to say that our stats are on a downwards trend. We went from about 7·46% last year to just over 6% this year. So, there certainly has been progress, and hopefully that downward trend will continue.

I suppose that we approach things differently. The South culls in certain areas. That is obviously not the route that I have taken, although I know that there are some out there who would like that to be the case. We have set up the TB strategic partnership group, which has been tasked with the development of a comprehensive and practical strategy and an implementation plan to secure the progressive reduction of disease levels and the associated costs. We also have our EU eradication plan, which is worth about £5 million. So, a lot of work is going on.

I do not have the figures for the levels in the South, but I am very happy to provide that information to the Member in writing. However, it is suffice to say that having a different disease status affects trade across the island. I intend to have the same disease status across the island for TB and other diseases. We are getting there with brucellosis and hope to have our stat-free status next year. We have a way to go with TB, but it is a priority to drive it out in as quickly a manner as possible.

Mr Elliott: I thank the Minister for her brief statement. She mentioned the Clones Erne East Blackwater project. What stage is the section of the Ulster canal project at? I think that funding from the Irish Government for that has been agreed or, at least, promised, but that does not seem to have progressed.

Mrs O'Neill: I do not have the detail of that here, but there will certainly be opportunities to look at that type of project under the next rural development programme. I think that there will be funding opportunities. One of the areas that we discussed with the new Minister who is in charge of rural development in the South, Minister Kelly, was a potential strategic project. I am certainly up for playing my role to make sure that we can restore the canal to its former glory.

Assembly Business

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Dallat): Before we continue with today's business, I wish to inform the House that I have been informed by the Chief Electoral Officer that Mr Maurice Devenney has been returned as a Member of the Assembly for the Foyle constituency to fill the vacancy resulting from the resignation of Mr William Hay. This morning, Mr Devenney signed the Roll of Membership and entered his designation in my presence and that of the Clerk to the Assembly. Mr Devenney has taken his seat. I again welcome him to the Assembly and wish him every success.

Private Members' Business

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Dallat): I call the Lord Morrow to move the Consideration Stage of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Further Provisions and Support for Victims) Bill.

Moved. — [Lord Morrow.]

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Dallat): Members will have a copy of the Marshalled List of amendments detailing the order for consideration. The amendments have been grouped for debate in the provisional grouping of amendments selected list.

There are five groups of amendments, and we will debate the amendments in each group in turn. The first debate will be on offences and penalties. This group comprises amendment Nos 1 through to 23, and amendment Nos 27, 40, 50, 60 and 61 as well as opposition to clauses 1, 2, 4 and 5 standing part.

The group 2 debate will be on amendment Nos 24 to 26 and 62 and opposition to clauses 7 and 15 standing part. This group deals with strategy and prevention.

The third debate deals with paying for sexual services. This group is made up of amendment Nos 28 to 39 and opposition to clause 6 standing part.

Group 4 deals with assistance, support and protection for victims of human trafficking and assistance for those wishing to exit prostitution. The debate will be on amendment Nos 41 to 49, 51 to 53 and opposition to clauses 8, 9, 10, 12 and 14 standing part.

The group 5 technical and commencement debate will be on amendment Nos 54 to 59, 63 and 64 and opposition to clauses 17 and 18 standing part.

I remind Members who intend to speak that, during the debates on the five groups of amendments, they should address all the amendments in each group on which they wish to comment. Once the debate on each group is completed, any further amendments in the group will be moved formally as we go through the Bill and the Question on each will be put without further debate. The Questions on stand part will be taken at the appropriate points in the Bill.

If that is clear, we shall proceed.

Clause 1 (Definition of human trafficking and slavery offences)

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Dallat): We now come to the first group for debate, which concerns amendment Nos 1 to 23, and amendment Nos 27, 40, 50, 60 and 61 as well as opposition to clauses 1, 2, 4 and 5 standing part. These amendments provide for new offences, penalties and minimum sentencing in relation to human trafficking, slavery and exploitation. A new offence of forced marriage is also included.

Members will note that amendment Nos 1 to 4 are mutually exclusive with clause 1 standing part; amendment Nos 3 to 6, 12, 15, 21 to 23, 27 and 50 are consequential to amendment Nos 1 and 2; amendment No 18 is consequential to amendment No 17; amendment No 60 is consequential to amendment No 22; and amendment No 61 is consequential to amendment Nos 1, 2, 4 and 23.

I call Lord Morrow to address his opposition to clause 1 and to address the other oppositions and amendments in the group.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The following amendments stood on the Marshalled List:

No 1: After clause 1 insert

"Slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour
 
1A.—(1) A person ("A") commits an offence if—
 
(a) A holds another person ("B") in slavery or servitude and the circumstances are such that A knows or ought to know that B is held in slavery or servitude, or
 
(b) A requires B to perform forced or compulsory labour and the circumstances are such that A knows or ought to know that B is being required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
 
(2) In subsection (1) the references to holding B in slavery or servitude or requiring B to perform forced or compulsory labour are to be construed in accordance with Article 4 of the Human Rights Convention.
 
(3) In determining whether B is being held in slavery or servitude or required to perform forced or compulsory labour regard may be had to all the circumstances.
 
(4) In particular, regard may be had to any of B’s personal circumstances which may make B more vulnerable than other persons such as, for example—
 
(a) that B is a child or a vulnerable adult; or
 
(b) that A is a member of B’s family.
 
(5) The consent of B to any act which forms part of an offence under this section is irrelevant.
 
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life.".

No 2: After clause 1 insert

"Human trafficking
 
1B.—(1) A person ("A") commits an offence if A arranges or facilitates the travel of another person ("B") with a view to B being exploited.
 
(2) A may in particular arrange or facilitate B’s travel by recruiting B, transporting or transferring B, harbouring or receiving B, or transferring or exchanging control over B.
 
(3) A arranges or facilitates B’s travel with a view to B being exploited only if—
 
(a) A intends to exploit B (in any part of the world) during or after the travel, or
 
(b) A knows or ought to know that another person is likely to exploit B (in any part of the world) during or after the travel.
 
(4) "Travel" means—
 
(a) arriving in, or entering, any country,
 
(b) departing from any country,
 
(c) travelling within any country.
 
(5) The consent of B to any act which forms part of an offence under this section is irrelevant.
 
(6) A person to whom this subsection applies commits an offence under this section regardless of—
 
(a) where the arranging or facilitating takes place, or
 
(b) where the travel takes place.
 
(7) Any other person commits an offence under this section if—
 
(a) any part of the arranging or facilitating takes place in the United Kingdom, or
 
(b) the travel consists of arrival in or entry into, departure from, or travel within the United Kingdom.
 
(8) Subsection (6) applies to—
 
(a) a UK national;
 
(b) a person who at the time of the offence was habitually resident in Northern Ireland; and
 
(c) a body incorporated under the law of a part of the United Kingdom.
 
(9) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life.".

No 3: After clause 1 insert

"Meaning of exploitation for purposes of section 1B
 
1C.—(1) For the purposes of section 1B, a person is exploited only if one or more of the following subsections apply in relation to the person.
 
Slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour
 
(2) The person is the victim of behaviour—
 
(a) which involves the commission of an offence under section 1A, or
 
(b) which would involve the commission of an offence under that section if it took place in Northern Ireland.
 
Sexual exploitation
 
(3) Something is done to or in respect of the person—
 
(a) which involves the commission of an offence under—
 
(i) Article 3(1)(a) of the Protection of Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (indecent photographs of children), or
 
(ii) any provision of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (sexual offences), or
 
(b) which would involve the commission of such an offence if it were done in Northern Ireland.
 
Removal of organs etc.
 
(4) The person is encouraged, required or expected to do anything—
 
(a) which involves the commission, by him or her or another person, of an offence under section 32 or 33 of the Human Tissue Act 2004 (prohibition of commercial dealings in organs and restrictions on use of live donors) in Northern Ireland, or
 
(b) which would involve the commission of such an offence, by him or her or another person, if it were done in Northern Ireland.
 
Securing services etc. by force, threats or deception
 
(5) The person is subjected to force, threats, abduction, coercion, fraud or deception designed to induce him or her—
 
(a) to provide services of any kind,
 
(b) to provide another person with benefits of any kind, or
 
(c) to enable another person to acquire benefits of any kind;
 
and for the purposes of this subsection "benefits" includes the proceeds of forced begging or of criminal activities.
 
Securing services etc. from children and vulnerable persons
 
(6) Another person uses or attempts to use the person for a purpose within paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of subsection (5), having chosen him or her for that purpose on the grounds that—
 
(a) he or she is a child or a vulnerable adult or is a member of the other person’s family or the other person is in a position of trust in relation to him or her; and
 
(b) a person who was not within paragraph (a) would be likely to refuse to be used for that purpose."

No 4: After clause 1 insert

"Committing offence with intent to commit offence under section 1A or 1B
 
1D.—(1) A person commits an offence under this section if the person commits any offence with the intention of committing an offence under section 1A or 1B (including an offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring an offence under that section).
 
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is (unless subsection (3) applies) liable—
 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years;
 
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
 
(3) Where the offence under this section is committed by kidnapping or false imprisonment, a person guilty of that offence is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.".

No 5: After clause 2 insert

"Sentencing for offences under section 1A or 1B
 
Offences to be serious offences for purposes of sentencing
 
2A.—(1) The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 is amended as follows.
 
(2) In Schedule 1 (serious offences for purposes of sentencing dangerous offenders) after paragraph 31 insert—
 
"The Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014
31A. An offence under—
 
section 1A (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
section 1B (human trafficking).".
 
(3) In Part 1 of Schedule 2 (specified violent offences for purposes of sentencing dangerous offenders) after paragraph 31 insert—
 
"The Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014
 
31A. An offence under—
 
section 1A (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
section 1B (human trafficking) which is not within Part 2 of this Schedule.".
 
(4) In Part 2 of Schedule 2 (specified sexual offences for purposes of sentencing dangerous offenders) after paragraph 14 insert—
 
"The Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014
 
"14A. An offence under section 1B (human trafficking) committed with a view to exploitation that consists of or includes behaviour within section 1C(3) of that Act (sexual exploitation)."".

No 6: In clause 3, page 2, line 9, leave out

"a human trafficking offence or a slavery offence"

and insert

"an offence under section 1A or 1B".

No 7: In clause 3, page 2, line 13, leave out "family member" and insert "member of the family".

No 8: In clause 3, page 2, line 15, leave out "a victim who was".

No 9: In clause 3, page 2, line 17, leave out "the victim’s family" and insert

"a member of the family of the victim".

No 10: In clause 3, page 2, line 19, leave out "offence" and insert "offender".

No 10: In clause 3, page 2, line 19, leave out "offence" and insert "offender".

No 11: In clause 3, page 2, line 21, leave out

"was committed by use of serious violence or".

No 12: In clause 3, page 2, leave out line 24 and insert

"—
 
(i) of an offence under section 1A or 1B;
 
(ii) of an offence under any provision repealed by this Act;
 
(iii) in respect of anything done outside Northern Ireland which was not an offence mentioned in paragraph (i) or (ii) but would have been such an offence if done in Northern Ireland.".

No 13: In clause 3, page 2, leave out lines 26 and 27 and insert

"‘"public official" means—
 
(a) a member of the Northern Ireland civil service or the United Kingdom civil service;
 
(b) a person employed by a body established by an Act of Parliament or by Northern Ireland legislation;
 
(c) the holder of an office established by an Act of Parliament or by Northern Ireland legislation;
 
(d) a police officer;".

No 14: In clause 3, page 2, leave out lines 30 to 34.

No 15: In clause 4, page 2, line 36, leave out

"a human trafficking offence or a slavery offence"

and insert

"an offence under section 1A or 1B.".

No 16: In clause 4, page 2, line 37, at end insert

"and that individual was aged 18 or over when the offence was committed".

No 17: In clause 4, page 2, line 41, at end insert

"(2A) If there are exceptional circumstances which justify—
 
(a) the imposition of a lesser sentence than that provided for under subsection (2); or
 
(b) the exercise by the court of its powers under section 18 of the Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968;
 
the court shall state in open court that it is of the opinion that such exceptional circumstances exist and the reasons for that opinion.".

No 17: In clause 4, page 2, line 41, at end insert

"(2A) If there are exceptional circumstances which justify—
 
(a) the imposition of a lesser sentence than that provided for under subsection (2); or
 
(b) the exercise by the court of its powers under section 18 of the Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968;
 
the court shall state in open court that it is of the opinion that such exceptional circumstances exist and the reasons for that opinion.".

No 18: In clause 4, page 2, line 41, at end insert

"(2B) Where subsection (3) applies the Chief Clerk shall record both the opinion of the court that exceptional circumstances exist and the reasons stated in open court which justify either the imposition of a lesser sentence or the exercise of its powers under section 18 of the Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 as the case may be.".

No 19: In clause 4, page 2, line 41, at end insert

"(2C) For the purposes of subsection (2) the words "custodial sentence" shall not include a sentence in relation to which the court has made an order under section 18 of the Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968.".

No 20: In clause 4, page 2, line 41, at end insert

"(2D) In section 36 (review of sentencing) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 in subsection (9)(b) omit the ‘and’ at the end of the subsection and after subsection (9)(c) insert—
 
"and
 
(d) subsection (2)(b) shall be read as if it included a reference to a sentence required by section 4(2) of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014.".
 
(2E) The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 is amended as follows—
 
(a) in Article 2(9) (interpretation of references to sentences falling to be imposed under various statutory provisions) after "2006" insert "or section 4(2) of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014";
 
(b) in each of —
 
(i) Article 4(1) (power to discharge defendant except in specified circumstances),
 
(ii) Article 10(1) (power to impose probation order except in specified cases),
 
(iii) Article 13(1) (power to impose community service order except in specified cases),
 
(iv) Article 15(1) (power to impose combination order except in specified circumstances),
 
after "2008" insert "or section 4(2) of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014".
 
(2F) In the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008—
 
(a) in Article 5 (restrictions on imposing certain custodial sentences) in paragraph (1)(b) omit "or" at the end add of paragraph (ii) and after paragraph (iii) add—
 
"or
(iv) section 4(2) of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014.";
 
(b) in Article 7 (length of custodial sentence) in paragraph (3) at the end add—
 
"(c) section 4(2) of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014.".".

No 21: After clause 5 insert

"Orders that may be made on conviction of offence under section 1A or 1B
 
Confiscation of assets
 
5A.—(1) Schedule 5 to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (criminal lifestyle offences in Northern Ireland) is amended as follows.
(2) After paragraph 3 insert—
 
"Slavery, etc.
 
3A. An offence under section 1A of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour)."
 
(3) In paragraph 4 (people trafficking) at the end insert—
 
"(4) An offence under section 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 (human trafficking).".".

No 22: After clause 5 insert

"Detention and forfeiture of certain vehicles, ships and aircraft
 
5B. Schedule 1 (which makes provision for, and in connection with, the detention and forfeiture of certain vehicles, ships and aircraft used or intended to be used in connection with offences under section 1A or 1B) has effect.".

No 23: After clause 5 insert

"Slavery and trafficking reparation orders
 
5C. Schedule 2 (which makes provision for, and in connection with, slavery and trafficking reparation orders) has effect.".

No 27: After clause 5 insert

"Investigation and prosecution of offences under section 1A or 1B
 
5G.—(1) The investigation or prosecution of an offence under section 1A or 1B is not dependent on the victim reporting the offence or accusing a person of committing the offence.
 
(2) Proceedings for an offence under section 1A or 1B may be commenced or continued even if the victim of the offence has withdrawn any statement made in relation to the offence.".

No 40: After clause 6 insert

"Offence of forced marriage
 
Offence of forced marriage
 
6B.—(1) A person commits an offence if he or she—
 
(a) uses violence, threats or any other form of coercion for the purpose of causing another person to enter into a marriage, and
 
(b) believes, or ought reasonably to believe, that the conduct may cause the other person to enter into the marriage without free and full consent.
 
(2) It is irrelevant whether the conduct mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) is directed at the victim of the offence under that subsection or another person.
 
(3) In relation to a victim who is incapable of consenting by reason of mental disorder, the offence under subsection (1) is capable of being committed by any conduct carried out for the purpose of causing the victim to enter into a marriage (whether or not the conduct amounts to violence, threats or any other form of coercion).
 
(4) In this section—
 
"marriage" means any religious or civil ceremony of marriage (whether or not legally binding);
 
"mental disorder" has the meaning given by the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986.
 
(5) A person commits an offence if he or she—
 
(a) practises any form of deception with the intention of causing another person to leave the United Kingdom, and
 
(b) intends the other person to be subjected to conduct outside the United Kingdom that is an offence under subsection (1) or would be an offence under that subsection if the victim were in Northern Ireland.
 
(6) A person commits an offence under subsection (1) or (5) only if, at the time of the conduct or deception—
 
(a) the person or the victim or both of them are in Northern Ireland,
 
(b) neither the person nor the victim is in Northern Ireland but at least one of them is habitually resident in Northern Ireland, or
 
(c) neither the person nor the victim is in the United Kingdom but at least one of them is a UK national.
 
(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;
 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years.".

No 50: In clause 13, page 8, line 7, leave out "a human trafficking offence" and insert

"an offence under section 1A or 1B".

No 60: After clause 19 insert

‘SCHEDULES
 
SCHEDULE 1
 
DETENTION AND FORFEITURE OF CERTAIN VEHICLES, SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT
 
FORFEITURE ON CONVICTION OF OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 1A OR 1B
 
1.—(1) This paragraph applies if a person is convicted of an offence under section 1A or 1B.
 
(2) The court may order the forfeiture of a land vehicle used or intended to be used in connection with the offence if the convicted person—
 
(a) owned the vehicle at the time the offence was committed,
 
(b) was at that time a director, secretary or manager of a company which owned the vehicle,
 
(c) was at that time in possession of the vehicle under a hire-purchase agreement,
 
(d) was at that time a director, secretary or manager of a company which was in possession of the vehicle under a hire-purchase agreement, or
 
(e) was driving the vehicle in the course of the commission of the offence.
 
(3) The court may order the forfeiture of a ship or aircraft used or intended to be used in connection with the offence if the convicted person—
 
(a) owned the ship or aircraft at the time the offence was committed,
 
(b) was at that time a director, secretary or manager of a company which owned the ship or aircraft,
 
(c) was at that time in possession of the ship or aircraft under a hire purchase agreement,
 
(d) was at that time a director, secretary or manager of a company which was in possession of the ship or aircraft under a hire-purchase agreement,
 
(e) was at that time a charterer of the ship or aircraft, or
 
(f) committed the offence while acting as captain of the ship or aircraft.
 
(4) But where sub-paragraph (3)(a) or (b) does not apply to the convicted person, forfeiture of a ship or aircraft may be ordered only if sub-paragraph (5) applies or—
 
(a) in the case of a ship (other than a hovercraft), its gross tonnage is less than 500 tons;
 
(b) in the case of an aircraft, the maximum weight at which it may take off in accordance with its certificate of airworthiness is less than 5,700 kilogrammes.
 
(5) This sub-paragraph applies where a person who, at the time the offence was committed—
 
(a) owned the ship or aircraft, or
 
(b) was a director, secretary or manager of a company which owned it,
 
knew or ought to have known of the intention to use it in the course of the commission of an offence under section 1A or 1B.
 
(6) Where a person who claims to have an interest in a land vehicle, ship or aircraft applies to a court to make representations about its forfeiture, the court may not order its forfeiture without giving the person an opportunity to make representations.
 
DETENTION OF CERTAIN VEHICLES, SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT
 
2.—(1) If a person ("P") has been arrested for an offence under section 1A or 1B, a constable may detain a relevant land vehicle, ship or aircraft.
 
(2) A land vehicle, ship or aircraft is relevant if the constable has reasonable grounds to believe that an order for its forfeiture could be made under paragraph 1 if P were convicted of the offence.
 
(3) The land vehicle, ship or aircraft may be detained—
 
(a) until a decision is taken as to whether or not to charge P with the offence,
 
(b) if P has been charged, until P is acquitted, the charge against P is dismissed or the proceedings are discontinued, or
 
(c) if P has been charged and convicted, until the court decides whether or not to order forfeiture of the vehicle, ship or aircraft.
 
(4) A person (other than P) may apply to the court for the release of the land vehicle, ship or aircraft on the grounds that the person—
 
(a) owns the vehicle, ship or aircraft,
 
(b) was, immediately before the detention of the vehicle, ship or aircraft, in possession of it under a hire-purchase agreement, or
 
(c) is a charterer of the ship or aircraft.
 
(5) The court to which an application is made under sub-paragraph (4) may, if satisfactory security or surety is tendered, release the land vehicle, ship or aircraft on condition that it is made available to the court if—
 
(a) P is convicted, and
 
(b) an order for its forfeiture is made under paragraph 1.
 
(6) In this paragraph "the court" means—
 
(a) if P has not been charged, or P has been charged but proceedings for the offence have not begun to be heard, a magistrates’ court;
 
(b) if P has been charged and proceedings for the offence have begun to be heard, the court hearing the proceedings.
 
INTERPRETATION
 
3.—(1) In this Schedule—
 
"captain" means master (of a ship) or commander (of an aircraft);
 
"land vehicle" means any vehicle other than a ship or aircraft;
 
"ship" includes every description of vessel (including a hovercraft) used in navigation.
 
(2) In this Schedule a reference to being an owner of a vehicle, ship or aircraft includes a reference to being any of a number of persons who jointly own it.".

No 61: After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 2
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDERS
 
POWER TO MAKE SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDER
 
1.—(1) The Crown Court may make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against a person if—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D, and
 
(b) the Crown Court makes a confiscation order against the person in respect of the offence.
 
(2) The Crown Court may also make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against a person if—
 
(a) by virtue of section 178 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (defendants who abscond during proceedings) it has made a confiscation order against a person in respect of an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D, and
 
(b) the person is later convicted of the offence.
 
(3) The court may make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against the person in addition to dealing with the person in any other way (subject to paragraph 3(1)).
 
(4) In a case within sub-paragraph (1) the court may make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against the person even if the person has been sentenced for the offence before the confiscation order is made.
 
(5) In determining whether to make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against the person the court must have regard to the person’s means.
 
(6) If the court considers that—
 
(a) it would be appropriate both to impose a fine and to make a slavery and trafficking reparation order, but
 
(b) the person has insufficient means to pay both an appropriate fine and appropriate compensation under such an order,
 
the court must give preference to compensation (although it may impose a fine as well).
 
(7) In any case in which the court has power to make a slavery and trafficking reparation order it must—
 
(a) consider whether to make such an order (whether or not an application for such an order is made), and
 
(b) if it does not make an order, give reasons.
 
(8) In this paragraph—
 
(a) "confiscation order" means a confiscation order under section 156 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;
 
(b) a confiscation order is made in respect of an offence if the offence is the offence (or one of the offences) concerned for the purposes of Part 4 of that Act.
 
EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDER
 
2.—(1) A slavery and trafficking reparation order is an order requiring the person against whom it is made to pay compensation to the victim of a relevant offence for any harm resulting from that offence.
 
(2) "Relevant offence" means—
 
(a) the offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D of which the person is convicted;
 
(b) any other offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D which is taken into consideration in determining the person’s sentence.
 
(3) The amount of the compensation is to be such amount as the court considers appropriate having regard to any evidence and to any representations made by or on behalf of the person or the prosecutor, but subject to sub-paragraph (4).
 
(4) The amount of the compensation payable under the slavery and trafficking reparation order (or if more than one order is made in the same proceedings, the total amount of the compensation payable under those orders) must not exceed the amount the person is required to pay under the confiscation order.
 
(5) In determining the amount to be paid by the person under a slavery and trafficking reparation order the court must have regard to the person’s means.
 
(6) A slavery and trafficking reparation order is enforceable in the same manner as any fine which has been, or might have been, imposed in respect of the offence for which the person has been convicted by the court making the order.
 
(7) In sub-paragraph (4) "the confiscation order" means the confiscation order within paragraph 1(1)(b) or (2)(a) (as the case may be).
 
SUPPLEMENTARY
 
3.—(1) A slavery and trafficking reparation order and a compensation order under Article 14 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1994 may not both be made in respect of the same offence.
 
(2) Where the court makes a slavery and trafficking reparation order as mentioned in paragraph 1(4), for the purposes of the following provisions the person’s sentence is to be regarded as imposed or made on the day on which the order is made—
 
(a) section 16(1) of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 (time limit for notice of appeal or application for leave to appeal);
 
(b) paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (time limit for notice of application for leave to refer a case under section 36 of that Act).
 
(3) Articles 15 to 17 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1994 (appeals, review etc. of compensation orders) apply to slavery and trafficking reparation orders as if—
 
(a) references to a compensation order were references to a slavery and trafficking reparation order;
 
(b) references to injury, loss or damage were references to harm;
 
(c) in Article 16(a) (as amended by Schedule 4) for sub-paragraph (ii) there were substituted—
 
"(ii) a compensation order under Article 14 of this Order; or";
 
(d) in Article 17 the references to service compensation orders or awards were omitted.
 
(4) If under section 171 or 172 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 the court varies a confiscation order so as to increase the amount required to be paid under that order, it may also vary any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order so as to increase the amount required to be paid under the slavery and trafficking reparation order.
 
(5) If under section 173 or 179 of that Act the court varies a confiscation order so as to reduce the amount required to be paid under that order, it may also—
 
(a) vary any relevant slavery and trafficking reparation order so as to reduce the amount which remains to be paid under that order;
 
(b) discharge any relevant slavery and trafficking reparation order.
 
(6) If under section 174 of that Act the court discharges a confiscation order, it may also discharge any relevant slavery and trafficking reparation order.
 
(7) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (5) and (6) a slavery and trafficking reparation order is relevant if it is made by virtue of the confiscation order and some or all of the amount required to be paid under it has not been paid.
 
(8) If on an appeal under section 181 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 the Court of Appeal—
 
(a) quashes a confiscation order, it must also quash any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order;
 
(b) varies a confiscation order, it may also vary any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order;
 
(c) makes a confiscation order, it may make any slavery and trafficking reparation order the Crown Court could have made if it had made the confiscation order.
 
(9) If on an appeal under section 183 of that Act the Supreme Court—
 
(a) quashes a confiscation order, it must also quash any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order;
 
(b) varies a confiscation order, it may also vary any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order.
 
(10) For the purposes of this paragraph—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking reparation order made under paragraph 1(1) is made by virtue of the confiscation order within paragraph 1(1)(b);
 
(b) a slavery and trafficking reparation order made under paragraph 1(2) is made by virtue of the confiscation order within paragraph 1(2)(a).".

No 61: After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 2
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDERS
 
POWER TO MAKE SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDER
 
1.—(1) The Crown Court may make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against a person if—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D, and
 
(b) the Crown Court makes a confiscation order against the person in respect of the offence.
 
(2) The Crown Court may also make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against a person if—
 
(a) by virtue of section 178 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (defendants who abscond during proceedings) it has made a confiscation order against a person in respect of an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D, and
 
(b) the person is later convicted of the offence.
 
(3) The court may make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against the person in addition to dealing with the person in any other way (subject to paragraph 3(1)).
 
(4) In a case within sub-paragraph (1) the court may make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against the person even if the person has been sentenced for the offence before the confiscation order is made.
 
(5) In determining whether to make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against the person the court must have regard to the person’s means.
 
(6) If the court considers that—
 
(a) it would be appropriate both to impose a fine and to make a slavery and trafficking reparation order, but
 
(b) the person has insufficient means to pay both an appropriate fine and appropriate compensation under such an order,
 
the court must give preference to compensation (although it may impose a fine as well).
 
(7) In any case in which the court has power to make a slavery and trafficking reparation order it must—
 
(a) consider whether to make such an order (whether or not an application for such an order is made), and
 
(b) if it does not make an order, give reasons.
 
(8) In this paragraph—
 
(a) "confiscation order" means a confiscation order under section 156 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;
 
(b) a confiscation order is made in respect of an offence if the offence is the offence (or one of the offences) concerned for the purposes of Part 4 of that Act.
 
EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDER
 
2.—(1) A slavery and trafficking reparation order is an order requiring the person against whom it is made to pay compensation to the victim of a relevant offence for any harm resulting from that offence.
 
(2) "Relevant offence" means—
 
(a) the offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D of which the person is convicted;
 
(b) any other offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D which is taken into consideration in determining the person’s sentence.
 
(3) The amount of the compensation is to be such amount as the court considers appropriate having regard to any evidence and to any representations made by or on behalf of the person or the prosecutor, but subject to sub-paragraph (4).
 
(4) The amount of the compensation payable under the slavery and trafficking reparation order (or if more than one order is made in the same proceedings, the total amount of the compensation payable under those orders) must not exceed the amount the person is required to pay under the confiscation order.
 
(5) In determining the amount to be paid by the person under a slavery and trafficking reparation order the court must have regard to the person’s means.
 
(6) A slavery and trafficking reparation order is enforceable in the same manner as any fine which has been, or might have been, imposed in respect of the offence for which the person has been convicted by the court making the order.
 
(7) In sub-paragraph (4) "the confiscation order" means the confiscation order within paragraph 1(1)(b) or (2)(a) (as the case may be).
 
SUPPLEMENTARY
 
3.—(1) A slavery and trafficking reparation order and a compensation order under Article 14 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1994 may not both be made in respect of the same offence.
 
(2) Where the court makes a slavery and trafficking reparation order as mentioned in paragraph 1(4), for the purposes of the following provisions the person’s sentence is to be regarded as imposed or made on the day on which the order is made—
 
(a) section 16(1) of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 (time limit for notice of appeal or application for leave to appeal);
 
(b) paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (time limit for notice of application for leave to refer a case under section 36 of that Act).
 
(3) Articles 15 to 17 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1994 (appeals, review etc. of compensation orders) apply to slavery and trafficking reparation orders as if—
 
(a) references to a compensation order were references to a slavery and trafficking reparation order;
 
(b) references to injury, loss or damage were references to harm;
 
(c) in Article 16(a) (as amended by Schedule 4) for sub-paragraph (ii) there were substituted—
 
"(ii) a compensation order under Article 14 of this Order; or";
 
(d) in Article 17 the references to service compensation orders or awards were omitted.
 
(4) If under section 171 or 172 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 the court varies a confiscation order so as to increase the amount required to be paid under that order, it may also vary any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order so as to increase the amount required to be paid under the slavery and trafficking reparation order.
 
(5) If under section 173 or 179 of that Act the court varies a confiscation order so as to reduce the amount required to be paid under that order, it may also—
 
(a) vary any relevant slavery and trafficking reparation order so as to reduce the amount which remains to be paid under that order;
 
(b) discharge any relevant slavery and trafficking reparation order.
 
(6) If under section 174 of that Act the court discharges a confiscation order, it may also discharge any relevant slavery and trafficking reparation order.
 
(7) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (5) and (6) a slavery and trafficking reparation order is relevant if it is made by virtue of the confiscation order and some or all of the amount required to be paid under it has not been paid.
 
(8) If on an appeal under section 181 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 the Court of Appeal—
 
(a) quashes a confiscation order, it must also quash any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order;
 
(b) varies a confiscation order, it may also vary any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order;
 
(c) makes a confiscation order, it may make any slavery and trafficking reparation order the Crown Court could have made if it had made the confiscation order.
 
(9) If on an appeal under section 183 of that Act the Supreme Court—
 
(a) quashes a confiscation order, it must also quash any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order;
 
(b) varies a confiscation order, it may also vary any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order.
 
(10) For the purposes of this paragraph—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking reparation order made under paragraph 1(1) is made by virtue of the confiscation order within paragraph 1(1)(b);
 
(b) a slavery and trafficking reparation order made under paragraph 1(2) is made by virtue of the confiscation order within paragraph 1(2)(a).".

Lord Morrow: Before I come to speak to the relevant amendments in this group, I want to open with some preliminary remarks about the purpose of my Bill.

The Bill has been long in the making and no one knows that better than the one who is speaking. The first consultation on the Human Trafficking and Exploitation Bill was launched in August 2012, and it has taken over two years for us to get to this stage. I have listened to and engaged with a wide range of stakeholders, and while the fundamental provisions of the Bill remain substantively the same, it is already significantly enhanced and revised, and I hope that it will be further revised by the amendments that I have tabled or co-signed, most of which have been in cooperation with the Minister of Justice.

Before I move to the substance of the amendments in this group, I would like to say thank you to a number of people who have contributed to my Bill so far. First, I would like to say thank you to everyone who submitted evidence to my initial consultation, to the consultation conducted by the Justice Committee and during the evidence sessions conducted by the Justice Committee. The quality of the evidence provided has been of a high standard, and I have put forward a number of amendments as a consequence of submissions that were made during the initial consultation and in the evidence given to the Justice Committee. This Bill undoubtedly will be a better Bill due to these contributions.

Secondly, I would like to pay tribute to the Justice Committee, which scrutinised the Bill. The Committee process was an onerous and lengthy one, and some of the evidence given was not easy to deal with. I am thankful to the Committee for its in-depth scrutiny, and I look forward to hearing contributions from its members during today's deliberations.

Thirdly and finally, I say thank you to the Minister of Justice and his team at the Department of Justice, particularly Julie Wilson, Simon Rogers and Alison Redmond. The Minister and his Department have engaged with me very constructively, which has led to many of the positive amendments that have been tabled. Of course, disagreements remain over particular parts of my Bill, which will be explored in due course, but it would be remiss of me not to thank the Minister and his team.

I also thank the Minister of Health —

Mr Ford (The Minister of Justice): I thank the Member for giving way, and I trust, Mr Deputy Speaker, that you will allow me to make an intervention that is slightly longer than usual.

Lord Morrow recorded his gratitude to my team and to the Department, and I wish to record my gratitude to him for the constructive and positive way and the spirit of partnership with which he engaged with the Department over recent months. The Bill is undoubtedly still Lord Morrow's, but those who thought that Maurice Morrow and David Ford could not agree on anything have been proven wrong today by the unique way in which so many amendments have been signed by both of us. That is sign of the constructive engagement of which he spoke.

I add my thanks to Lord Morrow and to Mark Baillie, who has worked most closely with him, as well recording my thanks to Julie Wilson, whom he named, her team in the DOJ and other officials in DFP and DHSSPS who have assisted in ensuring that, by the end of today's debate, the fight against human trafficking in this jurisdiction will be in a much better place. Given the complexity of the Bill, I suspect that there are issues that we will need to revisit for the next stage, but I give a commitment that that constructive engagement will continue to Further Consideration Stage so that we get the best possible legislation for Northern Ireland. Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker.

Lord Morrow: I thank the Minister very much for his comments. What he said adequately reflects the mood in which we have conducted ourselves on this side, on the Minister's side and in the Department. What he said clearly reflects the attitude that both of us brought to the table when we discussed the advancement of the Bill, even when it came to thorny issues.

I thank the Minister of Health, Social Services and Public Safety and his team of officials, who have also worked closely with me on a couple of key clauses, and the Attorney General, who has given ongoing advice, especially on issues to do with non-prosecution.

I want to explain the way in which the amendments have been tabled. Members will see that I am opposing a number of clauses standing part, the Minister, on other occasions, is opposing a number of clauses standing part and that, on most of the clauses, we have co-signed that they should not stand part. We have done that because we want to amend the clauses in question, and, procedurally, it is easier to remove them and to insert new clauses. I reassure Members that that approach does not mean that I have changed my mind on the principle or substance of the clauses. Rather, the objective of each clause remains the same, but the wording requires to be amended to ensure smooth operation in practice.

I move on to the substance of the clauses and the amendments, which are part of a very large group and that cover a variety of new offences and sentencing powers.

I am opposing clause 1 standing part due to developments that have resulted from the Modern Slavery Bill in Westminster. Members will remember that a draft Modern Slavery Bill was introduced last December, in which consolidated offences were proposed, bringing together previous legislation on human trafficking for sexual exploitation, forced labour and slavery. If accepted, that would have provided greater clarity for the police and prosecutors in seeking to tackle those crimes.

As a result of that Bill, the Department of Justice consulted on similar offences for Northern Ireland through its consultation document, 'Human Trafficking and Slavery: Strengthening Northern Ireland's Response'. The new offences that we will debate today are the result of that consultation. It is important that we have as consistent an approach as possible across the UK on the definitions of those offences.

When I introduced my Bill, the Modern Slavery Bill had not been introduced at Westminster, and we had not had sight of these proposed new offences. Consequently, in light of the changes that have occurred since I introduced my Bill, it is appropriate for clause 1 of my Bill to be replaced. Amendment No 1 introduces new clause 1A, which would introduce a consolidated offence of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour. That new offence would replace the existing offence that currently applies under section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. New clause 1A would make it an offence knowingly to hold another person in servitude or slavery or knowingly to require another person to perform forced or compulsory labour. Clause 1A(2) defines clearly what is meant by slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour by explicitly referring to article 4 of the Human Rights Convention.


12.30 pm

Taken together, clause 1A(3) and clause 1A(4) outline that in deciding whether a person is a victim of an offence under this clause, regard may be had to an individual's personal circumstances. It would particularly take into account any personal circumstances that would make an individual more vulnerable than others to exploitation.

Clause 1A(5) embeds in law what clause 2 of my Bill sought to achieve: the victim's consent to any part of the offence committed against them under clause 1A is irrelevant.

Lastly, clause 1A(6) ensures that offences of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour in Northern Ireland can be tried only on indictment. This is a different approach to that taken in the Modern Slavery Bill but fits with the way in which human trafficking offences are currently tried in Northern Ireland. Members will remember that we agreed to move to such trafficking cases being tried only in a Crown Court when we passed the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2013. In England and Wales, cases can be heard in a Magistrates' Court as well as in a Crown Court.

Amendment No 2 introduces new clause 1B. This clause would create a consolidated offence of human trafficking to replace the current separate offences of human trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation and human trafficking for other forms of exploitation that are set out in sections 57 to 59 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. Under new clause 1B, it would be an offence to arrange or facilitate the travel of another person with a view to them being exploited. The offence would cover all forms of exploitation as defined under new clause 1C.

Clause 1B(2) clarifies that arranging or facilitating travel may include transporting, transferring, harbouring or receiving the victim, or transferring or exchanging control over them. This addition goes beyond existing trafficking offences and makes it clear that the full international definition of the act of trafficking set out in the Palermo Protocol applies. I warmly welcome that development.

Clause 1B(3) makes it clear that an offence has been committed whether the person intends to exploit the victim themselves, or knows or ought to know that another person is likely to exploit them.

Clause 1B(4) defines travel comprehensively to mean entering into, departing from or travelling within any country. Clause 1B(5), like clause 1A(5), replicates the effect of clause 2 of my Bill by ensuring that a victim's consent to any act forming part of the offence is irrelevant.

Clause 1A(6), clause 1A(7) and clause 1A(8), taken together, address the international dimension of human trafficking. In line with clause 1A(6), clause 1B(9) ensures that an offence under this clause can be tried on indictment only.

Amendment No 3 introduces new clause 1C. This clause defines what constitutes exploitation for the purposes of a human trafficking offence under new clause 1B. In doing so, it consolidates the relevant provisions of what currently constitutes exploitation in respect of the existing offences of human trafficking and extends the categories of exploitation to include a number of additional measures that had previously been included in clause 5 of the Bill. These were and are intended to bring extra clarity to what constitutes exploitation of forced labour, and I hope that Members will appreciate that they have not been lost in the process of consolidation. These additional measures include a clarification that "benefits of any kind" include "the proceeds of forced begging" or "criminal activities" and that securing services by force includes the use of coercion, abduction or fraud to induce a person to provide services.

I also draw to Members' attention that we have taken the opportunity of consolidating these definitions to make it clear that there will be a different approach to securing services or benefits from children or vulnerable adults. Proposed new clause 1C(6) sets out that an offence can be committed where there is no use of force or coercion in making the victim provide the services, where the victim is a child or a vulnerable person. The existing legislation attempted to deal with these situations where the victims' particular vulnerability is exploited in this way; however, it used rather vague terms, such as "young" rather than stipulating that the person is a child.

Amendment No 4 introduces new clause 1D. Under article 66 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, it is an offence to commit an offence:

"with the intention of committing a relevant sexual offence".

Sections 57 to 59 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 provide that relevant sexual offences include offences of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation and, under article 66 of the Sexual Offences Order (Northern Ireland) 2008, preparatory offences, which include offences of "aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring" such an offence. However, as has been the case in many areas of trafficking legislation, these preparatory offences have applied only to human trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation and not for human trafficking for forced labour or of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour offences.

New clause 1D is one of many changes that will be made to the Bill to bring parity in the way that the criminal justice system treats human trafficking and slavery offences. It will create a new preparatory offence similar to that under article 66 of the 2008 Order, which would apply where an individual commits an offence with the intention of committing any slavery-like or trafficking offence under new clauses 1A or 1B. This will mean that lesser offences — for example, stealing a vehicle — that are committed in preparation for and with the intention of committing a slavery or trafficking offence will be eligible for a longer sentence, due to the connection with slavery or trafficking. These offences acknowledge that slavery and human trafficking often involve a chain of events and a range of people at different levels and stages but that they all contribute to the ultimate result of trafficking or forced labour.

In applying this preparatory offence to slavery-like offences, my Bill will go beyond the provisions of the Modern Slavery Bill, in which the equivalent preparatory offence would apply only in respect of human trafficking offences under clause 2 of that Bill. An offence under new clause 1D would ordinarily attract a maximum sentence of 10 years on indictment or six months and/or a fine on summary conviction. Where, however, the offence is committed by kidnapping or false imprisonment, it would attract a life sentence.

I hope that Members will feel that the four new clauses that I have outlined will give Northern Ireland a robust criminal law framework to take the Province forward in tackling these awful crimes. I urge all Members to vote in support of the proposed new clauses.

The purpose of clause 2 is to set out the situations in which the consent of a victim of trafficking or slavery will be considered irrelevant in the context of a criminal offence. The issue of consent, or lack of it, is now covered by the text of new clauses 1A and 1B. Consequently, clause 2 no longer needs to remain in the Bill and should be removed. I urge Members to oppose clause 2 standing part of the Bill.

Amendment No 5 introduces a new clause 2A. It seeks to amend the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 to classify the new slavery and human trafficking offences under new clauses 1A and 1B as serious offences for the purposes of sentencing dangerous offenders under schedule 1 to the 2008 Order. It also amends schedule 2 to the Order to classify human trafficking and slavery offences as violent offences under part 1 of the schedule and to classify human trafficking for sexual exploitation as a specified sexual offence for the purposes of sentencing dangerous offenders under part 2 of the schedule. In so doing, the clause will allow the court, where it considers it necessary for the purposes of public protection, to set down a life sentence, an indeterminate custodial sentence or an extended custodial sentence. Members will know that there is a significant increase in potential penalties from the previous arrangements, where the maximum penalty was 14 years. I hope that Members will support the very strong signal that offenders of those awful crimes committed in Northern Ireland will be treated extremely severely.

I am very pleased to have tabled amendment Nos 6 to 14 together with the Minister. Members will remember that I included a clause on aggravating factors in my Bill because the European directive and the European convention on trafficking include particular elements that indicate that a higher penalty should be given to a perpetrator. I recognise that setting out such factors is an unusual step to take, but it is not without precedent in the United Kingdom: aggravating factors are set out in section 4A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, as introduced by section 1 of the England and Wales Drugs Act 2005.

Amendment Nos 6 to 14 are a series of small, technical amendments that ensure that the text aligns with other pieces of legislation and add clarity to the definitions of "public official", "vulnerable adult" and a "member of the family of the victim". In all those cases, the purpose and effect of the clause remains the same. However, the amendments will make the text more effective, and areas of uncertainty will be removed. The Minister and I have agreed on the amendments outlined, and I urge all sides of the House to support them. Members will see that there are a considerable number of amendments that we will discuss shortly that bring in new powers on sentencing, such as in proposed new clauses 5A to 5D. The inclusion of specific aggravating factors is a helpful addition to the substantial efforts being made to tackle perpetrators severely.

The Minister made clear his opposition to the principle of clause 4 at Second Stage, and he is seeking to have it removed from the Bill today. I clearly state that I strongly and emphatically disagree with the Minister on this. In the past, as, I am sure, he will today, the Minister stated that introducing a minimum sentence would unduly fetter the discretion of judges to impose an appropriate sentence.

That, however, simply does not stand up to scrutiny.


12.45 pm

In the first instance, the Assembly frequently imposes limits on the sentences that can be handed down by judges. Judges do not have absolute discretion to impose whatever sentence they would like. For example, it would be manifestly unjust for a judge to impose a life sentence on a person who was caught shoplifting, and the relevant statute does not allow a judge to do so. If we as an Assembly can fetter the discretion of a judge in terms of the maximum penalty he or she can impose for an offence, why can we not do so in terms of minimum sentences?

In the second instance, in answer to that question and of vital importance, Northern Ireland already has minimum sentences. Article 70 of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004, which was passed in this House in 2004, imposes minimum sentences for a range of firearms-related offences, and schedule 2 of the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006, which applies to Northern Ireland, imposes a minimum sentence for the offence of using someone else to hide or carry a dangerous weapon so as to make the weapon available for the first person to use for an unlawful purpose. I doubt that we will hear anyone argue today for the repeal of article 70 of the Firearms Order or schedule 2 of the Violent Crime Reduction Act, but that is vital if one is really opposed to the principle of imposing minimum sentences in statute.

The truth is that, whether one considers minimum or maximum sentences, it is entirely appropriate for legislatures to set out the seriousness of an offence by determining the order of penalty that is required. That does not remove judicial discretion any more than defining an offence in statute does. It is very proper that a legislature should be able to define an offence and its seriousness as that relates to sentencing. Judicial discretion remains very much alive and well between minimum and maximum sentences.

Clause 4 rises to that challenge to make it plain that we in the Assembly, the lawmaking body on justice in Northern Ireland, regard human trafficking and slavery as very serious crimes and want would-be offenders to be fully cognisant of that fact before they consider trafficking or holding someone in slavery in Northern Ireland. That is a completely legitimate view for the Assembly to take and one that clause 4 helps to deliver.

To those who, despite those, in my judgement, overwhelming arguments, may still have questions, I will make two further points. First, with the help of the Attorney General we have been able to draft a sophisticated and balanced clause. I will shortly outline my amendments, which send out a very important message to would-be offenders whilst not removing judicial discretion.

Crucially, clause 4 gives judges the freedom to derogate from the two years in exceptional circumstances, although they must account for doing so. Secondly, they should also be aware that, in dealing with the serious crime that we are discussing today, it is a measure that the public supports. An Ipsos MORI poll conducted in August included the following question:

"A proposal has been put forward at the Northern Ireland Assembly to introduce a required minimum sentence of two years for those people convicted of human trafficking or slavery offences within the country. The proposal allows for judges to set a lower sentence in very exceptional circumstances. Do you believe that it is appropriate for such a minimum sentence to be introduced?"

Some 65% of people responded to that question with the answer "yes" and 54% said that they believed that very strongly.

I believe that it is a timely and very well conceived provision that will be very much to the benefit of Northern Ireland. I warmly commend it and urge the House to vote against the motion that clause 4 should not stand part of the Bill.

I will now address the amendments in detail. Amendment No 15 is a technical amendment that links clause 4 to the new consolidated offences. Amendment No 16 would amend clause 4 so that the minimum sentence framework would not apply to children. It was an oversight in the initial Bill that the sentence would apply to children. I am grateful to the Member for East Antrim, the Minister of Justice, who pointed that out at Second Stage.

Amendment No 17 would ensure that, if a judge decides that there are exceptional circumstances that justify not imposing the two-year minimum custodial sentence, they must state their reasons in open court. Amendment No 18 requires the reasons to be recorded by the chief clerk. This ensures that, where there are exceptional circumstances that mean either a lower sentence or a suspended sentence is appropriate, the court is able to give such a sentence, but the reasons need to be given in open court. This will help to ensure that judges are accountable for the sentences that they impose, ensuring that such decisions are taken in a reasoned way. It will also bring clarity about such exceptional decisions for the general public and help to maintain public trust in the sentencing regime.

My amendment No 19 arises out of the concern that —

Mr Elliott: Will the Member give way?

Lord Morrow: Right, OK, I will.

Mr Elliott: I appreciate the Member giving way. I just have a very short query about the last two amendments, under which the court has to give an explanation as to why it may give a lesser or more lenient sentence. I just wonder whether the Member has any ideas or are there any guidelines in statute at the moment as to why a more lenient sentence might even be given. Is it just left to the discretion of the judiciary?

Lord Morrow: I will come to that point in a moment or two. I listened carefully to what the Member said in relation to that.

My amendment No 19 arises out of the concern that, under the clause as currently drafted, it would be technically possible for a court to hand down a two-year suspended sentence. This outcome would undermine the ability of the clause to deliver the clear message that I believe we should send to traffickers. I am very grateful to the Attorney General for spotting that loophole and for suggesting a means to plug it by defining a custodial sentence as not including a suspended sentence, but allowing for such a sentence in exceptional circumstances.

Amendment No 20 introduces a series of technical consequential amendments to ensure that the sentencing framework in other relevant legislation includes the proposed minimum sentence. The changes I am putting forward here reflect the same changes on sentencing as in the minimum sentence in article 70 of the Firearms (Amendment) (Northern Ireland) Order 2004. Under new subsection 4(2D), the Attorney General may refer a sentence for review if the judge fails to impose the minimum sentence. Under new subsection 4(2E), the courts cannot give the perpetrator an absolute and conditional discharge, a probation order, a community service order or an order combining community service and probation. Under new subsection 4(2F), that new minimum sentence would be reflected in the same way as other minimum sentences in legislation setting custodial sentences.

My clause 5 outlines some policy changes I believe should take place to the current Asylum and Immigration Act 2004. However, I am glad to reassure Members that the proposals that I made in clause 5 have been incorporated into new clauses 1A to 1C. In light of those changes, I am content that clause 5 is no longer needed and should not stand part of the Bill.

I strongly support amendment Nos 21 to 30, 27, 60 and 61 to bring in new sentencing powers that reflect provisions in the Modern Slavery Bill. These are amendments that are proposed by the Minister and to which I have added my name. They are complicated provisions that I will set out in broad terms in the next few minutes and allow the Minister to deal with any points of detail.

Amendment No 21 will make it easier for assets to be recovered from those convicted of human trafficking and slavery offences by designating new clauses 1A and 1B as criminal lifestyle offences for the purpose of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. It seems clear to me that any measure that will make it easier to recover assets from those who commit these offences is worthy of support. It is crucial that perpetrators of these crimes can have any assets that they have gained through committing them confiscated.

Amendment Nos 22 and 60 introduce new clause 5B and the related schedule 1. Those amendments would allow courts to order the confiscation of land, vehicles, ships or aircraft if they were used or were intended to be used in connection with human trafficking and slavery offences. Under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, those powers are available in Northern Ireland and will continue to be available through the new consolidated offences in this clause.
Amendment Nos 23 and 61 introduce new clause 5C and schedule 2 to allow the court to order an offender to pay a reparation order. That will provide another avenue through which victims can gain some level of compensation for what they have suffered. The advantage of a reparation order over the criminal injuries compensation scheme is that the money comes directly from the perpetrator's assets, if they have any that can be claimed. I am particularly pleased that the courts must consider setting down a reparation order, and, if they do not do so, the judge must outline why they have not done so. However, the point should be emphasised that the orders do not stop a victim making a claim from the state, as well as through the criminal injuries compensation scheme. They simply offer another way of obtaining money to benefit victims.

Amendment No 27 introduces new clause 5G, which will maintain the content of clause 7(2) and 7(3) of my initial Bill in a separate new clause inserted in the most appropriate part of the Bill now that there are new clauses on other criminal justice matters. I believe that the clause is necessary to make it crystal clear to those investigating or seeking to prosecute the perpetrators of these offences that such action is not dependent on the victim reporting that the offence has occurred or accusing an individual of committing such an offence.

As I have said all along, this is a Bill about exploitation. Amendment No 40 has been tabled by the Minister of Finance and Personnel and would introduce a new offence of forced marriage to Northern Ireland. The offence was not included in the initial version of the Bill that I introduced in 2013. However, I am happy for it to be included. It is manifestly obvious to me that forced marriage is a form of exploitation. The offence is based on a similar offence that passed into law in England and Wales earlier this year. I will allow the Minister to speak about the matter further in his contribution.

Amendment No 50 pertains to clause 13 of my Bill, which seeks to protect victims during the course of criminal investigations. I will speak more about this clause later. Amendment No 50 links the protections of clause 13 to the offences that we are introducing through amendment Nos 1 and 2. Amendment No 50 also extends the provision of the measures to victims of offences under new clauses 1A and 1B. Originally, the clause provided the protection only to victims of human trafficking, following the England and Wales regulations and the EU anti-trafficking directive. However, I have since concluded that the vulnerability of victims of slavery offences is such that this special treatment should be available for those victims, as well as for those who have been trafficked.


1.00 pm

Mr Givan (The Chairperson of the Committee for Justice): With your indulgence, Mr Deputy Speaker, before addressing the amendments, I wish to make some general remarks about the Bill in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee for Justice.

First, I commend Lord Morrow on introducing this very important Bill to the Assembly. I know the commitment and tenacity that he has shown and the hard work and perseverance that it has taken to get the Bill to this stage of the process, and I congratulate him on that. Speaking in the capacity of party colleague, I can say that we are immensely proud of the way in which Lord Morrow has championed the Bill and spent over two years dedicating himself, heart and soul, to bringing forward this legislation. We have huge admiration for the way in which he has conducted himself, at times in the face of very difficult challenges that were being posed to him. He has very carefully and studiously avoided getting involved in confrontation and dealt methodically with all the issues that have been brought his way.

I have no doubt that, when we look back on what, I trust, will be the Bill's successful passage through the House, we will see this day as being a historic occasion. I trust that Lord Morrow will look back with immense pride that he led on the Bill and brought it to this stage and that the Assembly supported him. Indeed, on behalf of my colleagues, I would go as far as to say — this is no exaggeration — that, in bringing the Bill forward, we regard Lord Morrow as a modern-day William Wilberforce. I have no doubt that he would put his imprimatur on the Bill and endorse its content fully. I cannot speak highly enough of our colleague and party chairman, and I am very proud to have been able to support him in some way in getting to this point. It is important that we put that on the record.

As I have said on numerous occasions and as the Justice Committee has heard at first hand, human trafficking is a heinous crime that devastates people's lives and that needs to be tackled from every possible angle. In 2012, when the Committee considered the Criminal Justice Bill, which created two new human trafficking offences, we made it very clear to the Minister of Justice that we wanted the strongest possible legislation to be introduced in Northern Ireland for human trafficking. In the evidence that the Committee received during the passage of that Bill, it was clear that a number of organisations believed that the Department was adopting a minimalist approach in implementing the EU directive on human trafficking and had missed an opportunity to put additional measures into legislation, particularly in relation to the protection, assistance and support of victims, including children, and the availability of proper investigative tools.

There is no doubt that Lord Morrow, through his Bill, is changing that approach and ensuring that the legislation in this country to deal with human trafficking is much improved. His Bill will also address one of the other criticisms raised at that time, which related to the complexity and piecemeal approach to the legislative framework for offences concerning human trafficking and the need for a single comprehensive piece of legislation that would assist in increasing the understanding of the justice framework for dealing with the crime and awareness of it.

Given the importance of the Bill and the interest expressed, the Committee spent considerable time undertaking detailed and careful scrutiny of the then 19 clauses. After completion of Committee Stage, we have continued to consider a range of proposed amendments, most recently in September, following which the Committee wrote to all Assembly Members outlining the updated position.

The Committee sought a wide range of views as part of its deliberations on the Bill and requested evidence from interested organisations and individuals as well as from the Department of Justice. Over 139 written submissions were received, and the Committee took oral evidence from a wide range of witnesses, including voluntary organisations that provide support to trafficked victims and work with those involved in prostitution; academics; Church and faith-based representatives; individuals who are or were involved in prostitution; the Police Service; the Public Prosecution Service; officials from the Department of Justice; the Minister of Health, Social Services and Public Safety; and the Attorney General for Northern Ireland. Lord Morrow, as Bill sponsor, also attended the Committee on several occasions to discuss the Bill's provisions and possible amendments.

To assist its consideration of clause 6, the Committee undertook a visit to Sweden in December 2013 to meet government and non-government representatives to discuss its legislation, which criminalises the purchase of sex. We also met the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality in Dublin in January 2014 to discuss the findings of its report on a review of legislation on prostitution, which recommends the introduction of a summary offence penalising the purchase of sexual services of another person by means of prostitution or any request, agreement or attempt to do so.

It is clear that the Committee scrutinised and considered all aspects of the Bill in a full and thorough manner. I thank the members of the Committee for their diligence and contributions during the Committee Stage process. I put on record my thanks to those no longer on the Committee: Mr Jim Wells; Mr William Humphrey, who I see is here with us; Mr Sydney Anderson; and Ms McCorley. It is fair to say that some members came with a differing viewpoint at the start of the process, but I have no doubt that the scrutiny carried out and the challenges made led to the robust legislation that we have today. It was a demonstration of how the Assembly and the Justice Committee do work and can do a course of work in which all the political parties can operate together, albeit with differing viewpoints at times. The outcome of that work is a demonstration of how business can be done in the Assembly. This legislation is testimony to that.

As Lord Morrow said, it was not an easy task, and some of the oral evidence on personal experiences was difficult and distressing to hear. I also thank the witnesses who provided written and oral evidence, particularly those who shared with the Committee their personal experiences of trafficking and prostitution, which was not easy for them. I thank Lord Morrow, who, very helpfully, provided further information and kept the Committee informed of developments relating to the Bill, and the Department of Justice officials who kept us updated with developments relating to the Modern Slavery Bill in Westminster and the related provisions for Northern Ireland.

I believe that today is historic — it is an historic opportunity to seize the moment. Northern Ireland and the Assembly can lead on this issue in the United Kingdom and on the island of Ireland. I hope that Members, as we go through the various debates on the groups of amendments, will reflect and come together to send a clear message. I hope that we will seize the moment to make a difference in our society for the most vulnerable. That is what is at the core of the legislation: the protection and support of the most vulnerable.

I turn now to clauses 1, 2 and 5 and the amendments to introduce new clauses 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D and 2A. In the evidence received by the Committee, there was support for the clarity provided in clause 1 on the definition of human trafficking. The inclusion of forced labour was also welcomed, with views expressed that all forms of modern-day slavery should be covered under a unified piece of legislation. There was similar support for clause 5, which provides for the inclusion of additional definitions in the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 to mirror the EU directive, particularly in relation to forced begging.

During Committee Stage, the Department told the Committee that, as a result of the draft Modern Slavery Bill, which was published by the Home Secretary on 16 December 2013, it was undertaking a consultation on proposals to strengthen the response to human trafficking and slavery in Northern Ireland. The Committee was content with clauses 1 and 5 but noted that the results of the Department’s consultation, which included proposals to simplify and consolidate the legislative framework for human trafficking and slavery offences, would have a bearing on both clauses and that amendments may be needed.

On clause 2, all organisations that submitted evidence agreed that a victim’s consent should be irrelevant in cases of human trafficking or slavery offences. However, there were differing views on whether clause 2 was necessary, given the law already in place. While some were of the opinion that the provision was unnecessary and that enacting it may give rise to complications, others indicated that it was important to provide clarity on when a victim’s consent should be considered irrelevant. They highlighted the 2013 Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group report, which indicated that there seemed to persist an incorrect view that a trafficked person needed to be abducted or forced to come to the United Kingdom against their will.

When Lord Morrow attended a Committee meeting to discuss the Bill, he recognised that there had been considerable debate on whether clause 2 was required but said that, in his view, stating the need for the consent of victims to be irrelevant was important. He also advised the Committee that amendments would be required to the clause, depending on the outcome of the Department’s consultation. The Committee agreed that it was content to support clause 2, but noted that amendments may be needed.

More recently, departmental officials attended a Committee meeting on 10 September 2014 to outline the further work that had been carried out in conjunction with Lord Morrow following the consultation exercise and the range of amendments that is in front of us today. The aim of the amendments, which will replace clauses 1, 2 and 5, is to repeal existing offences and to create a series of new, consolidated offences and definitions relating to human trafficking, exploitation and slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour. They will also create new penalties. Amendment No 21 will enable slavery-like and human trafficking offences to be specified as criminal lifestyle offences, which will improve the courts’ ability to confiscate criminal assets. Amendment Nos 22 and 60 will enable the courts to order the forfeiture of land vehicles, ships or aircraft that were used or intended for use in connection with human trafficking or slavery-like offences; and amendment Nos 23 and 61 will make provision for the courts to impose new slavery and trafficking reparation orders under which offenders convicted of the offences under new clauses 1A, 1B or 1D will be required to pay reparation to their victims.

The Committee is content with the approach adopted by Lord Morrow and the Minister, and the new penalties obviously strengthen the ability of the police and the courts to deal with the perpetrators of human trafficking and are therefore very welcome indeed. The Committee also welcomes the fact that the new offences will be triable on indictment only, particularly as we used the Criminal Justice Bill to ensure that that would be the case when the new human trafficking offences where being brought forward at that time, and notes that they clarify that the victim’s consent to any part of an offence under these new clauses is irrelevant, thus delivering the intended effect of clause 2.

The Committee also supports new clause 2A, which will bring the new offences under the scope of the public protection sentencing framework enabling a court, where it considers it necessary, to impose a life sentence, an indeterminate custodial sentence or an extended custodial sentence, with the result that individuals subject to such sentences will also be subject to the relevant release, licence and recall arrangements.

Moving on to clause 3, the key issue is whether the aggravating factors that a court must consider when passing sentence for human trafficking or slavery offences should be set in statute and, if so, whether that will limit judicial discretion or whether sentencing guidelines would be preferable. The evidence received by the Committee indicated that, while a few organisations preferred sentencing guidelines, there was strong support for clause 3 from the majority of respondents, who felt that the aggravating factors should be set out in the Bill and considered that that approach was not inconsistent with judicial discretion.

The Department initially expressed concern that setting aggravating factors in statute would limit flexibility in responding to emerging case law and fetter the discretion of judges and was of the view that sentencing guidelines would be a better vehicle to respond flexibly to case law as it emerged. However, in light of the strong support in the evidence to the Committee, officials advised that the Minister would support clause 3 but indicated that a number of technical amendments were required. When considering clause 3, the Committee noted the opinion of the Attorney General for Northern Ireland that there was no obstacle to the legislature setting out a series of aggravating factors, that it was not inconsistent with judicial discretion in sentencing, and that the sentencing judge retained discretion to consider factors other than those set out by statute in reaching his or her decision on sentence. The Committee agreed that it was content with clause 3, subject to the technical amendments proposed by the Department and which have been brought forward today.

I turn now to clause 4 and the associated amendments brought by Lord Morrow. When the Committee considered clause 4, two particular issues arose: whether the inclusion of a minimum sentence in legislation regarding human trafficking and slavery offences fettered judicial discretion; and the fact that the compulsory minimum sentence applied to children. There was unanimity in the view that it was unacceptable for clause 4 to apply equally to children and adults and that it required amendment to clarify that the minimum sentence provision does not apply to children. The Committee agreed with this view, and Lord Morrow indicated that he intended to bring forward amendments to make the necessary changes, which he has done today.

With regard to whether clause 4 fetters judicial discretion, there was a much wider range of views, with organisations such as the Law Centre, the PSNI and Victim Support expressing concern that the application of minimum sentencing would compromise judicial discretion. Other key stakeholders welcomed the clause, stating that incorporating a minimum sentence in the legislation was a necessary deterrent, that it sent a strong message to the perpetrators of human trafficking, and that the wording used still provided for judges to apply discretion. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission agreed with this interpretation, advising that, in its view, the figure of two years proposed as the minimum sentence was not arbitrary but reflected a subtle increase in current sentencing practice and that the clause allows for judicial discretion because exceptional circumstances are written into it.


1.15 pm

From the start, the Minister of Justice indicated to the Committee that he had concerns regarding a compulsory minimum sentence, and he intends to oppose the clause today. When the Committee discussed the clause with departmental officials, they stated that compulsory minimum sentences were rarely specified in law, reflecting the principle that judges should normally be free to take account of all available evidence and the unique circumstances in a particular case, allowing them to reach a decision on sentencing that fits the crime. In their view, clause 4 would restrict the scope for judicial discretion.

When pressed on the issue of judicial discretion by Committee members, officials accepted that clause 4 did not, strictly speaking, introduce a compulsory minimum custodial sentence, as there was qualification to permit judicial discretion, but were of the view that it was better not to have a range of statutory provisions that would then have an exemption in them and that, instead, discretion should be left entirely in the hands of the judiciary.

The Committee availed itself of the opportunity to discuss the concerns raised regarding clause 4 with the Attorney General when he attended in March. He indicated that the clause does not make provision for a hard minimum sentence model, and the provision for the retention of discretion for the judge to impose a sentence below the minimum threshold, where there are exceptional circumstances, allows flexibility for judges to depart from the statutory minimum. He suggested that it might be desirable to include an obligation for reasons to be stated by the judge if a case is considered exceptional, which would strike an appropriate balance between the policy imperative of an effective minimum sentence and the requirement to do justice in the individual case. The Committee for Justice is clear in its support for a robust sentencing framework that reflects the gravity of human trafficking and slavery offences and indicates the seriousness with which such offences are viewed in Northern Ireland.

When considering clause 4, a number of Committee members expressed some reservations about the broad concept of including minimum sentences in legislation. They were concerned that the clause could interfere with judicial discretion in individual cases, that the majority of cases would become exceptional or that appeals in respect of the severity of the sentence based on whether the judge had given appropriate weight to the exceptional circumstances put forward would arise. They indicated that they wished to consider the arguments further before supporting the clause's inclusion in the Bill.

Other Committee members, including me, were content that sufficient qualification is provided to ensure that there is not an absolute minimum sentence and that it does not exclude judicial discretion. We viewed the clause as being persuasive on the court to impose a two-year sentence but not binding on it. We also welcomed the proposal for an amendment to require a judge to state the reasons if a decision is reached that the case is exceptional and the minimum sentence should not be imposed, viewing that as an appropriate mechanism to address concerns around exceptional cases becoming the norm.

The Committee agreed to support clause 4, subject to amendments to restrict a minimum sentence for a human trafficking offence to adults only, to ensure that the sentence is an immediate custodial sentence and not a suspended sentence and to require a court to state the reasons that a case is considered exceptional. Amendment Nos 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 tabled by Lord Morrow address those issues. I hope that the other Committee members who, when we were completing the Committee Stage of the Bill, required further time to reflect on the clause, are able to support its inclusion in the Bill today once it has been amended as outlined.

Clause 7 sets out requirements for investigation and prosecution, including that there must be sufficient training and resources for investigating and prosecuting human trafficking and slavery offences, that a prosecution is not dependent on reporting or accusation by a victim and that a prosecution can take place even if the victim has withdrawn their statement. Most of the organisations that discussed the clause with the Committee recognised the importance of sufficient training and resources for investigating and prosecuting human trafficking and slavery offences, and therefore welcomed this aspect of it, with views expressed that there was not much point in having legislation to tackle human trafficking if the investigators and prosecutors lacked the necessary tools and training to identify victims and prosecute perpetrators.

Further awareness training to recognise the signs and symptoms of trafficking and prostitution, including risks and triggers, was identified as particularly necessary. It was also felt that some amendments to the wording may be required to ensure that responsibility for all the training does not rest solely with the Department of Justice but that all Departments and agencies responsible for investigating or prosecuting human trafficking or slavery offences take appropriate measures.

In contrast, the police indicated that they developed and introduced training packages to educate and assist officers in detecting and investigating human trafficking offences and did not believe that there was a requirement for legislation in this area.

The Public Prosecution Service (PPS) also noted that the legislation placed a responsibility for public prosecutors to be trained and stated that this would require the appropriate Department to provide the PPS with legal training resources.

The Department indicated to the Committee that it recognised the intent behind clause 7 and the importance of providing appropriate training and resources for front line professionals in responding effectively to human trafficking and highlighted that a number of steps had already been taken across the criminal justice system and other front line professions to train and raise awareness of this issue. However, it did have concerns that the wording of the clause placed a statutory duty solely on the Department whereas responsibility for training and equipping investigators and prosecutors rested with a range of law enforcement agencies, some of which fall outside the Department's authority. The Department stated that it would prefer to omit clause 7(1) and amend clause 15 to include a requirement that the strategy under that clause must include matters relating to training, investigation and prosecution, which, in its view, would provide a more strategic response and allow training and resources to be considered under a more comprehensive multi-agency approach.

Lord Morrow subsequently advised the Committee that he had discussed the Department's concerns with officials and was content with the proposal to omit clause 7(1) and address matters relating to training, investigation and prosecution in clause 15. The Committee views the provision of adequate and appropriate training for all front line professionals to enable human trafficking to be tackled effectively as being very important and was therefore content to support the approach agreed by Lord Morrow and the Department of Justice in relation to clause 7(1).

In relation to clause 7, subsections (2) and (3), the PPS advised the Committee that it would apply the test for prosecution in all cases referred by the police regardless of whether the victim reported the offence, made a statement, or withdrew a statement, and highlighted that the PPS policy for prosecuting cases of human trafficking clarified this and the steps to be taken in such circumstances. The Committee agreed to support the provisions in clause 7, subsections (2) and (3), that set out that a prosecution is not dependent on reporting or accusation by a victim and can take place even if the victim has withdrawn their statement, in recognition of the difficulties for victims, some of whom do not even know what country they are in and speak little English, to come forward and give statements and evidence in court and noted that a technical amendment to omit unnecessary words in clause 7(2) was needed.

More recently, Lord Morrow and the Minister of Justice advised the Committee that to assist the structure of the Bill, they intend to remove clause 7 and replace it with new clause 5G, which is set out in amendment 27. As there are no substantive changes being made, the Committee is content with this approach.

Let me speak briefly on amendment 40, which is being brought by the Minister of Finance and Personnel and will introduce a new offence of forced marriage. During the Committee Stage of the Bill, Lord Morrow advised the Committee that he had received a request from the Minister to include this new offence in the Bill. He indicated that the offence was part of the Westminster Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which had recently received Royal Assent and created a new offence of forcing someone to marry against their will. The result of the introduction of the new offence in England and Wales is that Northern Ireland is out of step with the rest of the United Kingdom, and the gap needed to be addressed.

The Committee was supportive of the inclusion of the new provision in the Bill in principle and requested further information on the detail of the proposed new offence from the Department of Finance and Personnel. The Committee subsequently noted the further information on the new offence, which is before us today. It makes sense, therefore, to use this available legislative opportunity to bring about the necessary changes to provide for this new offence and appropriate penalties, and I am sure that the Assembly will support this new provision.

At this stage, those are all the comments I wish to make as Chairman of the Committee. I appreciate that it has taken a little bit of time; however, given that the Committee has a report of 1,200 pages, I will seek to do my best to get all the necessary points put into this particular debate.

Very briefly, as an individual MLA, I will say that obviously in this group the key clause 4 may well divide the House. I concur entirely with the arguments put forward by Lord Morrow in respect of the justification for taking this approach. The evidence has shown, and the Attorney General has recognised it, that it is appropriate for this Parliament to legislate in such a manner. It is not setting a precedent, as Lord Morrow highlighted; it has happened before. Indeed, what is striking in his opinion poll that was conducted during the summer was that a majority of people in Northern Ireland are looking to politicians to legislate for this minimum-sentence approach.

I know there will be some in this House who take the view that that should be entirely the responsibility of judges. However, that is not how the public see it. The public elect us to legislate on their behalf and, if we as politicians decide that there is an issue of significant magnitude that requires a minimum sentence to be put in, then, as the Attorney General said, it is entirely appropriate for politicians to exercise their mandate on behalf of the people in respect of this issue. Therefore, I will be supporting all the positions that Lord Morrow outlined to the House, and I commend them to the House.

Mr McCartney: Go raibh maith agat, a LeasCheann Comhairle. First, I obviously welcome Consideration Stage. I am mindful that you have cautioned us that we should stick to the group of amendments. I just have some indulgences and some broad comments. I actually think I want to support the comments that the Chair of the Committee made in relation to the proposer of the Bill, Lord Morrow, and about the obvious amount of work that he has put into this. There is absolutely no doubt that he was very efficient in terms of the Committee and in furnishing people with information. I acknowledge that.

I suppose that even he would acknowledge that the Bill has been changed since its first framing and the first draft, both by what other people have brought to him and in relation to the Modern Slavery Bill, which he talked about. As the Chair said, the Committee report is over 1,000 pages. I also feel that it is worth acknowledging that, at Committee Stage, all of us who were part of that scrutiny heard very many powerful and insightful witnesses, and I have absolutely no doubt that they will go away from this particular exercise knowing that, when they come to scrutiny Committees in the Assembly, they are there to be properly consulted and properly listened to. Obviously, that should then inform whatever opinion we take in the future. Again, there is absolutely no doubt that, running alongside the Justice Committee report, the joint Oireachtas report had very strong viewpoints, and the views expressed in it were also certainly very informative for us on the Sinn Féin Benches.

I heard Lord Morrow on Radio Ulster this morning and I know from one of the briefing documents that he supplied to all Assembly Members and other people that he laid out three very clear aims. All of us are very supportive of the idea that, where there are vulnerable people being exploited, right across the many different aspects and circumstances of trafficking, slavery and exploitation, we as legislators must do something about it. I think that the Bill, in some way, expresses that.

I now turn to the clauses, a LeasCheann Comhairle. In his introduction, Lord Morrow laid out and described the number of changes in the clauses. When you see that, you can see how this is nearly, if not a rewrite of the Bill, certainly a putting of it into a different context and a presenting of it in a different way. He accepts that the Modern Slavery Bill, which is now being processed at Westminster, has put him in a position, along with the Minister, to make a number of changes, which I think helps strengthen the Bill, and also makes it, if you like, easier to read. That is to be welcomed. I heard the Minister commenting that there are not too many occasions where people will say that he and Lord Morrow agree, but they have found common cause here today, and I suppose that is to be welcomed as well.

The Chair very ably and aptly went through the clauses and the amendments, practically one by one. I think he gave a very fair reflection of how the Committee approached it and the position that the Committee took on all the proposed changes in this group. In brief outline, we welcome, particularly in clauses 1A, 1C and 1D, this idea of a new offence of slavery to include servitude and forced or compulsory labour. I think the Committee at one stage, if it did not have a concern, certainly pointed out that it believed that forced and compulsory labour is a part of this exploitation that perhaps needed to be addressed. When people talk about forced or compulsory labour, it does not always necessarily mean that it is by physical force. It can be psychological or just circumstance. So, we welcome that provision as well.


1.30 pm

There is a very clear definition in the Bill, and that is to be welcomed, around what constitutes exploitation in relation to human trafficking, and, in terms of clause 1D, we welcome the fact that there are what Lord Morrow outlined as preparatory offences. He talked about the technical amendments in clause 2A, and, again, we would welcome that streamlining or bringing the sentencing processes under the dangerous offenders Act of 2008. That sends a very clear signal as to the Bill's intention to see human trafficking and exploitation as a serious offence that should be taken seriously by the courts.

I suppose that leads me to clause 4. At the Committee, that was maybe the issue, apart from clause 6, which we will talk about later on, that perhaps had the most conversation. We believe in principle that the idea of minimum sentences is not an appropriate one. We believe that it should be at the discretion of the judge in that judicial process. We listened very carefully, and I think that it has been laid out very clearly today that the offences that are being committed are serious, should be seen by the courts as serious and the appropriate sentence should be given for the appropriate offence. That is why we find it difficult to move away from the principle of not having a minimum sentence.

People might make a strong argument that this is a serious offence and an offence that most people are totally abhorred by, but I do not think that the circumstance should prevail where there is a minimum sentence for this that does not apply to other serious crimes. We are mindful of the MORI poll, and I am not saying that the question was loaded, but it was certainly framed in a particular way. Perhaps the question that should be asked is whether people agree with the principle that sentencing should be at the discretion of the court. You might get a better view from that. In this instance, I accept what the poll said, but we feel that, in principle, it should be left to the judge.

In the amendments that Lord Morrow has tabled, he accepts that there are circumstances that, I think, are described in the amendments as "exceptional". I think that the MORI poll said "very exceptional", but the amendment just says "exceptional". Although we believe that that is some attempt to except it, there are circumstances in other legislation that has come through the House where people have pointed out that, if you had a minimum sentence, there may be something unforeseen or a particular circumstance that is not catered for by the way that the legislation is framed. The word "exceptional" could be a minefield for different people in the process, be it the defence or the prosecution, to say, "We do not believe this is exceptional" or, "We do believe this is exceptional". We think that the principle of judicial discretion is the best way to take it forward. So, we will support the Department in relation to clause 4 not standing part of the Bill, but, if that fails, we will be supportive of the idea of the exceptional circumstances. I say that to put it on the record.

I will briefly touch on a number of other amendments. We support amendment No 40, which has been tabled by the Minister of Finance and Personnel. There is absolutely no doubt that the idea of forced marriage, as laid out in the amendment, is a form of exploitation. That needs to be addressed, and I think that this is the appropriate vehicle to do it. As the Chair touched on in the latter part of his contribution, we certainly support training with the proper resources and the servicing of that training, so that you have a very good approach in the investigation and in the prosecutorial processes in relation to this. It is good that it is being put into the Bill so that it becomes a requirement rather than people just feeling that it is something that they should do. If we are to make laws and want them to have a particular effect, there is no point in framing a law when those who are charged with enforcing it do not have the resources, do not see it as a priority or do not put in the proper training. That in itself creates a gap, which means that the law is very good and appropriate on paper but, in a contradictory way, is ineffectual.

We support the inclusion of the amendment whereby a prosecution should not rely on a victim's statement, and nor should that be a reason for a prosecution not proceeding. Many people who are involved in human trafficking and find themselves here as part of that experience are from different countries, different cultures and speak different languages, and the Bill caters for that adequately and appropriately.

In summary, we support most of the amendments in the first group. We have reservations with the concept or principle of a minimum sentence and who should have the ability to do that. Is it the legislator or the sentencing provision through to the judicial process? At present, we favour the judicial process.

Mr A Maginness: I thank Lord Morrow for introducing the Bill and for his hard work in realising it. It is faithful to the European directive on human trafficking, and it is important that we apply this into our domestic law. Lord Morrow has done a wonderful job. The work with the departmental officials has been outstanding. There has been a very good partnership between the Department and Lord Morrow. Some issues still divide Lord Morrow and the Department, but the bulk of the Bill is as perfected as it could be in the circumstances, and the original deficiencies have now been remedied by the amendments that have been tabled by Lord Morrow and the Justice Minister. That represents a good deal of good political work, and I believe that the Justice Committee fully supports that, and the Chairperson was sympathetic to that point of view. The Justice Committee has also done a tremendous amount of work on the Bill, and it is a great credit to the Chair, the Deputy Chair and Committee members.

When I was Chair of the Committee for Enterprise, Trade and Investment, I used to say that it was the best Committee in the House. I suppose that it still remains the best Committee in the House. I could not venture to say otherwise in front of the current Chair of the Committee. However, I think that the Justice Committee is probably almost the best Committee in the House. We did good work, which overcame party division. It is important to remember that in the House today.

I will not delay too long, because there is an awful lot of work to be done in relation to the Bill. The SDLP is very supportive of the amendments that have been tabled by Lord Morrow in the first group. As far as the definition of human trafficking and slavery offences is concerned, sensible amendments have been tabled, which to some extent reflect the Modern Slavery Bill, and it is important to have consistency on those matters.

I think that consent being irrelevant for the victim of human trafficking or slavery offences is very important. This is a heinous offence. Witnesses and victims can be intimidated, perhaps not directly but by force of circumstances: for example, the threat of deportation. It is important that consent is not necessary. Also, in clause 3, aggravating factors is a very sensible —

Mr B McCrea: Will the Member give way?

Mr A Maginness: Yes, I will indeed.

Mr B McCrea: I am struck by that argument, and I am interested in the Member's opinion on it. A number of cases of human trafficking have been brought to the courts recently, and one concerned a person who voluntarily arranged transportation. In other words, people were consensually working together. There was a guilty verdict at the conclusion of that case, but I am worried about the Member's thoughts on consent when two people willingly do something together. Are we sure that we do not need a little more oversight of what the law has to say about the matter?

Mr A Maginness: My point is that, if you have a situation in which proving the offence is entirely dependent on the consent of the victim, in those circumstances, that would be entirely wrong. I think that that is important. Here are people, perhaps the most vulnerable in the world, being subjected to this horrendous situation. Surely it is too much to expect that there would be consent in those circumstances.

There is no doubt that we make exceptions in the Bill, but the abhorrence of what is happening throughout the world and affecting our situation here in this region is such that we have to take an exceptional view in the legislation. I make no apology for that, and I think that we have to protect the most vulnerable people in the world.

Mr Wilson: Will the Member give way?

Mr A Maginness: Yes, indeed, Mr Wilson.

Mr Wilson: Does the Member also accept that, given the nature of some of the gangs who operate in human trafficking and the fact that they may have a hold not just on the victims but sometimes on the victims' families back home, the issue of consent is much more blurred than the Member suggested in his earlier intervention?

Mr A Maginness: I agree entirely with what the Member has said, and I think that the House should take that into consideration.

Mr B McCrea: Will the Member give way?

Mr A Maginness: Yes, of course, Mr McCrea.

Mr B McCrea: I totally accept the Member's point and the point that Mr Wilson has just raised about the nature of oppression, but there is an issue of principle here that interests me. If you were able to say that there was no coercion, hidden or otherwise, and that it is an act between two individuals in full consent — the case that I spoke about was dealt with by law — whereby one person willingly makes travel arrangements for another person, who willingly consents to some form of activity that we would not approve of, the fact is that they agreed to do something. I wonder about the general principle of where the state or the legislature interferes in consensual relationships between people.

Mr A Maginness: With respect to the Member, I think that he might be confusing the issue a little. I do not think that the circumstances that he outlined, in which there is a purely voluntary arrangement, could be characterised as human trafficking.

Mr Givan: I thank the Member for giving way. Unfortunately, I think that the other Member for Lagan Valley has taken a predetermined position on this debate. He clearly does not understand the amendments that are being debated and that we will subsequently vote on. This is about consent or otherwise in a statement being used for a prosecution. It is nothing to do with the circumstances that he referred to. It would be helpful of the Member read what we are dealing with and made a contribution that was relevant.

Mr B McCrea: On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. I find it difficult to engage in debate with the Member through another Member. You might give some direction as to how one might deal with such a situation.


1.45 pm

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Dallat): That is not a point of order. However, if there is any value in your statement, I will certainly take it on board.

Mr A Maginness: Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I will try to complete my remarks before Question Time.

I believe that the list of aggravating factors for the court to consider for the purposes of sentencing is comprehensive. It may well be that, in the circumstances, the court would have taken most of those into consideration anyway, but there is no harm in putting into statute the factors that the court should take into consideration.

I move on to clause 4, which is probably the most contentious clause dealt with by this group of amendments. My colleagues and I in the SDLP take the view that judicial discretion is very important, should be respected and that, in most ordinary circumstances, should be absolute. However, there are certain circumstances in which there are minimum sentences. Lord Morrow referred to those and gave examples such as firearms offences, excess alcohol, automatic disqualifications and those sorts of things. In this instance, we are talking about two years and a provision that should send out a very strong message to those who involve themselves in human trafficking that the courts will take a very severe view of it and that there would be a minimum sentence for the courts to apply.

If that was the absolute position, our party would object to it. However, it is not an absolute position because Lord Morrow has brought an element of judicial discretion into the Bill in so far as there are exceptional circumstances. I believe that that is a fair balance and that it provides the necessary judicial discretion. Such is the nature of this crime that we have to send out a very strong message nationally and internationally. That is important, and that is why it is included in the Bill and why we are supportive of it.

For those who seek reassurance on that point, the matter was discussed very thoroughly in the Committee. I refer to paragraph 75 of the Committee's report on the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Further Provisions and Support for Victims) Bill. It states that the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission:

"highlighted that the figure of two years proposed as the minimum sentence was not arbitrary but reflected a subtle increase on current sentencing practice. It advised that the existence of the exception under legislation should remain within the Bill to ensure that the sanctions imposed under Clause 4 are considered proportionate for all THB offences"

— that is human trafficking offences. Paragraph 75 continues:

"including those offences defined as trafficking domestically but which fall outside of the international standard."

Paragraph 76 of the same report states that in its oral evidence, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission:

"confirmed its view that Clause 4 allows for judicial discretion because exceptional circumstances are written into the Clause."

I concur with the view expressed by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. This is exceptional. We accept that it is exceptional and that it is not the ordinary run-of-the-mill. If it were, we would object to it. There are some limitations, but a degree of judicial discretion is permitted, and we believe that that should satisfy the concerns about clause 4.

I will end fairly quickly, Mr Deputy Speaker. Other aspects — assets recovery, reparation orders on the perpetrator and compensation for the victim coming from moneys from or properties owned by the perpetrator — all those things in the Bill are good and important, and it is important that we support them as well.

We support amendment No 40, on forced marriage, tabled by the Minister of Finance and Personnel. It is reflective of legislation at Westminster, and it is important to include it in our domestic legislation and in this Bill.

I do not think that there are any further points that I can make on the first group of amendments, so I will conclude there.

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Dallat): I may have to interrupt you, Mr Elliott, at 2.00 pm, when Question Time begins.

Mr Elliott: That is fine, Mr Deputy Speaker. I do not mind at all if you interrupt me. You are quite welcome to do that. However I hope that you will, as you did other Members, give me a wee bit of leeway to discuss the overall Bill at the start.

I congratulate Lord Morrow on getting progress on the Bill thus far. It has been an interesting project so far, and I am sure that it has been time-consuming for him. It has created a huge amount of discussion, let alone debate. In various areas out in the community and in the Justice Committee, and, I am sure, in the Department of Justice as well, there have been many soul-searching discussions around the rights, wrongs and merits of some aspects of the Bill.

On many occasions, I have been asked whether I support the Bill, and I have always maintained that I support its principle and ethos, as I am sure that most people do. However, as other Members have said, the Bill has undergone some major surgery in the past number of months, and it is interesting that we have a list of amendments that is over five times the length of the Bill as introduced. Anyway, it is good that Lord Morrow, the Department of Justice and the Minister have been working well together, and, hopefully, they will bring about a better conclusion.

Mr Wilson: I may have picked up the Member wrongly, given the tone of the remarks that he made about the amendments. Does he not accept that all Bills go through extensive amendments and that, rather than that being a fault of the Bill or its original intention, it reflects well on the seriousness with which the issue has been dealt with by Lord Morrow and those who scrutinised the legislation at Committee Stage?

Mr Elliott: I thank the Member for that. I said that I welcome the working-together of Lord Morrow, the Minister and the Department of Justice in bringing forward what may be better proposals. I totally accept that point.

On the matter of the first group of amendments, I acknowledge that a large number of them have been worked out between Lord Morrow and the Department of Justice, and, by and large, the Ulster Unionist Party supports them. Some of the more controversial aspects, as we have heard, are around clause 4 and the principle of setting minimum sentences. However, I acknowledge that Lord Morrow has carried this out in the right way, in that he has allowed for some judicial discretion. I support the issue of minimum sentencing, but I also support judicial discretion being applied in exceptional circumstances.

If Members have any doubt about supporting clause 4, they should look at a recent case in Craigavon Magistrates' Court, where a gangmaster was sentenced to payment of £500. That was someone who had committed crimes against a number of Romanian workers, who had to pick apples and scavenge in bins, for which they were given poverty wages. He charged them to live in an unheated shed. He was fined just £500. He actually charged them for living in that shed, which was unfit for human habitation.

I am pleased that the Gangmasters Licensing Authority said that it was shocked and appalled by the leniency of that punishment. It has indicated that it will appeal the sentence, and I hope it will. So, if anybody has any doubt about the potential of minimum sentencing, they should reflect on that case.

Under amendment Nos 17 and 18, where the minimum sentence is not imposed, the court is required to explain why and record the exceptional circumstances that apply. I envisage some interesting outworkings of that and look forward to seeing some of the explanations as to why courts do not impose the minimum sentences. I intervened when the Lord Morrow was speaking earlier to ask whether he had seen any guidelines that could potentially be utilised in those two amendments. That will be a judicial issue; it will be up to the judges and the courts to decide. However, I can see some interesting outcomes of it.

By and large, we support the amendments in this group. Hopefully, people will reflect on their opposition to clause 4 in light of the non-custodial sentence that was handed down in the case I mentioned.

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Dallat): Order. As Question Time begins at 2.00 pm. I suggest that the House takes its ease until then. This debate will continue after Question Time, when the next Member to speak will be Stewart Dickson.

The debate stood suspended.


2.00 pm

(Mr Principal Deputy Speaker [Mr Mitchel McLaughlin] in the Chair)

Oral Answers to Questions

Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister

Mr P Robinson (The First Minister): We are aware that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is working on resolving an outstanding legal impediment relating to the ownership of the historic barracks that form part of the St Lucia site. OFMDFM officials met Ministry of Defence officials in November 2013. However, the MoD has not responded to subsequent follow-up correspondence.

We fully recognise the significance of the historic buildings for the town of Omagh and the potential that they may have to contribute to the development of the area. However, in the current financial climate, we need to ensure that any future use of the St Lucia site and the listed buildings is affordable and sustainable. With that in mind, OFMDFM officials continue to discuss the potential uses of the site with officials from organisations with an interest, including the Department for Social Development and Omagh District Council.

Mr Hussey: Would the First Minister confirm whether the Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister would support local groups that, during the decade of centenaries, would like to use the barracks' square as part of that commemoration?

Mr P Robinson: I would of course. The Department has not considered the matter, but, subject to the legal issues between the MoD and the past owner being resolved, I see no reason why it should not be used for that purpose. There is, I understand, a memorial within the site, and I am sure that access to that would be much appreciated by people locally.

Mr Buchanan: Given that the council is keen to have something happen on the site but funds are limited, what are the options?

Mr P Robinson: The first requirement is for the MoD to resolve the legal issues as to whether the previous owner wants to take the site back into ownership or whether it is free for the MoD to transfer. If they offer it on transfer, clearly Omagh District Council would be one of the key partners that would have an interest in the issue. There may even be an interest in part of the site from the private sector or in partnership with DSD and Omagh District Council. Those are the possibilities, but we have to get over the first impediment. Some Members think that OFMDFM is slow at getting replies out. Well, meet the MoD. We are still waiting for our reply from last November.

Mr Milne: Go raibh maith agat, a Phríomh-LeasCheann Comhairle. What is the current position on the Shackleton Barracks site at Ballykelly?

Mr P Robinson: The deputy First Minister and I rescued it from a use that would not have maximised its funding centrally to the Assembly and Executive or the level of jobs that could be brought into the area. We have put it out for expressions of interest, and we received over 40, principally from the private sector, although there are some partnerships and public sector interests.

I have seen expressions of interest that indicate that 1,000 or 2,000 jobs could be created in the area. Indeed, there would be a significant income for the Executive. However, we decided that it is best that we look at dividing the site into lots because there is an interest in the site from, for instance, the Department of Agriculture and DRD. There are also different private sector interests that do not conflict with each other. In the next few days, the deputy First Minister and I will look at actioning that proposal, which is to put it out for public interest and see what bids come in.

Mr P Robinson: Mr Principal Deputy Speaker, with your permission, I will ask junior Minister Jonathan Bell to answer this question.

Mr Bell (Junior Minister, Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister): With your permission, Mr Principal Deputy Speaker, I will answers questions 2 and 4 together.

Funding has been committed to 23 projects, with the latest costs — following cost-validation exercises since letters of offer were issued — totalling £34·4 million. We are working with the projects' lead partners on preconditions associated with their social investment fund (SIF) funding. Once these have been met, we will be able to authorise delivery start dates.

One project has started in the northern zone: the Causeway rural and urban network capital project is for the development of a charity hub. Two others — one in the Londonderry zone and the other in Belfast east zone — are close to getting approval to proceed. The Londonderry community work programme is a revenue project designed to provide long-term placements for the long-term unemployed, specifically those on the margins, such as the under-25s, while the Belfast east Bryson Street capital project will create a purpose-built community doctors' surgery on a brownfield site. The surgery will provide state-of-the-art facilities for the local community in an area of high deprivation. It is anticipated that both projects will get off the ground in the near future.

We are exploring options in relation to the remaining zonal allocations, taking account of the levels of investment across the zones, community planning and the current financial position.

Mr Givan: I welcome that answer from the junior Minister, particularly when you consider that the quantum of moneys being talked about is £34·4 million. The Minister will be aware of the Resurgam Trust in my constituency. It is a grass-roots, community-led organisation that is professionally delivering, alongside other communities, in places such as Old Warren, the Low Road, Hillhall, Ballymacash and the Maze. It is making a really big difference in those communities. He will be aware of the successful application for one of the projects to do with SIF. Can he provide the House with an update of progress in taking forward the projects in my constituency?

Mr Bell: I am happy to do that, and I pay tribute to the trust for the work that it is doing with people who are most in need.

There are five projects in the south eastern zone. They include Laganview, which is aiming to create the healthy living centre in the Old Warren estate in Lisburn. A project aims to develop the family centre in Twinbrook, and SIF is part-funding this, alongside the Department for Social Development. The early years work aims to reduce the risk factors linked to educational underachievement and focuses on the transition stages at preschool, primary and post-primary levels, and that will be implemented right across the south eastern zone. In west Lisburn, there is an aim to redevelop the existing community centre — again, in the Old Warren estate — as a dedicated youth facility. Then there is the Cloona House project, which aims to redevelop the building as a headquarters for the Colin Neighbourhood Partnership, to allow the delivery of an extensive range of community services.

All the above projects, with the exception of Twinbrook, have a signed and returned letter of offer in place, and officials are working with the lead partners to meet the conditions. Twinbrook is being managed by DSD, and funding will be committed through that Department.

Mr Lunn: I thank the junior Minister for his answers to Mr Givan; obviously, we share an interest in that constituency. Can the junior Minister give us any sort of guarantee that this fund will be fully utilised in this financial year and that there will not be any underspend that may go to waste?

Mr Bell: It is an important question. Funding has been allocated to 23 projects to date, with the most up-to-date costs totalling, as I outlined, £34·4 million. Spend to date has been focusing on the work that is necessary to take forward the individual projects. We have looked at all the projects as they stand and at the total budget, and I am confident that a number of projects are about to receive their letter of offer. A further 22 projects will be examined. I am very keen that those projects are fully examined and come to fruition. I am confident, as far as I can be, that that fund will be fully utilised. If any project does not make it, there are other projects in the pipeline that will then be considered. Given what it was set up to do — to tackle deprivation and dereliction — I am fully confident that we can spend all the money.

Mr Spratt: I welcome the fact that a number of letters of offer have gone out in my constituency. Will the junior Minister assure the House that the £80 million will be protected to ensure that all the letters of offer will come to fruition?

Mr Bell: The money has been set aside and is targeted at where it is most needed. As I said, I am confident that that money will be fully utilised to tackle issues that have been raised in different zones.

Mr Attwood: At the end of your answer to the original question, you referred to current financial issues. Given that £34·4 million has been committed, are you hinting that OFMDFM will not be able to commit the balance or part of the balance of the moneys up to £80 million?

Mr Bell: No, is the short answer. The £80 million has been protected and is set to deliver on the projects. There is no hint whatsoever of that. As I said, the money has been allocated with the letters of offer. A number of projects are awaiting their letter of offer, and those are fairly imminent. Some £27 million remains. Twenty-two projects are being analysed in relation to that, which would take us to the full amount. If any of those projects were to drop off, there are other projects in the pipeline.

Mr Elliott: I thank the junior Minister for his answers so far. He mentioned a number of the zones, including the northern zone, the south-eastern zone and the Londonderry zone. Will he update me on the western zone, particularly the allocations that have gone out so far and the projects that are close to commencement?

Mr Bell: I am delighted that the old saying is true: all politics is local. In the western zone, we have Work Ready West, which is a revenue project that has been allocated £2·2 million There is SATCHEL, which is a Sure Start revenue project that has been allocated £1·3 million. There is also Fermanagh House, which is a capital project that has been allocated £0·9 million.

Mr P Robinson: Securing the power to lower corporation tax is a key priority for the Executive to promote the growth of the local economy. As part of our economic pact that we signed last year, the United Kingdom Government indicated the intention to make a decision on the devolution of corporation tax powers no later than the coming autumn statement, which will be on 3 December. Since the Scottish referendum last month, we have made clear our expectations regarding further fiscal devolution for Northern Ireland. That has involved discussions with the Secretary of State, and we have also written to the Prime Minister to press him to come to a decision quickly to ensure the swift devolution of corporation tax powers to Northern Ireland.

Mr Wilson: Given the refusal of Sinn Féin and the SDLP in particular, and, to a lesser extent, the Ulster Unionist Party, to face up to the Assembly's budgetary pressures, does the First Minister have any fear that we may find ourselves in a situation in which corporation tax powers are devolved, but we are unable to deliver on a reduction of the rate because of the financial shambles imposed on the Executive by the refusal of those parties to engage in serious debate on the Budget?


2.15 pm

Mr P Robinson: I say to my friend that my fear is not so much that the powers are devolved and we have difficulty implementing them thereafter; my fear is that Treasury might say that it expects a certain level of fiscal management responsibility and that it will therefore hold back from devolving those powers. I am sure — I say this in order to satisfy the concerns of Treasury — that the real difference between welfare reform and corporation tax is that there is unanimity around the Executive table on corporation tax. I am convinced that, if given the power, we will be able to deal with that in a unanimous manner around the Executive table.

I point out that we will obviously require legislation to go through Westminster, probably in much the same way as a money Bill would go through the House of Commons and the Lords. Even after that, there are considerable processes, particularly the procurement of the necessary IT equipment, which would probably mean that it would be, at the earliest, the end of 2016 or early 2017 before it could be implemented on the ground.

Mr Nesbitt: Notwithstanding the long wait, does the First Minister believe that, should the power be devolved, we are ready in terms of A-grade office accommodation, skill sets in the workforce and what some economists might consider other structural flaws in our set-up?

Mr G Robinson: It would be unfair to suggest that DETI and Invest have been anything other than the jewel in the crown of the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly, and, indeed, of Northern Ireland itself. They have been out there hammering away at bringing in jobs and have done so successfully. They have beaten every target that we set for them. They have brought in more jobs over this period than at any time in the history of Northern Ireland and more foreign direct investment per head of population than anywhere else in the United Kingdom, including London. So, they have done a first-class job. Do I have some concerns that there are areas of infrastructure that we need to do more about? Yes, I have, particularly office space, which he mentioned. We have been so successful that we have started to soak up all of the available office space. The planners and developers need to up their game to ensure that we can continue with the level of growth that we have been successful in bringing to Northern Ireland thus far.

Mr Lynch: Go raibh maith agat, a Phríomh-LeasCheann Comhairle. What discussions has OFMDFM had with the Scottish Executive, and what tax-varying powers are being considered for the North of Ireland?

Mr G Robinson: The deputy First Minister and I had breakfast this morning with the First Minister of Scotland, Alex Salmond. Both of us had a previous conversation with him as part of our business trip to Gleneagles, when we discussed with him elements of devolution; spoke to a major company that was looking to bring hundreds of jobs into Northern Ireland; and had discussions with the European Tour about the two visits of the Irish Open to Northern Ireland. Tomorrow, we leave here for a meeting on Wednesday with Carwyn Jones, the First Minister of Wales, on the same subject.

There is probably recognition that the same type of devolution will not be suitable for all three jurisdictions. Therefore, we need to be satisfied of what is best for us, just as Scotland and Wales will do for themselves. The hope and expectation is that there will be some commonality of approach in ensuring that we have the very best form of devolution for each of the three jurisdictions as we move forward.

In terms of what tax-raising powers we are looking at, we are looking at them all. What we come down on and which taxes are appropriate to be devolved will, ultimately, be a matter for the Executive.

Mr Eastwood: I note what the First Minister said about corporation tax. What are the Executive doing to address the very clear regional imbalances in economic development and job creation?

Mr P Robinson: I am glad to say that we have, through Invest Northern Ireland, been encouraging investment in every part of Northern Ireland. I think that the Member recognises that it is much easier in the greater Belfast area. I know that some people are very seriously considering job potential in the north-west. I hope that we can have announcements on that in the future.

There is no part of Northern Ireland, including the north-west, that anybody on the Executive — certainly not the deputy First Minister and I — would do anything other than encourage people to move to. I want to see everybody in Northern Ireland gainfully employed. I am glad to see that for 21 consecutive months, the claimant count has been going down in Northern Ireland. I am glad to see that we are back down to 6·1% unemployment and that it is hopefully still moving further down. All of that is a good sign. I want people to be employed as much in the north-west as in any other part of Northern Ireland.

Mr McCallister: From his discussions with the Scottish First Minister, Alex Salmond, the First Minister will know whether Scotland are pursuing corporation tax. Is he aware that no work has been done by either DETI or DFP on the impact that Scotland's getting corporation tax would have on Northern Ireland's receiving it or indeed the level at which it should be set? Is that a matter of concern to him?

Mr P Robinson: No. What would have been a matter of concern is that if DETI and its various advisers had not done a lot of work to see what benefit there would be to Northern Ireland if corporation tax powers were to be devolved. They have, and the economic advisers indicate that our benefit could be around 58,000 jobs. That is a significant benefit to Northern Ireland.

I am not convinced that Scotland can make the same strong case as Northern Ireland to have the devolution of corporation tax. In Northern Ireland, we have a devolved government that is coming out of a long period of conflict and division, which makes us a special case. We have a land frontier with another nation that has a very low level of corporation tax compared with that of the UK. That is a disadvantage and a uniqueness in our case. I think that, for many reasons, Northern Ireland stands apart as having a strong case for the devolution of corporation tax. I have no doubt that the First Minister of Scotland and his successor will push to have the devolution of corporation tax, but I think that we have a far better chance of getting it than they do.

Mr P Robinson: The Together: Building a United Community strategy, published on 23 May 2013, reflects the Executive's commitment to improving community relations and continuing the journey towards a more united and shared society.

Work is progressing across all seven headline actions that were announced alongside the publication of the strategy. One of the headline actions is the creation of 10 shared education campuses. The programme was launched by the Department of Education in January 2014, and it received 16 applications under the first call for expressions of interest. In July 2014, the first three projects to be supported were announced. They are shared STEM and sixth-form facilities, incorporating St Mary's High School, Limavady and Limavady High School; a shared education campus, incorporating Moy Regional Controlled Primary School and St John's Primary School, Moy; and a shared education campus, incorporating Ballycastle High School and Cross and Passion College, Ballycastle. Those projects are now proceeding to full business case.

A second call for expressions of interest opened on 1 October 2014, with submissions due by 30 January 2015. An announcement of the second tranche of shared education campuses is expected to be made in June 2015. In addition to the Together: Building a United Community commitment of 10 shared campuses, the Lisanelly shared education campus programme is also being progressed. The first phase of construction, which is at Arvalee School and Resource Centre, is expected to begin early next year. Work is continuing to prepare the site, and excellent progress is also being made in developing the overall exemplar of campus design.

Mr McAleer: Go raibh maith agat, a Phríomh-LeasCheann Comhairle. What progress has been made on the provision of 100 summer camps? Will those be available for young people outside Belfast?

Mr P Robinson: I thank the Member for his question. Progress is being made on all the areas that were recognised in the seven actions that are being taken forward. We have committed to creating 100 such school or summer camps in 2015. Work is under way to ensure that we meet that commitment. Intervention activities took place in the summer of 2014, and those will continue at Halloween this year. Following an evaluation of the programmes and other related activities, a full and final programme will be developed and rolled out in all council areas from summer 2015. The programme will build on the many existing examples of good practice that are operating in the community across the country.

Mr Byrne: I thank the First Minister for his answers on Lisanelly. Will he state whether all the capital moneys can be put in place in a sequenced order to make sure that the schools that want to go there can avail themselves of the opportunity as soon as possible?

Mr P Robinson: We almost had the embarrassing situation of having money offered to us without us having the ability to spend it on Lisanelly, simply because of the timing of the programme. We have been successful in getting money — as part of the economic pact, along with our own funds — to move on with the Arvalee site proposal. Work is still being done at design stage for the other schools that are going on to the site. Ultimately, it will be a matter for the Minister to make bids for the capital budget. I will say that our capital budget is not in as difficult a place as our revenue budget is for the future, so hopefully a programme can be worked out. I have no doubt that the Minister of Education will argue his case strongly for funding for that purpose.

Miss M McIlveen: Further to those answers, what options are available for schools where physical collocation is not possible?

Mr P Robinson: The deputy First Minister and I are passionately supportive of the shared education proposals. They are a recognition that we have to deal with the situation as it is at present. While he and I might have wanted an overall and immediate integration of education across Northern Ireland, we have to work within the parameters of our present circumstances. That, quite frankly, means that, while we are rolling out the shared education campuses, many schools simply would not have a partner in their area to avail themselves of the benefits of a shared campus. In those circumstances, we are rolling out proposals that look at having shared classes and shared extracurricular activity, be it sport or other elements. On some occasions, there are possibilities for us to go well beyond that.

The deputy First Minister and I recently announced that we have £25 million for a scheme as a result of a very generous offer from Atlantic Philanthropies. That will allow us to make progress on those kinds of schemes. Where departmental funds might have been difficult on the revenue side over the next three or four years, Atlantic Philanthropies' kind giving will allow us to make progress in precisely those areas — revenue — as opposed to in capital areas.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: We possibly have time for a question but no supplementary questions.

Mr P Robinson: We are pleased to confirm that we have made significant progress in our relationship with the People's Republic of China and on opening an Executive office in Beijing. The director of the Northern Ireland Bureau started work in Beijing on 1 September. He has been assigned, on an interim basis, the primary objective of setting up the office, establishing contact with key Departments and stakeholder organisations, and exploring opportunities for mutually beneficial partnerships with regions across China.


2.30 pm

Logistical arrangements are being finalised with the Chinese Government for the location of the office itself. The many administrative and protocol issues that are inevitably associated with such a project are being addressed. A number of encouraging initial meetings with government officials, businesses and agricultural organisations and local government bodies have also taken place.

The Executive's decision to open an office in China has been very well received within the Chinese Government and by the business sector. The deputy First Minister and I hope to further consolidate this growing relationship with the Chinese Government when we visit China in the near future to officially launch the Northern Ireland bureau and its services.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: That ends the period for listed questions. We now move onto 15 minutes of topical questions.

T1. Mr Irwin asked the First Minister and deputy First Minister for an update on the talks that are taking place. (AQT 1621/11-15)

Mr P Robinson: As Members are aware — at least, they should be — the talks process has begun. The Secretary of State has had initial meetings with the parties. I, personally, hope that she will widen it out beyond the Executive parties. If we are dealing with matters of Assembly and Executive budgets, welfare reform and the structures of the Assembly, parties other than the Executive parties have just as much a right to have their say. They may not get their way, just as some of us will not be able to get all that we want, but they should be heard at the very least.

During my party's meeting with the Secretary of State, we tabled a proposal on welfare reform. I look forward to the opportunity to talk to the other political parties about what we propose in that process. It is essential that we resolve this issue. I do not think that now is a time for us to be scoring party political points on it. A serious engagement now needs to take place. I want to make it very clear from my party's point of view that we genuinely want to get a satisfactory outcome to all the outstanding issues during the talks.

Mr Irwin: I thank the First Minister for his reply. Could the First Minister give an update on the date for reaching a conclusion to the talks?

Mr P Robinson: I know that the Secretary of State has optimistically suggested that we can deal with all of the issues by the end of November; would that it could be so. By the end of November, we will want, at the very least, to have made very considerable progress on the financial issues involved. We have looming Budget deadlines, and therefore we need to reach some conclusions as a result of the discussions. Apart from the discussions that we will have within the Executive and between Executive parties, there is a need for us to resolve with Her Majesty's Government some budgetary matters, not least the fact that our Budget in Northern Ireland has been virtually static since 2009 while pressures have been growing and costs have been increasing.

T3. Mr McCartney asked the First Minister and deputy First Minister for additional information on the First Minister’s answer to a question from Colum Eastwood, when he said that he had some hope or expectation of job announcements in the north-west, particularly Derry. (AQT 1623/11-15)

Mr P Robinson: I think that you should be declaring an interest as well, Mr Principal Deputy Speaker. The answer is that, yes, I could but, no, I will not. However, if the Member has a quiet word with the deputy First Minister, I think that he will indicate to him that we have had conversations that indicate that there is a very real interest that would be pretty substantial for the north-west. However, as with all of these issues and as the deputy First Minister knows as a fisherman, you have to wait until the fish is landed and in your hands on the bank before you say too much about it.

Mr Mitchel McLaughlin: And make sure that you have a licence.

[Laughter.]

Mr McCartney: Go raibh maith agat, a Phríomh-LeasCheann Comhairle. Gabhaim buíochas leis an Chéad Aire as an fhreagra sin. I thank the First Minister for his answer. Double confirmation is double confirmation, as they say. Does the First Minister agree that job creation and the expansion of the university are two of the main planks that will assist the regeneration of the north-west in line with the Programme for Government?

Mr P Robinson: I am very sympathetic to the case for Magee, which, I assume, is what he is talking about. I was one of those who felt strongly that, if we could do it financially, there should be an increase in the cap. I also strongly believe that that increase should take place in the STEM subjects. I have argued that, if, in the future, some of what we have to do in difficult financial times is about reducing public expenditure by reducing the number of people who work in the public services and if we are going to have a voluntary exit scheme, we will need to ensure that the private sector is bolstered in order to take up the slack. The only way you can do that is through the work that DEL and DETI are doing: getting people with the necessary qualifications to take the jobs that are coming into Northern Ireland and, at the same time, ensuring that we have the jobs coming in to be filled, as DETI is doing. I am strongly of the view that we need to continue to have the growth of students coming out with the necessary qualifications for the above-medium salary levels that we are now attracting to Northern Ireland. That can only be done with the support of our universities, including Magee.

T4. Mr Dunne asked the First Minister and deputy First Minister whether they are aware of any plans on the part of the new Minister for Social Development to introduce legislation in relation to welfare reform. (AQT 1624/11-15)

Mr P Robinson: I think the House knows that the Minister's predecessor brought legislation to the Assembly. There has not been agreement around the Executive table on how to take welfare reform forward. However, I point out to everyone in the House that it is not the Bill that is the problem; the House could easily pass the Bill without violence to the principles of anybody on either side of the House. It is the regulations that flow from the Bill that would be the issue.

We have an Executive convention of not bringing legislation to the Assembly unless the Executive are agreed on that legislation. Maybe that is one of the issues that parties will want to consider when we are talking about the arrangements at Stormont. I have heard requests from several parties in the Assembly that we bring the Bill to the Assembly. That seems to be a change in the convention, and it would mean that any Minister could bring a Bill to the Chamber, even if it did not have the agreement of the Executive. I think that we need to be careful about any precedent that is set. There may well be a time, if we are encouraged sufficiently, when we will bring the Bill to the Assembly, but the worst of all circumstances is bringing a Bill to the Assembly, having it defeated and ending up in circumstances where there is no route out of our present difficulties.

Mr Dunne: I thank the First Minister for his answer. Has he any proposals on how welfare reform can be progressed?

Mr P Robinson: "Lots", I think, is the answer to that. Taking into account the position adopted by other parties, I think there still is a way forward, provided that people are prepared to come forward with a reasonable outcome. Nobody will get everything that they want in this proposition. My party voted against many aspects of the Bill at Westminster in the Commons and in the Lords. However, we recognise that there is a balance. We have to protect the most vulnerable, but they are affected in two ways. Some will be affected by any reduction that would take place in their welfare payments, but most will be affected if there is a substantial reduction in public services and the health service, the education service and the Police Service get run down as a result of £1,000 million being taken out of our block grant. We need to balance those issues and make sure that we do something that is in the best interests. Although it may be difficult for some in our society, we need to do the best that we can for all of them. The bottom line on the issue is that, if we do not succeed in doing this and, as a result, the future of the Assembly and Executive is threatened, we would not be able to provide any protection at all to the most vulnerable under direct rule. They would not get the enhanced deal that is on offer.

T5. Mr Lunn asked the First Minister and deputy First Minister whether they agree that, if the talks are to bear fruit, there is an absolute need for compromise and goodwill to be shown by all sides of the House, with everyone participating. (AQT 1625/11-15)

Mr P Robinson: I have never known any talks or negotiations that have succeeded without there being compromise on both sides, and I think that there the Member encapsulates it — on both sides. Of course there needs to be goodwill, and of course parties need to roll up their sleeves and get down to the work. That is why I am pleased that my colleagues and I were the first and only party to put a serious submission to the Secretary of State.

Mr Lunn: I thank the First Minister for that answer. Will he agree that it would have been a good start and a good gesture of goodwill to allow the election of a Speaker to proceed last week?

Mr P Robinson: When you have agreements, one agreement is valued as much as another. I made it clear last week that we stand over and will honour both of our agreements. We believe that, as one is being put into the talks process, the other should too. Hopefully, in a few weeks, we can come back and do exactly that on both agreements.

T6. Mr Gardiner asked the First Minister and deputy First Minister why Northern Ireland has seen only 4% savings in Civil Service costs in the last four years, compared to 10% in England. (AQT 1626/11-15)

Mr P Robinson: That is something that, I think, will be fast remedied by the proposals that we are now looking at. I suppose that the answer to it has something to do with the ambition of the Executive in relation to the number of new projects that have been commenced. However, it is very clear that, with 120,000 public servants in Northern Ireland for a population of 1·8 million people, we certainly can make reductions without having any serious impact on the services that are provided. I agree wholeheartedly with the trade unions that that has to be a planned reduction, perhaps over a period, to ensure that we do not leave any parts of the public service undermanned and that we are able to provide the service that people need. Four per cent towards 5% has been the reduction in Northern Ireland, but it has been about 8% in Scotland and about 10% in Wales. I think that it has even gone beyond that in England, where it has been about 12%. So, whatever the percentages, you could argue that some may have been at too high a level before the cull began. The truth of it is that we are looking very seriously at a voluntary exit scheme that would allow us to reduce the number of public servants and, therefore, reduce the amount of our Budget that goes to that cost. If we are able to take a couple of hundred million pounds off our Budget, there are certainly plenty of things that we could use that expenditure on.

Mr Gardiner: I thank the First Minister for his comments. If the Minister is not successful in getting the £120 million estimated savings, will he turn to compulsory redundancy?

Mr P Robinson: I do not think that anybody is talking about compulsory redundancy. Indeed, the head of the Civil Service does not want to be in the doorway when the proposal is put forward that there should be a voluntary exit scheme because he believes that there will be such a rush that he will get knocked down. I do not think that we are in that space at all. We obviously want to talk with the unions to see that we have a fair package for those who will exit the public service at this stage, but I do not believe that it will be necessary to have any compulsory redundancies.

T7. Mr Craig asked the First Minister and deputy First Minister what action their Department is taking to tackle the recent increase in race hate crime. (AQT 1627/11-15)

Mr P Robinson: The deputy First Minister and I are adamantly opposed to anybody who believes that it is right and proper to intimidate or to attack anyone on the basis of their race. I am glad that local representatives are doing what local representatives should do and are going out and offering support to those who are under attack. We, of course, have our race relations programmes, which we will continue to roll out. The deputy First Minister and I will continue publicly to give our support to those who are under attack and to do whatever we can to discourage the attacks and to encourage the police to bring forward convictions of those involved.


2.45 pm

Mr Craig: I thank the First Minister for his comprehensive answer. Does he agree that, given the complications of some of the attacks that are labelled race hate crimes, the justice system must equally hand out heavy sentences to reflect how heinous those crimes are?

Mr P Robinson: Yes, unquestionably. Anyone who is setting out on this kind of activity needs to know that society repudiates their actions. The clearest sign of repudiation of that kind of activity is the ability of the court to set down very strong custodial sentences to those who are involved. I would be going back to an earlier debate if I started to talk about minimum or mandatory sentences in these matters. I do not want to open that one up, but I think that everyone in the House will agree that there has to be a method to discourage people from getting involved. One way in which we can do that — it is within the power of the Assembly — is to look at the sentencing regime to see whether we can strengthen it.

Justice

Mr Ford (The Minister of Justice): I have had general discussions on the police budget with the Chief Constable and members of the Policing Board. The allocation of the police budget, however, is an operational matter and, therefore, the responsibility of the Chief Constable, who is accountable to the board. It is not for me as Minister.

Mr Boylan: Go raibh maith agat, a Phríomh-LeasCheann Comhairle. Gabhaim buíochas leis an Aire as an fhreagra. I thank the Minister for his reply. Will he give some consideration, when future planning, to whether the cost of police overtime will increase or decrease over the next number of years? Will he factor that into any consideration?

Mr Ford: It is clear that current changes will make it difficult for the police to manage the budget in line with their overall responsibilities, but I repeat that, operationally, I cannot go into the detail of how the Chief Constable chooses to divide his budget. If there are fewer officers at times, he may feel compelled to increase overtime. On the other hand, with a general reduction in budget, it is very difficult to see how that overtime can be increased significantly. I repeat: it is not for me to tell him how to allocate that budget.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: Mr Danny Kinahan is not in his place.

Mr D McIlveen: The Minister will be aware that, in light of the budgetary pressures, his Department has undergone a 4·4% decrease in its budget in the incoming year. However, the PSNI has had to undertake over 7%. Will the Minister confirm, as the Chief Constable has hinted, that he is putting barristers before bobbies?

Mr Ford: That is not a hint that I recognise from anything said by the Chief Constable. The Chief Constable has to live within the budget that is allocated to the PSNI, just as every other spending area of the Department of Justice has to live within its spending limit. The reality is that there were significant pressures in the Department of Justice, not least because we had not driven through the programme of legal aid as fast as would have been hoped, and some matters have been resting before the Justice Committee for some months.

All that has contributed to a build-up on the current pressure, which, faced with the decision of the Finance Minister and the Executive to change the basis on which the DOJ budget was ring-fenced in-year without warning, has given significant difficulties to the Department of Justice. Given that there have been significantly greater cuts over the comprehensive spending review period to the block as a whole because of the linkages to the Home Office and the MOJ, further severer cuts have now been imposed on the Department of Justice. Given the existing legal pressures under which legal aid is obliged to be paid, it was simply not possible to protect all the spending areas that we would have wished to.

Mrs D Kelly: Notwithstanding that police overtime is an operational matter for the Chief Constable, does the Minister agree that much of it is because of the failure to show leadership at public order events, particularly parades and protests? Therefore, if there are any gaps in the legislation that need to be filled, would the Minister look at giving political cover to the Chief Constable for charging for such events?

Mr Ford: I certainly agree with Mrs Kelly's first point, which was that a very significant amount of overtime is related to public order issues, as I have said in the Chamber on more than one occasion and, I fear, may have to say on more occasions.

As to the precise issue of charging for events that happen in open, public spaces, there are significant issues that go beyond the kind of instant response that we might wish for. I have no doubt that some Members would wish particular bodies to be charged for events that they hold in the open air, and perhaps other Members would prefer that other people were charged. That is a measure of the difficulty. We need a resolution to the kind of problems that have led to public order difficulties on the streets over the last couple of years. We need political leadership, which the First Minister just talked about, coming into play in a talks process so that we can cut back on public order disputes and, incidentally, on the expense of policing them.

Ms Boyle: Go raibh maith agat. Can the Minister commit to providing extra resource to the ombudsman's office in light of the additional funding that he received lately?

Mr Ford: It is a slight jump from the funding of the police to the funding of the Office of the Police Ombudsman, which is, I take it, what the Member meant. The reality is that the Office of the Police Ombudsman is being protected very significantly compared with other aspects of Department of Justice spending. It is the only spending area in the justice family to have an increase in expenditure over the last three years, and, this year, it is suffering monitoring round cuts of no more than the average, the 4·4% that has just been spoken of. That seems to me very significant protection for the Police Ombudsman.

Mr Wilson: Given the concern from the SDLP and Sinn Féin about the pressures on the police overtime budget, does the Minister agree that one simple way of reducing those pressures would be for those two parties to stop manufacturing contentious parades that require additional policing and therefore increase the police overtime bill?

Mr Ford: It would be so much nicer if, when the Member was asking me to agree with him, he did not stand wagging his finger at me in a manner that is coming close to being unparliamentary.

I thought that I made general points about contentious parades and public order matters. They were not in any sense aimed at one particular group that organises such parades. The reality is that we have problems with parades and protests in different areas and with people from different backgrounds, although I was not aware that the SDLP organised many, so perhaps somebody can tell me about that in the next question. Clearly, there are significant concerns about the imposition on public order and the concomitant difficulties in community relations that come from a number of parades and related protests. As I said earlier, I hope that that will be ended by a resolution in the talks process.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: Here at least, we will move on.

Mr Ford: To date, the prison review oversight group, which I chair, has deemed 16 of the 40 prison review team (PRT) recommendations complete. The group referred a further 17 recommendations to Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland (CJINI) and the Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority (RQIA), as appropriate, for independent assessment. This means that 33 of the 40 recommendations are complete or under assessment. I expect that the seven remaining recommendations will be brought to the oversight group in December 2014 or March 2015.

This reform programme has been about modernising the Northern Ireland Prison Service (NIPS) to ensure resources are best directed at reducing reoffending and making the community safer. As part of that, we have also developed a more efficient and effective service. The foundations have been laid for lasting change. However, the economic challenges that we now face were not envisaged by the prison review team when it made its recommendations.

The review team anticipated that savings made through reform initiatives such as the voluntary early retirement scheme could be reinvested in prisons, but this has not been possible; nor has it been possible to invest as much in the voluntary and community sector as the review team and I had hoped.

Whilst my ambitions have not diminished, the reality is that difficult decisions will need to be made on how NIPS delivers for everyone in Northern Ireland.
Despite the cuts, the reforms being overseen by the prison review oversight group are significant and lasting. While the budget reduction is challenging, I believe that we can continue to deliver a modern, focused prison service with partnership working to reduce offending at its core.

Mr McKinney: I thank the Minister. I hear from him that the budgetary cuts are impacting severely, if I am not putting words in his mouth. What impact will there be on the provision of health care, including mental health care, in the Prison Service?

Mr Ford: Mr McKinney referred to the general issue of cost. Let me give a couple of figures. At the time of devolution in 2010-11, the cost per prisoner place was almost £74,000 per year; it has been reduced to, in the last financial year, under £63,000. That is a 21% reduction anticipated by this year — a significant improvement in efficiency. The specific point that he highlighted was around health care, specifically mental health care, which I acknowledge is a significant issue for prisons. Actually, as it is now the responsibility of the South Eastern Trust, it is an issue for DHSSPS to address, not DOJ. Clearly we work in partnership, but the precise issue of how services are provided is not something that I can answer.

Mr McCartney: Go raibh maith agat, a Phríomh-LeasCheann Comhairle. Gabhaim buíochas leis an Aire as an fhreagra sin. I think the Minister for his answer. He gave some indication about the roll-out of the implementation plan. Can the Minister provide some update as to its impact on Maghaberry prison?

Mr Ford: I believe that there has been a significant impact across all three prisons, not just Maghaberry. For example, at Maghaberry we have seen, with the opening of Quoile House, significant work being done with those who wish to reduce drug dependency, and work being done on the Family Matters landing. I also visited, in Glen House, a specific, intensive project for 12 prisoners seeking to come off drug habits. All of that is related to ensuring that people are less likely to reoffend when they come out. There has also been ongoing engagement, particularly through Business in the Community, with potential employers to ensure that we provide the opportunities for people to get employment when they leave and, therefore, be less likely to reoffend. All of those are significant issues, working with partners in the voluntary and community sector, and with staff being used in a more effective way to promote the rehabilitation of prisoners. I think that we have seen significant improvements from that work at Maghaberry and in the other two institutions.

Mrs Dobson: Minister, why is there no progress in reducing the misuse of drugs in prison?

Mr Ford: I have just given examples of work being done to reduce drug dependency in prison. There is clearly a significant drug problem in prisons, just as there is in the whole of society. Sadly it is not something that can be avoided in prisons when it is so prevalent elsewhere. However, there is work being done around education and prevention, and there is work being done to assist those who indicate a willingness to come off drugs in different ways. There is no doubt that, for example on some of the preventive work, a much more focused programme of intelligence-led rather than random searching has led to a reduction in the number of searches but an increase in the amount of drugs found. That is an indication of good work being done in the Prison Service.

Mr Ford: The decision to close the custody facilities at Limavady police station is an operational matter for the Chief Constable. I understand that the Chief Constable has already outlined his reasons for the closure to the Member and indicated that he is confident that it will not impact on crime levels or outcome rates in the area.

Mr Campbell: I thank the Minister for the response. However, is he aware that my information is that, shortly after the Limavady custody suite was closed, the Coleraine custody suite was also closed temporarily? Has he an indication from the Chief Constable as to when the Coleraine custody suite will reopen, given that the current position is that many people being detained have to travel 50, 60 or more miles for custody?

Mr Ford: I have no specific information on the Coleraine question. However, given that in the Limavady area — policing district G — there are currently operational custody suites in the Waterside, Strand Road and Strabane, I am not quite sure how anybody from that direction would be travelling 50 or 60 miles.

If it is an issue for Coleraine, then the distance from Coleraine to Antrim, where there is a very significant custody suite, is somewhat less than 50 miles.


3.00 pm

Mr Ford: Where individuals commit serious crimes, the shared focus of our justice system is to bring them to account for their actions. Where there are allegations of historical institutional abuse, it is the responsibility of the police to gather and present evidence and of the Public Prosecution Service to assess the strength of the case prepared by the police and determine whether it should proceed to court. As Minister of Justice, I, quite rightly, have no direct role in that process. Consequently, whilst I can confirm that the PSNI is devoting considerable resources to investigating historical institutional abuse, it is a matter for police officers to present the outcome of their investigations and for the independent prosecution service to determine whether that constitutes sufficient evidence to bring such cases to court.

Mr Poots: I thank the Minister for his answer. I welcome the fact that he included the PPS because, last week, when responding on the Maíria Cahill issue, he referred solely to the Police Ombudsman who, of course, has no responsibilities for the PPS or, indeed, for Northern Ireland Office interference. Can I have an assurance from the Minister that, in investigations into historical abuse, whether it is a police officer in Kincora, a priest in Rubane or a Provo in west Belfast, there will be no untouchables when it comes to paedophile abuse?

Mr Ford: As Minister, I cannot guarantee — I think that that is the term the Member used — that that is the case, but it is certainly my belief that there are no untouchables in the way that the PSNI and the PPS conduct their responsibilities in the present day. There are clearly difficulties in dealing with those points when we go back a number of years. That is what is coming from the historical institutional abuse inquiry, and I have seen no evidence to suggest that any matters that arise will not be properly considered by the agencies responsible for investigation and prosecution carrying out their duties fairly and impartially.

Mr Nesbitt: The Minister will be aware that much historical abuse did not take place in institutions, leaving people like Maíria Cahill feeling abandoned. What are his proposals for ensuring that such victims are not left feeling like second-class citizens compared to the victims of institutional abuse?

Mr Ford: The Member has highlighted one particular issue concerning one particular young lady, and that is obviously a matter that causes considerable concern to many of us given the way that it was reported in the media.

Running into the issue of an inquiry is more difficult in the context where we are merely, at this stage, talking about one case. If there are others, as has been hinted at by Ms Cahill, whom she is aware have been similarly abused, I urge them to come forward, however long it may be since their abuse, and make their concerns known to the police so that they can do their work and prepare a file and pass it to the Public Prosecution Service. That is what we hope anybody would do, and, in current circumstances, I believe that there is no reason why anybody should not be prepared to put their trust in the work to be done by the PSNI and the PPS.

If wider issues emerge from that, it may well be that there are appropriate issues to be considered by a public inquiry, but the important issue at this stage is that any of us who have any influence should encourage anybody who is in that position to come forward, however difficult the issues may be and however long ago it may be, and report their concerns and ensure that the police have them investigated.

Mr Milne: Go raibh maith agat, a Phríomh-LeasCheann Comhairle. Can the Minister reaffirm that all investigations and prosecution processes should be free from political interference?

Mr Ford: I detected an irony warning immediately to my right. I can certainly confirm that all investigations into any criminal allegation should be free from political interference, but, of course, I cannot guarantee that other politicians will not attempt to interfere.

Mr A Maginness: I thank the Minister for his previous answers. The most interesting answer was, of course, that if there are other people affected in a similar way to Maíria Cahill, the Minister could see a public inquiry. Is the Minister saying that he himself would try to set up that public inquiry, and is he committed to that if other victims emerge?

Mr Ford: I do not think that I am in a position to commit to such an inquiry. It seems to me that such a thing would have ramifications rather beyond my Department. However, I can only repeat the first point that I made. The important issue is that individuals come forward and make the police aware of what happened to them. That may then give us an assessment of the issues that may need to be addressed. Frankly, that goes back to the point that I made during the early part of Question Time about the wider issues concerned with reconciling the past and seeing how different institutions behaved at different times in the past as we seek to build a different and shared future.

Mr Ford: Youth engagement clinics have been operating successfully in Belfast since October 2012, and I am pleased to say that the plans to roll out youth engagement clinics to all police districts are well advanced. Training is currently being delivered to police officers in H district with a view to clinics being available in areas such as Ballycastle, Ballymena, Ballymoney, Coleraine and Larne by the end of November. Training will then be completed in the remaining police districts with a view to clinics being operational right across Northern Ireland in the first quarter of 2015. Based on experience to date, I am confident the clinics will help reduce the number of cases involving young people that proceed unnecessarily to court, and thereby improve processing times for youth court cases.

Mr Lunn: I thank the Minister for his answer. Will he outline how the youth engagement clinics that ran during the pilot programme affected performance in youth cases?

Mr Ford: The key answer to that is that the pilot established significant successes for youth engagement clinics in terms of resolving issues more quickly than would have been dealt with by a court or even if they were disposed of by police by a different kind of diversion outside the youth engagement clinic. The analysis of the data gathered from the pilot in Belfast found that the average processing time was 39 days as opposed to 53 days for non-clinic diversion cases. The performance in youth cases in Belfast improved significantly. In the first quarter of this year, the time taken to prepare and submit a charge file was 11 days rather than 22 days in the same period in the previous year, which is very significant and shows that good work is being done and that the improvements are continuing in Belfast. I

t is absolutely clear that by maintaining this pathway to deal with low-level offending, we are able to see improvements in services for them, and also the concentration of resources on those where there are more significant issues. They have certainly been able to ensure that young people access the supports that they need to keep them off a reoffending path at an earlier stage, to the benefit of them and the community.

Mr Maskey: Go raibh maith agat, a Phríomh-LeasCheann Comhairle. Is the Minister satisfied that the PCSPs should be really to the fore of ensuring maximum public engagement between the PSNI and the public?

Mr Ford: I really cannot see what PCSPs have to do with youth engagement clinics. My views on the need to maximise the efforts of PCSPs are well known to the House.

Mr Swann: The Minister indicated that those youth engagement clinics will be rolled out across my constituency. Does he agree with those who seem to intimate that those clinics can be an easy and soft option for young offenders?

Mr Ford: I think that all the evidence is to the contrary. Many young people have said that they are being forced, at an early stage, to confront the consequences of their reoffending and, in many cases, to have a direct meeting with those whom the crimes were against. That is actually a more difficult task than waiting a few months and being given a fine or whatever. That is the whole point of the restorative approach that is taken in the youth justice system: it actually ensures that young people face up to the consequences of their behaviour, and they are then less likely to reoffend than if they were simply treated in a conventional way with a fine or whatever.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: I call Ms Bronwyn McGahan.

Ms McGahan: Go raibh maith agat. Question 6. Sorry, question 7.

Mr Ford: I was going to answer question 7 anyway, Principal Deputy Speaker. The PSNI rural crime unit is a central resource for identifying trends and patterns of rural crime. The information is used by police commanders to enhance the effectiveness of their operational tactics in preventing and detecting rural and agricultural crime. The unit is supported by a data analyst, who is part-funded by my Department.

At a regional level, the work of the unit resulted in an initiative whereby over £3 million worth of agricultural equipment has now been fitted with security devices. At a strategic level, the work of the unit is supported by the rural crime partnership. The partnership, led by my Department, comprises representatives of the PSNI, NFU Mutual and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development. The partnership recently met a range of stakeholders, including the Ulster Farmers' Union and the National Sheep Association, to seek their views on livestock theft. Discussions are ongoing to develop actions to help address that issue.

The unit's impact is reinforced at a local level by interventions delivered by PCSPs in conjunction with the PSNI. In south Tyrone, those have included Farm Watch, text alert schemes for farmers, trailer-marking and the provision of multipurpose security locks.

Ms McGahan: Go raibh maith agat, a Phríomh-LeasCheann Comhairle. I thank the Minister for his response. The remit of the rural crime unit is to help the PSNI utilise its resources in the most effective way. Can the Minister elaborate on how the unit can be used on a cross-border basis, given that Augher, which happens to be a hotspot for rural crime, is on a border with County Monaghan?

Mr Ford: I am always surprised when any MLA highlights their constituency as being a hot spot for crime, but it is the sad reality that, if we look at livestock thefts, we will see that the two counties out of 32 on the island that had the worst statistics last year were Armagh and Tyrone. The Member correctly highlights the problem that we have to address.

There are issues that clearly need to be addressed regarding the traceability of cattle in particular — sheep are more difficult — and there are issues where, on a cross-border basis, the work of the rural crime unit in analysing the data is of assistance to the PSNI as it works in cooperation with an Garda Síochána to deal with issues where there are clearly some cross-border movements of stolen livestock. However, ongoing vigilance is required, and we have yet to see the full statistical results of the rural crime unit's first year of operation, which is only just complete.

Mr Elliott: The Minister will be aware that, less than two weeks ago, the Chief Constable indicated that community policing in rural areas would become virtually non-existent. How worried is the Minister about that, particularly in places such as Fermanagh, south Tyrone and Armagh? Has he had any discussions with the Chief Constable about the situation?

Mr Ford: I frequently discuss those sorts of general issues with the Chief Constable. When he talked about the type of policing that is likely to become non-existent, he was specifically talking about neighbourhood policing as opposed to response policing. We need to be careful that we do not raise hairs unnecessarily.

There is no doubt that, at a time of increasing difficulty, there will be problems for the PSNI in continuing to maintain services, and it is having to prioritise. That is why it is clear that certain difficult areas will be a priority for neighbourhood policing, while other areas will simply go back to the situation as it was not too long ago, where there was less of a neighbourhood policing input and more of a response policing input. However, the challenge is for the Chief Constable to determine exactly how he allocates resources. I can only report in general on what he said.

Mr Ford: I am pleased to say that my Department has made significant progress in the challenging process of transforming the young offenders' centre into a secure college. The NIPS has worked to put in place the structures, processes and cultural change necessary to deliver a college that will not only meet the needs of those in custody but give them the skills that they need to build a positive life when they are resettled back into the community. Helping young offenders to change their life will in turn help make Northern Ireland safer.

Design principles have been developed that capture the vision, ethos and direction for the college, which we will implement in full from transition in April 2015. A number of significant developments that will provide the infrastructure for the college have been made. Those include a draft timetable across all residential areas. Progress has also been made on a curriculum for the college that will meet the specific needs of the prisoners and address educational underachievement by many of those in custody. The college will also build transferable vocational skills in areas such as horticulture, catering, construction trades and industrial cleaning that will help make the young men more employable when they are released back into the community. I recently chaired a meeting of the oversight group at Hydebank Wood and discussed the college development with the senior team in the Prison Service.


3.15 pm

Mr McCarthy: Go raibh maith agat, a Phríomh-LeasCheann Comhairle. I thank the Minister for his very detailed response. Will he tell the Assembly whether the good work that is being done in Hydebank Wood could be replicated throughout all the Northern Irish prisons?

Mr Ford: Of course, the specific issue of a secure college for Hydebank Wood is not quite the same thing as would apply in the two adult male prisons. However, there is no doubt that a lot of good work is being done around rehabilitation in that context.

When I last visited Magilligan in the summertime, over half of the prisoners in Foyleview, the open aspect of Magilligan prison, had been out the day before engaged in constructive and positive work for local churches, charities and community groups. That was a sign of the kind of positive engagement around rehabilitation that happens there. The recent opening of Burren House on the Crumlin Road, as the working out unit for Maghaberry, is giving more prisoners the opportunity in the latter part of their time in custody to engage constructively and positively with the community.

There are, of course, educational opportunities in Magilligan and Maghaberry, but they are at a slightly different level from those that are aimed specifically at the younger offenders in Hydebank Wood. However, it is all part of a joined-up approach to try to ensure that, as far as possible, when people leave prison they have some sort of family support, some worthwhile activity, whether it is employment, education or further training, and suitable accommodation to live in. That is what makes society safer.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: That ends the period for listed questions. We now move to topical questions.

T1. Mr Lunn asked the Minister of Justice whether he agrees that, now that a new round of talks is under way, the dreadful revelations about the past that have emerged in recent days, some of which have been referred to today, make the case even more forcibly for a new and effective means with which to deal with the past. (AQT 1631/11-15)

Mr Ford: I have said it before now, and I fear that I may be repeating it, but the budget of the Department of Justice is a budget for dealing with the present and not the past. There are many issues of the past that seem to me to be only being dealt with by the Department of Justice, with the current exception of the historical institutional abuse inquiry.

It is absolutely clear that we need agreement on appropriate structures to meet the needs of the past. The revelations that came through last week from Maíria Cahill are a reminder that there is a variety of issues from the past that need to be addressed. Those will require a joined-up approach by parties working together, the Executive working together and, hopefully, the two Governments working in conjunction with us.

Mr Lunn: I thank the Minister for his answer. Whatever is agreed and promised to victims has to be deliverable. Will the Justice Department have a role to play in providing advice to the process to ensure that any new process is effective, efficient and article 2 compliant?

Mr Ford: I suppose that one of the difficulties that we saw during the talks that were led by Dr Richard Haass last autumn was that there was not the sort of information that has just been highlighted — whether that information comes from the Department of Justice or other Departments — about how things work within Northern Ireland. During the subsequent party leaders' talks in the early part of this year, my Department supplied a couple of papers to the party leaders' meeting. Those looked at issues relating to the past, how matters are currently being handled and how they might be better handled. If, as we go through the detail of the current round of talks, such papers are requested, my Department will certainly provide them. We currently bear the brunt of much of the difficulty of the past, and I am keen to ensure that we play our part in resolving the past.

T2. Mr D Bradley asked the Minister of Justice whether he is aware that today is the seventh anniversary of the dreadful murder of Paul Quinn who, in the words of the Independent Monitoring Commission, was murdered by current and former members of the IRA, and, given that, what message he has for those in south Armagh who have information about that terrible crime and those who attempted to criminalise Paul Quinn. (AQT 1632/11-15)

Mr Ford: Mr Bradley raises a very serious point. I confess that, although I saw some publicity last week, in the middle of everything else I was doing today, I had forgotten that this was the seventh anniversary. However, I had some meetings around that time, and I am well aware of the tragedy that that was for the Quinn family and others.

My message is the same one that I have just put out in other respects. Anybody who has any information about any criminal activity has a duty to report it to the PSNI so that the PSNI can investigate properly and, if there appears to be enough evidence for them to do so, pass a file to the Public Prosecution Service so that it can determine whether there should be a prosecution. That is the responsibility of each and every one of us as citizens. It is also the responsibility of political leaders to put that point to the community and encourage those who have information to report crime.

Mr D Bradley: Go raibh maith agat arís, a Phríomh-LeasCheann Comhairle. Gabhaim buíochas leis an Aire as an fhreagra. I thank the Minister for his answer. In light of what he said, will he join with me in meeting Stephen and Breege Quinn, Paul Quinn's parents? Will he also meet his counterpart in the South to bring himself up to date with the latest developments in the case?

Mr Ford: I thank Mr Bradley for those points. On his latter point, as Members know, I meet my colleague the Minister for Justice and Equality fairly regularly and frequently, and I am certainly very happy, when I next meet Frances Fitzgerald, to raise the issue with her.

On the specific issue of meeting Mr and Mrs Quinn, I frequently meet people who feel that they have been let down by the justice system in the past. I tend not to flag up those meetings in the media. I believe that, in those circumstances, things are better done with some discretion. Frequently, there is very little that the Minister can do but, if the Minister listening provides some measure of comfort to bereaved families, I am happy to use my time to provide that measure of comfort and assistance. If Mr Bradley wishes to talk about that privately with me later, I will happily discuss it with him.

T3. Mr McMullan asked the Minister of Justice whether he is satisfied that the courts are doing enough in sentencing those involved in major organised crime in the Larne area. (AQT 1633/11-15)

Mr Ford: I need to be ever so slightly careful. There are a number of threads in that question. I need to be extraordinarily careful, as Minister, that I do not appear to be second-guessing the work of judges. I may talk about issues in general, and Members may talk in here about sentencing policy in general, as, indeed, we did earlier with human trafficking. However, we all need to be very careful that we do not stray beyond our specific role, and I need to be particularly careful, as Minister, that I do not stray beyond my role into issues of sentencing in individual cases.

The Member also highlights the Larne area. Frankly, my concerns are to ensure that I provide the appropriate support to all the justice agencies in dealing with serious and organised crime in every part of Northern Ireland, using the available resources and working in cooperation with our colleagues in an Garda Síochána and in England, Wales and Scotland. Hopefully, at some point in the near future, we will also bring in the services of the National Crime Agency to deal with the serious crime that it can fight. That issue applies in every part of Northern Ireland. So whilst the Member may wish to highlight Larne in particular, as Minister, I will put my concerns about the whole of Northern Ireland to the forefront in ensuring that justice agencies are assisted as best they can be in dealing with those issues.

Mr McMullan: Go raibh maith agat. I thank the Minister for that intriguing answer. Does he agree that the publicity that Larne has had recently and in the past shows that it is in the grip of loyalist paramilitaries and that that still goes on today? Earlier this year, 200 took over the town one night and caused mayhem, and we are still waiting to see whether any of them will be brought before the courts. It is my responsibility to provide answers when I am asked about it by the community. Will the Minister ensure that those who have been arrested and charged will be brought before the courts soon?

Mr Ford: I wish to see people who are guilty of crimes being arrested and brought before the courts soon, but I have no responsibility whatsoever for ensuring that that happens.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: I will not call the Member who is listed to ask topical question 4.

T5. Ms Ruane asked the Minister of Justice whether he has had any contact with his counterpart in the South of Ireland following the serious matter of the find of an illegal abattoir in County Monaghan at the weekend. (AQT 1635/11-15)

Mr Ford: I have not had any specific contact with my colleague about the illegal abattoir in County Monaghan. If there are specific issues that Ms Ruane thinks that I should be raising with Frances Fitzgerald, I have no doubt that she will now take the opportunity to tell me what they are.

Ms Ruane: I strongly urge the Minister to engage with all relevant Departments, North and South, because this is a very serious matter, and I trust that the Minister sees that. It is important to be in contact with the Health Departments because of traceability and potential health concerns.

Mr Ford: I appreciate the serious points that have been made. I am not sure whether Ms Ruane was in the House when I answered an earlier question from her colleague Ms McGahan on the issue of livestock thefts and cross-border movements of livestock, which was highlighted from the south Tyrone side rather than the Monaghan side. I am well aware of those difficulties.

It is an issue on which there has been engagement between my Department and DARD, and I have no doubt that that will continue. There is also a concern about illegal abattoirs and the health standards operated in them. That principally involves DARD and DHSSPS on our side, and their southern departmental equivalents may also be involved.

There are real issues that tie into wider matters of organised crime that we have talked about. The PSNI has been leading the Changing the Mindset project on counterfeit goods and dubious services in Northern Ireland. We need to let people know that, if they are buying something, whether it is a dodgy DVD, inappropriate perfumes, batteries or meat, and it seems to be too good a bargain to be true, it almost certainly is. In the case of foodstuffs, there is the potential for significant health issues. Those involved in any part of the food supply chain need to carry out their duties properly to ensure the full safety and full security of the food chain throughout. Customers must ensure that they are careful about where they buy their produce and do not get taken in by backstreet or car-boot deals that are too good to be true.

T6. Mr Agnew asked the Minister of Justice for an update on the cross-departmental work that has taken place on early intervention. (AQT 1636/11-15)

Mr Ford: There have been a number of issues relating to early intervention over the last couple of years. My Department has tended to be a minor partner in that. In the good preventative work with families to ensure that young children do not get into a variety of difficulties in the future, the Health and Education Departments have a larger role and will see returns more quickly than the Justice Department. Nonetheless, we are partners in some projects because the justice system has a role to play and could benefit from such interventions.

Mr Agnew: I thank the Minister for that information. What are the benefits of cross-departmental work in early intervention?

Mr Ford: In a general sense, sometimes we do not see the significant benefits of cross-departmental work because our Departments are set up in silos. Mr Agnew has highlighted the fact that we need Departments to work together better. That applies across a variety of areas, and there is no doubt that, as we look at the resource problems that we face and the variety of difficulties that comes from those, we need to ensure joined-up working in as many different places as possible. In early intervention cross-departmental working, there is no doubt from research here and in other parts of these islands that, in many cases, a small number of families in a neighbourhood may make significant demands on education, health, social services, justice, housing and employment. There is no doubt in my mind that intensive intervention to support those families would give them significant benefits. In particular, it would give the children in those families significant benefits to ensure that they got better opportunities as they grew up, their health was better, they took their educational opportunities and, in an ideal world, did not come into contact with the justice system in an unfortunate way in their teenage years. Those are the benefits of the work that we have been seeking to pioneer over the past year.


3.30 pm

T7. Mr Sheehan asked the Minister of Justice for an update on his Department’s continuing efforts to reduce car crime and so-called joy riding. (AQT 1637/11-15)

Mr Ford: Again, it is not so much my Department's efforts around car crime as those of the justice system as a whole. At the first level, we see the work of the PSNI in dealing with car crime. They have to decide, given their list of issues, how they prioritise areas of crime and what resources they can put into them. There is also work being done around the preventative area, for example by the Youth Justice Agency, because there are issues that are more than just dealing with crime when it happens but about preventative work. It is almost the same thing that I was highlighting to Mr Agnew about early interventions. There is early intervention work to be done not just among the families of very young children but among younger teenagers to prevent them from getting into crime and to stop them when they are in danger of getting into crime and antisocial behaviour.

Private Members' Business

Debate resumed on Question, That clause 1 stand part of the Bill.

The following amendments stood on the Marshalled List:

Nos 1-23, 27, 40, 50, 60-61.

Mr Dickson: I welcome this opportunity to speak on the group 1 amendments. Before getting into the detail of what I wish to say, I thank Lord Morrow for bringing the Bill to the House, and Justice Minister David Ford for the excellent work that he and his departmental officials undertook in working with Lord Morrow to bring to the House a Bill that can be debated and, hopefully, a great deal of which can be enacted.

There is no doubt that we have questions of difference on some matters on how we would address the evil of human trafficking. However, I genuinely believe that Lord Morrow and I share a common determination, along with the Minister of Justice, to see it ended. It is in that spirit that many of the amendments tabled jointly in the names of Lord Morrow and the Minister will find favour in the House today.

The Bill has not only helped to further highlight the issue but has sparked a thorough and rigorous debate about our approach. We are very much part of a debate that is happening across western Europe and, indeed, the wider world.

Turning to some of the amendments, I welcome the creation and consolidation of new offences under clauses 1A to 1D, which, in line with what is considered internationally to be best practice, will bring those offences together under one Act and thus simplify the legislative framework.

It is appropriate that offences under clause 1A are triable only in a Crown Court to demonstrate the seriousness and abhorrence with which they are viewed. I also welcome the fact that a victim's consent will be viewed as irrelevant. For example, we know that some individuals may consent to being moved across borders, not knowing what awaits them. We are saying loud and clear that, if you traffic someone, there will be no excuse and you will face justice.

I move to clause 4. I have no doubt that Lord Morrow advocates mandatory minimum sentences with the best of intentions. However, good intentions do not always make good policy. We need to be mindful about what produces the best result. I continue to have deep reservations about imposing mandatory minimum sentences.

We need to ask ourselves whether justice is best served by our assigning fixed penalties to specific crimes or is it best to allow the judiciary to consider the aggravating and mitigating factors and to decide on the most appropriate sentence within a sentencing framework.

Mr A Maginness: I thank the Member for giving way. In relation to clause 4 and the point that you have made, the Justice Committee heard from the Attorney General, Mr Larkin. It was his opinion that clause 4 was "not a hard minimum-sentence model" and his view was that, in certain circumstances, any judge would:

"be free to depart from that predictive statutory minimum".

In those circumstances, surely there is enough flexibility to meet the concerns that the Member has just stated.

Mr Dickson: I considered what the Attorney General said to us but I believe firmly in the underlying belief and right for our judges, within a framework, to determine the appropriate sentences. Indeed, I read recently of how the judiciary may inform itself as to how a case should be dealt with. In the lack of any other formal guidance, when it comes to determining how matters should be dealt with, the judiciary may even take view of debates in the House and particularly the comments of the Minister of Justice. That is the most appropriate way in which these things should be handled. I firmly believe that sentencing is a matter for the courts, within that framework, and that judges are in the best position to consider the unique circumstances of each case.

It is important to note that, where a court might have treated a matter too leniently, the state can appeal and a higher penalty can be given. Indeed, a recent case in Northern Ireland demonstrated that. Those cases can be tried in the High Court and be added to the list of offences for which courts can award an indeterminate sentence. So there can be no argument that we are not treating these offences seriously enough. Furthermore, I have considered this in detail and, although some Members have advocated mandatory minimums for other crimes, I have not seen anything to suggest that they have verifiable deterrent effects. I nevertheless understand that, across the Chamber, there is much sympathy for this measure. If it stands part of the Bill, at least we will have an amendment that will ensure that it does not apply to under-18s, which was another of my major concerns about the initial clause.

In short, my view is that mandatory minimum sentences do not represent sound criminal justice policy. We should not tie courts' hands but let judges take decisions freely, based on the evidence presented to them. There is an important principle of judicial discretion that must be upheld.

Mr Buchanan: First, like other Members, I commend Lord Morrow for bringing the Bill to the House. Hopefully, we will see its passage through the House without too many objections. Today, I direct my comments against the attempt to remove clause 4 from the Bill and in favour of the amendments put forward by Lord Morrow.

Clause 4 would require a court to set down a minimum sentence of at least two years for an individual convicted of a human trafficking or slavery offence. The clause allows for a judge to derogate from this two-year minimum in cases where the court believes that there are exceptional circumstances relating to the offence or to the offender that justify not imposing the minimum sentence. A number of amendments have been proposed to the original clause since the Bill's First Reading. These amendments include ensuring that a minimum sentence cannot be levied against a child and ensuring that, should a judge derogate from imposing the minimum sentence due to exceptional circumstances, he or she is required to outline why they have done so. These amendments seem sensible, and I am happy to support them.

Lord Morrow would be the first to admit that his Bill was not the finished article when he introduced it to the House. It is to his credit that he has been willing to work with others to improve the Bill. This clause is in the minority of clauses that have been the subject of disagreement between Lord Morrow and the Minister of Justice.

The debate up to now can be summarised very simply: Lord Morrow believes that it is wholly appropriate for this elected House to lay down appropriate minimum sentences for particular offences. On the other hand, the Minister of Justice believes, on a point of principle, that it is wrong for the Assembly to fetter the discretion of judges in sentencing. I believe that the introduction of a mandatory minimum sentence for these offences, with the caveat of judges being able to derogate in exceptional circumstances, is the correct and proper way forward.

I will make three points in favour of retaining the clause. First, introducing a mandatory minimum sentence for these offences sends out a strong signal to our society that we take the offences very seriously and that every Member believes that human trafficking and slavery offences are heinous crimes that must be severely punished. Trafficking and slavery offences offend against the dignity of men, women and children who live in the Province or come to it. It is incumbent on us, as Members, to do everything in our power to stamp out this activity. Implementing a mandatory minimum sentence would act as a deterrent to those who seek to perpetrate these crimes and would show victims that we believe that the crime inflicted on them should be severely punished. To my mind, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where an individual found guilty of trafficking or slavery offences should be sentenced to less than two years in prison.

Secondly, mandatory minimum sentences already apply in Northern Irish law for particular offences. There is no constitutional block on introducing such sentences. As was pointed out at Second Stage, article 70 of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 sets out a minimum sentence of five years for those aged over 21 who are found guilty of a set of offences in the Order. I have yet to hear the Minister of Justice calling for the repeal of that article, considering his objections to minimum sentences. In England and Wales, minimum sentences exist with regard to drug trafficking, burglary and firearms offences. Other liberal democracies utilise minimum sentences for many offences. For example, in Canada, according to one think tank, there are currently 49 minimum sentences in operation for particular serious offences.

It is worth pointing out that the Attorney General and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission have no objection to introducing a minimum sentence in our Province. The Attorney General, in his evidence to the Justice Committee on 6 March 2014, stated that a minimum sentence is:

"a perfectly proper device if the legislature is satisfied as to its policy."

The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, in its evidence to the Committee, stated that it did not take objection to clause 4 as long as it did not apply to children. Consequently, there is no question of the clause being constitutionally inappropriate or contrary to individual human rights.

Thirdly, mandatory minimum sentences are, in principle, an effective way to ensure that justice is done in our country. It is important to be clear that, contrary to the extravagant claims of some MLAs at Second Stage, the clause does not eliminate a judge's ability to lay down a proportionate sentence. In fact, it provides a stable range within which a judge can decide what a proportionate sentence would be. In this case, a judge can also derogate from laying down a two-year sentence if exceptional circumstances are involved in a case. It is also worth pointing out that the Northern Ireland Assembly has frequently fettered the discretion of judges in the sentences that they can enforce. That is usually seen in how the Assembly limits the punishment that can be laid down by the courts. The truth is that no judge has absolute discretion in the punishments that they can set down.


3.45 pm

I am pretty confident this afternoon — I could be wrong — that the Minister of Justice and other Members making the argument that it is wrong to fetter the discretion of judges would not be in favour of reintroducing the death penalty in the Province, yet that is the ultimate logic of the view that the Assembly should not fetter the discretion of judges. If the Assembly can dictate that certain punishments are beyond the limits of the courts — we do it all the time by limiting the maximum penalty for offences — surely it can outline certain punishments as appropriate for particular offences.

Clause 4 is a sensible one that serves a very useful purpose. It illustrates that human trafficking and slavery offences are deeply serious crimes that will not be tolerated by this society. It is also a measure that is proportionate and constitutionally acceptable. I urge Members from all sides of the House to reject the Minister's attempt to have the clause removed from the Bill and to accept the amendments put forward by Lord Morrow.

Mr Agnew: At the outset, on behalf of the Green Party in Northern Ireland, I welcome the legislation and the attention that it has brought to the issue of human trafficking. My perception is that in Northern Ireland our Police Service is already taking a lead role in tackling human trafficking in terms of its standards set within these islands. The Bill has brought a renewed focus and can help us continue to innovate and move forward in how we tackle human trafficking issues. I am given to understand that the Minister may well have brought forward some of the legislation and, indeed, in working with Lord Morrow, has helped to bring forward this Bill. There is no doubt that the Bill has sped up the process, and anything that we can do to expedite the updating of our laws on human trafficking should be welcomed — of course with the caveat that we have to get the legislation right. Lord Morrow's colleague Paul Givan referred to Lord Morrow being the modern-day William Wilberforce. Whilst I think that may be stretching it a bit far — perhaps if human trafficking was socially acceptable and legal it would be an apt comparison — there is no doubt that many of us in the House will welcome the legislation, as will many of the public.

I will quickly touch on some of the non-controversial amendments in this group that I would like to welcome. I welcome amendment No 21, which would see human trafficking treated as a lifestyle offence. It will further empower the police in their investigation and, indeed, the courts in sentencing. It is a welcome and useful addition to the original Bill. Amendment No 27 ensures that human trafficking offences can be prosecuted even where a victim is reluctant to come forward. Given the nature of the crime we are talking about and the circumstances that many victims find themselves in — being coerced and intimidated and perhaps, in many cases, lacking the confidence to come forward — whilst of course having the victim come forward and act as a witness is always preferable and will strengthen the prosecution's case, it is important that no prosecution is derailed by the ability of those who commit human trafficking offences to intimidate their victims and perhaps circumvent the legal system through that method.

On behalf of the Green Party in Northern Ireland, I welcome the addition of the offence of forced marriage. It is important that this aspect of exploitation is included in the Bill. I think that the Bill is more complete in what it seeks to achieve by the introduction of this offence through this amendment, should it be passed here today.

I move on to clause 4, which is what has caused the controversy with this group of amendments. I oppose clause 4. I have failed to be convinced of the logic of it. I accept that it is not an absolute constraint on judges with regard to a minimum sentence, but there is no doubt that it is a change from the norm about which I am yet to be presented with the evidence. I know that one example was given of a minimum sentence in Northern Ireland law, but the fact that we are being drawn to one exception highlights how rare a situation it is. It was one that I was open-minded about, but I am yet to be convinced about the need for minimum sentencing. I am concerned that, rather than the driving force being evidence that the clause will reduce instances of human trafficking, which is what the Bill's priority should be, it is about being seen to be tough on human trafficking.

We can use any adjective we want. I abhor human trafficking; of course I do. It is a heinous crime; of course it is. That is a given. You would be hard pushed to find a Member in the House who would disagree with that. I think that the courts and judges would take a similar approach: that this is one of the most serious crimes that could be committed by a human being or group of human beings against another human being. I could think of little that is worse than to inflict slavery, imprisonment, abuse and coercion on a person. We should take it as a given that the courts will treat human trafficking with seriousness.

What I do not have in front of me to support the clause is evidence that it will help the courts, decrease instances of human trafficking or act as the deterrent that has been mentioned. What I do not have in front of me is the research that goes through every possible circumstance in which we would sentence in a case of human trafficking. There will be not only exceptional cases but instances in which there will be insufficient evidence to give the harshest of penalties. I have seen judgements in which the sentences given were for only what could be prosecuted for. It is a road that I would be concerned about going down.

What I do not want — it has, to some extent, been alluded to — is trial by public opinion. Judges will be presented with evidence on both sides. They will know the remit of their role. On the outside, we can often have an emotional response to what we hear about court judgements. Often, when we do not have the evidence in front of us, we may rush to judge a court judgement without being fully engaged with the facts. I do not think that it should be trial by public opinion or, in some cases, trial by the media. I fear that the drive behind minimum sentences is to be seen to be tough on crime. If we accept that human trafficking is a horrendous crime and that our judges and courts will treat it accordingly, we can accept that there is no need for minimum sentences in the Bill.

That said, the will of the House may well be that clause 4 passes, in which case I welcome amendment No 16, which would exclude children from the minimum sentences and about which, as has been highlighted, there may have been some children's rights concerns. In fact, there were undoubtedly some children's rights concerns with the clause in that regard. I welcome the recognition of that and amendment No 16, which would exclude children from the clause.

Mr Hazzard: Go raibh maith agat, a Phríomh-LeasCheann Comhairle. I, too, welcome the opportunity, as a new Committee member, to talk about the substantial and important legislation in front of us. Despite being on the Committee only a short number of weeks, I know that the workload, the amount of evidence taken and the direction of the Committee is commendable. Most people have touched on that today. I commend Maurice Morrow for a very assiduous approach to what is a very important issue to tackle. I welcome the evolution of the Bill, a Bill that now sits comfortably with European directives and, indeed, modern slavery legislation at Westminster. I welcome the fact that changes have been made.

Sinn Féin very much welcomes the new offence of slavery, which will include forced and compulsory labour, as we welcome the inclusion of the Finance and Personnel Minister's amendment on forced marriage, an issue that has received increasing publicity in recent years and that we need to get to grips with. I welcome the acceptance of the need for proper resources and training to be utilised in tackling exploitation, slavery and human trafficking. It is vital that the Bill builds on the need for effective exit strategies, compassionate care and a commitment to avoid the secondary victimisation of a victim. In the light of that, I welcome the amendment regarding the right of the victim not to give consent and that such consent is irrelevant in seeking prosecution by the state. That is a very important issue.

I want to touch on clause 4. Of course I agree that we must have robust and rigorous sentencing frameworks. Indeed, for an offence such as human trafficking and slavery, the penalty should reflect the gravity of the offence. However, we must not fall into the precarious situation where legislators feel it is proper to interfere with judicial discretion in such matters. Undeniably, minimum sentences are often the result of good intentions, but, all too often, good intentions do not make good judicial policies. Good policies and, indeed, good results should be paramount. It is with that in mind that I oppose any notion of minimum sentencing.

(Mr Deputy Speaker [Mr Beggs] in the Chair)

Surely, justice would be best served by enabling judges to be free to tailor sentences to the aggravating and mitigating facts of each case. Furthermore, minimum sentencing does not reduce crime; it is simply not the deterrent that was suggested earlier. As research indicates time and time again, it is simply false to suggest otherwise. The certainty of arrest, prosecution, conviction and punishment has a greater deterrent effect than the actual severity of said punishment. Just as good law should rightly be tempered with equity, robust sentencing rules should leave well alone so that judges can determine the individual facts of the case.

Overall, however, I welcome the opportunity to consider the Bill today. As I said, it is a better Bill at this stage, and I look forward to hearing the rest of the discussions this afternoon.

Mr McGlone: Go raibh maith agat, a Phríomh-LeasCheann Comhairle. I welcome the private Member's Bill and the opportunity to debate the important issue today.

The trafficking and exploitation of human beings is a degrading practice, and we have a duty to do all that we can to bring those responsible to justice. It is clear that human beings are being trafficked into and through the North by organised criminal gangs for exploitation here and elsewhere. That exploitation takes the form of sexual exploitation, the exploitation of labour and domestic servitude. It is also clear that the organised criminal gangs responsible have largely been able to evade justice. Although around 100 victims of human trafficking have been reported as having been rescued in the North in the past five years, there have been few successful convictions of actual traffickers. The criminal gangs responsible operate internationally, and any attempt to disrupt them and bring them to justice needs a joined-up approach involving a number of Departments and agencies, here and throughout these islands. That work continues through the immigration and human trafficking subgroup of the Organised Crime Task Force, which includes representatives of an Garda Síochána. It is important that we acknowledge that we legislate for one area of a common travel area and that our efforts must be coordinated on an all-island approach or, if you look at it that way, an all-islands approach.

The cross-border forum on human trafficking, which focuses on identifying victims and reducing demand, is an example of that cooperation.


4.00 pm

I commend Lord Morrow on his efforts in bringing forward the Human Trafficking and Exploitation Bill. I also commend the Assembly's Justice Committee, of which I am a member, for its work during the Bill's scrutiny. The Justice Minister has worked constructively with Lord Morrow and the Justice Committee to bring forward amendments to the Bill and, since its introduction to the Assembly, has published the second annual action plan on human trafficking and exploitation for Northern Ireland. The action plan identifies priority areas for the Department of Justice to drive forward during 2014-15: strengthening law enforcement, protecting and supporting victims, and preventing human trafficking and exploitation.

Official figures indicate that the scale of human trafficking in the North is relatively low when compared with the UK, with referrals making up only 2% of the overall figure. In 2013, the national referral mechanism (NRM) received 41 referrals of potential victims of trafficking here. Seventeen potential victims were referred in 2012, and 32 potential victims were referred in 2011. However, we must ensure that we are doing everything in our power to prevent these crimes in the first place and to respond robustly when they do occur.

The Bill, with agreed amendments, has much in it of great value. If implemented, it will do much to advance the interest of victims. The measures to support victims of trafficking are certainly most welcome. There needs to be a strong framework of assistance and support for victims to encourage them to engage with the criminal justice system and help to bring those responsible for trafficking to court. In particular, the additional measures in clauses 13 and 14 for victims who have to appear in court to give evidence are a very important step forward.

Lord Morrow and the Justice Minister have proposed a number of new provisions, among which is one to support services for those who wish to exit prostitution. Such a support mechanism or exit strategy is an important addition to the Bill and is to be commended.

Mr Nesbitt: I will make a short contribution, if I may. First, I apologise to the House that I have not been here for the whole debate to date. I also thank Lord Morrow for bringing forward this important legislation, which takes us beyond recognising that we have a problem to doing something concrete about it. That is to be commended, as is his attitude to the amendments and his discussions with officials, the Minister and so forth to get us to this point.

For me, the test has to be the impact of the Bill, which shines a light on the problem. What is the impact of shining that light? Do we get the traffickers to respond as rabbits in the headlights, which I guess is where we want them, or does it force them to scurry into a deeper, darker black hole where they are less accessible? That is the test for me in looking at the Bill and the amendments in this group.

The only amendment in this group that I want to reference at this point is clause 4 on minimum sentencing. In the House, we are all aware that there are three separate branches to government: the legislature, the Executive and the judiciary. I think that we all agree that we want to give each other the space to operate without interference, but, as was pointed out, we are, to some extent, in a Venn diagram with concentric circles.

There are precedents for one branch of government to overlap another. The question is whether it is a good idea on minimum sentencing. It is certainly constitutionally possible. As Mr Buchanan, among others, pointed out, there are constitutional precedents for setting minimum sentencing in this country. Is it desirable, however, for this legislature to say to the judiciary, "You must impose a minimum sentence"? In principle, we would probably rather not do that. However, is the case made on this specific issue?

I look at it very simply. If one human being is prepared to take another human being and traffic them and say, "I am prepared to subject you to a lifetime's slavery. I am prepared to ruin your life forever and a day by subjecting you to sexual abuse, mental torture and physical abuse, and I don't care," I say to Lord Morrow that, in the context of the judiciary having its own discretion, I want you to say to that trafficker, "We will catch you; we will convict you; and then we will send you away for at least two years." If that is what will happen, I ask Lord Morrow where the door to the Aye Lobby is, because I am 100% behind him on this clause.

Mr B McCrea: I am afraid that I am not one who will join in the plaudits for Lord Morrow on this Bill. I understand his intentions, and I am sure that he is an honourable man trying to address things, but, having listened to the contributions from all around the House, I have to say that I do not think that this is a good day's work. I do not think that the Committee for Justice has done its job properly or that people have inquired properly into this. I am disappointed that the Chair of the Justice Committee is not here, because he engaged in a debate with me earlier, and I would have liked to carry on with that. In this group of amendments, we see that the Department of Justice opposes clauses 1, 2, 4 and 5. Later, it will oppose clauses 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17 and 18. In total, DoJ has opposed 14 of the 19 clauses. That is not a particularly good record.

The Bill was not fit for purpose. Had it not been for the advent of the Modern Slavery Bill going through Westminster, we would not be talking about anything of any relevance. In my opinion, the Department of Justice, faced with a fairly unedifying spectacle, has done what it does best: tried to make the best of a bad job. It has subsumed Lord Morrow's Bill and made it into Northern Ireland's equivalent of the Modern Slavery Bill. It will, of course, allow Lord Morrow to be photographed, take the plaudits, be greeted as Northern Ireland's Wilberforce and all of those things, but, in reality, we are doing nothing more than what the Minister outlined in the interdepartmental reports that he put forward, which is to make sure that we are compliant with UK and European legislation.

I was disappointed. Maybe some of the Members who engaged with me earlier — not the Chairman, because he is not here — will tell me whether the Committee for Justice, when considering the Bill, looked at His Honour Judge Burgess's report on the Matyas Pis case. He outlined the sentencing guidelines that he was going to use, or which he has suggested —

[Interruption.]

Excuse me.

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Beggs): I remind Members that mobile phones should be switched off in the Chamber so that they do not interfere with the debate.

Mr B McCrea: I apologise for that. Tom Elliott asked a question twice, I think, and it is interesting that his party leader also picked up on the issue. I am not sure whether I have got this right, but I think so: under amendment Nos 17 and 18, where the minimum sentence is not imposed, the court is required to explain why and record the exceptional circumstances that apply. He envisaged some interesting outworkings and asked Lord Morrow whether he could give any examples.

Here is what Burgess had to say, and this is the information that I do not think anybody in the House has looked at. Under the Sentencing Council's guidelines, the starting point for involvement at any level in any stage of the trafficking operation "where the victim was coerced" is six years — not two years, six years. The sentencing range is four to nine years. So the two-year issue is a complete red herring.

I talked to Mr Maginness about involvement at any level in any stage of a trafficking operation where there was no coercion of the victim. I think that he ended up saying, if there is no coercion, where is the crime? Actually, there is a crime, according to the Matyas Pis judgement. The starting point for trafficking where there is no coercion is two years, and then it goes on to say that the sentencing range is one to four years. For Mr Elliott's benefit, Burgess sets out the aggravating factors for the offence of trafficking:

"(1) Large-scale commercial operation.

(2) High degree of planning or sophistication.

(3) Large number of people trafficked.

(4) Substantial financial (in the region of £5000 and upwards or other gain.

(5) Fraud.

(6) Financial extortion of the victim.

(7) Deception.

(8) Use of force, threats of force or other forms of coercion.

(9) Threats against victim or members of victim’s family.

(10) Abduction or detention.

(11) Restriction of victim’s liberty.

(12) Inhumane treatment.

(13) Confiscation of victim’s passport."

Those are the aggravating factors. I wonder whether the Committee for Justice or Lord Morrow actually looked at this pronouncement by Burgess because he also goes on to say that the sentencing guidelines set out the following as mitigation:

"(1) Coercion of the offender by a third party.

(2) No evidence of personal gain.

(3) Limited involvement."

In other words, the courts have looked at this, and the criminal provision is there. We do not have to be dealing with this issue. Just to be clear on that particular case, the prosecution accepted that there was no allegation that A and B were brought to or held in Northern Ireland against their will or that force or threat of force was made against them. The prosecution also accepted that the defendant was not part of any criminal gang. Despite all that, he got three years. Not two years but three years, even though, with no coercion, it could have been two. The courts have already addressed this issue. There is already the information, and there is already the legal framework to be present.

Mr Wilson: Will the Member give way?

Mr B McCrea: I will indeed.

Mr Wilson: The Member may well quote the examples that he has done, but Mr Elliott also quoted an example of where the court, having found someone guilty of holding people against their will, putting them in substandard accommodation and taking money from their wages, fined them £500. So, whilst the Member can quote what the sentences may be, there are, quite clearly, cases where even the minimum sentence of two years has not been applied. In fact, non-custodial sentences have been applied in instances where some of the factors that he has listed applied.

Mr B McCrea: I thank the Member for his intervention. He and I have previously talked on this matter. His quotation on this matter was in an accusation to me:

"It seems to be that he is defending the judiciary. He has talked about the length of sentences, the fact that the minimum sentence here is two years and the independence of the judiciary, which I do not actually subscribe to totally because I think that, sometimes, judges are a bit out of touch with the rest of society." — [Official Report, Vol 87, No 5, p44, col 1].

There is an issue here about the independence of the judiciary. All factors must be taken into account, and where there are sentencing guidelines they are adhered to. In the particular issue that Mr Elliott was talking about, I do not think that the gangmasters do have sentencing guidelines, but, if they are required, we will have them. I have to say to the House that I would far, far, far, far rather have the judiciary deciding on what was the appropriate sentence and the appropriate way forward than the Members gathered round here because all this is for the optics.

Mr Buchanan: Will the Member give way?

Mr B McCrea: I will in just one moment.

This is for the optics; this is not actually going to change anything. This is people putting out platitudes, saying that we are concerned and should do something and saying that something must be done, but do you know what? All the provisions are already there. This is purely for the optics, and, frankly, it is a waste of time. I will give way.

Mr Buchanan: The Member seems to have a problem with minimum sentences. Does he, therefore, think that minimum sentences regarding firearms offences should be repealed?


4.15 pm

Mr B McCrea: If that is meant to be some sort of fastball to deal with my argument, I do not see it. The fundamental thing that every single person has said in the Chamber, unless the Member is going to disagree with me, is that it is good to have a separation between the legislator and the judiciary. The justice system works because the people who are empowered to do these things are properly informed, can take on board all the issues in front of them and will come up with the appropriate sentence. That seems to me to be a fundamental leg upon which democracy stands.

I am surprised that people will say, "Do you know what? This is an exceptional circumstance, therefore, we can do away with it. We do not need to deal with this particular one." Pretty soon, everything will be an exceptional circumstance, and what happens then? Then you end up being forced to pass sentences that you do not think are appropriate, and circumstances come up, and you say, "This is not right." We are tinkering with a very fundamental part of our democracy, and no matter what the good intentions of the people who brought forward this Bill, and I know that Lord Morrow was well-intentioned in bringing forward the Bill, this will not help.

So, I come to a situation now about how we are going to move —

Mr Wilson: Will the Member give way?

Mr Wilson: I am sure down in the courts of justice, the judges will find it very touching that they have such a defender in Mr McCrea. Do not forget that this is an issue that there has been widespread concern about in society. Can he think of any circumstances in which a judge can conceivably believe that a custodial sentence of less than two years is acceptable in cases where people are being trafficked into this country, held against their will and forced to work for slave labour wages?

Mr B McCrea: The Deputy Speaker will forgive me just a little bit if I address this issue because it is slightly outside the remit. The question is not, "What are we trying to achieve?". I do not know of anybody who supports human trafficking. I do not think that is what we are talking about. The question that we are trying to deal with here is, "What is the most efficacious way of dealing with it?". I will make the argument later that I think that elements of the Bill, no matter how well-intentioned, are counterproductive.

There may well be some side benefits for having the debate. That is fair enough. As far as I am aware, people were having the debate anyway, but, in response to Mr Wilson, I will say that I think that we are treading on very thin ice when we start to try and dictate to the judiciary on every single item and say, "This is what you will do." You can take one exceptional issue and say, "That is an exception", but once you have made one exception, there is another exception and it builds up. A tenet of democracy is that we should legislate, and the judiciary should be involved in the judicial process.

Mr Frew: I thank the Member for giving way. I hear his argument. He is the defender with regard to the gap between the judiciary and us, as legislators. Is he then saying to the House today that we should repeal all the minimum sentences in Northern Ireland around firearms legislation and that the UK should do the same?

Mr B McCrea: The principle that I work on is that I do not understand why a minimum sentence is required if you are going to rely on the judiciary exercising its discretion. In reality, what we have had put forward is that we have said that we are going to have a minimum sentence and then we have said, "Unless we have exceptional circumstances." When you read the judgement by Burgess, everything that he says is, "There are exceptional circumstances, which I take into consideration." That is the proper rule of law. This is not somebody saying to the judge, "You will have a minimum sentence per se." We need to get a situation in which we should observe it properly in principle, and the judiciary should be independent and should be allowed to move forward.

Mr Buchanan: Will the Member give way?

Mr B McCrea: I am sorry. I have already given you a chance, and you will be pleased to know that I am just about to finish anyway.

All I am saying to you is that, on this particular issue and the way forward, I do not take any great pleasure in standing up and saying that I do not think that this is the right way forward. I actually think that we have missed opportunities. Look at the situation that we had at Second Stage, when the Bill was opposed by the PSNI, the PPS and others, and people were coming along saying, "This is not the right way forward". It is not.

Some people mentioned a poll and said that if you ask a question in a certain way, as was the position that Mr McCartney, I think, took, you will get a certain answer. However, the fundamental thing that we are meant to do here is legislate properly. I put it to you quite strongly that all of the flimflam and all of the saying, "Oh, well this should be different" does not hold water. We should not be interfering; we should not be putting down minimum sentences. This Bill stands only because the Department of Justice has managed to subsume it, take it over, be the cuckoo in the nest and make it the Modern Slavery Bill. That is what it comes back as; that is what we are faced with now; and on that basis we have to welcome those elements. But the rest of it is just for the optics and will not change anything.

Mr Ford: If I am "the cuckoo in the nest", then the thrush or blackbird, or whatever Lord Morrow is, is entirely complicit in much — although not all — that has been done.

Let me repeat the point that I made during my intervention in his opening remarks: this is very much an agreed proposal between us, and I, personally, see no harm in the Department of Justice assisting a private Member to achieve a shared aim by working together. It is actually what I think the people of Northern Ireland want to see in this place, because they see far too much of the other sort. Sadly, I suspect that much of the media comment about this debate will be around the very small areas on which we disagree rather than on the fundamental issue on which we do agree.

I welcome the opportunity at this stage to speak to the group 1 amendment Nos 1 to 14, 21 to 23, 27, 50, 60 and 61, which have all been tabled by jointly by Lord Morrow and me — as I said in my intervention, that is a unique situation — as well as amendment Nos 15 to 20 that Lord Morrow tabled and amendment No 40, tabled in the name of the Minister of Finance and Personnel, for which I carry Executive responsibility on the Floor today.

Amendment Nos 1 to 4 introduce four new clauses to create a package of new offences to tackle the exploitation of people through human trafficking and slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour. By bringing these offences together under a single piece of legislation, I believe that we will align Northern Ireland law with best practice as identified by GRETA, the Council of Europe's Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. Taken together, these amendments will streamline and simplify the legislative framework to facilitate the work of investigators, prosecutors and the courts to bring perpetrators to justice. They will also help to ensure that where individuals are prepared to exploit or enslave fellow human beings, there will be a consistent response under the law of Northern Ireland regardless of the nature of that exploitation. The new slavery-type offences and the new human trafficking offence will attract a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, commensurate with the seriousness of these offences and the impact they have on the victims.

Amendment No1 introduces new clause 1A, which will create the new offence of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour to replace the existing offence under section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The offence will be triable only in the Crown Court, reflecting the seriousness with which it is viewed. The provision also makes clear that in determining whether an offence under the new clause has taken place, regard must be had to all the circumstances and, in particular, to whether there are personal circumstances that may render the victim more vulnerable than other people. It also makes clear that the victim's consent to any act forming part of the offence is irrelevant. In doing so, I believe that this amendment will offer greater protection from slavery and exploitation to the more-vulnerable citizens amongst us.

Amendment No 2 introduces new clause 1B to create the new offence of human trafficking that is intended to replace both the existing offences of human trafficking for sexual exploitation under sections 57 to 59 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and of human trafficking for non-sexual exploitation under section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. The offence will apply at all stages of the trafficking chain, whether that is recruitment, transportation, harbouring, receiving or exchanging control over the victim.

The provision also addresses the international dimension of trafficking, which has been considered by previous legislation in this House. As with existing trafficking offences, the offence will apply where a person is trafficked into, out of or within the United Kingdom and will also cover trafficking activity that takes place anywhere else in the world where the perpetrator is a UK national, a habitual resident of Northern Ireland or a body incorporated under the law of the UK.

Amendment No 3 introduces new clause 1C, which defines exploitation for the purposes of the new trafficking offence under clause 1B and will cover a range of exploitation types including slavery and forced labour, sexual exploitation, organ removal, securing services by force, threats, deception, fraud etc or preying upon the vulnerabilities of children or vulnerable adults to secure services. In doing so, it also makes it clear that, for the purposes of these provisions, exploitation may include forced begging or criminal activity.

In addition to these offences, amendment No 4 introduces new clause 1D, which would create a new preparatory offence; that is, it will make it an offence to commit an offence with the intention of committing one of the offences under clauses 1A or 1B. Article 66 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 already makes it an offence to commit an offence with the intention of committing a relevant sexual offence, and there is already provision for preparatory offences in respect of trafficking for sexual exploitation. However, there is currently no equivalent preparatory offence in respect of trafficking for non-sexual exploitation or slavery-type offences. New clause 1D will close the current gap in the law and will offer greater protection against these types of offences, regardless of the nature of the exploitation involved.

Amendment No 5 introduces new clause 2A, which is intended to enhance the powers of courts in Northern Ireland to protect the public and individuals from the organised criminals who perpetrate these crimes. New clause 2A will amend schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 to specify the slavery-type and human trafficking offences under new clauses 1A and 1B as serious offences for the purposes of sentencing dangerous offenders. It will also amend schedule 2 to the 2008 Order to specify these offences as violent offences under Part 1 of the schedule and to list human trafficking for sexual exploitation as a specified sexual offence for the purposes of sentencing dangerous offenders. In doing so, new clause 2A will bring the offences under the ambit of the public protection arrangements — the public protection sentencing framework provided for under articles 13 and 14 of the 2008 Order — with the effect that, where the court considers it necessary for public protection, it could impose a life sentence, an indeterminate custodial sentence or an extended custodial sentence. Any individual who receives such a sentence will also be subject to the associated regime for release, licence, supervision and, importantly, recall arrangements.

The introduction of new clauses 1A to 1D will render clauses 1, 2 and 5 of the Bill as introduced no longer necessary, and that is why Lord Morrow and I have agreed they should no longer stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3 introduces factors that the courts must treat as aggravating factors when considering the seriousness of a trafficking or slavery-type offence for the purposes of sentencing. Amendment Nos 6 to 14 are relevant to that. As has been acknowledged in the Chamber today, I have questioned the desirability of and need for clause 3, since the courts already have the ability to issue sentencing guidelines that are flexible enough to respond to emerging case law and, indeed, guidelines are already in place in respect of human trafficking for sexual exploitation. I acknowledge, however, the strong support that exists for the provision, and I have worked with Lord Morrow and his team to develop and agree amendment Nos 6 to 14, which will amend clause 3. The amendments are technical in nature, for the most part providing the appropriate definitions to give effect to the provision. Others will omit certain definitions, such as "position of trust" or "vulnerable adult", from the clause. Those definitions are now included instead in the new general interpretation provisions at new clause 17A. They do not in any way change the intended effect of clause 3.

I suppose you might say, in response to the kind of criticisms that have come from Mr Basil McCrea, that Lord Morrow has convinced me to keep the provision for aggravating factors in the Bill, and I have persuaded him perhaps to amend some of the provisions to tighten up some of the language. We are now agreed that this group of amendments is the best way to handle this issue.

Clause 4 will introduce the mandatory minimum sentence of two years for any human trafficking or slavery-type offence under new clauses 1A and 1B, except where the court believes that there are exceptional circumstances to justify not doing so. The usual position of course is that, whilst the legislature determines the maximum sentence, it does not determine the minimum sentence. Indeed, in a previous debate in the House when we were considering the issue of crimes against elderly people, Mr Jim Allister highlighted a case that he had been involved in where a father assaulted a paedophile pensioner who had abused his child. It was an example of why there can be difficulties with mandatory minimums. Of course, we have the judgement of Judge Burgess in the case of Crown v Matyas Pis, where he looked at the issue of an appropriate level of sentencing. I do not need to repeat the points made by Basil McCrea in that respect, though, if I were to do so, I would do it in a slightly different tone of voice from that which he adopted.


4.30 pm

I wish it to be clear that I still, however, do not support clause 4. My firm belief is that judges are the best people to take account of the specific circumstances of each case as it is presented to them in court and that sentencing should be entirely a matter for the courts on a case-by-case basis. We have had examples highlighting certain bits of legislation. I will, however, point out that the Firearms Order 2004 was Westminster legislation and not, as seemed to be suggested earlier, legislation of this House. Whilst I acknowledge and am reassured that there can be exceptions allowed under clause 4, I do not believe, nonetheless, that the clause is appropriate or is helpful to us at this stage. Nor does the principle of a mandatory minimum sentence sit easily beside other sentencing provisions under new clause 2A, which would, for example, allow courts to award indeterminate sentences for the offences.

Mr Wilson: Will the Minister give way?

Mr Ford: I will.

Mr Wilson: I can understand the Minister's point that he does not believe that the clause is appropriate if he takes the view that you should hand over to judges completely the discretion on this matter, but perhaps he will explain his second remark. Given the seriousness of this type of crime and given the fact that anyone who involves themselves in human trafficking does so in the full knowledge of the suffering that they are imposing, why does he not believe that a statutory minimum sentence is helpful?

Mr Ford: I recognise the points that the Member has made, but, to correct the first point, we do not give judges full discretion; we impose, as a legislature, the maximum. I believe that it is unhelpful to say, "This is a minimum, but it is not really a minimum and exceptional circumstances may apply". There are elements where that is confusing, and that is why I remain opposed. I recognise that many Members from different sides of the House have indicated that they are sympathetic to the provision, and amendments that have been tabled by Lord Morrow address some of my key concerns. However, should clause 4 stand part of the Bill at the end of today's proceedings, some further amendments may be needed to ensure that it is aligned with the existing sentencing framework that we have in Northern Ireland. If that is the case, I will certainly offer to continue to work with Lord Morrow to address those points.

In the event that clause 4 were to be supported by the Assembly, I believe that amendment Nos 15 to 18 and amendment No 20 will help to improve the clause and will mitigate those concerns. Amendment No 15 is purely technical and will ensure that clause 4 applies in respect of offences under new clauses 1A and 1B.

Amendment No 16 is a key amendment, as has been acknowledged by Lord Morrow, to ensure that clause 4 applies only to adults and not to children. That was one of the most significant concerns that I raised at Second Stage and in subsequent discussions, and I have argued that the clause as drafted would run counter to the principle of the best interests of the child, which is set out in article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. I am grateful to Lord Morrow for engaging on that one and for tabling the amendment.

Amendment No 17 would require the judge to state in open court where he is of the opinion that exceptional circumstances exist that justify the imposition of a lesser sentence or a suspended sentence and the reasons for that. Amendment No 18, which is contingent on amendment No 17, would place an additional requirement on the chief clerk of the court to record the court's opinion and reasoning if such exceptional circumstances are considered to exist. Amendment No 19, however, removes the option for the court to award a suspended sentence and, I believe, would act as a further barrier to judicial discretion. I do not support that amendment.

Whilst I fully support the motivation behind it, I remain of the view that clause 4 as a whole runs contrary to the established principle of judicial discretion, the discretion that the legislature normally only sets the maximum rather than the minimum sentence, and I continue to stand against that.

Amendment Nos 21 to 23 and amendment Nos 60 and 61 are intended to facilitate the confiscation of criminal assets, and, in doing so, they seek to undermine the principal driver for the perpetrators of the offences.

They also include new powers to order the payment of reparation to victims.

Amendment No 21 introduces new clause 5A, which amends schedule 5 to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) to designate the new human trafficking and slavery-type offences under new clauses 1A and 1B as criminal lifestyle offences. That, perhaps, needs a degree of explanation. POCA sets out a strict chronology for making confiscation orders, and the question of whether a person has a criminal lifestyle is central to this legal process. If an individual is convicted of a lifestyle offence specified under POCA, the courts can find that they have obtained the benefit of general criminal conduct, which then allows the courts to undertake an inquiry, beyond the normal statutory six-year limitation period, into all prior criminal activities. Profit is clearly the key motivation for those involved in trafficking and exploitation, and by improving the court's ability to confiscate criminal assets, new clause 5A will help to undermine the economic motivation that fuels the exploitation of human beings. By specifying those offences as criminal lifestyle offences for the purposes of the confiscation of assets, there will also be a consistent approach between human trafficking and slavery-type offences and other organised crimes, such as drug trafficking, arms trafficking and money laundering.

Amendment Nos 22 and 60 taken together will introduce new clause 5B and new schedule 1 to the Bill, which will also enhance the powers of the court to target and pursue the assets of traffickers and exploiters. Those new provisions will provide courts with powers on conviction of an offender for a trafficking or slavery-type offence to order the forfeiture of ships, vehicles or aircraft that have been used or were intended for use in connection with that offence. Equivalent powers are already available in connection with the existing human trafficking offences, and it is important that they should be available also in connection with the new human trafficking offence. New clause 5B and schedule 1 will also extend those powers in respect of slavery-type offences under new clause 1A. In that respect, as Lord Morrow highlighted, Northern Ireland law will go beyond the provisions set out in the Westminster Modern Slavery Bill, which will apply only to human trafficking offences. I am delighted that that is an example of where we are able to go further in the Assembly than is currently the case in the UK Parliament. Perhaps that may be something that some MPs or Members of the House of Lords in this House may wish to take up when they go to Westminster.

Lord Morrow and I are clear that victims should be at the heart of the Bill. Amendment Nos 23 and 61 will introduce new clause 5C and new schedule 2, which, together, will enhance the rights of victims by providing the courts with powers to order convicted perpetrators to pay reparation to their victims for any harm that they have suffered as a result of the offence. The model for those slavery and trafficking reparation orders under new clause 5C and schedule 2 is broadly equivalent to that which already exists in respect of compensation orders under the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1994. However, in addition, these new measures would require the court to consider making one of those reparation orders where it had the power to do so, and where it can but chooses not to make one, to set out its reasons. That additional requirement on the courts is intended to enhance awareness of this further means of redress for victims of these offences. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of new schedule 2 set out the effect of a reparation order, including enforcement arrangements in the case of a breach of the order, and also make supplementary provision, including in respect of variations and appeals.

Reference was made in the context of existing clause 7 to training matters, particularly by the Chair of the Committee. Whilst those particular provisions are now to be removed from the Bill, let me remind the House that, so far, more than 4,000 PSNI officers have had —

Mr Humphrey: I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I appreciate that. Having recognised the right of the Assembly to set maximum sentences, why does the Minister shy away from setting minimum sentences and curtailing the power of judges?

Mr Ford: I thought that I had answered that point, although I am grateful to Mr Humphrey for giving me a chance to repeat it. I believe that it is the normal procedure that the legislature in nearly all criminal cases sets the maximum but not any minimum. The principle of judicial independence and judicial discretion then applies to consider how the case is handled on the facts of the individual case as presented to the judge. I believe that that is the appropriate way to continue, and that is the norm in most cases.

On the point that I was making about training, more than 4,000 PSNI officers have received training in the last couple of years. Operational guidance was issued by the PSNI in October 2013. There is policy and guidance for prosecutors. I have been at some awareness-raising events for staff from health and social care trusts as well as police officers, and a lot of work is being done by partners across health and social care and justice to ensure that guidance is available to staff — whether they be GPs or working in A&E — most likely to come across trafficking victims. I believe that provision for training is being adequately dealt with, and I am grateful for Lord Morrow's acknowledgement that clause 7(1) is no longer required.

Amendment No 27 standing in my name aims to introduce new clause 5G, which is intended to replace the remaining parts of clause 7 and make explicit the legal principle that investigations into and prosecutions on human trafficking and slavery-type offences are not dependent on victims reporting the offence or accusing a person of committing one of those offences. It also clarifies that criminal proceedings for one of those offences may commence or continue, even in cases in which the victim has made a statement about the offence and subsequently withdrawn it. If amendment No 27 is accepted, it would mean that clause 7 in its entirety need not stand part of the Bill, as agreed by Lord Morrow and me.

Amendment No 40, which was tabled in the name of the Minister of Finance and Personnel, aims to introduce new clause 6B to provide for the criminalisation of forced marriage. It is designed to capture two different sorts of behaviour. It is clear that this issue sits easily in a human trafficking Bill, and I am pleased to take up the opportunity on behalf of the Minister of Finance to ensure that it is carried through at this stage. Clause 6B(1) would capture violent, threatening or coercive behaviour intended to cause another person to enter into a marriage. Clause 6B(5) would capture any form of deception used to trick a person into leaving the country with a view to forcing that person to marry. The person may, for example, have been told that they are going abroad to attend a family event and may leave voluntarily on that false premise.

The new clause would cover people who do not or cannot consent because they lack capacity and the relevant penalties are duly set out in clause 6B(7). This is based on the corresponding offences in England, Wales and Scotland, for which the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 provides. It is often said that parents who force their children to marry believe that they are acting in their child’s best interests, building stronger families or preserving cultural or religious traditions. They may not see anything wrong in their actions and, often, they are otherwise loving and kind parents who have never given cause for concern in the treatment or care of their child. Such beliefs are, however, wholly misguided, and it is now rightly accepted that there can never be any justification for forcing a person to marry against his or her will. Indeed, freely given consent is a prerequisite of Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh marriages.

The initial act of overriding a person’s free will is objectionable in and of itself, but there are wider consequences that may flow from that act and that may continue to have a detrimental impact. The victim may find himself or herself in another country with a completely different culture, unable to leave home unaccompanied, isolated by language barriers and alone and deprived of the love and support of wider family members that we all value so much. He or she may have been removed from school or prevented from going on to further education, denied the opportunity to reach his or her full potential and to live a happy and productive life. It is not just the victim who is damaged; children who are born into these marriages may witness violence or abuse or may even be the subject of violence and abuse themselves.

We already have civil protection orders, which can be called in aid when a person is at risk of being forced into marriage or has already been forced into marriage. Those civil orders are underpinned by statutory guidance for key personnel. However, we must use every tool at our disposal and ensure that every possible protection is put in place. The criminalisation of forced marriage will offer additional protections, but, more importantly, it will send a clear message about what is and is not acceptable in the 21st century. If we are to eradicate forced marriage, we must adopt a zero-tolerance approach, and the new criminal offences in respect of forced marriage will allow us to do just that. I therefore commend amendment No 40 to the House.

Finally, you will be pleased to hear, amendment No 50, tabled jointly by Lord Morrow and me, is technical in nature —

Mr Frew: Will the Minister give way?

Mr Frew: I apologise about asking the Minister to go back, but will he give the House a better understanding of the fundamental point about setting a minimum sentence? Is it OK to set a maximum sentence and curtail the judiciary in that aspect but then not set a minimum sentence? What is the difference between maximum and minimum? How does one curtail judges if the other does not?

Mr Ford: I thought that we had got past that point, but I am grateful for yet another opportunity to talk to it. The simple reality is that legislation in any part of the United Kingdom will always assume that there is a maximum penalty for any given criminal offence, but not always a minimum. In fact, very rarely will there be a minimum. It is not, as said by a number of Members from the DUP Benches, that the legislature cannot do that, and the Attorney General has advised that that may be the case. Rather, it is saying that it is not normal. Once you put in a requirement for a mandatory minimum sentence and then write "exceptional circumstances", it starts to cloud the issue in an unhelpful way, particularly when we have Judge Burgess's defining judgement in the first trafficking case to be tried in Northern Ireland, which made it clear what the range of options will be on the basis of a judgement from the court. So I do not believe that it is necessary or appropriate to go there.


4.45 pm

Finally, and you will be pleased to hear me say that, Mr Deputy Speaker, amendment No 50, which was tabled jointly by Lord Morrow and me, is technical in nature and is needed to ensure that the measures provided for under clause 13 in respect of the protection of victims of police investigations will also apply to victims of the new offences specified under new clauses 1A and 1B.

That summarises the position of the Department of Justice. It is noteworthy that of the amendments tabled in this group — almost half of the Bill is covered by it — 27 have been agreed by Lord Morrow and me. Lord Morrow tabled one amendment that I do not agree with, there are four cases in which we agree that a particular clause should not stand part and one case in which I seek to remove a clause that Lord Morrow does not agree with. That is a measure of the positive and constructive engagement that was undertaken. It may not appeal to every Member — I think of a Member at my right shoulder — but it appeals to the great majority of us. I commend those amendments to the House.

Lord Morrow: It has been a fairly long and very interesting debate. I had thought that, at this stage of the day, we would have been nearly past group three. It bodes well for the evening — perhaps we should prepare ourselves for a long evening and night. It might be the night of the long knives. I do not know, but we will see how it goes from here on in.

I commend and thank all those who have spoken in the debate. It has been largely good tempered. One or two Members got excited and started to jump around and wave their papers all over the place. We always have such exceptions with us, for the present anyway — we will see what the future holds for those people.

I acknowledge everything that has been said. It seems a long time ago, although it was just before lunchtime, that my colleague the Chair of the Justice Committee elevated me marginally too highly, I think, when he likened me to the great abolitionist William Wilberforce. I am no latter-day William Wilberforce. I want to make that very clear, and I hope that you are listening, Mr McCrea. I do not accept that for a single second.

Quite recently, I was reminded of something about Wilberforce by an individual who had looked up how long he had fought slavery and found that it took him 40 years. I have been going at this Bill for less than three years, so maybe I have another 37 years to go. I do not know, but I know that Basil McCrea is saying, "There is not 37 years in that fellow over there." Just be careful before you make any pronouncements, Mr McCrea.

I thank Mr Givan for his very lavish praise, and I appreciate what he said. There has been general consensus, right around the House, that the Bill is basically good. There is one exception, and we will deal with that in a moment or two. Most have acknowledged that, while they may not agree with every aspect and part of the Bill covered by the group 1 amendments, it is a necessary Bill and something that should be done.

Only one person to date has said that it is not fit for purpose, but there is always one, is there not?

I was going to comment on what each individual said, but, since many individuals have said the same or similar things, that may not be necessary. However, I want to make it clear that I appreciate everything that has been said, even by those who, at times, have not been totally supportive of what I am trying to do through this Bill and, in particular, in relation to some of the clauses, whether they be single clauses or amendments.

It is obvious that one issue has been contentious, and it rotates around clause 4. I say, quite frankly, to those who oppose clause 4 that their opposition is not sustainable. When they were asked about maximum and minimum sentences, we had some answers that, in my books, were not very convincing. This Bill is trying to set out in clear and stark terms that the Assembly believes that human trafficking is a great social evil and a heinous crime. Even Mr McCrea, who has no regard for my Bill at all, at least admitted that human trafficking was something that we should be opposed to, and then he went off the rails completely and was not prepared to acknowledge anything else.

Mr B McCrea: Will the Member give way?

Lord Morrow: Not at the moment. I think that I have had enough, just for the minute. There is only so much that one can take in a day.

I believe that this modest proposal is a very appropriate and effective way of making it absolutely clear that we want to make Northern Ireland a cold house, or a cold place, for human trafficking and traffickers. It is designed to further concentrate the minds of would-be traffickers, increasing the incentive for them to think again and thereby reduce the chances for and levels of trafficking in Northern Ireland. I would also like to come back to the intervention that I received during my speech, just to clarify that, when clause 4 reaches the statute book, supplementary guidance for the courts will be produced as a matter of course. I very much hope that Members will support all the amendments in the group, with the exception of that tabled by the Minister, which argues that clause 4 should not stand part of the Bill.

Mrs Foster: I thank the Member for giving way. I have not been in the Chamber for the whole debate, but I have been following it as best I can on the television upstairs. What we want to do is send a very strong message on human trafficking. One of the ways that we do that is by setting a minimum sentence. It has been done before. It has been pointed out, and I accept, that it is not a regular occurrence. However, in relation to drink-driving, society felt that it wanted to send a very strong message, and therefore a minimum sentence was set in relation to that issue. I think that this is another issue on which society expects us to send a very strong message to the judiciary and, indeed, to society as a whole.

I have listened to what people have had to say about fettering the discretion of judges, but judges act within the laws that are set down by the Assembly and Parliament, so we are actually sending a very strong message to the judiciary in relation to that type of action. Therefore, I think, it is wholly and rightly within our limits to do such a thing. Therefore, I support you, Lord Morrow, in setting a minimum sentence for human trafficking, and I hope that the whole House supports what you have laid down.

Lord Morrow: I thank my colleague very much for those valuable and timely points. I too urge the House to take cognisance of what she has said. They are compatible with what I am trying to achieve through this private Members' Bill.

I do not wish to detain the House because, as I said, we have a fairly long evening ahead of us, but Mr Basil McCrea in particular was very disparaging. He said:

"The Bill was not fit for purpose".

He also said that the Department had helped me save face by giving me some concessions. I have had long discussions with the departmental officials on this Bill, and I do not believe that any of them, if they were able to stand in the middle of this Floor or stand where I am standing, would agree with that. Mr McCrea says my Bill is no different from the Modern Slavery Bill. He clearly has not read my Bill and compared it with the Modern Slavery Bill. If he had, he would have seen that my Bill goes much further. It always did in many areas, including — and I want him to listen — on the provision of child trafficking guardians and statutory provision for victims of trafficking.

Mr McCrea would do well to read both Bills: he should get the Modern Slavery Bill and my Bill, set them beside each other and see how much further my Bill goes. My Bill is tailored for Northern Ireland. It is not a perfect Bill. My colleague Tom Buchanan made it quite clear that, when I came to the House first, when I went to the Committee and wherever I went with my Bill, I made it clear that it was not the finished article. My Bill was never put forward as the perfect article. I have said that from day one. As a result of what the Committee has done, of what others have said to me and of what the Department has done and said, I have tabled amendments. Many of those amendments have been agreed with the Minister. Every Member can see quite clearly that they have been signed off by both of us.

Mr McCrea, I think you are out of school, I think you are not fit for purpose in the debate today and whether —

Mr B McCrea: Will the Member give way?

Lord Morrow: No, not now.

Mr B McCrea: So, you will not engage in debate.

Lord Morrow: No. You had your opportunity, and you will get another one a little later, I suspect. You obviously have not read this Bill to any great extent. You set your face against this piece of legislation from day one, and today you came in and denigrated it and said that it should not be going any further.

You said that we are fettering judges. My colleague Arlene Foster has made it quite clear that we do that on occasion. However, this is done in such a way that judges can derogate. Therefore, it is not right to say that we have said, "There will be a two-year minimum sentence. That's it. Full stop." We have not said that: we have allowed for a derogation.

I want to test the opinion of the House on this one. It is absolutely vital to retain clause 4 in the Bill.

Mr Frew: I thank the Member for giving way. I have listened to what he has said, and I know how much work he has put into the Bill and how much work the Justice Committee has put into scrutinising it. Does it not provide reassurance to the House that the Member who is bringing the Bill forward has listened to the Members of the House?

Lord Morrow: I thank my colleague Mr Frew for his comments.

To those who still have reservations about clause 4 remaining part of the Bill, I ask them to think very carefully. This is an attempt to highlight in a very explicit and determined way that we in Northern Ireland take human trafficking very, very seriously and that those who are engaged in it will be dealt with by the full rigours of the law and that they can, and possibly will, be subject to a two-year minimum sentence.

Mr Humphrey: I am grateful to the Member for giving way. In the final part of his contribution, Mr McCrea talked about the police and the Public Prosecution Service. Does the Member agree that the now Assistant Chief Constable, Mr Drew Harris, clarified the position of the Police Service of Northern Ireland on this Bill to the Committee when he appeared in front of it a number of months ago?


5.00 pm

Lord Morrow: I thank my colleague Mr Humphrey for making that salient and important point. Mr McCrea said that the PSNI were opposed to this legislation. Let me be very clear: that is not the position of the PSNI. I believe that it is an abuse of a Member's position to come in here and misrepresent the PSNI or, indeed, anyone else. That is not their position. If Mr McCrea wants to get up, he should get up now and withdraw that remark, knowing perfectly well that that is not the position of the police. They have not said that.

As a matter of fact, as my colleague said, ACC Harris has made it quite clear that that is not their position. I ask the Member to take cognisance of that.

I will leave the matter here and I would like to test the opinion of the House on these amendments.

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Beggs): Members, before I put the Question, I remind everyone that we have debated opposition to clause 1 but the Question will be put in the positive manner as usual.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 1 disagreed to.

New Clause

Amendment No 1 made:

After clause 1 insert

"Slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour
 
1A.—(1) A person ("A") commits an offence if—
 
(a) A holds another person ("B") in slavery or servitude and the circumstances are such that A knows or ought to know that B is held in slavery or servitude, or
 
(b) A requires B to perform forced or compulsory labour and the circumstances are such that A knows or ought to know that B is being required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
 
(2) In subsection (1) the references to holding B in slavery or servitude or requiring B to perform forced or compulsory labour are to be construed in accordance with Article 4 of the Human Rights Convention.
 
(3) In determining whether B is being held in slavery or servitude or required to perform forced or compulsory labour regard may be had to all the circumstances.
 
(4) In particular, regard may be had to any of B’s personal circumstances which may make B more vulnerable than other persons such as, for example—
 
(a) that B is a child or a vulnerable adult; or
 
(b) that A is a member of B’s family.
 
(5) The consent of B to any act which forms part of an offence under this section is irrelevant.
 
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause

Amendment No 2 made:

After clause 1 insert



"Human trafficking
 
1B.—(1) A person ("A") commits an offence if A arranges or facilitates the travel of another person ("B") with a view to B being exploited.
 
(2) A may in particular arrange or facilitate B’s travel by recruiting B, transporting or transferring B, harbouring or receiving B, or transferring or exchanging control over B.
 
(3) A arranges or facilitates B’s travel with a view to B being exploited only if—
 
(a) A intends to exploit B (in any part of the world) during or after the travel, or
 
(b) A knows or ought to know that another person is likely to exploit B (in any part of the world) during or after the travel.
 
(4) "Travel" means—
 
(a) arriving in, or entering, any country,
 
(b) departing from any country,
 
(c) travelling within any country.
 
(5) The consent of B to any act which forms part of an offence under this section is irrelevant.
 
(6) A person to whom this subsection applies commits an offence under this section regardless of—
 
(a) where the arranging or facilitating takes place, or
 
(b) where the travel takes place.
 
(7) Any other person commits an offence under this section if—
 
(a) any part of the arranging or facilitating takes place in the United Kingdom, or
 
(b) the travel consists of arrival in or entry into, departure from, or travel within the United Kingdom.
 
(8) Subsection (6) applies to—
 
(a) a UK national;
 
(b) a person who at the time of the offence was habitually resident in Northern Ireland; and
 
(c) a body incorporated under the law of a part of the United Kingdom.
 
(9) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause

Amendment No 3 made:

After clause 1 insert



"Meaning of exploitation for purposes of section 1B
 
1C.—(1) For the purposes of section 1B, a person is exploited only if one or more of the following subsections apply in relation to the person.
 
Slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour
 
(2) The person is the victim of behaviour—
 
(a) which involves the commission of an offence under section 1A, or
 
(b) which would involve the commission of an offence under that section if it took place in Northern Ireland.
 
Sexual exploitation
 
(3) Something is done to or in respect of the person—
 
(a) which involves the commission of an offence under—
 
(i) Article 3(1)(a) of the Protection of Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (indecent photographs of children), or
 
(ii) any provision of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (sexual offences), or
 
(b) which would involve the commission of such an offence if it were done in Northern Ireland.
 
Removal of organs etc.
 
(4) The person is encouraged, required or expected to do anything—
 
(a) which involves the commission, by him or her or another person, of an offence under section 32 or 33 of the Human Tissue Act 2004 (prohibition of commercial dealings in organs and restrictions on use of live donors) in Northern Ireland, or
 
(b) which would involve the commission of such an offence, by him or her or another person, if it were done in Northern Ireland.
 
Securing services etc. by force, threats or deception
 
(5) The person is subjected to force, threats, abduction, coercion, fraud or deception designed to induce him or her—
 
(a) to provide services of any kind,
 
(b) to provide another person with benefits of any kind, or
 
(c) to enable another person to acquire benefits of any kind;
 
and for the purposes of this subsection "benefits" includes the proceeds of forced begging or of criminal activities.
 
Securing services etc. from children and vulnerable persons
 
(6) Another person uses or attempts to use the person for a purpose within paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of subsection (5), having chosen him or her for that purpose on the grounds that—
 
(a) he or she is a child or a vulnerable adult or is a member of the other person’s family or the other person is in a position of trust in relation to him or her; and
 
(b) a person who was not within paragraph (a) would be likely to refuse to be used for that purpose."

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause

Amendment No 4 made:

After clause 1 insert

 

"Committing offence with intent to commit offence under section 1A or 1B
 
1D.—(1) A person commits an offence under this section if the person commits any offence with the intention of committing an offence under section 1A or 1B (including an offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring an offence under that section).
 
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is (unless subsection (3) applies) liable—
 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years;
 
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
 
(3) Where the offence under this section is committed by kidnapping or false imprisonment, a person guilty of that offence is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2 disagreed to.

New Clause

Amendment No 5 made:

After clause 2 insert

"Sentencing for offences under section 1A or 1B
 
Offences to be serious offences for purposes of sentencing
 
2A.—(1) The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 is amended as follows.
 
(2) In Schedule 1 (serious offences for purposes of sentencing dangerous offenders) after paragraph 31 insert—
 
"The Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014
31A. An offence under—
 
section 1A (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
section 1B (human trafficking).".
 
(3) In Part 1 of Schedule 2 (specified violent offences for purposes of sentencing dangerous offenders) after paragraph 31 insert—
 
"The Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014
 
31A. An offence under—
 
section 1A (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
section 1B (human trafficking) which is not within Part 2 of this Schedule.".
 
(4) In Part 2 of Schedule 2 (specified sexual offences for purposes of sentencing dangerous offenders) after paragraph 14 insert—
 
"The Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014
 
"14A. An offence under section 1B (human trafficking) committed with a view to exploitation that consists of or includes behaviour within section 1C(3) of that Act (sexual exploitation)."".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3 (Aggravating factors)

Amendment No 6 made:

In page 2, line 9, leave out

"a human trafficking offence or a slavery offence"

and insert

"an offence under section 1A or 1B".

Amendment No 7 made:

In page 2, line 13, leave out "family member" and insert "member of the family".

Amendment No 8 made:

In page 2, line 15, leave out "a victim who was".

Amendment No 9 made:

In page 2, line 17, leave out "the victim’s family" and insert

"a member of the family of the victim".

Amendment No 10 made:

In page 2, line 19, leave out "offence" and insert "offender".

Amendment No 11 made:

In page 2, line 21, leave out

"was committed by use of serious violence or".

Amendment No 12 made:

In page 2, leave out line 24 and insert

"—
 
(i) of an offence under section 1A or 1B;
 
(ii) of an offence under any provision repealed by this Act;
 
(iii) in respect of anything done outside Northern Ireland which was not an offence mentioned in paragraph (i) or (ii) but would have been such an offence if done in Northern Ireland.".

Amendment No 13 made:

In page 2, leave out lines 26 and 27 and insert

"‘'public official' means—
 
(a) a member of the Northern Ireland civil service or the United Kingdom civil service;
 
(b) a person employed by a body established by an Act of Parliament or by Northern Ireland legislation;
 
(c) the holder of an office established by an Act of Parliament or by Northern Ireland legislation;
 
(d) a police officer;".

Amendment No 14 made:

In page 2, leave out lines 30 to 34.

Clause 3, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4 (Minimum sentence for human trafficking and slavery offences)

Amendment No 15 made:

In page 2, line 36, leave out

"a human trafficking offence or a slavery offence"

and insert

"an offence under section 1A or 1B.".

Amendment No 16 made:

In page 2, line 37, at end insert

"and that individual was aged 18 or over when the offence was committed".

Amendment No 17 made:

In page 2, line 41, at end insert

"(2A) If there are exceptional circumstances which justify—
 
(a) the imposition of a lesser sentence than that provided for under subsection (2); or
 
(b) the exercise by the court of its powers under section 18 of the Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968;
 
the court shall state in open court that it is of the opinion that such exceptional circumstances exist and the reasons for that opinion.".

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Beggs): Amendment No 18 is consequential to amendment No 17.

Amendment No 18 made:

In page 2, line 41, at end insert

"(2B) Where subsection (3) applies the Chief Clerk shall record both the opinion of the court that exceptional circumstances exist and the reasons stated in open court which justify either the imposition of a lesser sentence or the exercise of its powers under section 18 of the Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 as the case may be.".

Amendment No 19 proposed:

In page 2, line 41, at end insert

"(2C) For the purposes of subsection (2) the words "custodial sentence" shall not include a sentence in relation to which the court has made an order under section 18 of the Treatment of Offenders Act (Northern Ireland) 1968.".

Question put, That amendment No 19 be made.

Question put a second time and agreed to.


5.15 pm

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Beggs): Order. I ask Members to return to their seats, please. Thank you.

Amendment No 20 made:

In page 2, line 41, at end insert

"(2D) In section 36 (review of sentencing) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 in subsection (9)(b) omit the ‘and’ at the end of the subsection and after subsection (9)(c) insert—
 
"and
 
(d) subsection (2)(b) shall be read as if it included a reference to a sentence required by section 4(2) of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014.".
 
(2E) The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 is amended as follows—
 
(a) in Article 2(9) (interpretation of references to sentences falling to be imposed under various statutory provisions) after "2006" insert "or section 4(2) of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014";
 
(b) in each of —
 
(i) Article 4(1) (power to discharge defendant except in specified circumstances),
 
(ii) Article 10(1) (power to impose probation order except in specified cases),
 
(iii) Article 13(1) (power to impose community service order except in specified cases),
 
(iv) Article 15(1) (power to impose combination order except in specified circumstances),
 
after "2008" insert "or section 4(2) of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014".
 
(2F) In the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008—
 
(a) in Article 5 (restrictions on imposing certain custodial sentences) in paragraph (1)(b) omit "or" at the end add of paragraph (ii) and after paragraph (iii) add—
 
"or
(iv) section 4(2) of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014.";
 
(b) in Article 7 (length of custodial sentence) in paragraph (3) at the end add—
 
"(c) section 4(2) of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014.".".

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

The Assembly divided:

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 4, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5 (Amendments to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004)

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Question put a second time and negatived.

Clause 5 disagreed to.

New Clause

Amendment No 21 made:

After clause 5 insert

"Orders that may be made on conviction of offence under section 1A or 1B
 
Confiscation of assets
 
5A.—(1) Schedule 5 to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (criminal lifestyle offences in Northern Ireland) is amended as follows.
(2) After paragraph 3 insert—
 
"Slavery, etc.
 
3A. An offence under section 1A of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour)."
 
(3) In paragraph 4 (people trafficking) at the end insert—
 
"(4) An offence under section 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 (human trafficking).".".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause

Amendment No 22 made:

After clause 5 insert

"Detention and forfeiture of certain vehicles, ships and aircraft
 
5B. Schedule 1 (which makes provision for, and in connection with, the detention and forfeiture of certain vehicles, ships and aircraft used or intended to be used in connection with offences under section 1A or 1B) has effect.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause

Amendment No 23 made:

After clause 5 insert

"Slavery and trafficking reparation orders
 
5C. Schedule 2 (which makes provision for, and in connection with, slavery and trafficking reparation orders) has effect.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Beggs): We now come to the second group of amendments for debate, which concerns amendment Nos 24 to 26 and 62, as well as opposition to clauses 7 and 15 standing part. The amendments deal with a duty on the Department to publish a strategy, new slavery and trafficking prevention orders and a duty on specified public bodies to notify the National Crime Agency when it is believed someone may be a victim of relevant offences. Members will note that amendment No 25 is mutually exclusive with clause 15 standing part. Amendment No 62 is mutually exclusive with clause 24 standing part.

Mr Ford: I beg to move amendment No 24:

After clause 5 insert

"Prevention, enforcement, etc.
 
Slavery and trafficking prevention orders
 
5D. Schedule 3 (which makes provision for, and in connection with, slavery and trafficking prevention orders) has effect.".

The following amendments stood on the Marshalled List:

No 25: After clause 5 insert

"Strategy on offences under sections 1A and 1B
 
5E.—(1) The Department shall, at least once in every year, publish a strategy on offences under section 1A and 1B ("relevant offences").
 
(2) In drawing up the strategy the Department must—
 
(a) consult with other relevant organisations; and
 
(b) have regard to views expressed by such organisations.
 
(3) The purpose of the strategy is to—
 
(a) raise awareness of relevant offences in Northern Ireland;
 
(b) contribute to a reduction in the number of such offences.
 
(4) The strategy shall in particular—
 
(a) set out arrangements for co-operation between relevant organisations in dealing with relevant offences or the victims of such offences;
 
(b) include provision as to the training and equipment of those involved in investigating or prosecuting relevant offences or dealing with the victims of such offences;
 
(c) include provisions aimed at raising awareness of the rights and entitlements of victims of such offences.
 
(5) In this section "relevant organisation" means any body, agency or other organisation with functions or activities relating to relevant offences or the victims of such offences.".

No 26: After clause 5 insert

"Duty to notify National Crime Agency about suspected victims of offences under section 1A or 1B
 
5F.—(1) A specified public authority must notify the National Crime Agency if it has reason to believe that a person may be a victim of an offence under section 1A or 1B.
 
(2) The Department—
 
(a) must issue guidance to specified public authorities about the sorts of things which indicate that a person may be a victim of an offence under section 1A or 1B;
 
(b) may from time to time revise the guidance; and
 
(c) must arrange for any guidance issued or revised to be published in a way the Department considers appropriate.
 
(3) The Department may by regulations make provision about the information to be included in a notification under subsection (1).
 
(4) The regulations must provide that a notification relating to a person aged 18 or over may not include information that—
 
(a) identifies the person, or
 
(b) enables the person to be identified (either by itself or in combination with other information),
 
unless the person consents to the inclusion of the information.
 
(5) The regulations may not require information to be included if its inclusion would result in a disclosure which contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998.
 
(6) In this section "specified public authority" means a public authority specified in regulations made by the Department.".

No 62: After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 3
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
PART 1
 
MAKING AND EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON DEALING WITH DEFENDANT
 
1.—(1) A court may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") where it deals with the defendant in respect of—
 
(a) a conviction for a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a finding that the defendant is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity, or
 
(c) a finding that the defendant is unfit to plead and has done the act charged against the defendant in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), convictions and findings include those taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(4) In this Schedule a "slavery or human trafficking offence" means any of the following offences—
 
(a) an offence under section 145 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(b) an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (trafficking for sexual exploitation);
 
(c) an offence under section 62 of that Act (committing offence with intent to commit relevant sexual offence), where the relevant sexual offence the person in question intended to commit was an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of that Act;
 
(d) an offence under section 22 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(e) an offence under section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (trafficking for exploitation);
 
(f) an offence under section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(g) an offence under section 47 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(h) an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D of this Act;
 
(i) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence listed above;
 
(j) an offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of an offence so listed;
 
(k) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting) where the offence (or one of the offences) which the person in question intends or believes would be committed is an offence so listed.
 
(5) The Department may by order amend sub-paragraph (4).
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON APPLICATION
 
2.—(1) A court of summary jurisdiction may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") on an application by the Chief Constable.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) the defendant is a relevant offender (see paragraph 3), and
 
(b) since the defendant first became a relevant offender, the defendant has acted in a way which means that the condition in sub-paragraph (3) is met.
 
(3) The condition is that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(4) The Chief Constable may make an application under this paragraph only in respect of a person—
 
(a) who lives in Northern Ireland, or
 
(b) who the Chief Constable believes is in, or is intending to come to, Northern Ireland.
 
(5) An application under this paragraph is to be made by complaint.
 
(6) The acts of the defendant which may be relied on for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b) include acts taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(7) The Department may by order provide that an application under this paragraph may be made by a person or body specified in the order (as well as by the Chief Constable); and such an order may make such consequential amendments to this Schedule as the Department thinks necessary or expedient.
 
MEANING OF "RELEVANT OFFENDER"
 
3.—(1) A person is a "relevant offender" for the purposes of paragraph 2 if sub- paragraph (2) or (3) applies to the person.
 
(2) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a court has made a finding that the person is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if, under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of an equivalent offence (whether or not the person has been punished for it),
 
(b) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of an equivalent offence.
 
(4) An "equivalent offence" means an act which—
 
(a) constituted an offence under the law of the country concerned, and
 
(b) would have constituted a slavery or human trafficking offence under the law of Northern Ireland if it had been done in Northern Ireland, or by a UK national, or as regards the United Kingdom.
 
(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) an act punishable under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom constitutes an offence under that law, however it is described in that law.
 
(6) On an application under paragraph 2 where sub-paragraph (3) is alleged to apply to the defendant, the condition in sub-paragraph (4)(b) is to be taken as met unless—
 
(a) not later than provided by magistrates’ court rules, the defendant serves on the Chief Constable a notice which states that in the defendant’s opinion the condition is not met, shows the grounds for that opinion, and requires the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met, or
 
(b) the court permits the defendant to require the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met without service of such a notice.
 
(7) References in this paragraph to convictions, findings and cautions include those taking place before this paragraph comes into operation.
 
EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
4.—(1) A slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(2) The only prohibitions or requirements that may be included in the order are those which the court is satisfied are necessary for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) Subject to paragraph 5(1), a prohibition or requirement contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order has effect—
 
(a) for a fixed period, specified in the order, of at least 5 years, or
 
(b) until further order.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may specify that some of its prohibitions or requirements have effect until further order and some for a fixed period;
 
(b) may specify different periods for different prohibitions or requirements.
 
(5) If a court makes a slavery and trafficking prevention order in relation to a person who is already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.
 
PROHIBITIONS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL
 
5.—(1) A prohibition on foreign travel contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order must be for a fixed period of not more than 5 years.
 
(2) A "prohibition on foreign travel" means—
 
(a) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom named or described in the order,
 
(b) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom other than a country named or described in the order, or
 
(c) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) Sub-paragraph (1) does not prevent a prohibition on foreign travel from being extended for a further period (of no more than 5 years each time) under paragraph 6.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order that contains a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c) must require the defendant to surrender all of the defendant’s passports at a police station specified in the order—
 
(a) on or before the date when the prohibition takes effect, or
 
(b) within a period specified in the order.
 
(5) Any passports surrendered must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the person ceases to be subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order containing a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c).
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply in relation to—
 
(a) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom if the passport has been returned to those authorities;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of an international organisation if the passport has been returned to that organisation.
 
VARIATION, RENEWAL AND DISCHARGE
 
6.—(1) A person within sub-paragraph (2) may apply to the appropriate court for an order varying, renewing or discharging a slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(2) The persons are—
 
(a) the defendant;
 
(b) the Chief Constable.
 
(3) On the application the court, after hearing—
 
(a) the person making the application, and
 
(b) the other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) (if that person wishes to be heard),
 
may make any order varying, renewing or discharging the slavery and trafficking prevention order that the court considers appropriate.
 
(4) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions or requirements on the defendant, only if the court is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to renew or vary the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(5) Any renewed or varied order may contain only those prohibitions or requirements which the court is satisfied are necessary for that purpose.
 
(6) The court must not discharge an order before the end of 5 years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and the Chief Constable.
 
(7) Sub-paragraph (6) does not apply to an order containing a prohibition on foreign travel and no other prohibitions.
 
(8) In this paragraph "the appropriate court" means—
 
(a) where the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal made the slavery and trafficking prevention order, the Crown Court;
 
(b) in any other case, a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
(9) An application under sub-paragraph (1) may be made—
 
(a) where the appropriate court is the Crown Court, in accordance with Crown Court rules;
 
(b) in any other case, by complaint.
 
INTERIM SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
7.—(1) This paragraph applies where an application under paragraph 2 ("the main application") has not been determined.
 
(2) An application for an "interim slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or
 
(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.
 
(3) The court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(4) An interim slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(5) The order—
 
(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;
 
(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.
 
(6) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.
 
APPEALS
 
8.—(1) A defendant may appeal against the making of a slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(a), as if the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence;
 
(b) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(b) or (c), as if the defendant had been convicted of the offence and the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for that offence;
 
(c) where the order was made on an application under paragraph 2, to the county court.
 
(2) A defendant may appeal to the county court against the making of an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(3) A defendant may appeal against the making of an order under paragraph 6, or the refusal to make such an order—
 
(a) where the application for such an order was made to the Crown Court, to the Court of Appeal;
 
(b) in any other case, to the county court.
 
(4) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c), (2) or (3)(b), the county court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.
 
(5) Any order made by the county court on an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c) or (2) is for the purposes of paragraph 6(8) or 7(6) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought.
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply to an order directing that an application be reheard by a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
PART 2
 
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
OFFENDER SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
9.—(1) References in the following provisions of this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are references to an offender who is for the time being subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order which is in effect under this Schedule.
 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) has effect subject to paragraph 12(7) (which excludes from paragraph 12 an offender subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order).
 
INITIAL NOTIFICATION
 
10.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must notify the required information to the police within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which the slavery and trafficking prevention order or the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order comes into force in relation to the offender ("the relevant date").
 
(2) The "required information" is the following information about the offender—
 
(a) date of birth;
 
(b) national insurance number;
 
(c) name on the relevant date or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(d) home address on the relevant date;
 
(e) name on the date on which the notification is given or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(f) home address on the date on which the notification is given;
 
(g) the address of any other premises in the United Kingdom at which on that date the offender regularly resides or stays;
 
(h) any information prescribed by regulations made by the Department.
 
(3) When determining the period of 3 days mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), there is to be disregarded any time when the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(4) In this Part "home address" means in relation to the offender—
 
(a) the address of the offender’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or
 
(b) if the offender has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the offender can regularly be found or, if there is more than one such place, such one of them as the offender selects.
 
NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES
 
11.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which any notifiable event occurs, notify to the police—
 
(a) the required new information, and
 
(b) the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2).
 
(2) A "notifiable event" means—
 
(a) the use by the offender of a name which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(b) any change of the offender’s home address;
 
(c) the expiry of any qualifying period during which the offender has resided or stayed at any premises in the United Kingdom the address of which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(d) any prescribed change of circumstances; or
 
(e) the release of the offender from custody pursuant to an order of a court or from a custodial sentence or detention in a hospital.
 
(3) The "required new information" is—
 
(a) the name referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(a),
 
(b) the new home address (see sub-paragraph (2)(b)),
 
(c) the address of the premises referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(c),
 
(d) the prescribed details, or
 
(e) the fact that the offender has been released as mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(e),
 
as the case may be.
 
(4) A notification under sub-paragraph (1) may be given before the notifiable event occurs, but in that case the offender must also specify the date when the event is expected to occur.
 
(5) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates occurs more than 2 days before the date specified, the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1).
 
(6) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates has not occurred by the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified—
 
(a) the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1), and
 
(b) the offender must, within the period of 6 days beginning with the date specified, notify to the police the fact that the event did not occur within the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified.
 
(7) Paragraph 10(3) applies to the determination of—
 
(a) any period of 3 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), or
 
(b) any period of 6 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (6),
 
as it applies to the determination of the period of 3 days mentioned in paragraph 10(1).
 
(8) In this paragraph—
 
(a) "prescribed change of circumstances" means any change—
 
(i) occurring in relation to any matter in respect of which information is required to be notified by virtue of paragraph 10(2)(h), and
 
(ii) of a description prescribed by regulations made by the Department;
 
(b) "the prescribed details", in relation to a prescribed change of circumstances, means such details of the change as may be so prescribed.
 
(9) In this paragraph "qualifying period" means—
 
(a) a period of 7 days, or
 
(b) two or more periods, in any period of 12 months, which taken together amount to 7 days.
 
PERIODIC NOTIFICATION
 
12.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the applicable period after each notification date, notify to the police the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2), unless the offender has already given a notification under paragraph 11(1) within that period.
 
(2) A "notification date" means, in relation to the offender, the date of any notification given by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) Where the applicable period would (apart from this paragraph) end while sub-paragraph (4) applies, that period is to be treated as continuing until the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which sub-paragraph (4) first ceases to apply.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court,
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence,
 
(c) detained in a hospital, or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) In this paragraph "the applicable period" means—
 
(a) in any case where sub-paragraph (6) applies, such period as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Department, and
 
(b) in any other case, the period of one year.
 
(6) This sub-paragraph applies if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1) was the address or location of such a place as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(b).
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph applies to an offender who is subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
ABSENCE FROM NOTIFIED RESIDENCE
 
13.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements at any time if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1) was an address in Northern Ireland such as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(a) (sole or main residence).
 
(2) If the offender intends to be absent from that home address for a period of more than 3 days ("the relevant period"), the offender must, not less than 12 hours before leaving that home address, notify to the police the information set out in sub-paragraph (3).
 
(3) The information is—
 
(a) the date on which the offender will leave that home address;
 
(b) such details as the offender holds about—
 
(i) the offender’s travel arrangements during the relevant period;
 
(ii) the offender’s accommodation arrangements during that period;
 
(iii) the offender’s date of return to that address.
 
(4) In this paragraph—
 
"travel arrangements" include, in particular, the means of transport to be used and the dates of travel,
 
"accommodation arrangements" include, in particular, the address of any accommodation at which the relevant offender will spend the night during the relevant period and the nature of that accommodation.
 
(5) Where—
 
(a) an offender has given a notification under sub-paragraph (2), and
 
(b) at any time before that mentioned in that sub-paragraph, the information notified becomes inaccurate or incomplete,
 
the offender must give a further notification under sub-paragraph (2).
 
(6) Where an offender—
 
(a) has notified a date of return to the offender’s home address, but
 
(b) returns to that home address on a date other than that notified,
 
the offender must notify the date of the offender’s actual return to the police within 3 days of the actual return.
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph requires an offender to notify any information which falls to be notified in accordance with a requirement imposed by regulations under paragraph 14.
 
(8) In calculating the relevant period for the purposes of this paragraph there is to be disregarded—
 
(a) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, an address of the kind mentioned in paragraph 10(2)(g) notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1);
 
(b) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, any premises, if his stay at those premises would give rise to a requirement to notify the address of those premises under paragraph 11(2)(c).
 
TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM
 
14.—(1) The Department may by regulations make provision with respect to offenders subject to notification requirements, or any description of such offenders—
 
(a) requiring such persons, before they leave the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (2);
 
(b) requiring such persons, if they subsequently return to the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (3).
 
(2) A notification under this paragraph must disclose—
 
(a) the date on which the offender proposes to leave the United Kingdom;
 
(b) the country (or, if there is more than one, the first country) to which the offender proposes to travel and the proposed point of arrival (determined in accordance with the regulations) in that country;
 
(c) any other information prescribed by the regulations which the offender holds about the offender’s departure from or return to the United Kingdom, or about the offender’s movements while outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) A notification under this sub-paragraph must disclose any information prescribed by the regulations about the offender’s return to the United Kingdom.
 
METHOD OF NOTIFICATION AND RELATED MATTERS
 
15.—(1) An offender gives a notification to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6) by—
 
(a) attending at any police station in Northern Ireland prescribed by regulations under section 87(1)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and
 
(b) giving an oral notification to any police officer, or to any person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station.
 
(2) Any notification given in accordance with this paragraph must be acknowledged; and the acknowledgement must be—
 
(a) in writing, and
 
(b) in such form as the Department may direct.
 
(3) Where a notification is given under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), the offender must, if requested to do so by the police officer or other person mentioned in paragraph (1)(b), allow that officer or person to—
 
(a) take the offender’s fingerprints,
 
(b) photograph any part of the offender, or
 
(c) do both of those things,
 
in order to verify the offender's identity.
 
(4) Fingerprints taken from a person under this paragraph (and any copies of those fingerprints) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(5) Photographs taken of any part of the offender under this paragraph (and any copies of such photographs) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(6) In this paragraph "photograph" includes any process by means of which an image may be produced.
 
PART 3
 
SUPPLEMENTARY
 
OFFENCES
 
16.—(1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with any prohibition or requirement contained in—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order, or
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
commits an offence.
 
(2) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or (6)(b), 12(1), 13(2) or (6) or 15(3), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
commits an offence.
 
(3) A person who notifies to the police, in purported compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
any information which the person knows to be false, commits an offence.
 
(4) As regards an offence under sub-paragraph (2), so far as it relates to non-compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
a person commits such an offence on the first day on which the person first fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the provision mentioned in paragraph (a) or (as the case may be) the requirement mentioned in paragraph (b), and continues to commit it throughout any period during which the failure continues.
 
(5) But a person must not be prosecuted under sub-paragraph (2) more than once in respect of the same failure.
 
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this paragraph is liable—
 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years;
 
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
 
(7) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this paragraph, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make an order for conditional discharge in respect of the offence.
 
CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT WITHIN UK
 
17.—(1) The Department may by order amend paragraph 16(1) so as to add to or remove from the list of orders in that paragraph any relevant UK order.
 
(2) "Relevant UK order" means an order under the law of Scotland or England and Wales which appears to the Department to be equivalent or similar to—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION TO RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
18.—(1) This paragraph applies to information notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1).
 
(2) The Chief Constable may, for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Schedule, supply information to which this paragraph applies to—
 
(a) a relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners,
 
(d) a person providing services to a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with a relevant function,
 
for use for the purpose of verifying the information.
 
(3) In relation to information supplied to any person under sub-paragraph (2), the reference to verifying the information is a reference to—
 
(a) checking its accuracy by comparing it with information held—
 
(i) in the case of a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners by that department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(ii) in the case of a person within sub-paragraph (2)(d), by that person in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there, and
 
(b) compiling a report of that comparison.
 
(4) Subject to sub-paragraph (5), the supply of information under this paragraph is to be taken not to breach any restriction on the disclosure of information (however arising).
 
(5) This paragraph does not authorise the doing of anything that contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998.
 
(6) This paragraph does not affect any power to supply information that exists apart from this paragraph.
 
(7) In this paragraph—
 
"the Commissioners" means Her Majesty’s Commissioners for Revenue and Customs;
 
"relevant Northern Ireland department" means the Department for Employment and Learning, the Department of the Environment, the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety or the Department for Social Development;
 
"relevant function" means—
 
(a) in relation to the Department for Employment and Learning, a function relating to employment or training,
 
(b) in relation to the Department of the Environment, a function under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981;
 
(c) in relation to the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, a function relating to health or social care;
 
(d) in relation to the Department for Social Development, a function relating to social security or child support;
 
(e) in relation to the Secretary of State, a function relating to passports or the Gangmasters Licensing Authority;
 
(f) in relation to the Commissioners, any of their functions.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION BY RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
19.—(1) A report compiled under paragraph 18 may be supplied to the Chief Constable by—
 
(a) the relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners, or
 
(d) a person within paragraph 18(2)(d).
 
(2) Such a report may contain any information held—
 
(a) by the relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(b) by a person within paragraph 18(2)(d) in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there.
 
(3) Where such a report contains information within sub-paragraph (2), the Chief Constable—
 
(a) may retain the information, whether or not used for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Part, and
 
(b) may use the information for any purpose related to the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences (whether or not under this Part), but for no other purpose.
 
(4) Sub-paragraphs (4) to (7) of paragraph 18 apply in relation to this paragraph as they apply in relation to paragraph 18.
 
INFORMATION ABOUT RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF OFFENDER
 
20.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements who is—
 
(a) serving a custodial sentence; or
 
(b) detained in a hospital.
 
(2) The Department may by regulations make provision requiring the person who is responsible for such an offender to give notice to specified persons—
 
(a) of the fact that that person has become responsible for the offender; and
 
(b) of any occasion when—
 
(i) the offender is released, or
 
(ii) a different person is to become responsible for the offender.
 
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) "specified persons" means persons specified, or of a description specified, in the regulations.
 
(4) The regulations may make provision for determining who is to be taken for the purposes of this paragraph as being responsible for an offender.
 
POWER OF ENTRY AND SEARCH OF OFFENDER’S HOME ADDRESS
 
21.—(1) If, on an application made by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above, a lay magistrate is satisfied that the requirements in sub-paragraph (2) are met in relation to any premises, the lay magistrate may issue a warrant authorising a constable—
 
(a) to enter the premises for the purpose of assessing the risks posed by the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates; and
 
(b) to search the premises for that purpose.
 
(2) The requirements are—
 
(a) that the address of each set of premises specified in the application is an address falling within sub-paragraph (3);
 
(b) that the offender is not one to whom sub-paragraph (4) applies;
 
(c) that it is necessary for a constable to enter and search the premises for the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a); and
 
(d) that on at least two occasions a constable has sought entry to the premises in order to search them for that purpose and has been unable to obtain entry for that purpose.
 
(3) An address falls within this sub-paragraph if—
 
(a) it is the address which was last notified in accordance with this Schedule by the offender to the police as the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies to an offender if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) A warrant issued under this paragraph must specify the one or more sets of premises to which it relates.
 
(6) The warrant may authorise the constable executing it to use reasonable force if necessary to enter and search the premises.
 
(7) The warrant may authorise entry to and search of premises on more than one occasion if, on the application, the lay magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary to authorise multiple entries in order to achieve the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
 
(8) Where a warrant issued under this paragraph authorises multiple entries, the number of entries authorised may be unlimited or limited to a maximum.
 
(9) In this paragraph a reference to the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates is a reference to the offender—
 
(a) who has in accordance with this Schedule notified the police that the premises specified in the warrant are the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
GUIDANCE
 
22.—(1) The Department must issue guidance to the Chief Constable in relation to the exercise of the powers of the Chief Constable under this Schedule.
 
(2) The Department may, from time to time, revise the guidance issued under sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) The Department must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this paragraph to be published in a way the Department considers appropriate.
 
INTERPRETATION OF THIS SCHEDULE
 
23.—(1) In this Schedule—
 
"cautioned" means cautioned after the person concerned has admitted the offence;
 
"custodial sentence" means—
 
(a) a sentence of imprisonment,
 
(b) a sentence of detention in a young offenders centre;
 
(c) a sentence of detention under Article 13(4)(b) or 14(5) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008;
 
(d) a sentence of detention under Article 45 of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998;
 
(e) an order under Article 39A of that Order sending the offender to a juvenile justice centre;
 
(f) any other sentence under which a person is detained in custody;
 
"detained in a hospital" means detained in a hospital under Part 3 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
"home address" has the meaning given by paragraph 10(4);
 
"interim slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 7;
 
"slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 1 or 2;
 
"slavery or human trafficking offence" has the meaning given by paragraph 1(4).
 
(2) In this Schedule "passport" means—
 
(a) United Kingdom passport within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
 
(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.
 
(3) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a conviction for an offence in respect of which an order for conditional discharge is made, despite—
 
(a) Article 6(1) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (conviction with conditional discharge deemed not to be a conviction), or
 
(b) section 14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (equivalent provision for England and Wales).
 
(4) Sub-paragraph (3) applies only to convictions after this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(5) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a finding of a court in summary proceedings that the accused did the act charged, where the court makes an order under—
 
(a) Article 44(4) of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
 
(b) section 37(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983, or
 
(c) section 58(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
 
(hospital and guardianship orders).
 
(6) In relation to an offence under the law of Scotland, a reference in this Schedule to a person being found not guilty by reason of insanity is to be treated as a reference to a person being acquitted by reason of the special defence in section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
 
(7) References in this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are to be read in accordance with paragraph 9.
 
(8) In this Schedule, a reference to a finding that a person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence includes a finding that a person is under a disability or insane and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence.
 
(9) A person’s age is to be treated for the purposes of this Schedule as being that which it appears to the court to be after considering any available evidence.".

No 62: After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 3
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
PART 1
 
MAKING AND EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON DEALING WITH DEFENDANT
 
1.—(1) A court may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") where it deals with the defendant in respect of—
 
(a) a conviction for a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a finding that the defendant is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity, or
 
(c) a finding that the defendant is unfit to plead and has done the act charged against the defendant in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), convictions and findings include those taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(4) In this Schedule a "slavery or human trafficking offence" means any of the following offences—
 
(a) an offence under section 145 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(b) an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (trafficking for sexual exploitation);
 
(c) an offence under section 62 of that Act (committing offence with intent to commit relevant sexual offence), where the relevant sexual offence the person in question intended to commit was an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of that Act;
 
(d) an offence under section 22 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(e) an offence under section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (trafficking for exploitation);
 
(f) an offence under section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(g) an offence under section 47 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(h) an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D of this Act;
 
(i) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence listed above;
 
(j) an offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of an offence so listed;
 
(k) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting) where the offence (or one of the offences) which the person in question intends or believes would be committed is an offence so listed.
 
(5) The Department may by order amend sub-paragraph (4).
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON APPLICATION
 
2.—(1) A court of summary jurisdiction may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") on an application by the Chief Constable.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) the defendant is a relevant offender (see paragraph 3), and
 
(b) since the defendant first became a relevant offender, the defendant has acted in a way which means that the condition in sub-paragraph (3) is met.
 
(3) The condition is that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(4) The Chief Constable may make an application under this paragraph only in respect of a person—
 
(a) who lives in Northern Ireland, or
 
(b) who the Chief Constable believes is in, or is intending to come to, Northern Ireland.
 
(5) An application under this paragraph is to be made by complaint.
 
(6) The acts of the defendant which may be relied on for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b) include acts taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(7) The Department may by order provide that an application under this paragraph may be made by a person or body specified in the order (as well as by the Chief Constable); and such an order may make such consequential amendments to this Schedule as the Department thinks necessary or expedient.
 
MEANING OF "RELEVANT OFFENDER"
 
3.—(1) A person is a "relevant offender" for the purposes of paragraph 2 if sub- paragraph (2) or (3) applies to the person.
 
(2) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a court has made a finding that the person is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if, under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of an equivalent offence (whether or not the person has been punished for it),
 
(b) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of an equivalent offence.
 
(4) An "equivalent offence" means an act which—
 
(a) constituted an offence under the law of the country concerned, and
 
(b) would have constituted a slavery or human trafficking offence under the law of Northern Ireland if it had been done in Northern Ireland, or by a UK national, or as regards the United Kingdom.
 
(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) an act punishable under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom constitutes an offence under that law, however it is described in that law.
 
(6) On an application under paragraph 2 where sub-paragraph (3) is alleged to apply to the defendant, the condition in sub-paragraph (4)(b) is to be taken as met unless—
 
(a) not later than provided by magistrates’ court rules, the defendant serves on the Chief Constable a notice which states that in the defendant’s opinion the condition is not met, shows the grounds for that opinion, and requires the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met, or
 
(b) the court permits the defendant to require the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met without service of such a notice.
 
(7) References in this paragraph to convictions, findings and cautions include those taking place before this paragraph comes into operation.
 
EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
4.—(1) A slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(2) The only prohibitions or requirements that may be included in the order are those which the court is satisfied are necessary for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) Subject to paragraph 5(1), a prohibition or requirement contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order has effect—
 
(a) for a fixed period, specified in the order, of at least 5 years, or
 
(b) until further order.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may specify that some of its prohibitions or requirements have effect until further order and some for a fixed period;
 
(b) may specify different periods for different prohibitions or requirements.
 
(5) If a court makes a slavery and trafficking prevention order in relation to a person who is already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.
 
PROHIBITIONS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL
 
5.—(1) A prohibition on foreign travel contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order must be for a fixed period of not more than 5 years.
 
(2) A "prohibition on foreign travel" means—
 
(a) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom named or described in the order,
 
(b) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom other than a country named or described in the order, or
 
(c) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) Sub-paragraph (1) does not prevent a prohibition on foreign travel from being extended for a further period (of no more than 5 years each time) under paragraph 6.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order that contains a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c) must require the defendant to surrender all of the defendant’s passports at a police station specified in the order—
 
(a) on or before the date when the prohibition takes effect, or
 
(b) within a period specified in the order.
 
(5) Any passports surrendered must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the person ceases to be subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order containing a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c).
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply in relation to—
 
(a) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom if the passport has been returned to those authorities;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of an international organisation if the passport has been returned to that organisation.
 
VARIATION, RENEWAL AND DISCHARGE
 
6.—(1) A person within sub-paragraph (2) may apply to the appropriate court for an order varying, renewing or discharging a slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(2) The persons are—
 
(a) the defendant;
 
(b) the Chief Constable.
 
(3) On the application the court, after hearing—
 
(a) the person making the application, and
 
(b) the other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) (if that person wishes to be heard),
 
may make any order varying, renewing or discharging the slavery and trafficking prevention order that the court considers appropriate.
 
(4) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions or requirements on the defendant, only if the court is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to renew or vary the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(5) Any renewed or varied order may contain only those prohibitions or requirements which the court is satisfied are necessary for that purpose.
 
(6) The court must not discharge an order before the end of 5 years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and the Chief Constable.
 
(7) Sub-paragraph (6) does not apply to an order containing a prohibition on foreign travel and no other prohibitions.
 
(8) In this paragraph "the appropriate court" means—
 
(a) where the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal made the slavery and trafficking prevention order, the Crown Court;
 
(b) in any other case, a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
(9) An application under sub-paragraph (1) may be made—
 
(a) where the appropriate court is the Crown Court, in accordance with Crown Court rules;
 
(b) in any other case, by complaint.
 
INTERIM SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
7.—(1) This paragraph applies where an application under paragraph 2 ("the main application") has not been determined.
 
(2) An application for an "interim slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or
 
(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.
 
(3) The court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(4) An interim slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(5) The order—
 
(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;
 
(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.
 
(6) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.
 
APPEALS
 
8.—(1) A defendant may appeal against the making of a slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(a), as if the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence;
 
(b) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(b) or (c), as if the defendant had been convicted of the offence and the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for that offence;
 
(c) where the order was made on an application under paragraph 2, to the county court.
 
(2) A defendant may appeal to the county court against the making of an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(3) A defendant may appeal against the making of an order under paragraph 6, or the refusal to make such an order—
 
(a) where the application for such an order was made to the Crown Court, to the Court of Appeal;
 
(b) in any other case, to the county court.
 
(4) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c), (2) or (3)(b), the county court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.
 
(5) Any order made by the county court on an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c) or (2) is for the purposes of paragraph 6(8) or 7(6) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought.
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply to an order directing that an application be reheard by a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
PART 2
 
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
OFFENDER SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
9.—(1) References in the following provisions of this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are references to an offender who is for the time being subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order which is in effect under this Schedule.
 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) has effect subject to paragraph 12(7) (which excludes from paragraph 12 an offender subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order).
 
INITIAL NOTIFICATION
 
10.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must notify the required information to the police within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which the slavery and trafficking prevention order or the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order comes into force in relation to the offender ("the relevant date").
 
(2) The "required information" is the following information about the offender—
 
(a) date of birth;
 
(b) national insurance number;
 
(c) name on the relevant date or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(d) home address on the relevant date;
 
(e) name on the date on which the notification is given or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(f) home address on the date on which the notification is given;
 
(g) the address of any other premises in the United Kingdom at which on that date the offender regularly resides or stays;
 
(h) any information prescribed by regulations made by the Department.
 
(3) When determining the period of 3 days mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), there is to be disregarded any time when the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(4) In this Part "home address" means in relation to the offender—
 
(a) the address of the offender’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or
 
(b) if the offender has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the offender can regularly be found or, if there is more than one such place, such one of them as the offender selects.
 
NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES
 
11.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which any notifiable event occurs, notify to the police—
 
(a) the required new information, and
 
(b) the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2).
 
(2) A "notifiable event" means—
 
(a) the use by the offender of a name which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(b) any change of the offender’s home address;
 
(c) the expiry of any qualifying period during which the offender has resided or stayed at any premises in the United Kingdom the address of which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(d) any prescribed change of circumstances; or
 
(e) the release of the offender from custody pursuant to an order of a court or from a custodial sentence or detention in a hospital.
 
(3) The "required new information" is—
 
(a) the name referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(a),
 
(b) the new home address (see sub-paragraph (2)(b)),
 
(c) the address of the premises referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(c),
 
(d) the prescribed details, or
 
(e) the fact that the offender has been released as mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(e),
 
as the case may be.
 
(4) A notification under sub-paragraph (1) may be given before the notifiable event occurs, but in that case the offender must also specify the date when the event is expected to occur.
 
(5) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates occurs more than 2 days before the date specified, the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1).
 
(6) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates has not occurred by the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified—
 
(a) the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1), and
 
(b) the offender must, within the period of 6 days beginning with the date specified, notify to the police the fact that the event did not occur within the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified.
 
(7) Paragraph 10(3) applies to the determination of—
 
(a) any period of 3 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), or
 
(b) any period of 6 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (6),
 
as it applies to the determination of the period of 3 days mentioned in paragraph 10(1).
 
(8) In this paragraph—
 
(a) "prescribed change of circumstances" means any change—
 
(i) occurring in relation to any matter in respect of which information is required to be notified by virtue of paragraph 10(2)(h), and
 
(ii) of a description prescribed by regulations made by the Department;
 
(b) "the prescribed details", in relation to a prescribed change of circumstances, means such details of the change as may be so prescribed.
 
(9) In this paragraph "qualifying period" means—
 
(a) a period of 7 days, or
 
(b) two or more periods, in any period of 12 months, which taken together amount to 7 days.
 
PERIODIC NOTIFICATION
 
12.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the applicable period after each notification date, notify to the police the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2), unless the offender has already given a notification under paragraph 11(1) within that period.
 
(2) A "notification date" means, in relation to the offender, the date of any notification given by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) Where the applicable period would (apart from this paragraph) end while sub-paragraph (4) applies, that period is to be treated as continuing until the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which sub-paragraph (4) first ceases to apply.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court,
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence,
 
(c) detained in a hospital, or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) In this paragraph "the applicable period" means—
 
(a) in any case where sub-paragraph (6) applies, such period as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Department, and
 
(b) in any other case, the period of one year.
 
(6) This sub-paragraph applies if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1) was the address or location of such a place as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(b).
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph applies to an offender who is subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
ABSENCE FROM NOTIFIED RESIDENCE
 
13.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements at any time if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1) was an address in Northern Ireland such as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(a) (sole or main residence).
 
(2) If the offender intends to be absent from that home address for a period of more than 3 days ("the relevant period"), the offender must, not less than 12 hours before leaving that home address, notify to the police the information set out in sub-paragraph (3).
 
(3) The information is—
 
(a) the date on which the offender will leave that home address;
 
(b) such details as the offender holds about—
 
(i) the offender’s travel arrangements during the relevant period;
 
(ii) the offender’s accommodation arrangements during that period;
 
(iii) the offender’s date of return to that address.
 
(4) In this paragraph—
 
"travel arrangements" include, in particular, the means of transport to be used and the dates of travel,
 
"accommodation arrangements" include, in particular, the address of any accommodation at which the relevant offender will spend the night during the relevant period and the nature of that accommodation.
 
(5) Where—
 
(a) an offender has given a notification under sub-paragraph (2), and
 
(b) at any time before that mentioned in that sub-paragraph, the information notified becomes inaccurate or incomplete,
 
the offender must give a further notification under sub-paragraph (2).
 
(6) Where an offender—
 
(a) has notified a date of return to the offender’s home address, but
 
(b) returns to that home address on a date other than that notified,
 
the offender must notify the date of the offender’s actual return to the police within 3 days of the actual return.
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph requires an offender to notify any information which falls to be notified in accordance with a requirement imposed by regulations under paragraph 14.
 
(8) In calculating the relevant period for the purposes of this paragraph there is to be disregarded—
 
(a) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, an address of the kind mentioned in paragraph 10(2)(g) notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1);
 
(b) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, any premises, if his stay at those premises would give rise to a requirement to notify the address of those premises under paragraph 11(2)(c).
 
TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM
 
14.—(1) The Department may by regulations make provision with respect to offenders subject to notification requirements, or any description of such offenders—
 
(a) requiring such persons, before they leave the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (2);
 
(b) requiring such persons, if they subsequently return to the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (3).
 
(2) A notification under this paragraph must disclose—
 
(a) the date on which the offender proposes to leave the United Kingdom;
 
(b) the country (or, if there is more than one, the first country) to which the offender proposes to travel and the proposed point of arrival (determined in accordance with the regulations) in that country;
 
(c) any other information prescribed by the regulations which the offender holds about the offender’s departure from or return to the United Kingdom, or about the offender’s movements while outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) A notification under this sub-paragraph must disclose any information prescribed by the regulations about the offender’s return to the United Kingdom.
 
METHOD OF NOTIFICATION AND RELATED MATTERS
 
15.—(1) An offender gives a notification to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6) by—
 
(a) attending at any police station in Northern Ireland prescribed by regulations under section 87(1)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and
 
(b) giving an oral notification to any police officer, or to any person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station.
 
(2) Any notification given in accordance with this paragraph must be acknowledged; and the acknowledgement must be—
 
(a) in writing, and
 
(b) in such form as the Department may direct.
 
(3) Where a notification is given under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), the offender must, if requested to do so by the police officer or other person mentioned in paragraph (1)(b), allow that officer or person to—
 
(a) take the offender’s fingerprints,
 
(b) photograph any part of the offender, or
 
(c) do both of those things,
 
in order to verify the offender's identity.
 
(4) Fingerprints taken from a person under this paragraph (and any copies of those fingerprints) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(5) Photographs taken of any part of the offender under this paragraph (and any copies of such photographs) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(6) In this paragraph "photograph" includes any process by means of which an image may be produced.
 
PART 3
 
SUPPLEMENTARY
 
OFFENCES
 
16.—(1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with any prohibition or requirement contained in—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order, or
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
commits an offence.
 
(2) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or (6)(b), 12(1), 13(2) or (6) or 15(3), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
commits an offence.
 
(3) A person who notifies to the police, in purported compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
any information which the person knows to be false, commits an offence.
 
(4) As regards an offence under sub-paragraph (2), so far as it relates to non-compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
a person commits such an offence on the first day on which the person first fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the provision mentioned in paragraph (a) or (as the case may be) the requirement mentioned in paragraph (b), and continues to commit it throughout any period during which the failure continues.
 
(5) But a person must not be prosecuted under sub-paragraph (2) more than once in respect of the same failure.
 
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this paragraph is liable—
 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years;
 
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
 
(7) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this paragraph, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make an order for conditional discharge in respect of the offence.
 
CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT WITHIN UK
 
17.—(1) The Department may by order amend paragraph 16(1) so as to add to or remove from the list of orders in that paragraph any relevant UK order.
 
(2) "Relevant UK order" means an order under the law of Scotland or England and Wales which appears to the Department to be equivalent or similar to—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION TO RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
18.—(1) This paragraph applies to information notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1).
 
(2) The Chief Constable may, for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Schedule, supply information to which this paragraph applies to—
 
(a) a relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners,
 
(d) a person providing services to a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with a relevant function,
 
for use for the purpose of verifying the information.
 
(3) In relation to information supplied to any person under sub-paragraph (2), the reference to verifying the information is a reference to—
 
(a) checking its accuracy by comparing it with information held—
 
(i) in the case of a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners by that department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(ii) in the case of a person within sub-paragraph (2)(d), by that person in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there, and
 
(b) compiling a report of that comparison.
 
(4) Subject to sub-paragraph (5), the supply of information under this paragraph is to be taken not to breach any restriction on the disclosure of information (however arising).
 
(5) This paragraph does not authorise the doing of anything that contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998.
 
(6) This paragraph does not affect any power to supply information that exists apart from this paragraph.
 
(7) In this paragraph—
 
"the Commissioners" means Her Majesty’s Commissioners for Revenue and Customs;
 
"relevant Northern Ireland department" means the Department for Employment and Learning, the Department of the Environment, the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety or the Department for Social Development;
 
"relevant function" means—
 
(a) in relation to the Department for Employment and Learning, a function relating to employment or training,
 
(b) in relation to the Department of the Environment, a function under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981;
 
(c) in relation to the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, a function relating to health or social care;
 
(d) in relation to the Department for Social Development, a function relating to social security or child support;
 
(e) in relation to the Secretary of State, a function relating to passports or the Gangmasters Licensing Authority;
 
(f) in relation to the Commissioners, any of their functions.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION BY RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
19.—(1) A report compiled under paragraph 18 may be supplied to the Chief Constable by—
 
(a) the relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners, or
 
(d) a person within paragraph 18(2)(d).
 
(2) Such a report may contain any information held—
 
(a) by the relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(b) by a person within paragraph 18(2)(d) in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there.
 
(3) Where such a report contains information within sub-paragraph (2), the Chief Constable—
 
(a) may retain the information, whether or not used for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Part, and
 
(b) may use the information for any purpose related to the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences (whether or not under this Part), but for no other purpose.
 
(4) Sub-paragraphs (4) to (7) of paragraph 18 apply in relation to this paragraph as they apply in relation to paragraph 18.
 
INFORMATION ABOUT RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF OFFENDER
 
20.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements who is—
 
(a) serving a custodial sentence; or
 
(b) detained in a hospital.
 
(2) The Department may by regulations make provision requiring the person who is responsible for such an offender to give notice to specified persons—
 
(a) of the fact that that person has become responsible for the offender; and
 
(b) of any occasion when—
 
(i) the offender is released, or
 
(ii) a different person is to become responsible for the offender.
 
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) "specified persons" means persons specified, or of a description specified, in the regulations.
 
(4) The regulations may make provision for determining who is to be taken for the purposes of this paragraph as being responsible for an offender.
 
POWER OF ENTRY AND SEARCH OF OFFENDER’S HOME ADDRESS
 
21.—(1) If, on an application made by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above, a lay magistrate is satisfied that the requirements in sub-paragraph (2) are met in relation to any premises, the lay magistrate may issue a warrant authorising a constable—
 
(a) to enter the premises for the purpose of assessing the risks posed by the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates; and
 
(b) to search the premises for that purpose.
 
(2) The requirements are—
 
(a) that the address of each set of premises specified in the application is an address falling within sub-paragraph (3);
 
(b) that the offender is not one to whom sub-paragraph (4) applies;
 
(c) that it is necessary for a constable to enter and search the premises for the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a); and
 
(d) that on at least two occasions a constable has sought entry to the premises in order to search them for that purpose and has been unable to obtain entry for that purpose.
 
(3) An address falls within this sub-paragraph if—
 
(a) it is the address which was last notified in accordance with this Schedule by the offender to the police as the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies to an offender if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) A warrant issued under this paragraph must specify the one or more sets of premises to which it relates.
 
(6) The warrant may authorise the constable executing it to use reasonable force if necessary to enter and search the premises.
 
(7) The warrant may authorise entry to and search of premises on more than one occasion if, on the application, the lay magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary to authorise multiple entries in order to achieve the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
 
(8) Where a warrant issued under this paragraph authorises multiple entries, the number of entries authorised may be unlimited or limited to a maximum.
 
(9) In this paragraph a reference to the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates is a reference to the offender—
 
(a) who has in accordance with this Schedule notified the police that the premises specified in the warrant are the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
GUIDANCE
 
22.—(1) The Department must issue guidance to the Chief Constable in relation to the exercise of the powers of the Chief Constable under this Schedule.
 
(2) The Department may, from time to time, revise the guidance issued under sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) The Department must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this paragraph to be published in a way the Department considers appropriate.
 
INTERPRETATION OF THIS SCHEDULE
 
23.—(1) In this Schedule—
 
"cautioned" means cautioned after the person concerned has admitted the offence;
 
"custodial sentence" means—
 
(a) a sentence of imprisonment,
 
(b) a sentence of detention in a young offenders centre;
 
(c) a sentence of detention under Article 13(4)(b) or 14(5) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008;
 
(d) a sentence of detention under Article 45 of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998;
 
(e) an order under Article 39A of that Order sending the offender to a juvenile justice centre;
 
(f) any other sentence under which a person is detained in custody;
 
"detained in a hospital" means detained in a hospital under Part 3 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
"home address" has the meaning given by paragraph 10(4);
 
"interim slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 7;
 
"slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 1 or 2;
 
"slavery or human trafficking offence" has the meaning given by paragraph 1(4).
 
(2) In this Schedule "passport" means—
 
(a) United Kingdom passport within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
 
(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.
 
(3) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a conviction for an offence in respect of which an order for conditional discharge is made, despite—
 
(a) Article 6(1) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (conviction with conditional discharge deemed not to be a conviction), or
 
(b) section 14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (equivalent provision for England and Wales).
 
(4) Sub-paragraph (3) applies only to convictions after this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(5) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a finding of a court in summary proceedings that the accused did the act charged, where the court makes an order under—
 
(a) Article 44(4) of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
 
(b) section 37(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983, or
 
(c) section 58(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
 
(hospital and guardianship orders).
 
(6) In relation to an offence under the law of Scotland, a reference in this Schedule to a person being found not guilty by reason of insanity is to be treated as a reference to a person being acquitted by reason of the special defence in section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
 
(7) References in this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are to be read in accordance with paragraph 9.
 
(8) In this Schedule, a reference to a finding that a person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence includes a finding that a person is under a disability or insane and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence.
 
(9) A person’s age is to be treated for the purposes of this Schedule as being that which it appears to the court to be after considering any available evidence.".

No 62: After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 3
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
PART 1
 
MAKING AND EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON DEALING WITH DEFENDANT
 
1.—(1) A court may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") where it deals with the defendant in respect of—
 
(a) a conviction for a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a finding that the defendant is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity, or
 
(c) a finding that the defendant is unfit to plead and has done the act charged against the defendant in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), convictions and findings include those taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(4) In this Schedule a "slavery or human trafficking offence" means any of the following offences—
 
(a) an offence under section 145 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(b) an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (trafficking for sexual exploitation);
 
(c) an offence under section 62 of that Act (committing offence with intent to commit relevant sexual offence), where the relevant sexual offence the person in question intended to commit was an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of that Act;
 
(d) an offence under section 22 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(e) an offence under section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (trafficking for exploitation);
 
(f) an offence under section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(g) an offence under section 47 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(h) an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D of this Act;
 
(i) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence listed above;
 
(j) an offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of an offence so listed;
 
(k) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting) where the offence (or one of the offences) which the person in question intends or believes would be committed is an offence so listed.
 
(5) The Department may by order amend sub-paragraph (4).
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON APPLICATION
 
2.—(1) A court of summary jurisdiction may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") on an application by the Chief Constable.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) the defendant is a relevant offender (see paragraph 3), and
 
(b) since the defendant first became a relevant offender, the defendant has acted in a way which means that the condition in sub-paragraph (3) is met.
 
(3) The condition is that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(4) The Chief Constable may make an application under this paragraph only in respect of a person—
 
(a) who lives in Northern Ireland, or
 
(b) who the Chief Constable believes is in, or is intending to come to, Northern Ireland.
 
(5) An application under this paragraph is to be made by complaint.
 
(6) The acts of the defendant which may be relied on for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b) include acts taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(7) The Department may by order provide that an application under this paragraph may be made by a person or body specified in the order (as well as by the Chief Constable); and such an order may make such consequential amendments to this Schedule as the Department thinks necessary or expedient.
 
MEANING OF "RELEVANT OFFENDER"
 
3.—(1) A person is a "relevant offender" for the purposes of paragraph 2 if sub- paragraph (2) or (3) applies to the person.
 
(2) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a court has made a finding that the person is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if, under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of an equivalent offence (whether or not the person has been punished for it),
 
(b) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of an equivalent offence.
 
(4) An "equivalent offence" means an act which—
 
(a) constituted an offence under the law of the country concerned, and
 
(b) would have constituted a slavery or human trafficking offence under the law of Northern Ireland if it had been done in Northern Ireland, or by a UK national, or as regards the United Kingdom.
 
(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) an act punishable under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom constitutes an offence under that law, however it is described in that law.
 
(6) On an application under paragraph 2 where sub-paragraph (3) is alleged to apply to the defendant, the condition in sub-paragraph (4)(b) is to be taken as met unless—
 
(a) not later than provided by magistrates’ court rules, the defendant serves on the Chief Constable a notice which states that in the defendant’s opinion the condition is not met, shows the grounds for that opinion, and requires the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met, or
 
(b) the court permits the defendant to require the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met without service of such a notice.
 
(7) References in this paragraph to convictions, findings and cautions include those taking place before this paragraph comes into operation.
 
EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
4.—(1) A slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(2) The only prohibitions or requirements that may be included in the order are those which the court is satisfied are necessary for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) Subject to paragraph 5(1), a prohibition or requirement contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order has effect—
 
(a) for a fixed period, specified in the order, of at least 5 years, or
 
(b) until further order.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may specify that some of its prohibitions or requirements have effect until further order and some for a fixed period;
 
(b) may specify different periods for different prohibitions or requirements.
 
(5) If a court makes a slavery and trafficking prevention order in relation to a person who is already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.
 
PROHIBITIONS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL
 
5.—(1) A prohibition on foreign travel contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order must be for a fixed period of not more than 5 years.
 
(2) A "prohibition on foreign travel" means—
 
(a) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom named or described in the order,
 
(b) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom other than a country named or described in the order, or
 
(c) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) Sub-paragraph (1) does not prevent a prohibition on foreign travel from being extended for a further period (of no more than 5 years each time) under paragraph 6.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order that contains a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c) must require the defendant to surrender all of the defendant’s passports at a police station specified in the order—
 
(a) on or before the date when the prohibition takes effect, or
 
(b) within a period specified in the order.
 
(5) Any passports surrendered must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the person ceases to be subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order containing a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c).
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply in relation to—
 
(a) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom if the passport has been returned to those authorities;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of an international organisation if the passport has been returned to that organisation.
 
VARIATION, RENEWAL AND DISCHARGE
 
6.—(1) A person within sub-paragraph (2) may apply to the appropriate court for an order varying, renewing or discharging a slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(2) The persons are—
 
(a) the defendant;
 
(b) the Chief Constable.
 
(3) On the application the court, after hearing—
 
(a) the person making the application, and
 
(b) the other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) (if that person wishes to be heard),
 
may make any order varying, renewing or discharging the slavery and trafficking prevention order that the court considers appropriate.
 
(4) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions or requirements on the defendant, only if the court is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to renew or vary the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(5) Any renewed or varied order may contain only those prohibitions or requirements which the court is satisfied are necessary for that purpose.
 
(6) The court must not discharge an order before the end of 5 years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and the Chief Constable.
 
(7) Sub-paragraph (6) does not apply to an order containing a prohibition on foreign travel and no other prohibitions.
 
(8) In this paragraph "the appropriate court" means—
 
(a) where the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal made the slavery and trafficking prevention order, the Crown Court;
 
(b) in any other case, a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
(9) An application under sub-paragraph (1) may be made—
 
(a) where the appropriate court is the Crown Court, in accordance with Crown Court rules;
 
(b) in any other case, by complaint.
 
INTERIM SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
7.—(1) This paragraph applies where an application under paragraph 2 ("the main application") has not been determined.
 
(2) An application for an "interim slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or
 
(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.
 
(3) The court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(4) An interim slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(5) The order—
 
(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;
 
(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.
 
(6) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.
 
APPEALS
 
8.—(1) A defendant may appeal against the making of a slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(a), as if the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence;
 
(b) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(b) or (c), as if the defendant had been convicted of the offence and the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for that offence;
 
(c) where the order was made on an application under paragraph 2, to the county court.
 
(2) A defendant may appeal to the county court against the making of an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(3) A defendant may appeal against the making of an order under paragraph 6, or the refusal to make such an order—
 
(a) where the application for such an order was made to the Crown Court, to the Court of Appeal;
 
(b) in any other case, to the county court.
 
(4) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c), (2) or (3)(b), the county court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.
 
(5) Any order made by the county court on an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c) or (2) is for the purposes of paragraph 6(8) or 7(6) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought.
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply to an order directing that an application be reheard by a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
PART 2
 
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
OFFENDER SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
9.—(1) References in the following provisions of this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are references to an offender who is for the time being subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order which is in effect under this Schedule.
 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) has effect subject to paragraph 12(7) (which excludes from paragraph 12 an offender subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order).
 
INITIAL NOTIFICATION
 
10.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must notify the required information to the police within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which the slavery and trafficking prevention order or the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order comes into force in relation to the offender ("the relevant date").
 
(2) The "required information" is the following information about the offender—
 
(a) date of birth;
 
(b) national insurance number;
 
(c) name on the relevant date or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(d) home address on the relevant date;
 
(e) name on the date on which the notification is given or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(f) home address on the date on which the notification is given;
 
(g) the address of any other premises in the United Kingdom at which on that date the offender regularly resides or stays;
 
(h) any information prescribed by regulations made by the Department.
 
(3) When determining the period of 3 days mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), there is to be disregarded any time when the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(4) In this Part "home address" means in relation to the offender—
 
(a) the address of the offender’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or
 
(b) if the offender has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the offender can regularly be found or, if there is more than one such place, such one of them as the offender selects.
 
NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES
 
11.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which any notifiable event occurs, notify to the police—
 
(a) the required new information, and
 
(b) the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2).
 
(2) A "notifiable event" means—
 
(a) the use by the offender of a name which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(b) any change of the offender’s home address;
 
(c) the expiry of any qualifying period during which the offender has resided or stayed at any premises in the United Kingdom the address of which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(d) any prescribed change of circumstances; or
 
(e) the release of the offender from custody pursuant to an order of a court or from a custodial sentence or detention in a hospital.
 
(3) The "required new information" is—
 
(a) the name referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(a),
 
(b) the new home address (see sub-paragraph (2)(b)),
 
(c) the address of the premises referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(c),
 
(d) the prescribed details, or
 
(e) the fact that the offender has been released as mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(e),
 
as the case may be.
 
(4) A notification under sub-paragraph (1) may be given before the notifiable event occurs, but in that case the offender must also specify the date when the event is expected to occur.
 
(5) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates occurs more than 2 days before the date specified, the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1).
 
(6) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates has not occurred by the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified—
 
(a) the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1), and
 
(b) the offender must, within the period of 6 days beginning with the date specified, notify to the police the fact that the event did not occur within the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified.
 
(7) Paragraph 10(3) applies to the determination of—
 
(a) any period of 3 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), or
 
(b) any period of 6 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (6),
 
as it applies to the determination of the period of 3 days mentioned in paragraph 10(1).
 
(8) In this paragraph—
 
(a) "prescribed change of circumstances" means any change—
 
(i) occurring in relation to any matter in respect of which information is required to be notified by virtue of paragraph 10(2)(h), and
 
(ii) of a description prescribed by regulations made by the Department;
 
(b) "the prescribed details", in relation to a prescribed change of circumstances, means such details of the change as may be so prescribed.
 
(9) In this paragraph "qualifying period" means—
 
(a) a period of 7 days, or
 
(b) two or more periods, in any period of 12 months, which taken together amount to 7 days.
 
PERIODIC NOTIFICATION
 
12.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the applicable period after each notification date, notify to the police the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2), unless the offender has already given a notification under paragraph 11(1) within that period.
 
(2) A "notification date" means, in relation to the offender, the date of any notification given by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) Where the applicable period would (apart from this paragraph) end while sub-paragraph (4) applies, that period is to be treated as continuing until the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which sub-paragraph (4) first ceases to apply.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court,
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence,
 
(c) detained in a hospital, or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) In this paragraph "the applicable period" means—
 
(a) in any case where sub-paragraph (6) applies, such period as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Department, and
 
(b) in any other case, the period of one year.
 
(6) This sub-paragraph applies if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1) was the address or location of such a place as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(b).
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph applies to an offender who is subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
ABSENCE FROM NOTIFIED RESIDENCE
 
13.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements at any time if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1) was an address in Northern Ireland such as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(a) (sole or main residence).
 
(2) If the offender intends to be absent from that home address for a period of more than 3 days ("the relevant period"), the offender must, not less than 12 hours before leaving that home address, notify to the police the information set out in sub-paragraph (3).
 
(3) The information is—
 
(a) the date on which the offender will leave that home address;
 
(b) such details as the offender holds about—
 
(i) the offender’s travel arrangements during the relevant period;
 
(ii) the offender’s accommodation arrangements during that period;
 
(iii) the offender’s date of return to that address.
 
(4) In this paragraph—
 
"travel arrangements" include, in particular, the means of transport to be used and the dates of travel,
 
"accommodation arrangements" include, in particular, the address of any accommodation at which the relevant offender will spend the night during the relevant period and the nature of that accommodation.
 
(5) Where—
 
(a) an offender has given a notification under sub-paragraph (2), and
 
(b) at any time before that mentioned in that sub-paragraph, the information notified becomes inaccurate or incomplete,
 
the offender must give a further notification under sub-paragraph (2).
 
(6) Where an offender—
 
(a) has notified a date of return to the offender’s home address, but
 
(b) returns to that home address on a date other than that notified,
 
the offender must notify the date of the offender’s actual return to the police within 3 days of the actual return.
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph requires an offender to notify any information which falls to be notified in accordance with a requirement imposed by regulations under paragraph 14.
 
(8) In calculating the relevant period for the purposes of this paragraph there is to be disregarded—
 
(a) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, an address of the kind mentioned in paragraph 10(2)(g) notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1);
 
(b) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, any premises, if his stay at those premises would give rise to a requirement to notify the address of those premises under paragraph 11(2)(c).
 
TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM
 
14.—(1) The Department may by regulations make provision with respect to offenders subject to notification requirements, or any description of such offenders—
 
(a) requiring such persons, before they leave the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (2);
 
(b) requiring such persons, if they subsequently return to the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (3).
 
(2) A notification under this paragraph must disclose—
 
(a) the date on which the offender proposes to leave the United Kingdom;
 
(b) the country (or, if there is more than one, the first country) to which the offender proposes to travel and the proposed point of arrival (determined in accordance with the regulations) in that country;
 
(c) any other information prescribed by the regulations which the offender holds about the offender’s departure from or return to the United Kingdom, or about the offender’s movements while outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) A notification under this sub-paragraph must disclose any information prescribed by the regulations about the offender’s return to the United Kingdom.
 
METHOD OF NOTIFICATION AND RELATED MATTERS
 
15.—(1) An offender gives a notification to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6) by—
 
(a) attending at any police station in Northern Ireland prescribed by regulations under section 87(1)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and
 
(b) giving an oral notification to any police officer, or to any person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station.
 
(2) Any notification given in accordance with this paragraph must be acknowledged; and the acknowledgement must be—
 
(a) in writing, and
 
(b) in such form as the Department may direct.
 
(3) Where a notification is given under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), the offender must, if requested to do so by the police officer or other person mentioned in paragraph (1)(b), allow that officer or person to—
 
(a) take the offender’s fingerprints,
 
(b) photograph any part of the offender, or
 
(c) do both of those things,
 
in order to verify the offender's identity.
 
(4) Fingerprints taken from a person under this paragraph (and any copies of those fingerprints) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(5) Photographs taken of any part of the offender under this paragraph (and any copies of such photographs) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(6) In this paragraph "photograph" includes any process by means of which an image may be produced.
 
PART 3
 
SUPPLEMENTARY
 
OFFENCES
 
16.—(1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with any prohibition or requirement contained in—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order, or
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
commits an offence.
 
(2) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or (6)(b), 12(1), 13(2) or (6) or 15(3), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
commits an offence.
 
(3) A person who notifies to the police, in purported compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
any information which the person knows to be false, commits an offence.
 
(4) As regards an offence under sub-paragraph (2), so far as it relates to non-compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
a person commits such an offence on the first day on which the person first fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the provision mentioned in paragraph (a) or (as the case may be) the requirement mentioned in paragraph (b), and continues to commit it throughout any period during which the failure continues.
 
(5) But a person must not be prosecuted under sub-paragraph (2) more than once in respect of the same failure.
 
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this paragraph is liable—
 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years;
 
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
 
(7) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this paragraph, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make an order for conditional discharge in respect of the offence.
 
CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT WITHIN UK
 
17.—(1) The Department may by order amend paragraph 16(1) so as to add to or remove from the list of orders in that paragraph any relevant UK order.
 
(2) "Relevant UK order" means an order under the law of Scotland or England and Wales which appears to the Department to be equivalent or similar to—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION TO RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
18.—(1) This paragraph applies to information notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1).
 
(2) The Chief Constable may, for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Schedule, supply information to which this paragraph applies to—
 
(a) a relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners,
 
(d) a person providing services to a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with a relevant function,
 
for use for the purpose of verifying the information.
 
(3) In relation to information supplied to any person under sub-paragraph (2), the reference to verifying the information is a reference to—
 
(a) checking its accuracy by comparing it with information held—
 
(i) in the case of a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners by that department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(ii) in the case of a person within sub-paragraph (2)(d), by that person in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there, and
 
(b) compiling a report of that comparison.
 
(4) Subject to sub-paragraph (5), the supply of information under this paragraph is to be taken not to breach any restriction on the disclosure of information (however arising).
 
(5) This paragraph does not authorise the doing of anything that contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998.
 
(6) This paragraph does not affect any power to supply information that exists apart from this paragraph.
 
(7) In this paragraph—
 
"the Commissioners" means Her Majesty’s Commissioners for Revenue and Customs;
 
"relevant Northern Ireland department" means the Department for Employment and Learning, the Department of the Environment, the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety or the Department for Social Development;
 
"relevant function" means—
 
(a) in relation to the Department for Employment and Learning, a function relating to employment or training,
 
(b) in relation to the Department of the Environment, a function under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981;
 
(c) in relation to the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, a function relating to health or social care;
 
(d) in relation to the Department for Social Development, a function relating to social security or child support;
 
(e) in relation to the Secretary of State, a function relating to passports or the Gangmasters Licensing Authority;
 
(f) in relation to the Commissioners, any of their functions.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION BY RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
19.—(1) A report compiled under paragraph 18 may be supplied to the Chief Constable by—
 
(a) the relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners, or
 
(d) a person within paragraph 18(2)(d).
 
(2) Such a report may contain any information held—
 
(a) by the relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(b) by a person within paragraph 18(2)(d) in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there.
 
(3) Where such a report contains information within sub-paragraph (2), the Chief Constable—
 
(a) may retain the information, whether or not used for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Part, and
 
(b) may use the information for any purpose related to the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences (whether or not under this Part), but for no other purpose.
 
(4) Sub-paragraphs (4) to (7) of paragraph 18 apply in relation to this paragraph as they apply in relation to paragraph 18.
 
INFORMATION ABOUT RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF OFFENDER
 
20.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements who is—
 
(a) serving a custodial sentence; or
 
(b) detained in a hospital.
 
(2) The Department may by regulations make provision requiring the person who is responsible for such an offender to give notice to specified persons—
 
(a) of the fact that that person has become responsible for the offender; and
 
(b) of any occasion when—
 
(i) the offender is released, or
 
(ii) a different person is to become responsible for the offender.
 
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) "specified persons" means persons specified, or of a description specified, in the regulations.
 
(4) The regulations may make provision for determining who is to be taken for the purposes of this paragraph as being responsible for an offender.
 
POWER OF ENTRY AND SEARCH OF OFFENDER’S HOME ADDRESS
 
21.—(1) If, on an application made by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above, a lay magistrate is satisfied that the requirements in sub-paragraph (2) are met in relation to any premises, the lay magistrate may issue a warrant authorising a constable—
 
(a) to enter the premises for the purpose of assessing the risks posed by the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates; and
 
(b) to search the premises for that purpose.
 
(2) The requirements are—
 
(a) that the address of each set of premises specified in the application is an address falling within sub-paragraph (3);
 
(b) that the offender is not one to whom sub-paragraph (4) applies;
 
(c) that it is necessary for a constable to enter and search the premises for the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a); and
 
(d) that on at least two occasions a constable has sought entry to the premises in order to search them for that purpose and has been unable to obtain entry for that purpose.
 
(3) An address falls within this sub-paragraph if—
 
(a) it is the address which was last notified in accordance with this Schedule by the offender to the police as the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies to an offender if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) A warrant issued under this paragraph must specify the one or more sets of premises to which it relates.
 
(6) The warrant may authorise the constable executing it to use reasonable force if necessary to enter and search the premises.
 
(7) The warrant may authorise entry to and search of premises on more than one occasion if, on the application, the lay magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary to authorise multiple entries in order to achieve the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
 
(8) Where a warrant issued under this paragraph authorises multiple entries, the number of entries authorised may be unlimited or limited to a maximum.
 
(9) In this paragraph a reference to the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates is a reference to the offender—
 
(a) who has in accordance with this Schedule notified the police that the premises specified in the warrant are the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
GUIDANCE
 
22.—(1) The Department must issue guidance to the Chief Constable in relation to the exercise of the powers of the Chief Constable under this Schedule.
 
(2) The Department may, from time to time, revise the guidance issued under sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) The Department must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this paragraph to be published in a way the Department considers appropriate.
 
INTERPRETATION OF THIS SCHEDULE
 
23.—(1) In this Schedule—
 
"cautioned" means cautioned after the person concerned has admitted the offence;
 
"custodial sentence" means—
 
(a) a sentence of imprisonment,
 
(b) a sentence of detention in a young offenders centre;
 
(c) a sentence of detention under Article 13(4)(b) or 14(5) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008;
 
(d) a sentence of detention under Article 45 of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998;
 
(e) an order under Article 39A of that Order sending the offender to a juvenile justice centre;
 
(f) any other sentence under which a person is detained in custody;
 
"detained in a hospital" means detained in a hospital under Part 3 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
"home address" has the meaning given by paragraph 10(4);
 
"interim slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 7;
 
"slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 1 or 2;
 
"slavery or human trafficking offence" has the meaning given by paragraph 1(4).
 
(2) In this Schedule "passport" means—
 
(a) United Kingdom passport within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
 
(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.
 
(3) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a conviction for an offence in respect of which an order for conditional discharge is made, despite—
 
(a) Article 6(1) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (conviction with conditional discharge deemed not to be a conviction), or
 
(b) section 14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (equivalent provision for England and Wales).
 
(4) Sub-paragraph (3) applies only to convictions after this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(5) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a finding of a court in summary proceedings that the accused did the act charged, where the court makes an order under—
 
(a) Article 44(4) of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
 
(b) section 37(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983, or
 
(c) section 58(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
 
(hospital and guardianship orders).
 
(6) In relation to an offence under the law of Scotland, a reference in this Schedule to a person being found not guilty by reason of insanity is to be treated as a reference to a person being acquitted by reason of the special defence in section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
 
(7) References in this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are to be read in accordance with paragraph 9.
 
(8) In this Schedule, a reference to a finding that a person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence includes a finding that a person is under a disability or insane and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence.
 
(9) A person’s age is to be treated for the purposes of this Schedule as being that which it appears to the court to be after considering any available evidence.".

No 62: After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 3
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
PART 1
 
MAKING AND EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON DEALING WITH DEFENDANT
 
1.—(1) A court may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") where it deals with the defendant in respect of—
 
(a) a conviction for a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a finding that the defendant is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity, or
 
(c) a finding that the defendant is unfit to plead and has done the act charged against the defendant in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), convictions and findings include those taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(4) In this Schedule a "slavery or human trafficking offence" means any of the following offences—
 
(a) an offence under section 145 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(b) an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (trafficking for sexual exploitation);
 
(c) an offence under section 62 of that Act (committing offence with intent to commit relevant sexual offence), where the relevant sexual offence the person in question intended to commit was an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of that Act;
 
(d) an offence under section 22 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(e) an offence under section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (trafficking for exploitation);
 
(f) an offence under section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(g) an offence under section 47 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(h) an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D of this Act;
 
(i) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence listed above;
 
(j) an offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of an offence so listed;
 
(k) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting) where the offence (or one of the offences) which the person in question intends or believes would be committed is an offence so listed.
 
(5) The Department may by order amend sub-paragraph (4).
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON APPLICATION
 
2.—(1) A court of summary jurisdiction may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") on an application by the Chief Constable.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) the defendant is a relevant offender (see paragraph 3), and
 
(b) since the defendant first became a relevant offender, the defendant has acted in a way which means that the condition in sub-paragraph (3) is met.
 
(3) The condition is that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(4) The Chief Constable may make an application under this paragraph only in respect of a person—
 
(a) who lives in Northern Ireland, or
 
(b) who the Chief Constable believes is in, or is intending to come to, Northern Ireland.
 
(5) An application under this paragraph is to be made by complaint.
 
(6) The acts of the defendant which may be relied on for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b) include acts taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(7) The Department may by order provide that an application under this paragraph may be made by a person or body specified in the order (as well as by the Chief Constable); and such an order may make such consequential amendments to this Schedule as the Department thinks necessary or expedient.
 
MEANING OF "RELEVANT OFFENDER"
 
3.—(1) A person is a "relevant offender" for the purposes of paragraph 2 if sub- paragraph (2) or (3) applies to the person.
 
(2) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a court has made a finding that the person is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if, under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of an equivalent offence (whether or not the person has been punished for it),
 
(b) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of an equivalent offence.
 
(4) An "equivalent offence" means an act which—
 
(a) constituted an offence under the law of the country concerned, and
 
(b) would have constituted a slavery or human trafficking offence under the law of Northern Ireland if it had been done in Northern Ireland, or by a UK national, or as regards the United Kingdom.
 
(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) an act punishable under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom constitutes an offence under that law, however it is described in that law.
 
(6) On an application under paragraph 2 where sub-paragraph (3) is alleged to apply to the defendant, the condition in sub-paragraph (4)(b) is to be taken as met unless—
 
(a) not later than provided by magistrates’ court rules, the defendant serves on the Chief Constable a notice which states that in the defendant’s opinion the condition is not met, shows the grounds for that opinion, and requires the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met, or
 
(b) the court permits the defendant to require the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met without service of such a notice.
 
(7) References in this paragraph to convictions, findings and cautions include those taking place before this paragraph comes into operation.
 
EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
4.—(1) A slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(2) The only prohibitions or requirements that may be included in the order are those which the court is satisfied are necessary for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) Subject to paragraph 5(1), a prohibition or requirement contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order has effect—
 
(a) for a fixed period, specified in the order, of at least 5 years, or
 
(b) until further order.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may specify that some of its prohibitions or requirements have effect until further order and some for a fixed period;
 
(b) may specify different periods for different prohibitions or requirements.
 
(5) If a court makes a slavery and trafficking prevention order in relation to a person who is already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.
 
PROHIBITIONS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL
 
5.—(1) A prohibition on foreign travel contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order must be for a fixed period of not more than 5 years.
 
(2) A "prohibition on foreign travel" means—
 
(a) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom named or described in the order,
 
(b) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom other than a country named or described in the order, or
 
(c) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) Sub-paragraph (1) does not prevent a prohibition on foreign travel from being extended for a further period (of no more than 5 years each time) under paragraph 6.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order that contains a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c) must require the defendant to surrender all of the defendant’s passports at a police station specified in the order—
 
(a) on or before the date when the prohibition takes effect, or
 
(b) within a period specified in the order.
 
(5) Any passports surrendered must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the person ceases to be subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order containing a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c).
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply in relation to—
 
(a) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom if the passport has been returned to those authorities;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of an international organisation if the passport has been returned to that organisation.
 
VARIATION, RENEWAL AND DISCHARGE
 
6.—(1) A person within sub-paragraph (2) may apply to the appropriate court for an order varying, renewing or discharging a slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(2) The persons are—
 
(a) the defendant;
 
(b) the Chief Constable.
 
(3) On the application the court, after hearing—
 
(a) the person making the application, and
 
(b) the other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) (if that person wishes to be heard),
 
may make any order varying, renewing or discharging the slavery and trafficking prevention order that the court considers appropriate.
 
(4) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions or requirements on the defendant, only if the court is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to renew or vary the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(5) Any renewed or varied order may contain only those prohibitions or requirements which the court is satisfied are necessary for that purpose.
 
(6) The court must not discharge an order before the end of 5 years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and the Chief Constable.
 
(7) Sub-paragraph (6) does not apply to an order containing a prohibition on foreign travel and no other prohibitions.
 
(8) In this paragraph "the appropriate court" means—
 
(a) where the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal made the slavery and trafficking prevention order, the Crown Court;
 
(b) in any other case, a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
(9) An application under sub-paragraph (1) may be made—
 
(a) where the appropriate court is the Crown Court, in accordance with Crown Court rules;
 
(b) in any other case, by complaint.
 
INTERIM SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
7.—(1) This paragraph applies where an application under paragraph 2 ("the main application") has not been determined.
 
(2) An application for an "interim slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or
 
(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.
 
(3) The court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(4) An interim slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(5) The order—
 
(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;
 
(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.
 
(6) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.
 
APPEALS
 
8.—(1) A defendant may appeal against the making of a slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(a), as if the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence;
 
(b) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(b) or (c), as if the defendant had been convicted of the offence and the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for that offence;
 
(c) where the order was made on an application under paragraph 2, to the county court.
 
(2) A defendant may appeal to the county court against the making of an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(3) A defendant may appeal against the making of an order under paragraph 6, or the refusal to make such an order—
 
(a) where the application for such an order was made to the Crown Court, to the Court of Appeal;
 
(b) in any other case, to the county court.
 
(4) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c), (2) or (3)(b), the county court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.
 
(5) Any order made by the county court on an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c) or (2) is for the purposes of paragraph 6(8) or 7(6) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought.
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply to an order directing that an application be reheard by a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
PART 2
 
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
OFFENDER SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
9.—(1) References in the following provisions of this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are references to an offender who is for the time being subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order which is in effect under this Schedule.
 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) has effect subject to paragraph 12(7) (which excludes from paragraph 12 an offender subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order).
 
INITIAL NOTIFICATION
 
10.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must notify the required information to the police within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which the slavery and trafficking prevention order or the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order comes into force in relation to the offender ("the relevant date").
 
(2) The "required information" is the following information about the offender—
 
(a) date of birth;
 
(b) national insurance number;
 
(c) name on the relevant date or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(d) home address on the relevant date;
 
(e) name on the date on which the notification is given or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(f) home address on the date on which the notification is given;
 
(g) the address of any other premises in the United Kingdom at which on that date the offender regularly resides or stays;
 
(h) any information prescribed by regulations made by the Department.
 
(3) When determining the period of 3 days mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), there is to be disregarded any time when the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(4) In this Part "home address" means in relation to the offender—
 
(a) the address of the offender’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or
 
(b) if the offender has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the offender can regularly be found or, if there is more than one such place, such one of them as the offender selects.
 
NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES
 
11.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which any notifiable event occurs, notify to the police—
 
(a) the required new information, and
 
(b) the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2).
 
(2) A "notifiable event" means—
 
(a) the use by the offender of a name which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(b) any change of the offender’s home address;
 
(c) the expiry of any qualifying period during which the offender has resided or stayed at any premises in the United Kingdom the address of which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(d) any prescribed change of circumstances; or
 
(e) the release of the offender from custody pursuant to an order of a court or from a custodial sentence or detention in a hospital.
 
(3) The "required new information" is—
 
(a) the name referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(a),
 
(b) the new home address (see sub-paragraph (2)(b)),
 
(c) the address of the premises referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(c),
 
(d) the prescribed details, or
 
(e) the fact that the offender has been released as mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(e),
 
as the case may be.
 
(4) A notification under sub-paragraph (1) may be given before the notifiable event occurs, but in that case the offender must also specify the date when the event is expected to occur.
 
(5) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates occurs more than 2 days before the date specified, the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1).
 
(6) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates has not occurred by the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified—
 
(a) the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1), and
 
(b) the offender must, within the period of 6 days beginning with the date specified, notify to the police the fact that the event did not occur within the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified.
 
(7) Paragraph 10(3) applies to the determination of—
 
(a) any period of 3 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), or
 
(b) any period of 6 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (6),
 
as it applies to the determination of the period of 3 days mentioned in paragraph 10(1).
 
(8) In this paragraph—
 
(a) "prescribed change of circumstances" means any change—
 
(i) occurring in relation to any matter in respect of which information is required to be notified by virtue of paragraph 10(2)(h), and
 
(ii) of a description prescribed by regulations made by the Department;
 
(b) "the prescribed details", in relation to a prescribed change of circumstances, means such details of the change as may be so prescribed.
 
(9) In this paragraph "qualifying period" means—
 
(a) a period of 7 days, or
 
(b) two or more periods, in any period of 12 months, which taken together amount to 7 days.
 
PERIODIC NOTIFICATION
 
12.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the applicable period after each notification date, notify to the police the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2), unless the offender has already given a notification under paragraph 11(1) within that period.
 
(2) A "notification date" means, in relation to the offender, the date of any notification given by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) Where the applicable period would (apart from this paragraph) end while sub-paragraph (4) applies, that period is to be treated as continuing until the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which sub-paragraph (4) first ceases to apply.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court,
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence,
 
(c) detained in a hospital, or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) In this paragraph "the applicable period" means—
 
(a) in any case where sub-paragraph (6) applies, such period as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Department, and
 
(b) in any other case, the period of one year.
 
(6) This sub-paragraph applies if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1) was the address or location of such a place as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(b).
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph applies to an offender who is subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
ABSENCE FROM NOTIFIED RESIDENCE
 
13.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements at any time if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1) was an address in Northern Ireland such as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(a) (sole or main residence).
 
(2) If the offender intends to be absent from that home address for a period of more than 3 days ("the relevant period"), the offender must, not less than 12 hours before leaving that home address, notify to the police the information set out in sub-paragraph (3).
 
(3) The information is—
 
(a) the date on which the offender will leave that home address;
 
(b) such details as the offender holds about—
 
(i) the offender’s travel arrangements during the relevant period;
 
(ii) the offender’s accommodation arrangements during that period;
 
(iii) the offender’s date of return to that address.
 
(4) In this paragraph—
 
"travel arrangements" include, in particular, the means of transport to be used and the dates of travel,
 
"accommodation arrangements" include, in particular, the address of any accommodation at which the relevant offender will spend the night during the relevant period and the nature of that accommodation.
 
(5) Where—
 
(a) an offender has given a notification under sub-paragraph (2), and
 
(b) at any time before that mentioned in that sub-paragraph, the information notified becomes inaccurate or incomplete,
 
the offender must give a further notification under sub-paragraph (2).
 
(6) Where an offender—
 
(a) has notified a date of return to the offender’s home address, but
 
(b) returns to that home address on a date other than that notified,
 
the offender must notify the date of the offender’s actual return to the police within 3 days of the actual return.
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph requires an offender to notify any information which falls to be notified in accordance with a requirement imposed by regulations under paragraph 14.
 
(8) In calculating the relevant period for the purposes of this paragraph there is to be disregarded—
 
(a) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, an address of the kind mentioned in paragraph 10(2)(g) notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1);
 
(b) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, any premises, if his stay at those premises would give rise to a requirement to notify the address of those premises under paragraph 11(2)(c).
 
TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM
 
14.—(1) The Department may by regulations make provision with respect to offenders subject to notification requirements, or any description of such offenders—
 
(a) requiring such persons, before they leave the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (2);
 
(b) requiring such persons, if they subsequently return to the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (3).
 
(2) A notification under this paragraph must disclose—
 
(a) the date on which the offender proposes to leave the United Kingdom;
 
(b) the country (or, if there is more than one, the first country) to which the offender proposes to travel and the proposed point of arrival (determined in accordance with the regulations) in that country;
 
(c) any other information prescribed by the regulations which the offender holds about the offender’s departure from or return to the United Kingdom, or about the offender’s movements while outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) A notification under this sub-paragraph must disclose any information prescribed by the regulations about the offender’s return to the United Kingdom.
 
METHOD OF NOTIFICATION AND RELATED MATTERS
 
15.—(1) An offender gives a notification to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6) by—
 
(a) attending at any police station in Northern Ireland prescribed by regulations under section 87(1)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and
 
(b) giving an oral notification to any police officer, or to any person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station.
 
(2) Any notification given in accordance with this paragraph must be acknowledged; and the acknowledgement must be—
 
(a) in writing, and
 
(b) in such form as the Department may direct.
 
(3) Where a notification is given under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), the offender must, if requested to do so by the police officer or other person mentioned in paragraph (1)(b), allow that officer or person to—
 
(a) take the offender’s fingerprints,
 
(b) photograph any part of the offender, or
 
(c) do both of those things,
 
in order to verify the offender's identity.
 
(4) Fingerprints taken from a person under this paragraph (and any copies of those fingerprints) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(5) Photographs taken of any part of the offender under this paragraph (and any copies of such photographs) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(6) In this paragraph "photograph" includes any process by means of which an image may be produced.
 
PART 3
 
SUPPLEMENTARY
 
OFFENCES
 
16.—(1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with any prohibition or requirement contained in—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order, or
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
commits an offence.
 
(2) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or (6)(b), 12(1), 13(2) or (6) or 15(3), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
commits an offence.
 
(3) A person who notifies to the police, in purported compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
any information which the person knows to be false, commits an offence.
 
(4) As regards an offence under sub-paragraph (2), so far as it relates to non-compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
a person commits such an offence on the first day on which the person first fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the provision mentioned in paragraph (a) or (as the case may be) the requirement mentioned in paragraph (b), and continues to commit it throughout any period during which the failure continues.
 
(5) But a person must not be prosecuted under sub-paragraph (2) more than once in respect of the same failure.
 
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this paragraph is liable—
 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years;
 
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
 
(7) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this paragraph, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make an order for conditional discharge in respect of the offence.
 
CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT WITHIN UK
 
17.—(1) The Department may by order amend paragraph 16(1) so as to add to or remove from the list of orders in that paragraph any relevant UK order.
 
(2) "Relevant UK order" means an order under the law of Scotland or England and Wales which appears to the Department to be equivalent or similar to—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION TO RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
18.—(1) This paragraph applies to information notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1).
 
(2) The Chief Constable may, for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Schedule, supply information to which this paragraph applies to—
 
(a) a relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners,
 
(d) a person providing services to a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with a relevant function,
 
for use for the purpose of verifying the information.
 
(3) In relation to information supplied to any person under sub-paragraph (2), the reference to verifying the information is a reference to—
 
(a) checking its accuracy by comparing it with information held—
 
(i) in the case of a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners by that department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(ii) in the case of a person within sub-paragraph (2)(d), by that person in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there, and
 
(b) compiling a report of that comparison.
 
(4) Subject to sub-paragraph (5), the supply of information under this paragraph is to be taken not to breach any restriction on the disclosure of information (however arising).
 
(5) This paragraph does not authorise the doing of anything that contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998.
 
(6) This paragraph does not affect any power to supply information that exists apart from this paragraph.
 
(7) In this paragraph—
 
"the Commissioners" means Her Majesty’s Commissioners for Revenue and Customs;
 
"relevant Northern Ireland department" means the Department for Employment and Learning, the Department of the Environment, the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety or the Department for Social Development;
 
"relevant function" means—
 
(a) in relation to the Department for Employment and Learning, a function relating to employment or training,
 
(b) in relation to the Department of the Environment, a function under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981;
 
(c) in relation to the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, a function relating to health or social care;
 
(d) in relation to the Department for Social Development, a function relating to social security or child support;
 
(e) in relation to the Secretary of State, a function relating to passports or the Gangmasters Licensing Authority;
 
(f) in relation to the Commissioners, any of their functions.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION BY RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
19.—(1) A report compiled under paragraph 18 may be supplied to the Chief Constable by—
 
(a) the relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners, or
 
(d) a person within paragraph 18(2)(d).
 
(2) Such a report may contain any information held—
 
(a) by the relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(b) by a person within paragraph 18(2)(d) in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there.
 
(3) Where such a report contains information within sub-paragraph (2), the Chief Constable—
 
(a) may retain the information, whether or not used for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Part, and
 
(b) may use the information for any purpose related to the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences (whether or not under this Part), but for no other purpose.
 
(4) Sub-paragraphs (4) to (7) of paragraph 18 apply in relation to this paragraph as they apply in relation to paragraph 18.
 
INFORMATION ABOUT RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF OFFENDER
 
20.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements who is—
 
(a) serving a custodial sentence; or
 
(b) detained in a hospital.
 
(2) The Department may by regulations make provision requiring the person who is responsible for such an offender to give notice to specified persons—
 
(a) of the fact that that person has become responsible for the offender; and
 
(b) of any occasion when—
 
(i) the offender is released, or
 
(ii) a different person is to become responsible for the offender.
 
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) "specified persons" means persons specified, or of a description specified, in the regulations.
 
(4) The regulations may make provision for determining who is to be taken for the purposes of this paragraph as being responsible for an offender.
 
POWER OF ENTRY AND SEARCH OF OFFENDER’S HOME ADDRESS
 
21.—(1) If, on an application made by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above, a lay magistrate is satisfied that the requirements in sub-paragraph (2) are met in relation to any premises, the lay magistrate may issue a warrant authorising a constable—
 
(a) to enter the premises for the purpose of assessing the risks posed by the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates; and
 
(b) to search the premises for that purpose.
 
(2) The requirements are—
 
(a) that the address of each set of premises specified in the application is an address falling within sub-paragraph (3);
 
(b) that the offender is not one to whom sub-paragraph (4) applies;
 
(c) that it is necessary for a constable to enter and search the premises for the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a); and
 
(d) that on at least two occasions a constable has sought entry to the premises in order to search them for that purpose and has been unable to obtain entry for that purpose.
 
(3) An address falls within this sub-paragraph if—
 
(a) it is the address which was last notified in accordance with this Schedule by the offender to the police as the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies to an offender if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) A warrant issued under this paragraph must specify the one or more sets of premises to which it relates.
 
(6) The warrant may authorise the constable executing it to use reasonable force if necessary to enter and search the premises.
 
(7) The warrant may authorise entry to and search of premises on more than one occasion if, on the application, the lay magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary to authorise multiple entries in order to achieve the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
 
(8) Where a warrant issued under this paragraph authorises multiple entries, the number of entries authorised may be unlimited or limited to a maximum.
 
(9) In this paragraph a reference to the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates is a reference to the offender—
 
(a) who has in accordance with this Schedule notified the police that the premises specified in the warrant are the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
GUIDANCE
 
22.—(1) The Department must issue guidance to the Chief Constable in relation to the exercise of the powers of the Chief Constable under this Schedule.
 
(2) The Department may, from time to time, revise the guidance issued under sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) The Department must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this paragraph to be published in a way the Department considers appropriate.
 
INTERPRETATION OF THIS SCHEDULE
 
23.—(1) In this Schedule—
 
"cautioned" means cautioned after the person concerned has admitted the offence;
 
"custodial sentence" means—
 
(a) a sentence of imprisonment,
 
(b) a sentence of detention in a young offenders centre;
 
(c) a sentence of detention under Article 13(4)(b) or 14(5) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008;
 
(d) a sentence of detention under Article 45 of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998;
 
(e) an order under Article 39A of that Order sending the offender to a juvenile justice centre;
 
(f) any other sentence under which a person is detained in custody;
 
"detained in a hospital" means detained in a hospital under Part 3 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
"home address" has the meaning given by paragraph 10(4);
 
"interim slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 7;
 
"slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 1 or 2;
 
"slavery or human trafficking offence" has the meaning given by paragraph 1(4).
 
(2) In this Schedule "passport" means—
 
(a) United Kingdom passport within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
 
(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.
 
(3) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a conviction for an offence in respect of which an order for conditional discharge is made, despite—
 
(a) Article 6(1) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (conviction with conditional discharge deemed not to be a conviction), or
 
(b) section 14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (equivalent provision for England and Wales).
 
(4) Sub-paragraph (3) applies only to convictions after this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(5) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a finding of a court in summary proceedings that the accused did the act charged, where the court makes an order under—
 
(a) Article 44(4) of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
 
(b) section 37(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983, or
 
(c) section 58(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
 
(hospital and guardianship orders).
 
(6) In relation to an offence under the law of Scotland, a reference in this Schedule to a person being found not guilty by reason of insanity is to be treated as a reference to a person being acquitted by reason of the special defence in section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
 
(7) References in this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are to be read in accordance with paragraph 9.
 
(8) In this Schedule, a reference to a finding that a person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence includes a finding that a person is under a disability or insane and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence.
 
(9) A person’s age is to be treated for the purposes of this Schedule as being that which it appears to the court to be after considering any available evidence.".

Mr Ford: No doubt, the House will decide that it is teatime at this point. This group of amendments includes a range of provisions, which, together, will, I believe, reinforce the work of Government, law enforcement and civic society in tackling human trafficking and slavery, and in driving it from our shores. Some of these provisions broadly mirror equivalent measures in the Westminster Modern Slavery Bill. Others build on measures already included in this Bill. All of them have the support of the Bill's sponsor, Lord Morrow, the Justice Committee and the Executive.

They are intended to bolster our prevention and enforcement capabilities, to ensure that there is an informed and strategic coordinated response to these offences and to protect the public, or specific individuals, from the harm that such organised criminals wreak, by restricting the behaviours of convicted traffickers and exploiters, where that is necessary.

Amendment Nos 24 and 62 introduce new clause 5D and schedule 3, which create new powers for courts in Northern Ireland to impose slavery and trafficking prevention orders (STPO) where a person has been convicted of a human trafficking or slavery-type offence. These new civil orders are intended to protect the public or specific individuals from harm associated with human trafficking and slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour. These orders are preventative in nature. That is, they are intended to stop a person or persons becoming subject to a trafficking or slavery offence by restricting the harmful behaviours of convicted perpetrators.

Since STPOs would be imposed essentially as a diversionary measure to prevent an offence from occurring, it is important that they are proportionate. That is why an STPO under new clause 5D and schedule 3 could be imposed only in cases where the court is satisfied that there is a risk that the offender may commit a human trafficking or slavery-type offence and that the STPO, and the prohibitions and requirements in it, are necessary to protect individuals or the public from the physical or psychological harm that would be likely to occur if the offence were committed.

The nature of the prohibitions or requirements contained in one of these orders would be entirely a matter for the court on a case-by-case basis, depending on the nature of the risk presented. By way of some possible examples, however, they could impose restrictions on an individual to prohibit them from operating as a gangmaster, from working with children or from travelling outside Northern Ireland. Given the potential level of harm associated with these offences, I am satisfied that the STPOs are proportionate and appropriate.

The detailed provisions, including the effect of a slavery and trafficking prevention order, are set out in schedule 3 along with provisions for variation, renewal and discharge of orders and for appeals. Orders could be imposed by courts either on sentencing or following an application by the PSNI where an individual has been convicted of a relevant slavery or human trafficking offence; where they have been found not guilty by reason of insanity; where they have done the act but have been found unfit for trial; or where they have been cautioned in relation to a human trafficking or slavery-type offence. Breach of one of those civil orders would be a criminal offence attracting a sentence of up to five years on indictment or six months and/or a fine on summary conviction.

Work is under way in the other UK jurisdictions to introduce similar orders, although the regime in Northern Ireland will differ slightly from those in the other jurisdictions. For example, I do not believe that it is appropriate to extend STPOs to children and so the orders under new clause 5D and schedule 3 will apply only to adults. In addition, having considered concerns that were raised in response to my public consultation, I do not intend to introduce slavery and trafficking risk orders, which would apply to individuals even where they had not previously been convicted of or cautioned in respect of a human trafficking or slavery-type response.

Nevertheless, I wish to ensure that STPOs are enforceable across each UK jurisdiction. That is, where an order is made in Scotland or in England and Wales but is breached in Northern Ireland, it can be enforced by courts in this jurisdiction, and vice versa. In practical terms, to do this, the relevant authorities need to know that an STPO is in place, and that is why I have included provision in respect of the notification requirements that would be attached to an STPO. These cover the information to be provided by the offender to the police in respect of their personal details, addresses, national insurance number and any travel plans, either within or outside the United Kingdom.

Our ultimate goal is that, through this Bill and other actions that my Department and its partners are engaged in, we may make Northern Ireland free from trafficking and slavery. To achieve this, we need to have a clear strategic vision and direction in place and we need to ensure that there is a consistent, joined-up approach across government, the law enforcement agencies and civic society. So, amendment No 25 introduces new clause 5E, which will build upon the existing annual human trafficking and exploitation action plans that my Department has produced over recent years. It will place a statutory duty on my Department to publish an annual strategy aimed at raising awareness of and, ultimately, reducing human trafficking and slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour in Northern Ireland.

In recognition of the importance of a joined-up response, new clause 5E places a requirement on my Department to consult other relevant organisations and to have regard to their views in drawing up the strategy. This approach reflects the productive partnership that my Department has had with statutory and non-statutory organisations through the organised crime task force and NGO engagement group respectively.

Placing this strategy on a statutory footing is a strong signal of my continuing commitment to working in partnership with other key stakeholders towards the eradication of human trafficking, slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour. New Clause 5E is intended to replace clause 15 of the Bill, and, as such, Lord Morrow and I agree that clause 15 should no longer stand part.

We have already debated the introduction of new clause 5G under amendment No 27, which relates to the investigation and prosecution of slavery and trafficking offences.


5.45 pm

New clause 5G is intended, as I said earlier, to replace subsections 2 and 3 of clause 7. I have also previously expressed concerns about the effect of subsection 1 of clause 7, which would place a requirement on my Department in respect of training which it could not fulfil, because the responsibilities rest across a wide range of bodies, including other Departments and statutory agencies. I highlighted earlier the work that was being done in respect of training. Lord Morrow and I have instead agreed that these matters should be covered by the statutory strategy required under new clause 5E. As such, we are agreed that clause 7 should no longer stand part.

Amendment No 26 introduces new clause 5F. It is intended to improve our understanding of, and, as a consequence, our response to, human trafficking and slavery offences as they occur in Northern Ireland. Much of our current understanding of the nature and scale of human trafficking is derived from the referral of potential victims of trafficking to the national referral mechanism (NRM). While it provides a helpful insight, we know that the information is limited, especially since, in the case of potential victims who are adults and who do not consent to a referral being made, that information will not be captured.

The UK Human Trafficking Centre also conducts an annual retrospective strategic baseline exercise to give an indication of others who may not be captured in the official NRM statistics. However, whilst it is helpful, that, too, is known to be limited. To address that, new clause 5F places a statutory duty on specified public authorities to notify the United Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre, which is now part of the National Crime Agency, of any person they believe may be a victim of trafficking or slavery-type offences.

The resultant data will be an important tool in helping to inform effective policy development as well as police operational responses. As such, information gathered in this way could, crucially, aid the recovery of other victims from situations where they are being trafficked and exploited, or lead to the conviction of perpetrators.

New clause 5F includes provision to ensure that information may be captured and reported in an anonymised form so that it is not lost, even in cases where an adult potential victim does not wish their personal details to be provided.

In debating these amendments, which will reinforce our capacity in respect of prevention and enforcement, I should also touch on clause 16, which would currently require my Department to establish an independent rapporteur for Northern Ireland to report on the operation of the Bill.

Members will be aware of the proposal in the Modern Slavery Bill at Westminster for a United Kingdom-wide anti-slavery commissioner. It is my firm view that a commissioner operating across the entire United Kingdom would provide a much better model of oversight than the local rapporteur envisaged by clause 16. The issue is primarily one of accountability. A UK-wide anti-slavery commissioner would have oversight of all law enforcement agencies and statutory organisations operating in the sphere of human trafficking and slavery in Northern Ireland, devolved and non-devolved. A local rapporteur would not. I believe that that is a critical factor, particularly given the wide range of bodies, both devolved and non-devolved, in combating these crimes here.

A UK-wide commissioner would also be best placed to identify and recommend best practice across each of the UK’s constituent jurisdictions, as well as to offer a wider strategic view of human trafficking and slavery and associated trends across the United Kingdom as a whole.

Whilst I acknowledge that cost should not be our driving consideration, neither, in the current climate, can we afford to ignore financial implications. It is the case that a commissioner operating across the whole of the United Kingdom would offer greater economies of scale and value for money, and would ultimately be more affordable than a local rapporteur with limited oversight within this jurisdiction.

For those reasons, I intend to seek the Assembly’s legislative consent to extend the anti-slavery commissioner under the Westminster Modern Slavery Bill to Northern Ireland. Lord Morrow has indicated that, in principle, he agrees with that approach, but that he wishes to see the detail of the draft Westminster legislation before he will support the removal of clause 16 from the Bill.

I have agreed a package of measures with the Home Secretary to ensure that Northern Ireland interests will be adequately met under the Westminster legislation, and I am satisfied that those will be effective and appropriate. However, Lord Morrow, quite understandably, wishes to be assured on the detail of the provisions. For that reason, I do not, at this stage, propose to push this House to a vote on clause 16. Subject to securing the Assembly’s consent to a devolved role for the United Kingdom-wide commissioner, however, it is my firm belief that it should ultimately be removed from the Bill at Further Consideration Stage. I commend this group of amendments to the House.

Mr Givan (The Chairperson of the Committee for Justice): First of all, I will cover clause 15 and then amendment No 25.

There is widespread support for a statutory requirement for the Department of Justice to publish a strategy every year on raising awareness and tackling human trafficking and slavery offences in cooperation with governmental and non-governmental organisations. While the publication of the Department’s human trafficking action plan in May 2013 was welcomed and could provide a possible template, the clear view was that there should be a statutory requirement to ensure continued commitment from the Department, particularly given that information sharing, data collection and collaborative working across agencies and departments continue to present challenges. A number of organisations also felt that the strategy should be flexible enough to respond to changing trends in trafficking and suggested that it should also include reporting on the measures prohibiting paying for sexual services of a person.

The Department advised the Committee that it was content with the statutory requirement in clause 15 for it to publish an annual strategy and that it intended to bring forward amendments regarding training, investigation and prosecution to replace clause 7(1), as discussed earlier, and to ensure the strategy must include matters relating to raising awareness of the rights and entitlements of victims of human trafficking across the criminal justice system, and that would address concerns relating to the prosecution of victims of human trafficking who have been compelled to commit an offence as a consequence of being trafficked.

The Committee supports the intention to place a statutory requirement on the Department of Justice to publish a strategy to raise awareness of and contribute to the reduction of human trafficking and slavery offences and agrees with the issues that the strategy should cover, including the proposed amendments from the Department.

Amendment No 25 introduces a new clause 5E, which effectively replicates the provision of clause 15 and the amendments that I have previously outlined. Given that there are no substantive changes and the replacement of clause 15 by new clause 5E is intended to accommodate technical changes and re-group the provision more logically within the Bill, the Committee is content to support this approach.

Amendment Nos 24 and 62, taken together, make provision for the courts to impose new slavery and trafficking prevention orders either upon sentencing or following an application by the PSNI. The Committee received information on these new civil orders, a breach of which will be a criminal offence, from the Department in September, and, having noted that they will enable the courts to respond swiftly by regulating the actions of those convicted of being involved in slavery and human trafficking offences where it is necessary to do so, thus protecting the public from harm, it is content to support these amendments.

The Committee also supports amendment No 26, which places a statutory duty on the PSNI and the Health and Social Care Trusts to notify the United Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre of any cases where there is reason to believe that an individual may be a victim of a human trafficking or slavery offence even in cases where the individual has declined to give their consent to a referral to the National Referral Mechanism. The capture of this additional information, even though it may be anonymised, will improve understanding of the extent and nature of human trafficking and slavery-like offences and, according to the Department of Justice, inform timely operational responses and the development of effective strategic and policy responses.

Mr Deputy Speaker, with your indulgence, I would like to briefly refer to clause 16, which provides for a Northern Ireland rapporteur to report to the Northern Ireland Assembly on the performance of this Act and other matters relating to human trafficking and slavery. The concept of an independent oversight mechanism to provide effective monitoring and accountability arrangements has been broadly welcomed, apart from by the PSNI and the Minister of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, who both felt that the current system of scrutiny and the accountability mechanisms were sufficient.

The key issue is whether a Northern Ireland rapporteur or a UK-wide anti-slavery commissioner is more appropriate. When the Committee sought evidence on this proposal, some organisations supported a UK-wide commissioner, given the international nature of human trafficking and the fact they would be able to look comprehensively at the actions of all the organisations and agencies involved in tackling trafficking in Northern Ireland, which a Northern Ireland rapporteur would not be able to do, given that responsibility for some organisations, such as the Home Office, the UK Human Trafficking Centre and the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, is not devolved.

In the absence of detailed proposals regarding a UK-wide commissioner, others felt clause 16 should be retained, at least in the meantime, and it was important that whatever form the rapporteur took, they should scrutinise the work of the PSNI and the relevant Northern Ireland Departments and report to the Minister and the Assembly.

Lord Morrow advised the Committee that he accepts that there is an argument for a national rapporteur to operate on a UK-wide basis but indicated that he had concerns about the fact that, as initially drafted in the Modern Slavery Bill, the commissioner would only consider law enforcement and not areas such as victim support, which the Northern Ireland rapporteur would have the power to do if clause 16 were enacted. He also highlighted the importance of having a rapporteur who would effectively consider the needs of Northern Ireland and its particular challenges, including the land border with the Republic of Ireland.

When the Committee visited Sweden, it met the Swedish national rapporteur and discussed her role, remit and the benefits of having such an appointment. Members support the principle of having an independent body to monitor and report on the response to human trafficking in Northern Ireland. The Committee therefore agreed to support clause 16 but noted that the remit of the anti-slavery commissioner, which is a post that would be created by the Modern Slavery Bill, could be extended to Northern Ireland and decided that it would consider the matter further once clarity on the position regarding such a commissioner and the remit and responsibilities was available.

More recently, the Department advised the Committee in September that the Minister has been engaging with the Home Secretary and with Scotland to ensure that Northern Ireland interests are covered with a view to including a provision in the Modern Slavery Bill to extend the commissioner's role to Northern Ireland, subject to the Assembly's consent through a legislative consent motion. I know that the Minister elaborated on that.

The Department outlined that the Minister has got agreement on a range of issues, including a requirement for the Home Secretary to consult devolved Ministers on the appointment of the commissioner, a duty on the Home Secretary to consult devolved Ministers before agreeing the strategic plan or annual report, a power for the Northern Ireland Minister to be able to request ad hoc reports on Northern Ireland matters, that reports by the commissioners will be jointly submitted to the Home Secretary and devolved Ministers, and that there will be a statutory duty on the Northern Ireland Minister to lay the reports before the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Department is due to brief the Committee on the proposed legislative consent motion at the meeting scheduled for 5 November.

Mr McCartney: Go raibh maith agat, a LeasCheann Comhairle. I will be brief, because the Chair outlined all the main issues in relation to this group. On the latter point, officials will be coming to the Committee on 5 November to provide information on the process for the LCM, and I would say to the Minister that whatever detail is forthcoming should be shared with the proposer of the Bill, obviously, but certainly the Committee and, indeed, the wider Assembly.

Lord Morrow: I am glad to be able to support the Minister on the series of amendments that propose new clauses 5D to 5F and schedule 3. Amendment Nos 24 and 62 would introduce slavery and trafficking prevention orders through new clause 5D and schedule 3. They will help to ensure that those convicted of human trafficking and slavery can be prevented from embarking upon particular activities linked to committing human trafficking and slavery offences. I believe that such orders will provide the police with another tool in their armoury with which they can seek to tackle this crime. In and of themselves, they will not solve the problem but are a useful part of a package of measures that could make a real difference. Introducing such orders is a positive step forward in tackling this crime in Northern Ireland.

Amendment No 25, which relates to new clause 5E, would replace and amend clause 15, moving it up so that it sits in Part 1 rather than in Part 4. I am particularly grateful to the Minister for agreeing to have in statute a requirement to publish a strategy every year, which will ensure that the Department of Justice remains focused on tackling those crimes in Northern Ireland. The annual strategy will cover human trafficking and slavery offences. The Department will have to consult with other relevant organisations in drawing up the strategy. The strategy will need to consider how best to foster cooperation between organisations, the provision of training and equipment for those involved in investigating or prosecuting trafficking or slavery offences, and raising awareness.

While it would be wonderful if human trafficking and slavery could be eradicated in the near future, it seems unlikely in our increasingly globalised world. Consequently, ongoing efforts will be required by the Department to tackle this crime. Having an annual strategy that includes requirements for cooperation between organisations working in this field, provision for training and equipment for those involved in investigating and prosecuting those offences and provisions aimed at raising awareness of the rights of victims will help to improve the response of statutory and non-governmental organisations to human trafficking and slavery offences.

If the annual strategy were not in statute, a future Minister could simply end the publication of the annual action plan, and the Assembly could do nothing about it. Consequently, I feel that it is necessary for that provision to be kept in statute.


6.00 pm

As the Minister outlined, amendment No 26, which is new clause 5F, would place a statutory duty on particular public authorities to notify the National Crime Agency, of which the UK Human Trafficking Centre is a part, of any cases in which there is a reason to believe that an individual may be a victim of human trafficking or slavery offences. I believe that that is a positive amendment that will help statutory bodies to respond to human trafficking and slavery offences. As many Members will be aware, data on the extent and nature of human trafficking and slavery in Northern Ireland is often incomplete and limited. In reality, due to the hidden nature of the crimes, we consider that that will probably always be the case. However, the duty to notify the National Crime Agency will help to provide a better picture of the situation in Northern Ireland and will clearly assist law enforcement agencies and other statutory authorities to respond more effectively to the crimes being committed.

I also support the decision to ensure that that data does not go into the existing national referral mechanism statistics but is held in a different data set. That is very difficult terrain to navigate because, ideally, all victims of human trafficking would be willing to put themselves through the national referral mechanism process. However, in practice, a substantial group of victims does not want to do so. That may be because, on being rescued, they want to return immediately to their home country. It can also be caused, sadly, by a distrust of the police and other law enforcement agencies. Not requiring that the duty be a part of the current national referral mechanism process will allow additional anonymised data to be recaptured and will give us a clearer idea of the scope of the problem in Northern Ireland.

Clause 7 outlines requirements and resources for training, investigation or prosecution. I have already spoken about new clause 5E, and we have already agreed new clause 5G, which together cover the content of clause 7. With the Minister, I am therefore proposing to remove clause 7 from the Bill. New clause 5E covers training needs, and new clause 5G will mirror clauses 7(1) and 7(2).

Clause 15 requires the Department of Justice to publish an annual strategy on human trafficking and slavery. Following constructive discussions with the Department of Justice, it was agreed that the clause required substantial amendment. Consequently, a redrafted clause was drawn up and has been introduced as new clause 5E, which I spoke about just now. I am therefore proposing that clause 15 be removed from the Bill.

I also want to speak about clause 16, on which no amendments have been tabled. One of the key requirements of the European directive and the European Convention is that there should be an anti-trafficking national rapporteur or equivalent mechanism to review the efficiency of anti-trafficking legislation and policy, so I provided for a rapporteur in clause 16. Since publishing that proposal in my draft Bill in August 2012, the UK Government have announced their decision to create the new office of an anti-slavery commissioner, which would have some overlap with the functions of a national rapporteur.

(Mr Deputy Speaker [Mr Dallat] in the Chair)

For me, the issues are now quite finely balanced. On the one hand, the remit of the anti-slavery commissioner is limited to criminal justice, and whilst the scope has been extended to improve identification of victims, it has nothing to do with victim care, which is, I believe, a very significant shortcoming. Moreover, the anti-slavery commissioner is not independent of government.

On the other hand, money is tight. Departmental officials indicated at the Justice Committee that it would cost around £50,000 annually to introduce a regional rapporteur for Northern Ireland, while it would cost only between £20,000 and £30,000 annually for Northern Ireland to be covered by the anti-slavery commissioner at UK level. In difficult financial times, we, as Members of the Assembly, have to bear that in mind.

I have received assurances from the Department of Justice suggesting that the commissioner would be of real benefit to Northern Ireland. As of today, the legislative consent motion that would enable Northern Ireland to benefit from the anti-slavery commissioner has not been tabled. I certainly am not willing to propose that clause 16 be removed until I have seen the text of that motion. I have been assured by the Public Bill Office that it will be possible for us to agree to keep clause 16 in the Bill today and make a final decision at Further Consideration Stage. Consequently, I propose that, for the moment at least, clause 16 should stand part.

Mr Ford: I am sure that it will be a pleasure to the House that we have concluded this group in such a short time. I have outlined at length the effect of the proposed measures. I believe that they are important: they will help to protect Northern Ireland from the evil done by those who seek to traffic and exploit others; they will provide the necessary new powers for our courts to protect people and deter perpetrators; and they will enhance our understanding of the nature and scale of these evil practices in Northern Ireland so that we can better target our efforts and be more strategic in how we use our resources to eradicate them.

After listening to the Members who spoke, I felt that it was clear that there was general support around the House. The one key issue that remains is that of the rapporteur and clause 16. I entirely accept Lord Morrow's point that he, at this stage, wishes to keep clause 16 in. From the conversations that my team and I have had with the Home Office, I am optimistic that we will be able to see the benefits of a UK-wide rapporteur in Northern Ireland, which, as Lord Morrow acknowledged, will have financial benefits as well as the benefit of ensuring that the role would look at non-devolved as well as devolved matters in this region. At this stage, Lord Morrow has made it clear that he wants to see the colour of my money as well as the colour of the Home Office's money. That is a perfectly reasonably position at this point, but I trust that, within the next week or two, we will be able to resolve that and deal with it properly at Further Consideration Stage. So, I am content that clause 16 stand part at this stage, and it appears that the House is content with the various amendments that I have proposed.

Question, That amendment No 24 be made, put and agreed to.

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause

Amendment No 25 made:

After clause 5 insert

"Strategy on offences under sections 1A and 1B
 
5E.—(1) The Department shall, at least once in every year, publish a strategy on offences under section 1A and 1B ("relevant offences").
 
(2) In drawing up the strategy the Department must—
 
(a) consult with other relevant organisations; and
 
(b) have regard to views expressed by such organisations.
 
(3) The purpose of the strategy is to—
 
(a) raise awareness of relevant offences in Northern Ireland;
 
(b) contribute to a reduction in the number of such offences.
 
(4) The strategy shall in particular—
 
(a) set out arrangements for co-operation between relevant organisations in dealing with relevant offences or the victims of such offences;
 
(b) include provision as to the training and equipment of those involved in investigating or prosecuting relevant offences or dealing with the victims of such offences;
 
(c) include provisions aimed at raising awareness of the rights and entitlements of victims of such offences.
 
(5) In this section "relevant organisation" means any body, agency or other organisation with functions or activities relating to relevant offences or the victims of such offences.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause

Amendment No 26 made:

After clause 5 insert

"Duty to notify National Crime Agency about suspected victims of offences under section 1A or 1B
 
5F.—(1) A specified public authority must notify the National Crime Agency if it has reason to believe that a person may be a victim of an offence under section 1A or 1B.
 
(2) The Department—
 
(a) must issue guidance to specified public authorities about the sorts of things which indicate that a person may be a victim of an offence under section 1A or 1B;
 
(b) may from time to time revise the guidance; and
 
(c) must arrange for any guidance issued or revised to be published in a way the Department considers appropriate.
 
(3) The Department may by regulations make provision about the information to be included in a notification under subsection (1).
 
(4) The regulations must provide that a notification relating to a person aged 18 or over may not include information that—
 
(a) identifies the person, or
 
(b) enables the person to be identified (either by itself or in combination with other information),
 
unless the person consents to the inclusion of the information.
 
(5) The regulations may not require information to be included if its inclusion would result in a disclosure which contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998.
 
(6) In this section "specified public authority" means a public authority specified in regulations made by the Department.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause

Amendment No 27 made:

After clause 5 insert

"Investigation and prosecution of offences under section 1A or 1B
 
5G.—(1) The investigation or prosecution of an offence under section 1A or 1B is not dependent on the victim reporting the offence or accusing a person of committing the offence.
 
(2) Proceedings for an offence under section 1A or 1B may be commenced or continued even if the victim of the offence has withdrawn any statement made in relation to the offence.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6 (Paying for sexual services of a person)

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Dallat): We now come to the debate on the third group, which concerns opposition to clause 6 stand part and amendment Nos 28 to 39. This group deals with the offence of paying for sexual services and the Minister's opposition to the clause; the repeal of an existing offence in connection with prostitution; adding detail to the reporting duty in clause 6; and the Minister's alternative to clause 6A, which would amend the existing legislation to extend the timeline for prosecution of an offence relating to prostitutes subject to force.

Members will note that amendment No 32 is consequential to amendment No 31. I call the Minister of Justice, Mr David Ford, to speak to clause 6 stand part and to address the amendments in the group.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The following amendments stood on the Marshalled List:

No 28: In page 3, line 26, at end insert

"(2) In Article 58 (Interpretation of this Part) at the end of paragraph (3) insert "other than in Article 64A".".

No 29: In page 3, line 26, at end insert

"(2) Article 59 (Loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution) is repealed.".

No 30: In page 3, line 31, leave out "over the age of 18".

No 31: In page 3, line 35, after "to" insert

"imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or".

No 32: In page 3, line 36, after "scale" insert ", or both".

No 33: In page 3, line 37, before "to imprisonment" insert "on conviction on indictment".

No 34: In page 3, line 39, after "advantage" insert

"to B or any person other than B".

No 35: In page 3, line 41, leave out "(including sexual services)".

No 36: In page 3, line 41, at end insert

"(3A) No offence is committed under this article unless the sexual services that are provided or are to be provided by B to A involve—

(a) B being physically in A’s presence,

(b) B touching A or A touching B, and

(c) the touching is sexual.".

No 37: In page 4, line 4, leave out "must raise awareness of this offence." and insert

"shall conduct an advertising campaign to ensure public awareness of the change effected by this section.".

No 38: In page 4, line 7, at end insert

"(7) In particular the report must set out—
 
(a) information on the nature and extent of prostitution connected to human trafficking including numbers of arrests and convictions during the period covered by the report in connection with an offence under this Article or section 1A, 1B or 1D of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Further Provisions and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014;
 
(b) the extent to which, in the opinion of the Department, this Article has operated to reduce human trafficking; and
 
(c) the impact of this Article on the safety and well-being of prostitutes.".

New Clause

No 39: After clause 6 insert

"Time limit for prosecution of offences under Article 64A of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008
 
6A.—(1) In Article 64A of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (paying for sexual services of a prostitute subjected to force, etc.) at the end add—
 
"(5) Notwithstanding anything in Article 19(1) of the Magistrates Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981, proceedings for an offence under this Article may be brought within the period of 6 months from the date on which evidence sufficient in the opinion of the prosecutor to warrant the proceedings came to the knowledge of the prosecutor; but no proceedings shall be brought by virtue of this paragraph more than 3 years after the commission of the offence.
 
(6) For the purposes of paragraph (5)—
 
(a) a certificate signed by or on behalf of the prosecutor and stating the date on which such evidence as is mentioned in that paragraph came to the knowledge of the prosecutor shall be conclusive evidence of that fact; and
 
(b) a certificate stating that matter and purporting to be so signed shall be deemed to be so signed unless the contrary is proved.".
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to proceedings for an offence if—
 
(a) the offence was committed before the day on which that subsection comes into operation; and
 
(b) but for that subsection, Article 19(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order would have prevented proceedings being brought for that offence on that day.".

Mr Ford: I welcome the opportunity to open the debate on whether clause 6 should stand part of the Bill. My view is that it should not, either in its original form or with amendment Nos 28 to 38.

The House will recall that, on previous occasions when this subject has been discussed, I have referred to the need to make and develop policy based on relevant knowledge, evidence and facts. My view has always been that clause 6 was, unfortunately, lacking in those component parts. We have, for example, heard quite a lot in previous discussion and debate about the law in Sweden, and I have taken the time to go there and hear for myself the views of interested parties. I have no wish to detract from what Sweden has done in their own best interests and for their own societal reasons, but I absolutely question the validity of making serious changes to the criminal law in this jurisdiction based on what happens to work for a very different country with a very different ideological outlook.

Mr Wilson: Will the Minister give way?

Mr Ford: Yes, I will.

Mr Wilson: If the Minister is going to use the justification that Sweden somehow has a different society from Northern Ireland, maybe he will explain why the restriction works in Sweden but would not work in Northern Ireland. What are the differences between the two societies?

Mr Ford: Deputy Speaker, rule number one is clearly never give way in the first 30 seconds of a speech before you have had the chance to explain anything. If Mr Wilson chooses to listen, he will hear some of the reasons as I go through them.

In order to plug what appeared to me to be an obvious knowledge gap, I commissioned research earlier this year into the framework of prostitution in Northern Ireland. The report of that research by Queen’s University was published last week, and I wrote to all Members on Thursday to share with them a summary of the key findings relevant to this debate. Although the primary purpose of the research is to inform future policy development and legislative change, should that be necessary, we are now, at least, in a better position to understand why clause 6 is not the best way forward at this time, even if we do not have ready answers yet to make decisions on future policy.

I have two main concerns about the effect of clause 6. Those concerns are not based on an ideological view of prostitution but are grounded at a real and practical level. First, the clause began its life in a Bill designed to reduce the incidence of human trafficking both for sexual and other forms of exploitation. The argument in favour of such a provision says that criminalisation will reduce demand for sexual services, and, where demand is depressed, the traffickers will not come because there will be no market for them and they will go elsewhere. If only it were that simple. From the evidence provided by the research report, I have serious concerns over that basis for adopting clause 6.

The survey results make it clear that criminalising the purchase of sex will not deter those who buy sex to a significant extent: only 16% of those surveyed said that it would make them desist. Nor will it stop people selling sex. Indeed, if amendment No 29, standing in the name of Raymond McCartney, is carried, we could see it becoming easier to do. That amendment would repeal the current offence of soliciting in a public place for the purpose of selling sexual services. It seems that the Assembly needs to be careful that we do not ignore the fundamentals of policy development, which are so important — proper review, consideration and consultation — by engaging in what I fear to be a box-ticking exercise in the minds of some.

The argument in favour of criminalisation to reduce demand does not take account of the realities of prostitution, which we are now in a better place to understand. It fails to recognise that the people involved in prostitution are individuals, all with different backgrounds, different perspectives and different circumstances. This is not a homogeneous group. The research provides ample evidence of that fact with different ethnicities and nationalities, different genders, ages, educational provision, family status and reasons for involvement in prostitution. I am certainly not suggesting, nor has the research found, that everyone involved in prostitution has made an independent and free choice to do so. I totally accept the need for the law to protect the vulnerable and to punish the perpetrator. That is why so much of the Bill is good, right and proper. That is why I have worked with Lord Morrow to make the Bill as effective as possible in addressing trafficking and in supporting the victims, but that underpinning and shared desire is not furthered by clause 6.

In addition to not meeting the fundamental objective of depressing the market and thus reducing the attraction of Northern Ireland to traffickers, the provision will push the sale and purchase of sexual services further into the background, thus allowing more scope for criminality to become involved. Over 60% of the sex workers surveyed thought that criminalisation would put them at greater risk. That is the second failing, when we enter the territory of making law that not only is likely to be ineffective in achieving the fundamental objective of the provision but will create a more hostile environment in which women, at varying levels of vulnerability, will continue to sell sexual services.

We have two real problems here: law that may well be ineffective in reducing trafficking and law that may also increase the risk for women who continue to sell sexual services. The evidence from elsewhere is that some women will continue to sell, and some men will continue to buy.


6.15 pm

Mr Wilson: I thank the Minister for giving way. Of course, as part of his defence, he is using some of the research that he has commissioned through his Department and Queen's University. Does he accept that all the academics who were involved in the research took a very liberal point of view and were supportive of the sex industry rather than being opposed to it? Therefore, the information and colour of the research he got back was somewhat influenced by the views of those whom he appointed. If he had really wanted balanced research, why did he not at least ensure that there was some balance amongst the research team that was appointed?

Mr Ford: That is a fairly serious attack on the academic credibility of those who carried out the work. That group was awarded the contract on the basis of the case they put forward that they could do the research in an appropriate way. They have academic credentials and come from three institutions — it was not merely Queen's; there was also involvement from Galway and Berlin universities. On that basis, it is a fairly dangerous attack, with no evidence, on the credibility of those who carried out the research.

There is also a third element of clause 6, which has to figure largely for anyone who seriously wishes to engage in the proper consideration of the justification of the provision. Certainly, as Minister of Justice, I must be alert to the credibility of any proposed addition to the statute law. I have to accept that that role is likely to be curtailed in circumstances such as these, but I would be failing in my duty if I were not to point out to the House that the provision falls short on yet another count — having a credible chance of consistent enforcement — and therefore risks undermining the integrity of the criminal law.

The Chair of the Justice Committee said that I had some serious explaining to do regarding the concerns I expressed in my letter to Members over the views the police had on the question of enforcement. I think that the views I expressed were quite clear. I referred to the difficulties that were clearly articulated by the police at the Justice Committee and to the researchers, the difficulties that they would have in using clause 6 to emulate the way it is enforced in Sweden and, particularly in the current climate, to target finite resources to police consensual sexual transactions, instead of pursuing organised crime, trafficking and the associated sexual exploitation. There is no change to the police's position, and they have articulated that over a period of time.

There are real concerns about the implementation of clause 6 that are illustrated in the research report. First — this is one of the key points to learn from the comparison with Sweden — offences of consensual sex purchase in this jurisdiction will not reach the legal threshold of seriousness necessary for covert evidence gathering. We know that in Sweden evidence is obtained through telephone taps, largely of mobile phones, to get the necessary evidence to catch the perpetrators. Mind you, we also know that prostitution continues at a higher level in Sweden than is currently the case in Northern Ireland, despite its being illegal. We simply cannot rely on telephone taps to carry out covert operations against what is a consensual activity. It does not meet the required threshold, and a police superintendent would not be in a position to sign the necessary warrant for it. Secondly, it is absolutely clear, in any circumstances and particularly in the difficult financial circumstances we are in now, that police resources will quite rightly be focused on circumstances of sexual exploitation, whether it is trafficking, human slavery or whatever else. That has to be the priority, not the small instances of consensual sexual activity that are currently lawful and where there is full consent on the part of those participating. The third point is that, in the absence of things like intelligence from covert telephone tapping, witness evidence is very unlikely. Those are simple statements of fact as to how policing would operate in this jurisdiction, compared with elsewhere, as to the possibility of enforcing it.

The timing of the debate and the publication of the research report just last week have not allowed for full and proper consideration of how we might address the law and policy on prostitution for the future, but we should at least be perfectly clear on how the law works at present to protect victims of sexual exploitation. It is already an offence to buy sex from a prostitute who is being coerced. There is no defence to that charge; it is an absolute offence. The argument used in a radio interview by a recent former member of the Justice Committee that people will say that they did not know simply does not make any difference. The onus is on the purchaser to take the necessary steps to ensure that the person whom he is buying from is selling independently and without coercion. The logical conclusion of that is that no one at all should buy.

There has been criticism — I have no doubt we will hear it again today — that no prosecutions have been brought for this offence. To improve the prospect of obtaining successful prosecutions, I have tabled an amendment to article 64A of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 to make it more effective. Amendment No 39 will extend from six months to three years the statutory time bar on the prosecution of offences of paying for sex with a prostitute subjected to force. I have done that on the advice of the police and the prosecution service, to better enable them to successfully prosecute purchasers where a case against the traffickers or exploiters first has to be completed. It is clearly the case that, if it can take a year or sometimes up to two years to prosecute exploiters, having a six-month limit on the prosecution of clients is inadequate. It is also clear that having three years to prosecute clients would make a significant difference and would mean that they did not get the opportunity to get off on timing.

The provisions already available to target sexual exploitation are often ignored or dismissed. When a person knowingly engages in sex with a prostitute who is being subjected to any form of force — if it is knowing — the law is absolutely straightforward: the absence of consent to the act means that the purchaser will be guilty of rape or serious sexual assault. No lesser charge would be appropriate; no lesser charge is appropriate.

My support for the vast majority of this Bill is not in question. I hope and believe that Lord Morrow will accept that as a true statement. Human trafficking remains a global curse that we all want to see stopped, but clause 6, in my opinion, does not further those shared objectives. I know that there are honourable and principled beliefs in the House that drive the desire of Lord Morrow and others to see this provision enacted; I cannot and do not fault people for that. However, as Minister of Justice, I also hold firm views on how the criminal law is used and, in that context, I cannot support a provision that I do not believe addresses the primary objective: to reduce the demand for trafficking into sexual exploitation. The provision will not act to protect women who sell sexual services, and it will not lend itself to reasonable standards of enforcement. I therefore oppose clause 6 and urge —

Mr Givan: I appreciate the Minister giving way. He touched on the police's position in respect of this. At the meeting of the Justice Committee, Assistant Chief Constable — now Deputy Chief Constable — Drew Harris said this, and I want to be clear and put it on the record, so I quote him:

"We believe that clause 6 sends out a strong message ... it offers us another plank on which to mount prosecutions against those who have used prostitutes."

He went on to say in that Committee meeting that the police supported clause 6 with some qualifications:

"We are not opposed to clause 6 ... We give it qualified support".

That is important, and I will elaborate on it when I speak. However, I want to counteract some of the Minister's remarks: the police support the clause because it sends out a strong message and allows them another tool to target those who use prostitutes.

Mr Ford: The issue is that reservations have been expressed about the practicality of clause 6 and the existence of laws that are already there to deal with prostitutes who are subject to any kind of coercion or force . That is the position that, it seems to me, has also been clearly articulated in recent times by the police.

The reality is that we have to ensure that we get legislation that works and has a chance of securing convictions and that we address the issue of prostitution in an appropriate way, which can be done if we look in a wider sense at the body of research we have and at other information available to the House.

I fear, however, that clause 6, even with the proposed amendments, merely creates difficulties with law enforcement without the prospect of getting the convictions we want. The key issue for me is the fight against trafficking, and by capturing consensual sexual relationships at the same time, whatever we may think of them, we run into the danger of not succeeding in the key objective of the Bill, which is to protect the vulnerable, fight the traffickers and ensure that we put in support mechanisms to deal with those who wish to exit prostitution and get the benefits from doing so. I therefore oppose clause 6.

Mr Givan (The Chairperson of the Committee for Justice): First, I apologise for missing the first part of the Minister's contribution in this very important debate on clause 6. I am pleased to stand here and speak in support of clause 6, as the Chairman of the Committee for Justice and on a personal basis.

Clause 6 has attracted the most attention, the most comment and the most controversy. Much of the written evidence received by the Committee focused on the clause, and we took the opportunity during the oral evidence sessions to explore and debate in considerable detail the evidence for and against it with a wide and varied range of stakeholders. Those stakeholders included the Minister of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, Department of Justice officials, the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the Public Prosecution Service, voluntary organisations that provide support to trafficked victims and work with those involved in prostitution, academics, church and faith-based representatives, human rights organisations, and individuals who are or were involved in prostitution. We also held informal meetings with a victim of trafficking for sexual exploitation and a sex purchaser. The evidence that we heard, particularly from former prostitutes and the victim of human trafficking, was some of the most powerful and distressing that I, and I am sure I speak for all the Committee members, have ever experienced.

To assist consideration of the issues, the Committee undertook a visit to Sweden, which was the first country to pass legislation to prohibit the purchase of sexual services, and met with a range of governmental and non-governmental officials, including the national rapporteur. We also met with the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality to discuss the findings and conclusions of its report on a review of legislation on prostitution, which was published in June 2013 and recommended the adoption of the Swedish approach of criminalising the purchase of sexual services.

While a majority of the written submissions received by the Committee supported clause 6, either in its entirety or in principle, a number raised a variety of arguments against it. A number of those who supported the introduction of the clause also highlighted the need to ensure that a support package is put in place to provide assistance to those who wish to exit prostitution and wanted to see that included in the Bill. As a result of that evidence, Lord Morrow has brought forward an amendment to provide for such support. I very much welcome that, and I am sure that the Assembly will support it when we debate it later.

A number of key issues, which I want to touch on briefly, came through in the evidence. The first is the reasons for people entering prostitution. Some academics and those who represented sex workers indicated that there were those who entered prostitution as a career choice. However, former prostitutes and organisations involved in providing support and assistance to prostitutes and former prostitutes who gave evidence to the Committee, including Women’s Aid and Ruhama, indicated that frequently the reasons related to poverty, homelessness and abusive and dysfunctional family backgrounds rather than a career choice. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, in its oral evidence to the Committee, stated that protecting vulnerable people had to be the priority and that it therefore welcomed clause 6, viewing it as reasonable and proportionate to legislate in that area.

Concerns were also voiced that clause 6 could have a negative impact by driving prostitution underground and preventing people reporting incidents or seeking assistance from the authorities.

However, the overwhelming majority of respondents were firmly of the view that prostitution was already underground because of its very nature, the prevalence of criminal elements within that area and reporting of incidents to the statutory authorities rarely taking place. In evidence provided to the Committee, when asked if she had reported an instance of rape to the police, Mia, a former prostitute, said:

"No. Calling the police is not something that you even think of ... It is hard enough for women outside prostitution to take rape cases. Many people do not even believe that a prostituted woman can be raped. It does not even enter our heads to call the police."


6.30 pm

The message that legislation that criminalises the purchase of sex would send was also highlighted, with many stakeholders firmly of the view that it would challenge and change attitudes within society towards prostitution and curtail demand. They drew attention to research that has shown that changing the law in Sweden has had a transformative effect on public attitudes over the past 10 years regarding paying for sex and the attitudes of men to buying sex, particularly amongst the younger population. In 1996, before the law came in, just under 70% of the population were against criminalisation. In 2008, 70% supported the law, with 78% of people aged 18 to 28 in support of it.

I say that bearing in mind figures from an opinion poll of 1,000 people in Northern Ireland, where we are already ahead of the public attitude in Sweden, where they have criminalisation. The people in Northern Ireland have recognised what the right thing to do is even before this law is brought in. The figures that struck me most in that survey was that 16- to 34-year-olds were of the strongest view that it was right to bring in the provision contained in clause 6.

Those opposed to clause 6 were, however, concerned that the impact could be to ostracise prostitutes further, and referred to evidence that, in their view, demonstrated that sellers were further stigmatised in Sweden following the introduction of the Swedish Sex Purchase Act.

Another issue raised was whether further research on the nature, scale and extent of sex work and the links between human trafficking and prostitution was required before adopting legislation on criminalising the purchase of sexual services in Northern Ireland. However, those organisations that work on the ground with trafficked victims and those in prostitution indicated that there was ample evidence on those areas and the situation would be little different in Northern Ireland.

As I mentioned, a key issue raised was the importance of ensuring that support services were put in place for those who were in, had exited or wished to exit prostitution before clause 6 is enacted. I will return to that issue in the next debate.

I will turn to the issue of whether clause 6 should be included in this Bill. Those who do not support it have indicated that the selling of sexual services and human trafficking are separate, complex social phenomena that require separate policy and legislative responses. The view of those in favour of clause 6 is that there is overwhelming evidence and research available to demonstrate that prostitution and trafficking are inextricably linked. For example, two recent reports by economists published by the International Labour Organization showed a direct correlation between scale and percentage. In other words, the more the sex industry grows, the bigger the scale of trafficking. It is, therefore, not just appropriate but essential to include clause 6 in the Bill.

Let me speak about the Swedish model in more detail. The majority of those who gave evidence to the Committee were of the view that the Swedish model of criminalising the purchase of sexual services was an effective, tried and tested model and was the best way to tackle the demand for prostitution and trafficking of human beings for the purposes of sexual exploitation.

The Committee visited Sweden to gain first-hand knowledge of the legislation that is in place and the impact that it has had. We met a range of governmental and non-governmental officials, including the national rapporteur, and engaged in detailed discussions on how the legislation works in practice, the effect on the scale and nature of human trafficking and prostitution in Sweden and the benefits and outworkings of it. All members found the visit very interesting and informative.

Many of the issues that have been raised in the debate on clause 6 were discussed. Governmental officials were adamant that the legislation in place in Sweden works and has not driven prostitution further underground. They stated that the sellers and buyers have to find each other; therefore, the authorities can also find them. Of particular interest, was the discussion with a detective inspector in the vice team, who candidly admitted that the Swedish police were initially opposed to the legislation, as they did not think that it would work. However, they now fully support it and believe that it has assisted in tackling prostitution and trafficking.

Following the visit to Sweden, the Committee met the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality to discuss the findings and conclusions of its report on a review of legislation on prostitution, which recommended the adoption of the Swedish approach of criminalising the purchase of sexual services. The meeting provided the opportunity for a useful and interesting discussion on how that Committee unanimously concluded that criminalising the purchase of sexual services would curtail demand and therefore lessen the incentives for human trafficking.

Committee members also took the opportunity to raise some of the key issues that I outlined earlier, including the message sent out by legislation to criminalise the purchase of sexual services, whether such legislation should be separate or part of the Human Trafficking Bill and whether further research is required. The Joint Committee pointed to significant international research and evidence of the link between human trafficking and prostitution, including the report of the international human-trafficking unit, the European Union anti-trafficking coordinator and the report from the United States Department of State on its monitoring of international trafficking. The Joint Committee suggested that separating trafficking and prostitution could undermine what the legislation is aiming to achieve.

The Joint Committee felt strongly that the criminalisation of the buying of sexual services would have the effect of sending a message that prostitution was not acceptable in today’s society. It has received evidence that trafficking was happening because of the demand for sexual services and the money to be made. In its view, while the legislation would not totally prevent prostitution, it would curtail demand and challenge attitudes within society towards paying for sex and indicate a desire to protect the most vulnerable in society who were unable to do so for themselves.

Mr Poots: Will the Member give way?

Mr Poots: Does the Member agree with me and, indeed, with the European Union anti-trafficking coordinator, who said that trafficking, organised crime and prostitution are linked? Why would the European Union coordinator be wrong on this issue and the Minister right?

Mr Givan: I think that the European coordinator is right. We can see the tide coming across Europe on this issue. You had the Nordic countries of Sweden and Norway, and now we have it being taken forward by the French Parliament, led by the socialist movement on this occasion. You had the vote in the European Parliament, leading on this issue as well. Northern Ireland has the opportunity to lead within the United Kingdom and on the island of Ireland. It is right that we do so, given the overwhelming evidence that exists at an international and at a local level. Now is the time to do it.

To conclude on the Joint Committee of the Oireachtas that dealt with this: it also highlighted the importance of ensuring that support services are in place for those who wish to exit prostitution.

Speaking briefly in an individual capacity, I believe that the engagement with the Joint Committee at the Oireachtas was one of the most beneficial visits that the Committee undertook. I single out one member of that Committee because, in my view, he spoke very well. He does not come from my political belief-set and does not share my constitutional beliefs, but it is Pádraig Mac Lochlainn, who is a Sinn Féin TD. Pádraig Mac Lochlainn was the most articulate and effective at that meeting in being able to answer questions from Committee members to try to help get a better understanding of the approach that has been taken in the Republic of Ireland on this issue. I want to put that on the record, because I think that it is right to pay tribute to the work that he has been doing on this issue in the Republic of Ireland. He has been leading on it, and I found the arguments that he made during that visit to be very persuasive. In the spirit of trying to put out the hand of generosity on this issue, it is right that I pay tribute to a Sinn Féin member who, in my view, has been a champion of this cause.

I will now clarify the position of the PSNI on clause 6. I commend the PSNI for listening to and taking account of the evidence received by the Committee, which has resulted in a significant change of position. The written submission received from the Police Service highlighted a number of concerns and indicated a view that the deterrent value of the legislation would be minimal and would present investigative difficulties. However, when Assistant Chief Constable Drew Harris attended in February, he stated that the PSNI welcomed clause 6 as it sent out a strong message that Northern Ireland is a difficult place for organised crime groups to operate in. If the law were passed, the PSNI envisaged that prosecutions may flow from major ongoing investigations into organised crime gangs. ACC Harris highlighted the fact that Northern Ireland is a target for such groups. He said that demand existed for prostitutes and that crime gangs regard it as high yielding in cash and low risk, so it is attractive to get involved. Most of the groups operating prostitution in Northern Ireland come from outside the jurisdiction, and clause 6 would send a strong message of intent and demonstrate our revulsion at that type of crime.

The PSNI welcomed the awareness that had been raised regarding human trafficking in Northern Ireland as a result of the debate on the Bill and indicated that, if clause 6 were passed, it would use the legislation to the best effect it could. When pressed by the Committee to clarify the PSNI position, which had obviously moved from that outlined in its written submission, ACC Harris stated that, having listened to the debate and discussed it as a command team, the PSNI was now in a position of having qualified support for clause 6. He said that he believed that the impacts could be positive, but that, at that stage, it was difficult to quantify.

Having taken such a substantial range of evidence, the Committee discussed and debated the merits of clause 6. A number of members, including me, indicated that they supported the clause and the amendments that Lord Morrow intended to make to narrow the scope of the offence, provide further sentencing options and require an advertising campaign to ensure public awareness of the changes in the law. We noted that a wide-ranging group of organisations, including the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, various Christian Church groups and organisations such as Women's Aid that work with and support victims of human trafficking and those in prostitution, indicated in written and oral evidence that they fully supported the criminalisation of the purchase of sexual services in Northern Ireland. The evidence from those who had exited prostitution and victims of sex trafficking made a compelling case for the introduction of clause 6. As one former prostitute put it:

"it is not possible to defend prostitution without defending all the harm and damage it causes. Therefore, it is not possible to be pro-women in prostitution but not pro-prostitution, as some argue for upholding the sex trade."

In our view, the information obtained during our visit to Sweden regarding the impact that its legislation had on reducing demand for sexual services and tackling human trafficking and the meeting with the Oireachtas Joint Committee added weight to the argument to support clause 6. We also noted developments that had recently taken place that indicated a move towards the adoption of similar legislation in other countries such as France, the publication of the European Parliament's Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality report on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its impact on gender equality, the European Parliament's plenary vote, which supported the position that demand reduction should be part of the strategy to reduce trafficking, and the Westminster all-party parliamentary group on prostitution and the global sex trade, whose report recommended that there should be a general offence for the purchase of sexual services. All that strengthens the argument for clause 6.

The members in support of clause 6 strongly believe that there is a clear link between human trafficking and the demand for sexual services. Criminalising the purchase of such services will curtail demand and therefore lessen the incentive for human trafficking for sexual exploitation, thus reducing it and making Northern Ireland a hostile place for such activity. Without clause 6, the objectives of the Bill are weakened.


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The view was also expressed that changing the law changes and creates values over time. The drink-driving legislation was cited as an example. Changing the law will challenge attitudes in Northern Ireland to paying for sex and indicate a desire to protect the most vulnerable and tackle trafficking for sexual exploitation.

Let me stop and speak briefly as an individual MLA. For me, there are serious question marks over the quality of the Queen's University research. I know that colleagues will go into that in more detail, but, if you accept the bona fides of that research, it should alarm, disturb and disgust all Members to learn that 17,500 men pay for sex every week in Northern Ireland. That, in itself, should send a very clear message to Members that we need to challenge that attitude. Those people believe that it is right to treat women and young girls as a commodity that they can buy for their sexual gratification. That, in itself, if you accept the Queen's University research, should give people a mandate to walk through the Lobbies in support of this law to challenge that attitude.

When completing Committee Stage back in April, other members of the Committee indicated that they were not in a position, at that time, to support clause 6. They stated that they required more evidence on the size and nature of prostitution in Northern Ireland, and they were concerned about the possible unintended consequences for those involved in prostitution of criminalising the purchase of sexual services. The Committee agreed to support clause 6, subject to the proposed amendments, with no member of the Committee voting against the clause. I hope that Committee members who were unable to express support for clause 6 back in April are in a position to do so today.

As I finish speaking as Chairman of the Committee, I want to bring to the attention of Members two quotes from informal meetings that the Committee held. One trafficked individual, Anna, has spoken in the media. She did not want to appear in the public sessions but met members privately. The other quote is from an individual whose evidence I found totally abhorrent and disgusting but who was incredibly candid and gave a real insight into the mind of someone who engages in paying for sexual services.

Let me quote the individual who thought that it was right to pay for sex. He believed that prostitution was driven by accessibility and acceptability. He was asked whether criminalising the buyer would stop him from buying sex. That individual said that he had engaged in encounters with over 200 individuals, not just in Northern Ireland but in foreign countries. He told the Committee that, even though he suspected that the people with whom he engaged were underage, that they were children, it did not stop him from having sex with — in my view, raping — those young girls. That is the type of mindset that exists. That is what we are talking about when we talk about the individuals involved.

That individual lives in Northern Ireland, is married and has three children. We asked him what his response would be if the law was introduced: would it stop him buying sex? He answered yes, saying that his wife knew nothing about his sex-buying and that the naming and shaming would be a massive deterrent. That was his response. Take it at face value, given the conduct in which he was engaged and the type of individual involved. He was a married man with three children. What was the single most important deterrent to him? The public shame — getting caught. The onus of enforcement would be on the buyer, not the seller, who is the victim in these instances. It is the effect of naming and shaming that would deter him from engaging in that activity.

The second quote is from Anna, who was trafficked to Northern Ireland for sexual exploitation. She stated that her one wish was for legislators to bring in laws criminalising men who pay for sex. She said, and I quote:

"Gangs involved in trafficking would not give up their profits easily and the only way to end trafficking is to end demand."

I support clause 6.

Ms Ruane: Go raibh maith agat, a LeasCheann Comhairle. Cuirim fáilte roimh an díospóireacht seo. Tá an Bille seo an-tábhachtach ar fad. I welcome the debate and the fact that the private Member's Bill has been brought forward by Lord Morrow. From the outset, it is obvious to anyone in this House that I am coming from a very different side of the political spectrum from Lord Morrow. He is a unionist. I am a republican. I do not want to label anybody, but I presume that he considers himself to be to the right. I consider myself to be to the left. I have never heard him call himself a feminist, whereas I am a strong feminist. You will have heard me say that on many occasions.

It is nice to hear my colleagues in the South of Ireland, such as Pádraig MacLochlainn TD, whom I was speaking to earlier today and over the weekend, getting such high praise. The best way to support the work that he has done is by supporting my party's amendment, which does not criminalise women. I look forward to hearing from the Member on that. It is also nice to see that the DUP is not afraid to break parity. We have heard a lot about parity over the years, and it is good to see that it is not afraid to break it.

I have watched the debate. I met many people and had discussions with women and men right across this island and indeed throughout the world. I have watched as progressive groups such as Amnesty International and Women's Aid are on opposite sides of the argument. I have enormous respect for both those organisations. I have listened as many women spoke about the rights of sex workers and workers while other women talked about prostitution with regard to human rights abuses and the exploitation of women. I have listened to academics. I will not engage in putting down research by any academics because the reality is that there are hundreds of them in the world, doing their research and coming from different perspectives. That is the reality. We can sit here and rubbish one report and use another. What I say is that, yes, the Minister has his report, but, equally, there is the report of 75 very esteemed academics in Ireland who are very critical of the approach that the Minister is taking. Today, I will not get into —

Mr B McCrea: Will the Member give way?

Ms Ruane: I will, Basil, yes.

Mr B McCrea: Thank you. I would like to ask you to think again about research. Does that mean that we do not bother with any research because you will always get some that supports your argument and somebody else will get their own research? Surely there must be something that we can rely upon to inform public debate.

Ms Ruane: I am not anti-research; I am all for it. The more research we have, the better. However, what I will not do here today is rubbish one report and say that another is wonderful because it supports my argument. The point that I am making is that academics are divided on this; let us not pretend that they are not. Some want to see legalisation of the so-called sex industry and regulations to protect people from it; others want to see the criminalisation of the purchaser of sex and for women who are prostitutes not to be criminalised.

As regards legal views, we could have different lawyers here who all have different opinions, depending on what question they are asked. I have always been very clear: I like the Nordic model. I believe that we should criminalise the purchaser of sex and decriminalise women. On a recent visit to Iceland in the summer with some of my colleagues who are here in the Chamber, we met the Minister of Social Affairs and Housing. I am not very good at Icelandic, but her name is Eygló Harðardóttir. Gender equality comes under her Department.

She was very supportive. As you know, Iceland is one of the countries that did bring in this law, and she was strongly in support of it. I absolutely accept some of the points that the Minister made. Some of those countries are much more equal than we are, have a much stronger focus on gender equality and are much fairer societies, but that should not be an excuse for us not to bring in good law.

We heard that different police forces have different interpretations. I am sure that the Dutch police would give us a very different view than the Swedish police now. Members will know that I am on the Policing Board. I listened to the PSNI, which started by saying that it would not be able to police it, and then — this is where the confusion comes in — changed its position when challenged. It is not up to the PSNI to decide what can or cannot be policed. It is up to the Assembly; it is up to us to make the law. For too long, and too often in the past, the PSNI took positions that were not actually its to take; parades is just one example of that. I am glad to see that the PSNI has now stated the correct position, which is that it will respect what the House agrees.

In Sinn Féin, we have had a robust debate. We have had detailed scrutiny. We have reserved our position. We wanted to genuinely hear all points of view. We are not nodding dogs. Debate, and grappling with complex issues, is part and parcel of our everyday political life. I am not on the Justice Committee, but I pay tribute to my colleagues Seán, Raymond and Rosie. I particularly thank Rosie for her attention to detail on this. We had an all-Ireland team, as you would expect from us, and Pádraig Mac Lochlainn and his team also worked with us.

I want to state in the House today that I respect people's right to hold different views and accept that many of them are sincerely held. I make no judgement on them. Personally, I have had a very clear view on this for a long time. I support clause 6. Our aim is to ensure that women in prostitution are not exploited. This means that we must create the circumstances where the women are not criminalised. That is why Sinn Féin tabled amendment No 29 and why we are looking for your support. The Chair of the Justice Committee will be delighted to know that Pádraig Mac Lochlainn supports the amendment. I ask for support for the amendment from across the House.

I support the Nordic model, but the debate has become very — what would you say — polarised. Nobody is saying, and I am certainly not saying — and to be fair to Lord Morrow, I have not heard him say — that we are going to get rid of prostitution in the morning, next year or the year after. However, I have heard people say that this is an important step in the right direction.

I am 52 years of age. I am a mother and a grandmother — a mamó, as Gaeilge. I have lived and worked in three continents. I have worked with some of the poorest people. I remember being in one country, which I will not name, where I had to go to a mother to tell her that her five-year-old child was getting $2·50 to have oral sex with a soldier. The reason that was happening was that nearly every prostitute in the town had AIDS. It broke my heart to go to that house. You could not call it a house; it was the size of nothing, with five children living in it. The mother did not know where her next penny was coming from. She said to me, "I've five children. I hid his clothes. I don't know how to stop him. I'm worn out."

Mr B McCrea: Will the Member give way?

Ms Ruane: I will.

Mr B McCrea: I am touched by the story that you have recounted. I think that everybody would be saddened by it. However, the Member will no doubt be aware of the International Labour Organization, which runs a large campaign about the reduction of AIDS.


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It has a report out that says that you will not be able to tackle the Aids epidemic throughout the world unless you are able to decriminalise sex. The argument that it makes is that there is no access to condoms, health provision or any of those things. If the Member is concerned about tackling disease in the human condition, and I am quite sure that she is, surely she agrees that we must find a way of making it acceptable to get support to the people who need it most.

Ms Ruane: I absolutely agree. I will come on to the International Labour Organization, and of course I will come on to proper sex education, which we have not had for too long in our society. Our children and young people need proper sex education.

Ms P Bradley: I thank the Member for giving way, and I thank her for telling us that. Will the Member agree with me that, in our country, we do not have a lot of those problems with HIV and Aids, but we do have men and women in our country who, daily, are abusing children as young as that and using them for sexual gratification. We do not know whether they are the children next door to us or children who are being trafficked into this country. So it is happening here in Northern Ireland as well.

Ms Ruane: I thank the Member for her intervention, and I absolutely agree with her.

As I was saying, I have worked on three different continents. I have worked with some of the richest people in the world, and I have worked with some of the poorest. As Members here will know, I was Minister of Education in the Assembly for four years. During that time, I met thousands of young people. I had daily conversations with them about careers and futures. In all those 52 years and in all those various jobs, no one ever said to me, "When I grow up, I want to be a prostitute."

The reality is that there are deep inequalities in Ireland, North and South. There are deep inequalities in the global north/south. I agree with my colleague Basil McCrea that a multifaceted approach is needed to deal with many of these issues. I am glad to hear the Chair of the Justice Committee talking about gender equality. We do not hear it enough from the opposite Benches, but I welcome the fact that we are hearing it more and more. Women are under-represented in politics, business, statutory bodies, sporting and cultural bodies, and international organisations.

The strongest message that we got in Iceland was that it is a more progressive society because women are active citizens in that society. I see my colleague Paula Bradley nodding her head in agreement, because she, too, was on that trip. It is in all of our interests — men and women — that we create a fairer, more equal society. I ask those men who do not yet call themselves feminists to do so rather than to react. You have daughters, and I have yet to meet a father who says that they do not want their daughters getting a fair crack of the whip and fair play.

Mr Givan: I thank the Member for giving way. I am all in favour of gender equality. I have no issue with that whatsoever. Let me say it as a father. I do not often talk about my children, but I have three daughters: Annie, Holly and Maisie. One is seven, one is five, and the other is coming two in a couple of weeks. What disturbs me is that there are people in our society who believe that they could be a commodity for them to buy. I could never, ever support such a proposition. Shame on those in the House who want to defend the enslaving and exploitation of my children and other people in the future for taking that approach.

Ms Ruane: I thank the Member for his intervention, but I have not heard anyone —

Ms Lo: Will the Member give way?

Ms Ruane: I will, yes.

Ms Lo: While, obviously, I agree that no children would want to be in prostitution as a career, it is important to note that many of them have been driven into prostitution because of social inequalities, poverty, drug addiction, homelessness — various social problems. We need to eradicate those social inequalities — those difficult problems that they experience. Then, they would not be driven into prostitution.

Ms Ruane: I absolutely agree with my colleague, and I am coming to some of those points. I have not heard anyone in the House trying to defend exploitation, prostitution or people who abuse women. I have not heard that, and I think we need to be fair. Rather than saying, "Shame on people who do not agree with us", I think we need to recognise that we are having a very honest debate. Nobody has all the answers. I have one view; other people have other views. I am going to believe that all of us want to try to bring about changes so that none of our children has to face the issues that my colleague or Anna Lo has talked about.

I make no judgement of prostitutes. I understand the reasons why they choose that role. The point I was making is that it is not a role they started in life saying they wanted. They are driven to be something that they did not choose to be because of life experience or poverty. That is why we have brought forward an amendment, which I did not hear the Chair of the Justice Committee talking about. He talked about Lord Morrow's amendment, but he did not talk about ours, which is that the Minister of Health develop a strategy, in consultation with other Departments, and where we will actively support women who want to exit prostitution. It is all very well —

Mr Agnew: I thank the Member for giving way. She describes herself as a feminist. I would describe myself as someone who is aspiring to feminism. I think that that is probably as close as I can put it. She makes reference to those who wish to exit prostitution. The Queen's University research, whatever people think of it, showed that something like 32% of those in prostitution in Northern Ireland who were surveyed have third-level education degrees. As a feminist and as a woman, does she support those who choose prostitution to make that choice for themselves?

Ms Ruane: I would prefer to see prostitution eradicated. I do not believe that any woman chooses prostitution, and I do not believe that prostitution is not harmful to women. I think that there are complex reasons why women go into prostitution. You know that I am a feminist, but I do not believe that prostitution is a life choice for a woman. Again, I stress, in case anyone did not hear me: I do not believe we should criminalise women. That is why I am asking for your support on our amendment.

Mr Givan: I appreciate the Member giving way. She has made the point that I did not mention their amendment. Let me make it clear: we will be supporting the amendment that has been tabled in relation to that aspect.

Ms Ruane: Is that amendment No 28?

Mr Givan: It is to do with the criminalisation aspect that you talked about.

Ms Ruane: I appreciate that clarification; I thank the Member for it. I want to broaden this a little bit. Iceland and Norway can introduce and implement their laws, and make the changes that are necessary, because they have an equal society. We have a way to go before we reach the equality that they have in their society. We have to aspire towards it, and we have to work towards it. We have to do things, like get rid of page 3. I find it offensive to see pictures of naked women splayed all over popular newspapers. We have to get rid of partially clothed women in advertisements to sell cars; we have to stop feeding into a culture that turns a blind eye to misogyny, sexism, violence against women and children and glorification of the lad culture. We have loads of that here. I throw that out as a challenge.

I cringe every time I hear people in the House or on the radio — leaders of parties — talk about "manning up". Get rid of that language. It is outdated, and it should be gone. It should not be used; it is so insulting.

We need a new message going out, to boys and girls, of respect, equality, assertiveness and empowerment. Added to this, women are seen as less than, and men are seen as more important. It chips away at the self-esteem of women. As I said before, we do not have a particularly good culture in talking about sexuality and about protecting ourselves. Is it any wonder that we have such a high level of teenage pregnancy and significant levels of domestic and sexual violence? I am not saying this to make a political point, but it is those same negative and dangerous messages that are being sent to our LGBT community that they are less than. All these negative images need to stop.

Now, on to prostitution. I find that what happens to women who are engaged in prostitution deeply hurtful. Their bodies are being touched, grabbed and penetrated again and again, usually on a daily basis, having different men dictate what they want to do. Prostitution is about the sexual satisfaction of the sex buyer, not the prostituted person. One person with money buys access to the body of another person, who, generally, is in a very desperate situation. Prostitution has a devastating impact on the physical and mental health of those affected. It affects self-esteem and self-confidence, and it can result in infertility. Many women involved in Ireland's sex industry feel that they had no real choice and that poverty and life circumstances dictated "choices" that they made. Those in prostitution face beatings, rape, sexual assault and degrading treatment, and they live in a state of constant tension.

Contrarily to that, the sex buyer has a choice, and it should be noted that only one in 15 men — although it is too many — has purchased sex in Ireland. So, 14 out of 15 have not. Let us not forget that. In the North, we are told that it is 3%. This is not a myth about lonely, isolated men; 60% are married or in a relationship.

Reducing the size of the sex trade will help to combat organised prostitution. Organised criminality is linked to and completely pervades the sex trade in Ireland. The sale of people for sex is one of the three most lucrative international criminal enterprises along with drugs and arms. Prostitution is a high-gain, low-risk enterprise for those involved. That is, those who are not prostituted themselves.

Many third parties gain. Who gains? Career criminal pimps, landlords and prostitution advertisers. Demand from those who buy sex fuels the trade in women and children who are trafficked. It sustains an illegal prostitution industry worth hundreds of millions a year in Ireland. The simple, lucrative step of incriminating the purchase of sex would immediately cut demand to that huge, lucrative trade. Diminished demand for paid sex would support the PSNI to target persistent criminality, and we need a step change from the PSNI in relation to this.

Legislation can be used to change attitudes and, ultimately, behaviours. I know that we can have a debate about whether it has been successful in Sweden and how successful it has been, but what we do have now is a decade of an entire generation that has grown up in a society where it is considered unacceptable for bodies of women and girls to be bought by others for their sexual satisfaction. Seventy per cent to, possibly, 80% of Swedes support this on the basis that exploitation is exploitative and incompatible with equality. In the past 12 months, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, MPs in France and, just two weeks ago, MPs in Canada have backed the targeting of demand to curb exploitation, abuse and trafficking.


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One of the European Parliament resolutions supported Iceland, Norway and Sweden, and it did so because it:

"Believes that looking upon prostitution as legal ‘sex work’ ... is not a solution to keeping vulnerable women and under-age females safe from violence and exploitation, but has the opposite effect and puts them in danger of a higher level of violence, while at the same time encouraging prostitution markets – and thus the number of women and under-age females suffering abuse – to grow;".

Trafficking women and girls for the purposes of sexual exploitation is a modern, global form of slavery.

Ms P Bradley: I thank the Member for giving way. The Member and I often do not agree on things, but there are things that we do agree on, and one of those is the rights of women. Will the Member comment on the issue in clause 6 and what the Human Rights Commission has come out and said in its support for clause 6?

Ms Ruane: I read the submission from the Human Rights Commission, and I heard what the Chair of the Justice Committee said. The Human Rights Commission had queries about some aspects, but it was supportive. Amnesty International is not, and I have huge respect for Amnesty International. It has its reasons, but I do not agree with its reasons, on this occasion. I thank the Member for her intervention.

I will move on to looking at Dublin, and I know that reference was made to what has happened there. We can look to our colleagues there. We now have two reports from the Oireachtas Justice Committee. It has unanimously backed sex buyer laws decisions taken after 800 written submissions and six months of hearings. The Justice Minister, Frances Fitzgerald, has also spoken of using laws to target demand and ruin the business model for pimps and traffickers. There is now an expectation that the South will publish legislation before Christmas and that laws will follow.

Sex buyer laws are not new. As we have heard, they have been implemented successfully in a number of countries, including Sweden. The level of men buying sex has reduced from 13·6% in 1996 to 7·9% in 2008, according to research commissioned by the Swedish Government. Three years ago, the Stockholm police estimated that between 200 and 400 women and girls have been annually trafficked into Sweden for prostitution, while, in Finland, where there is no law targeting demand, the number is 15,000 to 17,000.

The Swedish experience stands in marked contrast to the situation in the Netherlands, where laws that attempted to regularise prostitution have brought about more than a decade of failure. Organised crime and illegal brothels continue to flourish right alongside those that are licensed. A recent paper commissioned by the International Labour Organization indicates that Germany, which introduced a more liberal prostitution law in 2002, is estimated to have 150,000 people working as prostitutes. That is 60 times that of Sweden, even though the population is only 10 times bigger.

The Oireachtas Justice Committee agreed, when it included prostitution as sexual violence, and said that no action should be taken to criminalise or stigmatise those who sell sex.

I would like to mention briefly the Turn Off the Red Light campaign, and I know that other Members have mentioned it. The campaign seeks to end prostitution and human trafficking. It sees the trafficking of women and girls for the purposes of sexual exploitation as a modern form of slavery. Dozens of community groups, charities, trade unions, religious and secular alike, support the campaign, and our party has signed up to it. Amongst those organisations are the National Child Protection Training Centre, the National Women's Council of Ireland, One in Four Ireland, Rape Crisis Network, Immigrant Council of Ireland, Ruhama, Irish Refugee Council, SIPTU, the trade union movement, the Union of Students of Ireland and Women's Aid.

I want to single out Women's Aid. I have tremendous respect for it. What makes Women's Aid and groups like it different is that they are working day and daily with women and children who suffer violence, regardless of who they are. They are not involved at the academic level, and I respect academic research and reports, but I also accept that I have a right to disagree with them. They deal with it day in and day out.

They support and empower the women and children. They provide a safe place for the women and children when they are crying out for support. They are not getting enough support, and the women in the House from all parties will know that they need more support and more funding. I want to put it on record that, when I was Minister of Education, I put in place a programme to support Women's Aid so that it could train teachers in identifying children at risk at the earliest stage.

Sinn Féin has also tabled an amendment — amendment No 44 — calling on Minister Jim Wells to put in place support for women who want to exit prostitution and to work with other Departments to develop a strategy. We need a multi-agency approach; nobody can do this on their own. We will need to see real action on the part of Minister Wells rather than rhetoric, and resources need to be put alongside the Bill, if it is successful. I look forward to working with everyone in the House to ensure that that happens.

Mia de Faoite was mentioned, and I will quote her as I thought that she was particularly articulate. I will not quote some of the more distressing bits, because I do not think that I would be able to get through it. She said:

"Life on the street is complex. We led difficult and complex lives, and I would never be able to explain them in this short time. However, there are two issues that I would like to address today. The first is rape. Rape becomes part of the job, so much so that we do not really use the term 'rape'; we do not have permission to. We might allude to it, but then it is ignored and the subject is changed. Many people become desensitised to the pain of others because, if you acknowledge someone else's pain, you may just have to acknowledge your own."

She also said:

"Prostitution and sex trafficking are intrinsically linked: you have one because of the other. For the last 18 months of my time on the Burlington Road, I stood alongside a trafficked woman. She became my closest friend, and I have never seen a human being so broken down. The conditions in which she lived were inhumane, and, although we had arrived at the same place through different means, we were connected because we were bought, used, exploited, humiliated and raped by the same offenders. One night I would be bought, and, a few nights later, the same man would buy her. On a couple of occasions, we were bought together. That connection can never be broken by anyone at any time in any country."

Reading Ms de Faoite's evidence to the Committee was harrowing, and I pay tribute to her for speaking up on this important issue.

I have also listened to many people in the House talk about regulation and driving things underground. I have no doubt that, if we were living in a different century, we would be having the same debate here except that the term would be "slavery". Some people would have been saying, "You have to regulate and protect. Slaves are not from one country, one colour, one age or one language". I know that hindsight is a great thing, but would anyone in the House advocate that we should legislate and put slaves in a red light district so that we can protect and regulate them? I do not think so.

The debate that we are having today is taking place all over the world. We have an opportunity to show leadership and send out the message that this part of Ireland is not open for business for pimps and traffickers, that we will not criminalise prostitutes and that we will put in place mechanisms of support for women to exit prostitution. Supporting our amendments is the best way of sending a very clear message that the aim of the Bill is not to criminalise women involved in prostitution. In the aftermath of this debate and the Bill, I ask that we show understanding for different viewpoints and that we continue to engage, regardless of the outcome. I hope that the Bill goes through the House. We will play our role to ensure that it does.

Mr A Maginness: I do not intend to speak for too long. Many of the issues have been outlined by the Chair of the Committee in a succinct fashion in relation to the Committee's deliberations and the attitude that it adopted both in general terms and, in particular, on clause 6. Of course, the Minister, quite properly, presented his point of view in opposition to clause 6, a position that my SDLP colleagues and I disagree with. In fact, I have become a little impatient with this debate because we could have reached a unified position on the clause much earlier.

I am grateful to Ms Ruane for clarifying the position of her party, and I take that on board. However, the central issue is exploitation: the exploitation of a woman by a man. That is it. It is as simple as that, and you do not have to go any further. It is exploitation by violence or economic superiority. There may be other reasons, too, but it is the exploitation by a man of a woman because he wants sex, he has the money and he is prepared to pay for it. In essence, that is what this is all about. If we ignore that, we are running away from the central issue of exploitation. It is a gross violation of any woman that this should happen. Some spurious arguments have been put forward, not, I believe, in the House but outside the House, on women choosing this as a working career. That is absolutely and utterly wrong, and it is important to nail that lie.

Mr Agnew: I thank the Member for giving way. I find it hard to understand why anyone, male or female — we have to acknowledge that there are male prostitutes — would choose that form of making money, but can he cite the evidence that contradicts the Minister's evidence that significant numbers do so? What evidence does he have that every circumstance involves coercion, poverty or lack of volition?

Mr A Maginness: I had the privilege to be a member of the Justice Committee. I heard the very clear evidence coming through, and I do not resile for one second from the position that I have expressed. I defy the Member to produce evidence to support the myth that there is such a thing as a happy hooker. It is a myth, and those who have exited prostitution will tell you that it is entirely erroneous — entirely wrong. We should not peddle myths in the House. We should be educating the public and the media, telling them that there is no such thing as an option and that women are forced into prostitution. That is the position, and we should act on that. We should do away with the notion that there is such a thing as a happy hooker who simply enjoys this so-called work, allows herself to be exploited and allows herself to become some sort of object of pleasure for a man with whom she has no loving relationship. Will the Member give way?

Mr A Maginness: Certainly, I will give way.


7.30 pm

Mr B McCrea: I have no doubt of the sincerity of the Member's position. However, does he think that the criminalisation of the purchase of sex by men will improve the situation considerably, or are there other things that we should take into consideration, such as education?

Mr A Maginness: I will come to that, but the short answer is that I do believe that the criminalisation of the purchaser will have a profound effect on prostitution. It has had a profound effect in other jurisdictions, particularly in the Nordic countries. The Nordic model — the Swedish model, as we call it — is something that we should attempt to emulate, and I do not think that there are any serious arguments against it. I said that the evidence was presented to the Committee. I will not repeat it all, but, if you had listened to Mia de Faoite or to Anna, who gave evidence to the Committee in private session, you would have been absolutely overwhelmed by their testimony, which was very impressive indeed.

Mr Agnew: I thank the Member for giving way. While I have no doubt that that evidence was compelling — we have heard some of it summarised today — the Member is well educated and knows that the testimony of one person does not represent the generality. We have to go from the general to the specific. That is why we need research, and the Minister has provided us with that. While many have questioned the validity of that research, I have yet to see counter-evidence to it.

Mr A Maginness: Huge amounts of research have been done on this, both nationally and internationally. The overwhelming conclusion that people have come to when asking whether women voluntarily enter into prostitution is that, no, they do not. They are exploited human beings. Ms Ruane made a very telling point about the parallel with slavery. This is a form of slavery. There is absolutely no doubt that it is a form of slavery. Nobody volunteers to do this, and to say otherwise is totally wrong and misleading.

Mr Givan: Will the Member give way?

Mr A Maginness: Yes, indeed.

Mr Givan: The Member says that it is totally misleading to give the contrary view that Mr Agnew and Mr McCrea seem to hold. Does the Member agree that that very benign view of prostitution is not borne out by the reality of the evidence that we heard? Can the Member cite for me any evidence that shows that prostitution is good for the woman? That is a salient point. Those who want to uphold the mythical right to choose in respect of the most vulnerable women, who are being exploited, present this as a right to choose, yet those women are in the depths of despair. That is not a choice. Where is the evidence that prostitution in any form is good for you?

Mr A Maginness: I agree. The Member expresses it very well. We did not come across such evidence, and I defy anybody in the House to produce it. The more evidence we heard, the more convinced we were that there was no such thing as a career choice. If you do not believe me, talk to Women's Aid. Some of the most powerful evidence came from Women's Aid. They are working with women in prostitution who are trying to exit prostitution. Do not take my word for it; talk to them. I have absolute confidence in their expertise in this field.

I am on the point about research. The Department has produced research from Queen's University. I will not go into the details of it, but the conclusion of Women's Aid on that research was that it was:

"deeply flawed and lacks a basic understanding of the links between prostitution, human trafficking and the spectrum of sexual exploitation that is taking place here in Northern Ireland."

For that reason, Women's Aid withdrew its name and moral authority from the research that had been produced. That is good enough for me. They are the people who know what this is all about. That was no fancy academic essay or fancy idea, but a reaction by them, given their experience, to a flawed research report. I put my trust in their judgement in relation to that report.

I had better deal with the Minister's position. He also said that he doubts the practicality of the provision. There may well be difficulties with the provision and with enforcement, but we have to test it. It is an advance on what we have and we have to test it. For the first time ever —

Mr Wilson: Will the Member give way?

Mr A Maginness: Yes, indeed.

Mr Wilson: Would the Member agree that almost any law enforcement produces practical difficulties on occasions? Rural crime and the stealing from farms across the countryside in Northern Ireland creates huge difficulties for the police because of the shortage of cars and manpower to patrol areas. Just because we find it difficult to patrol those areas or catch those people, it does not mean that we should not have a law and allow robbers to steal from farms . Would he agree that if we use the argument the Minister has used, there are a whole lot of things that the police are asked to do at the moment that we would simply tell them to give up on as they cannot possibly do them with ease?

Mr A Maginness: Of course, I agree with what the Member has said.

For the first time ever, the man will have to pay in terms of criminality. That is the difference and that is an important message to send across this society. Across this island, across these islands and across the UK, this will be the first time that that will have happened. We are setting a precedent. I think that we are setting a good precedent and that we can build on it. This law may not be perfect, but it is a good first step, and that is the important thing about it.

An argument was put forward — I think it was by the Minister; I do not know if I am right — that prostitution would simply go underground. The view that was expressed to the Committee was that prostitution is already underground. If you do not trust that then let me quote from an interview with Anna, who gave evidence to our Committee, in today's 'News Letter'. She stated that the Bill:

"will not drive vulnerable women underground".

She continued:

"They are already underground. Nobody was coming to help me."

That is a good answer to that argument about driving prostitution underground.

In relation to one other aspect — the change in the onus — paragraph 128 of the Committee's report shows that the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission advised the Committee that:

"in July 2013, the UN CEDAW Committee recommended to the UK Government that they revise their legislation by shifting the burden of proof from the prosecution to the purchaser of sexual services."

That was another development internationally, and, indeed, international law is moving in that direction anyway. The Swedes, the Nordic countries, the lower House in the French Parliament, the Canadian Parliament and the European Parliament, through the Honeyball report, and there have been developments in other fora throughout the world. I think it is important that we bear those in mind. They have been mentioned already by Ms Ruane and by the Chair of the Committee.

Let me also say, in dealing with the Minister's argument, that the PSNI started off in a position of opposition to this but, fair credit to them, they moved their position, not as a result of political pressure but of clear arguments coming to them. They changed their minds, and people should give them credit for changing their minds from opposition to qualified support. Yes, they see difficulties in implementation and so forth, but it is right and proper for them to identify those difficulties. When this law was introduced in Sweden, the Swedish police said that they did not want it and were opposed to it, but now the Swedish police are advocates for this particular law. It is very important that we bear that in mind.

Finally, in relation to the change in law, let me say that law has an effect on society; law changes values in society. Somebody referred earlier to drink-driving. Most people now — the generality of people — are horrified by anybody drinking and driving. Ten or 20 years ago, people chanced their arm, and people did not see that as something antisocial. So the values have changed; and there is a normative effect in society when law changes. That sends out a very strong message, not simply to human traffickers but also to society at large, and young people in particular, that there has been an important value established by this law. I think that that —

Ms Ruane: Will the Member give way?

Mr A Maginness: Yes, Ms Ruane.

Ms Ruane: I absolutely appreciate the point you make about law. Another good example of that is the anti-smoking law. You would not go into a restaurant now and expect to see people smoking, whereas it was the norm before. There was not much intervention, although police forces, North and South, thought that it might be difficult. So I thank the Member for making that point.

Mr A Maginness: I thank Ms Ruane for that very effective intervention. Of course, when all those matters were being debated in relation to smoking, the police said that it was impossible for them to police or enforce that. However, if you go to the toughest areas of Belfast, you see people obeying the law in a right and proper fashion. There is a respect for the law, and people enjoy the change in atmosphere within establishments.

We are not in a position to support amendment No 29. We think it is late in the day. We do not think that the case has yet been proven in relation to it, and there could be abuse if the provision were passed. It could cause a public nuisance. However, I would say in relation to amendment No 29 that the current position in relation to soliciting is this: the PSNI, in its report to the Committee, said that over the past five years there had been no prosecutions. So it is not a matter of the police actively enforcing that particular provision, and I think that the current provision, whereby there is tolerance of such, should be preferred. We do not rule out a review of that position in the future, but at this moment we cannot support the amendment.

Amendment No 38 concerns the report on clause 6. I do not think it incompatible with clause 6(6), if I am correctly citing the Bill as it presently stands. Amendment No 38 has been brought by Sinn Féin. We support that particular amendment because it adds to clause 6. We are happy enough to support it. I will conclude there.


7.45 pm

Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Dallat): The Minister has been in his place since Question Time and has indicated that he does not wish to be discourteous to the House by leaving the debate. I propose to suspend the sitting for a short break until 8.00 pm.

The sitting was suspended at 7.45 pm and resumed at 8.00 pm.

(Mr Principal Deputy Speaker [Mr Mitchel McLaughlin] in the Chair)

Mr Elliott: Clause 6 has caused much debate, probably much more than any other part of the Bill. Unfortunately, there were some quite aggressive debates in Committee and attempts, due to individual stances, at character assassination. I will not engage in any of that this evening.

I listened to the Minister speaking on the matter. I paraphrase what he said, but he suggested that the clause would not do what it is probably intended to do. That is one of the main bases of the Minister's arguments. I have sympathy with that position, and I believe that he is accurate in some ways. However, the problem is that there is nothing else here, and I think that Mr Maginness said that. There is nothing else in place to deal effectively with prostitution and the sale and purchase of sexual services.

A number of organisations and individuals, including the Presbyterian Church and the Methodist Church, highlighted potential problems. Indeed, the Police Service of Northern Ireland is still indicating that it has some issues with clause 6. However, in the absence of any legislation currently in statute or with the potential to be in statute at any time in the near future, this is all we have to improve the situation regarding the sale and purchase of sexual services.

I note that the Department of Justice last Friday published the research that was carried out by Queen's University. I will not try to discredit that research by any means; I do not think that that is my position. It came out only last Friday, and we have not had a reasonable opportunity to assess it. However, I am concerned that it came out just two days before this debate. If it had not been for Lord Morrow's Bill and clause 6, would we have had that research at all? Would the pressure have been there to progress other legislation that may come forward — I hope that it does — to deal with prostitution and the sale and purchase of sexual services? What we have is out of date and needs to be updated and upgraded. We do not have legislation at the moment, so clause 6 is all there is. We want a reduction in the sale of sexual services and prostitution, and what we have at the moment is the only means to provide support for that. If it speeds up further legislation, it will have been worth it. If it moves the Department to do further research and bring forward legislation in the future, clause 6 will have served that purpose as well.

Sinn Féin has tabled amendment No 29. Ms Ruane did not fully address many of the issues on which I have queries, but maybe they will be addressed by other Members. I do not know whether that amendment will be helpful in reducing prostitution. If it were helpful, I would find a way to support it, but I am not sure. It may encourage prostitution. If the offence of loitering and soliciting were removed, would that not encourage more prostitution? I am open to persuasion. The amendment has just come forward, but, at present, I have not heard enough to persuade me of its merits. I will listen to further debate.

The second amendment that I want to deal with is amendment No 37 from Lord Morrow, which would replace the part that puts responsibility on the Department to raise awareness of the offence. That responsibility is made somewhat more specific, in that Lord Morrow's amendment states that there must be an advertising campaign to raise awareness. I am just trying to get a basis for that. I am not saying that I oppose it; I just want to hear more information. I am sure that Lord Morrow will address the issue. I want more information on why the responsibility is not more broadly based, as was, I think, the original intent of the Bill, and why it is narrowed down to just an advertising campaign. Maybe, at Further Consideration Stage, we can look at how there could be more involvement and work with those in the sex trade in an attempt to persuade them and better educate them. That would be a much more broadly based situation than just an advertising campaign. Lord Morrow has just tabled the amendment, and I am happy to listen to what he has to say in the debate.

What I am trying to say and what I hope that I am saying is that I envisage difficulties with clause 6, but, as somebody asked earlier, what legislation comes without difficulties? I hope that it will pressurise the Department into making further legislation. It is all that we have at the moment, so we should take what we are getting and hope that it will lead to further legislation.

Mr Dickson: Clause 6 is, undoubtedly, the most controversial part of the Bill. It has generated most attention and, indeed, the longest and most rigorous part of the debate today. It is important that we debate clause 6, but it should not detract from what, I hope that Lord Morrow will agree, is the key part of his Bill, which is the human trafficking element — people brought into this country for domestic servitude or forced labour and other forms of human trafficking. I trust that the debate on clause 6 will not detract from what, I hope, he would describe as the key point of his Bill, which is human trafficking and the purposes for which it happens.

One clause is insufficient to deal with a subject such as the criminalisation of the purchase of sexual services. It is for that and other reasons, which I will explain, that I do not believe that clause 6 should stand part. Indeed, it may divert important attention and resources from the key import of the Bill, namely human trafficking. However, let me, for the avoidance of doubt, say that I believe that this should be the subject of a separate Bill — I pick up the point that Mr Elliott made — that can deal in detail with the complexities of the subject.

My opposition is based on evidence from looking at what happened in Sweden, where a similar model has been in place for 15 years. The reality is that criminalising the purchase of sex has not resulted in any demonstrable reduction in prostitution or trafficking in Sweden. Some reports suggest that the level of street prostitution has gone down, although that is disputed by those who have rigorously scrutinised the numbers. There is also no certainty that it has decreased permanently. Furthermore, the vast majority of prostitution is now off-street and online, but, some 15 years on in the Swedish experience, that is not surprising. As the research by Queen's University has now shown, it is also the case here that those arguing that the law has been successful seem to have equated the reduction in street prostitution with an overall reduction, which has not been proved. Indeed, in 2008, the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare said:

"It is also difficult to discern any clear trend of development: has the extent of prostitution increased or decreased? We cannot give any unambiguous answer to that question."

The likely outcome of clause 6 is that it may drive the industry further underground and further marginalise sex workers, moving them to the so-called darknet, paramilitaries and drug dealers but no less accessible. They will be perceived de facto to be working in a criminal environment, which will undoubtedly increase stigma and substantially reduce the tolerance of them by society. The clause may act under the guise of protecting sex workers, but, for some, it will fuel an ideological position against prostitution and those who work as prostitutes.

We see that, in Sweden, rather than offering support and protection, for example, foreign sex workers are criminalised and deported. It will be more difficult for sex workers to avail themselves of important essential services to protect themselves or to leave prostitution. There is evidence in Sweden of sex workers moving off the streets and into underground work, following the criminalisation of purchase, as well as urgent and panicked arrangements leaving prostitutes with little time to assess clients for risk, making it more dangerous for the women involved. Similarly, there is more reluctance on the part of those who buy sex online to give any identifying information that may lead to their prosecution, again preventing the proper vetting of clients and leaving sex workers more vulnerable to abuse. There is evidence from two Swedish researchers who said that a sex worker with whom they had worked through fieldwork had now lost count of the number of times that she had been raped by men who had not provided appropriate personal information and were now untraceable. It is important to note that the same sex worker said that she had not been raped before the purchase of sex was criminalised in Sweden in 1999.

Crucially for the Bill's primary objective, there is evidence that the criminalisation of purchase in Sweden has discouraged clients from reporting incidents of trafficking and abuse. Those involved in fieldwork in Sweden have been able to directly establish this by talking to the purchasers of sex. This principle is why I believe that clause 6 has the potential to be ineffective in reducing trafficking and to create a more dangerous situation for those who are trafficked for sexual exploitation.

Other Members across the House know that to be true. From Committee discussions and plenary debates, we were, at least, strongly led to believe that members of Sinn Féin had reservations about clause 6. It is remarkable and extremely disappointing how suddenly that questioning has simply collapsed, with minds made up before the initial research from Queen's University was published. When Rosie McCorley of Sinn Féin told the Assembly on 23 September 2013 that her party needed detailed information from research on the impact on women involved in prostitution before it could make a decision on clause 6, she said that she looked forward to seeing the Department's research. Yet, the amendments from Mr McCartney, Mr Lynch and Mr Hazzard were clearly formulated and submitted before the Minister circulated the initial findings of the Queen's University research at the end of last week.

That research tells us, as we have heard from others in the House, that only 2% of sex workers think that the purchase of sex should be made illegal; 61% of Northern Ireland-based sex workers surveyed thought that it would make them less safe; 85% believe that it will not reduce sex trafficking; and only 8% of clients said that it would make them stop purchasing sex. The overwhelming weight of evidence is against clause 6 in its current form. It is opposed by the vast majority of sex workers, whom the Bill seeks to protect. Yet, the Assembly is on the verge of passing it into law. That, I believe, is an indictment of this institution. Strength of feeling is trumping the evidence on how we best protect some of the most vulnerable people in society. This is clearly a case of heart over head, ideology over practicality and, for Sinn Féin, control from party leadership in the Republic of Ireland.

It shows how little progress has been made in involving sex workers and properly considering their views on policies relating to them. It is, quite frankly, astounding that the only piece of independent research telling us what the sex industry looks like in Northern Ireland has been, by and large, rubbished and ignored by those who wish to support clause 6. I suspect that that is because it is telling them what they do not want to know or hear.


8.15 pm

I remind Members of the written evidence given to the Committee by members of the national working group on prostitution and exploitation and by Tamara Barnett, senior researcher for policing and crime in the Greater London Authority. She told us:

"Those working with sex workers state that criminalisation of either the client or sex worker can result in dangerous and sometimes fatal consequences for sex workers. This is particularly the case for on-street sex workers, since criminalisation often leads to displacement, forcing sex workers to work in less well lit, more dangerous and less well known areas."

Members should think very carefully, and consider the warnings, about the potential for fatal results from criminalisation. If, in the next three years, it can be shown that even one sex worker has been beaten, raped or murdered as a result of the legislative change made by the Assembly, those consequences will forever haunt this institution.

It is clear that our approach to prostitution should not be dealt with in one clause of a Bill on human trafficking. It is a much wider, more complicated issue that urgently needs to be considered separately. I commend groups such as Amnesty International, which, in the face of public opinion, has highlighted the deep flaws in clause 6. It is extremely important that those points have been made. We have in front of us a clause that should, in my view, not stand part of the Bill. I urge Members to follow the evidence and oppose it, and, in doing so, issue a call for separate legislation to deal with this complex matter.

Ms P Bradley: Like others in the House, I commend Lord Morrow for bringing the Bill forward. I know that he has applied great commitment and, I say on a personal level, has sat with me, on many occasions, to explain his rationale and alleviate any concerns I may have had, especially around the rights and empowerment of women. I know that he has done that with many people; when asked to sit down and explain, he has been more than generous with his time and has offered explanations to anyone who has asked for them.

In my comments on clause 6, I will first focus specifically on the letter that we received from the Minister of Justice on Thursday informing us of the research that was published on Friday. Then, I will focus on the research itself.

The letter from the Minister suggests that one of the main problems with clause 6 is the opposition of the police; the Minister claims they say that the offence is unenforceable. However, that is flatly contradicted by the evidence given to the Justice Committee by the police. In February this year, the now Assistant Chief Constable, Drew Harris, was asked whether the PSNI was against the legislation. He said, not once but three times, that the PSNI was not opposed. Moreover, when asked about the legislation in September last year and whether the police would enforce it, the then Chief Constable, Matt Baggott, far from suggesting that the offence was unenforceable — and there was an ideal opportunity to say then that it was unenforceable — said, "Absolutely. That is our job."

I now turn to the research itself. I am glad that it has been brought up. Much mention was made of it earlier in the debate, and I am glad to be able to speak on it because I feel that it was flawed. When the Minister commissioned the research in September 2013, just before the Second Stage of the Bill and 13 months after Lord Morrow first consulted on his Bill, he would have been aware that it would be at least a year before the research would come out. The argument then would have been that Members should reject clause 6 until we had the research or, as has now proven the case due to the date of Consideration Stage, that clause 6 would have to be rejected until the findings of the report could be considered.

Amanda Patterson, a Department of Justice official, was clear in the evidence that she provided to the Justice Committee back in March. She was asked by a Member for Foyle from the party opposite why the Department could not seek to work with Lord Morrow to ensure that the research was published before Consideration Stage. Her response was that clause 6 should be rejected even if Lord Morrow delayed, because:

"There would be too much coming out of the research to make a decision in a short time, because we would have to consider its findings. There may be recommendations that involve other people and having to consult other people. I do not think that it would work."

If another Department wants a great example of the textbook way to try to topple a proposal, the way that the Department of Justice has proceeded in considering clause 6 provides one.

If anyone has any doubts about what I have said about the Department's motivation, these must be blown away when we look at the researchers that they appointed. I know that Mr Wilson has also spoken about this. It is well known that academia is hugely divided on the question of whether criminalising demand is a good idea, not so much on the basis of the interpretation of the data but rather on the basis of the answers of scholars, like anyone else, in response to the underlying question of whether there any circumstances in which you regard selling sex as an acceptable form of employment. People have very strong views on this, and academics who answer yes to that question are, not surprisingly, completely opposed to criminalising paying for sex.

In this context, if one is to use public monies to conduct a review, it is imperative to assemble a balanced research team. Far from doing that, the Department assembled a group including published opponents of criminalising paying for sex — led by some who had already gone on the record in their opposition to clause 6 — that, not surprisingly, did not contain a single scholar who has been published in favour. The academics then proceeded to select an advisory group that was something of a who's who of critics of the approach of criminalising the purchase of sexual services. It even included one academic who is chair of the Sex Workers Alliance Ireland. Consequently, it should come as no great shock to anyone that the research was so critical of the criminalisation approach.

Rather than acting like a Government Department providing a proper review —

Mr Agnew: Will the Member give way?

Ms P Bradley: No, I will not. I am sure that you will have time to speak later.

The Department has acted like a think tank with a very clear agenda. However, I do have sympathy for these academics in some regards. First, the document that was produced, although deeply flawed, is actually a lot more nuanced than the Department of Justice's summary of findings. The Department of Justice did not include in its summary of the research any of the caveats that the researchers included in the text of the document, some of which I will come to in a few moments. The Department was also selective in the quotations from the report that they chose to highlight. This is not a surprise considering the political goal that they had for the research, which was to kick clause 6 to the kerb.

Secondly, I think that the researchers were probably quite rushed in preparing the document and conducting the fieldwork involved. The Department of Justice timetable involved here was a tight one, due to political considerations that it had in commissioning the research. This may have led to some of the methodology flaws in the research document.

I would now like to draw attention to some of the flaws that have been flagged up to me and that I have noticed in the research document. First, the use of an online survey as a basis for many of the conclusions drawn is of significant concern. I am informed by academics who have contacted me about this piece of research that online surveys are typically very selective and not very reliable in dealing with personal and emotional issues, of which this is certainly one. As the authors admit, this strategy was used not because it was the most appropriate strategy but because it was the most convenient one. This may well have been the case, because the researchers simply did not have the time to engage with more individuals face to face. The authors admit that face-to-face interviews would produce more reliable and authentic results, but they undertook an online survey, again, because it was most convenient.

In paragraph 2.6.12 of the report, the authors make a revealing statement with regard to the nature of the online survey that they utilised. They state that:

"It is also possible that sex workers with a relatively high degree of choice and independence about their working conditions are over-represented, and women, men and transgender persons, who are, to varying degrees, controlled by someone else, are underrepresented."

To my mind, that is an admission that those who are in prostitution who have been trafficked and who are controlled will have been unable to take part in the online survey, for obvious reasons. It is highly unlikely that they will have private internet access, and it is hard to believe that they would be allowed to take part in such research by their pimps or controllers. Despite that highly significant flaw, the researchers continue to assert that the online survey is reliable, and they go on to make a number of bold claims about the status of prostitution in Northern Ireland on the back of it, which the Department of Justice has repeated.

It is acknowledged that the researchers conducted 19 face-to-face surveys, but that is a very small sample from which to draw any meaningful conclusions. By way of comparison, a recent study conducted by Professor Roger Matthews and a number of academic researchers for a study into exiting from prostitution conducted face-to-face interviews with 114 women. They are more cautious about their findings than the academics involved in producing this research were.

Furthermore, the research openly acknowledges that fewer than half of the respondents, 46%, said that they sold sex in Northern Ireland. That means that the majority of respondents sold sex outside Northern Ireland. That is a major consideration, because, when the Minister proposed research, the point was made that it was not necessary since there was already an abundance of research. To that, the Minister responded that he wanted specific research on Northern Ireland. What he has done, though, is provide research that tells us far more about the rest of the British Isles than it does about Northern Ireland.

Sixty thousand pounds of the budget was spent on this research, and it turns out that the majority of the data does not even relate to Northern Ireland. The fact that the majority of the respondents do not sell sex in Northern Ireland has enormous implications for the findings, since it is virtually impossible to know whether responses are by those selling sex in Northern Ireland. Therefore, many of the claims made in the report cannot be relied on since over half of the sample live elsewhere.

Finally, as the author noted, after putting a case for the use of an opportunistic sampling frame, as is stated on page 31 of the report, one of the disadvantages of sampling frames is that some people will be more inclined to respond to the survey than others, and it is difficult to know which sub-population is over-represented. Estimates of the population size of sex workers and the clients on the basis of such data alone are, therefore, unreliable.

That knowledge of the serious limitations of the data does not prevent the authors going on to make a number of unjustified and unreliable claims. The implications of the selected and distorted nature of a sample and the lumping together of different types of sex workers, most of whom do not operate in Northern Ireland, mean that the principal aims of this research were not met. To my mind, considering the manifest flaws in this research, it seems apparent that the House should pay little heed.

Clause 6 outlines an approach that has proven effective in other jurisdictions and which will send a strong signal that paying for sex is not conduct that we will tolerate in Northern Ireland, with all that it means for trafficking and wider exploitation.

I finish with this, Mr Deputy Speaker. Before I became an MLA, I had a career as a police officer, and I worked in social services. I dealt with many horrific stories of vulnerable people. One sticks out clearly in my mind. We talk about child exploitation and trafficking, but let us not be so naive: this is happening in Northern Ireland on a daily basis.

I know of one child, whom I found out about and got to speak with. She was a young girl of 11. At 11 years old, she was selling oral sex to men — grown men — for as little as a few cigarettes. This is happening on our streets. We need to stop that. We need to prosecute those men for what they are doing to our children.


8.30 pm

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: There is an awful lot of background noise, which does not help us to follow the debate.

Mr McCartney: Go raibh maith agat, a Phríomh-LeasCheann Comhairle. Do not tolerate it while I am on my feet.

Caitríona Ruane laid out in a longer way than I will our support for clause 6, and she gave a comprehensive explanation of why we are supporting clause 6. I welcome the fact that there is an intention from the Democratic Unionist Party to support our amendment on soliciting and loitering. That is where I want to turn my attention first. Alban Maginness and Tom Elliott said that the lateness with which we tabled the amendment did not allow them to have a proper go at this. I appreciate that, and, perhaps, we should have done it a bit earlier, but timescales and deadlines always pose challenges.

Throughout our deliberations, particularly at Committee Stage, we had the view that, if we were doing this as an attempt to say on behalf of the Assembly and, indeed, the people whom we represent that we had a very clear issue with prostitution, we should be taking steps to decriminalise the actual prostitution. We would be sending a clear message to prostitutes that we do not consider them as part of the criminalisation that will take place as a part of this legislation. Alban Maginness, in a way, brought this down into a very short sentence when he said that at the core of this was the issue of exploitation. Indeed, Tom Elliott, if I picked him up correctly, agreed with that sentiment. Alban went on to say that it was a form of slavery. That is the context and the approach that we took on amendment No 29. If people were involved in slavery, you would not want to have in place a law that would criminalise someone for being a slave. That is the approach that we have taken to repealing the issues around soliciting and loitering. It is to send a very clear message to the people who are being exploited that in no way will we permit or allow a process of criminalisation when we are trying to tackle this complex issue. That is what was behind the framing of that amendment. I am not sure what way the vote will go tonight, but I appreciate that you may take more time and that maybe this is something that we might have to revisit at Further Consideration Stage. We will not count the votes in advance.

Alban Maginness has made the point tonight and consistently throughout our deliberations and scrutiny about the normative effect that changing the law can have. We would send a clear signal to the people who, we accept, are vulnerable and who, we accept, are being exploited that changing or repealing the law in this way would allow them to feel that they are not part of the process and are not to blame and therefore should not be charged or criminalised as a result of some of their vulnerabilities and some of their exploitation. That is the context in which we tabled that amendment.

Amendment No 38 relates to reporting. We feel that it is a good way, and I think that everybody accepts that it is the first go that this Assembly or, indeed, any legislature on these islands has had at bringing about this type of legislation. It is not a bad precedent to set that, after a period, we will reflect on its effect. We all accept that there is no point in having legislation in place and then finding out that it has no real effect. The reporting mechanism ensures that, in two or three years, as we have framed it, people will be able to look back and say, "Here is the effect that we had". If there are gaps and issues around arrests or convictions or if people who leave prostitution are not given the services and resources that are framed in this legislation and that it intends to give, that needs to be addressed. That is a good appraisal of it in three years' time.

One thing that struck me is that there is no doubt that the PSNI — Caitríona Ruane and others have touched on this — had a particular position and then changed it. In fairness to them, in the middle of it, they said that the Nordic model was based around surveillance and, in particular, phone tapping. In this legislation, phone tapping would not be permitted under our RIPA laws. Therefore, that is the type of thing that we have to monitor in three years' time. That is why we feel that the amendment around the progress report is necessary.

There has been much mention tonight of Pádraig Mac Lochlainn. Indeed, the Chair spoke about him in very glowing terms. Jim Wells is not here, but, if you go back through the Hansard reports of many of our Committee meetings, you will see that the name Pádraig Mac Lochlainn featured in nearly every evidence session. In fact, I think that he could be the first Sinn Féin member to address a DUP conference. He will be waiting for that invite in the future.

Stewart Dickson was there — he is not in his place now — when we went to Dublin and met the Joint Oireachtas Committee. The Oireachtas report had concluded. It was an 800-page report, and there were hundreds of witnesses. The question was asked about the two processes that were in place. One had taken place in Dublin, and the other was unfolding up here. He said very stridently that all of us should come at this with an open mind. He found himself on a journey, and the journey took him from having a particular position to another position. That is the way that we approached the issue.

Stewart Dickson mentioned the research, and Tom Elliott also touched on it. Obviously, the Department and the researchers were under a fair degree of pressure, but the Bill was tabled last year. It went to Committee Stage around November, so it was reasonable enough for us to expect that the research would have been at a more advanced stage than it was. If Stewart Dickson was of the view that we could be convinced by the research to take a different position from the one that we have now taken on clause 6, the emphasis or onus was on the Department to come up with that research a bit quicker. I suppose that the easy way out of this is to say that Dublin made up its mind and we followed for whatever reason, but we have a very clear approach to the matter. We listened to the evidence, and there is absolutely no doubt that many of the people who came in front of the Committee and gave evidence — I think that Alban Maginness mentioned Women's Aid and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions — made very powerful arguments on this.

Again, there might be a debate about whether there are some people who do this and believe that they are not being exploited. That might be the case, but the strength of the evidence and the approach taken by most people was that the overwhelming majority of people who find themselves in the clutches of prostitution do not do it willingly. They believe that they were forced into it, perhaps by circumstances beyond their control. There may not be physical enforcement, but they found themselves enforced. In that light and with that in mind, we support clause 6.

Mrs Cameron: I support the Bill tabled by my colleague Lord Morrow and welcome the opportunity to take part in the debate this evening. I will also take the opportunity to thank Lord Morrow for the valuable work that he has done to bring this important Bill before the House today.

Since the days of Thomas McCabe and Mary Ann McCracken, Northern Ireland has had a rich abolitionist heritage in respect of slavery. Yet, over 200 years since the Abolition of the Slave Trade Act and 181 years since slavery was made illegal in the United Kingdom, thousands of vulnerable and disadvantaged people are still trapped as slaves in our so-called modern, progressive society. Those people are the evidence of a modern-day form of slavery that is hidden in plain sight and walks amongst us daily.

Human trafficking has many manifestations, including forced labour, domestic enslavement and criminal exploitation, with the sexual exploitation of women and children the most common type. All of those serve only to suppress and humiliate people and reduce them to little more than tradable commodities. As a legislature, we must ensure the passage of the Bill in order to protect the vulnerable and voiceless in our society and provide them with viable alternatives and support to return them to life rather than simply an existence.

Human trafficking is often a detached and displaced crime with the coordinators, in many cases, based in different countries as part of shadowy, faceless organisations. As we see a growing number of ethnic minorities being trafficked, it is clear that those organisations prey on the most vulnerable, particularly women who are already at risk, be it due to ethnic cleansing or caste systems or simply by virtue of their gender. The victims are selected, groomed and traded like possessions, perhaps most poignantly on the promise of a better life that, we all know, is rarely, if ever, the case. As they are often people who, to all intents and purposes, do not exist in their own country, we must do all that we can to help them when they arrive in our country through no choice of their own. As the UK and Republic of Ireland Governments have moved to enact similar legislation, it is vital that Northern Ireland puts in place similar measures to ensure that we do not become a conduit for human trafficking across Europe or allow our country to be used by organisations as a business address for their dealings in other jurisdictions.

In 1999, Sweden was the first country to pass legislation to prohibit the purchase of sexual services. Whilst the argument against clause 6 focuses on the assumption that criminalising the purchaser of sexual services will drive prostitution underground, a 2010 study demonstrated that street prostitution had halved. It also proved that there was no evidence of an increase in off-street prostitution. In addition, significant evidence was provided that that law had deterred human trafficking. Further to that, in April 2014, the Council of Europe recognised that sex buyer laws were the most effective tool for preventing and combating trafficking in human beings. The recommendations included counselling centres, providing prostitutes with legal and health assistance and exit programmes for those who wish to give up prostitution. It is clear that the so-called Nordic model offers many valuable lessons by way of ensuring that there is proper support for those who have been trafficked into prostitution and demonstrates that it is possible to ensure that they are properly protected from exploitation and humiliation. We must focus our efforts on providing support services for those exiting prostitution to make their transaction as easy as possible, whether that be by providing counselling, drug rehabilitation, educational programmes or health advice.

I tend not to use figures from opinion polls in speeches, as, in most cases, they are open to interpretation over some aspect of how they were gathered. I do not intend to change my view on that for the purposes of today's debate. I am, however, a passionate supporter of Women's Aid, and I am on the record numerous times speaking up for the organisation and about the valuable work it does. When that organisation came out so strongly against the research findings that it has withdrawn its support for the departmental panel looking into this aspect of the Bill, I was naturally inclined to pay great heed to its views.

We are increasingly surrounded by headlines of historical sexual abuse that has been covered up by many prominent organisations and institutions, and I find it incredible that those calling for the further investigation of past abuses cannot fully support the attempts to defeat the ongoing abuse that is being inflicted on the most vulnerable people in our midst. Sadly, not all the individuals trapped in abuse and slavery because of trafficking can find the voice or the courage of those brave enough to come forward to highlight and challenge the appalling horror that has been inflicted on them for the sexual gratification of individuals.

There are those in the House who may argue that individuals who sell or pay for sex are entitled to do so if that is what they individually choose to do, but I am much more concerned for those who have no choice and no voice. That is why I support the Bill.


8.45 pm

Mr McGlone: Go raibh maith agat, a Phríomh-LeasCheann Comhairle. Mo bhuíochas as éisteacht a thabhairt domh. I appreciate the opportunity to talk about the Bill.

Some concerns have been expressed about the unintended consequences of clause 6 on those involved in prostitution. If I picked the Minister up correctly, he said that it could create difficulties in law enforcement and might not act to protect women who provide sexual services. I think that this is very important because, until I heard evidence at the Justice Committee, I could have been influenced one way or the other. On one side of the debate was the argument that, if you go ahead with this, you drive prostitution underground; on the other side was the argument that quite the opposite was true.

Women's Aid came before the Committee and other Members referred to Women's Aid. They are the people who have to help women to pick up the pieces of their lives when they have been abused, brutalised and, in this instance, sexually assaulted, manipulated, trafficked or whatever it may be. It is very important that I read into the record what Women's Aid said:

"Women’s Aid supports the provisions within clause 6 of the Bill, which criminalises those who purchase sexual services. Given that the majority of human trafficking in Northern Ireland is for the purposes of sexual exploitation, we believe it is crucial to tackle the demand that fuels this heinous crime and send a strong message that anyone buying sexual services here or worldwide is supporting sexual slavery and the degradation of human rights. We are joined in our belief that criminalising the buying of sex is the way forward in tackling human trafficking by the End Violence Against Women coalition (EVAW); European Women’s Lobby (EWL); Equality Now; Turn Off the Red Light Campaign in the Republic of Ireland, whose members include the Immigrant Council of Ireland, Ruhama, Barnardos, Rape Crisis Network Ireland, ICTU, the Labour Party, SIPTU, Soroptimist International Ireland, and a host of other NGOs, trade unions and charities.

Clause 6 of the Bill would implement a similar response to prostitution and human trafficking as the model used in Sweden, which was introduced there in 1999 ... According to a report by Swedish police in 2010, the law criminalising buyers of sexual services has successfully deterred many criminal networks from considering Sweden as an option for trafficking or pimp-led organised prostitution. The report also states that there has been a significant decrease in on-street prostitution, that the numbers of sexual services sold via Internet/off-street means are still much smaller than neighbouring countries Denmark and Norway, and that the proportion of prostituted persons from other countries had not exploded in the way it had elsewhere.
On the other hand, in countries where prostitution has been legalised, there has been no improvement in the situation of those in prostitution or decrease in human trafficking.

In the Netherlands, a 2007 report for the Ministry of Justice concluded, 'There has been no significant improvement of the situation of persons in prostitution'. This has been corroborated by other studies and criminal cases, in which exploitation, trafficking and coercion have been found to exist within legal, licensed brothels. 'The prostitutes’ emotional well-being is now lower than in 2001 on all measured aspects. The use of sedatives has increased.'

Options for leaving the industry were in high demand, while only 6% of municipalities offer assistance.

Several other countries have followed Sweden’s lead in criminalising the purchase of sex."

As we speak here tonight, I have heard no valid reason why we should not support clause 6. Other Members have deliberated on it, and the Minister has reservations. Frankly, I do not understand those reservations because I, too, heard the evidence from the police — from Drew Harris — who said that they could support clause 6. Frankly, I do not understand the position that the Minister has put himself in or found himself in.

Finally, and very briefly —

Mr B McCrea: Will the Member give way?

Mr McGlone: Yes, OK.

Mr B McCrea: You mentioned Drew Harris. The Official Report shows that he said:

"The criminalisation of the purchasing of sexual services may add a further impediment, and it can reasonably be anticipated that it may add a further impediment to individuals who are prosecuted coming forward to police to make complaints".

That is why the Minister has a problem, because Drew Harris said that criminalisation has implications that are not fully understood but which can be anticipated to be detrimental.

Mr McGlone: I thank the Member for that, but had he read on a wee bit further, he would have found that Mr Harris clarified his position and that of the PSNI in regard to this matter. He highlighted that later on when the Chair of the Committee challenged it and got further clarification from the police on their position.

Mr B McCrea: What is your response to my question?

Mr McGlone: Sorry, if I could speak.

Mr Givan: Will the Member give way?

Mr Givan: The Member for Mid Ulster is exactly right. It has been stated time and time again that the PSNI moved away from its original written submission, but the evidence session was unequivocal. They support clause 6 with some qualifications, but they think that it is and will be an effective tool for serious organised crime. That is where they anticipate using it to best effect.

To put it on the record, I spoke with the Chief Constable about this issue over the weekend. I contacted his office and he has assured me, in writing, from the Deputy Chief Constable on his behalf, that the PSNI supports clause 6. I am happy to put that correspondence in the Library to verify that for Members' benefit.

Mr McGlone: That would be very welcome. I thank the Chair for that further clarity. Hopefully, that would put Mr McCrea's reservations on clause 6 to bed.

Finally, and briefly, my colleague Alban Maginness referred to the lateness of amendment No 29's introduction. Frankly, I do not understand it. It proposes to repeal article 59:

"Loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution".

I possibly could be convinced, although, at this stage, I do not understand why or how you would remove that tool from the range of services and enabling legislation that police have to address some problems that have arisen previously on the streets in this city, in Belfast. I am not entirely sure of the rationale behind amendment No 29, although I am sure that some Sinn Féin Members will clarify their thinking and rationale.

That is my contribution in support of clause 6; I look forward to the rest of the debate.

Mrs Hale: I wish to speak against the Minister of Justice's amendment seeking to remove clause 6.

One of the major drivers for human trafficking in this country is for the purposes of sexual exploitation. The national referral mechanism (NRM) figures, which I acknowledge are flawed but which provide the only official figures that we have, show that a majority of those trafficked into Northern Ireland were trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation. We must ask why these individuals are being trafficked into Northern Ireland to work in prostitution. The answer is simple: people in Northern Ireland — mostly men — want to buy them, and they can buy them.

The grim reality is that none of those who pay to use the bodies of trafficked people has faced any consequences whatsoever for what they have done. Not a single person has been charged or convicted of the offence of paying for sex with a person who has been coerced, as outlined in article 64A of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008. It is most certainly not the case that no one has paid for sex with a trafficked person in Northern Ireland since 2009. I do not think that anyone in the Chamber would be so naive as to believe that. The truth of the matter is that the offence introduced in 2009 has been an abject failure. Clearly, the current offence is not an offence worth having.

The reason why it has failed is twofold. First, our criminal justice system has been unable to successfully prosecute on the offence within the six-month time bar. To be fair, Minister Ford has suggested an amendment to remove that time bar. However, it should be added that he has done so only in response to this Bill.

Mr Ford: Will the Member give way?

Mrs Hale: I am happy to.

Mr Ford: Will the Member accept that I had intended to legislate on that issue, but that this Bill provided the means by which to do so?

Mrs Hale: I thank the Minister for his intervention. I was going to say that, but he has now saved me the bother.

Secondly, the offence has failed due to its caveat nature and complexities in prosecution. While it is true that the offence is a strict liability offence, meaning that whether the buyer knows or does not know whether the seller has been trafficked or exploited is irrelevant, it is still necessary to prove that the seller has been coerced into providing the service. It is not always clear-cut that an individual has been coerced, and it can be difficult to substantiate. That is underlined by the fact that it is not the experience of Northern Ireland alone.

Other places have been tempted by the idea of addressing demand for paid sex simply by targeting transactions with those who have been subject to force, and their efforts in that regard have been sadly ineffective. A good example to consider is Finland. In 2013, the Finnish Ministry of Justice conducted a review of the law in Finland, which, like Northern Ireland, only criminalised the purchase of sexual services from individuals who have been trafficked. The review found that the law was not doing enough to protect victims of human trafficking and argued that the criminalisation of the purchase of sexual services would have a much stronger impact and would be easier to monitor.

It is my contention that, even with the change advocated by the Department of Justice today, the current caveated offence will not be nearly as effective in tackling human trafficking as clause 6 of Lord Morrow's Bill. If the House were to agree with the Minister that his amendment is a better way forward, I predict that it will not be long before we would back here considering the issue after the amendment failed to tackle the real problem.

The Minister of Justice is seeking to resist clause 6 on the basis of the research that he published on Friday. To my mind, that research was commissioned as a wrecking tactic to try to destroy clause 6. As we know, Lord Morrow launched his consultation on the Bill in August 2012. Minister Ford proceeded to announce that he was going to launch research into prostitution only in September 2013, over a year later. The selected researchers only began work in April 2014, with a final document only being released on Friday of last week. Much has been said about the findings of the document, and I will leave it at that. It was manifestly obvious from the beginning that the purpose of the research was to derail clause 6. It was like a tactic straight out of 'Yes Minister'. The hope was that Lord Morrow would either remove his clause or postpone bringing his Bill forward.

As Mr Wilson and Ms Bradley said, the research team did not contain a single published supporter of criminalising paying for sex. It did, however, include published opponents, including the lead researcher, who had already entered the debate specifically on clause 6 prior to being selected and had said that clause 6 should be removed from the Bill without replacement. However, many academics do not share that view. For example, 75 academics signed an open letter in support of the Honeyball amendment that went before the European Parliament in 2013. They included many eminent figures.

If the Department had wanted a wider perspective, it could have insisted on a balanced panel with some academics who believe that prostitution is a legitimate form of work and some who do not, but it did not do that. In my opinion, that is a terrible shame, considering the fact that the Department of Justice spent £60,000 of taxpayers' money on that research. The Minister has consistently stated that his Department is short of cash, which I have no doubt is true given these strained financial times. However, he felt that he could spend £60,000 on a flawed study, which is more than the cost of a regional rapporteur for Northern Ireland.

I will now respond to the criticism —

Ms Lo: Will the Member give way?

Mrs Hale: I am happy to give way,

Ms Lo: Does the Member agree that law and policy should be based on evidence, and that it was quite right that the Minister spent money to commission the research?

Mr Poots: Will the Member further give way?

Mr Poots: Is it not the case that the evidence provided was extremely poor? The consequence of that is that, very sadly, reputational damage has been done to an organisation in the form of Queen's University Belfast, which many of us respect. That reputational damage has been done as a result of how the report was produced. As has been quite rightly pointed out, it is £60,000 wasted.

Mrs Hale: Thank you.

Ms Lo: Will the Member give way?

Mrs Hale: One final time, Ms Lo.

Ms Lo: In response to Mr Poots's comments —

[Inaudible.]

Mr McCarthy: I did not speak. It was him.

Ms Lo: Sorry, I got distracted. I have suddenly forgotten what I was going to say.

Mrs Hale: Maybe the Member would like to respond during her speech.

Ms Lo: Forget it. I will come back.

Mrs Hale: I will now respond to the criticism that is regularly levelled at clause 6 by those who say that it confuses prostitution with trafficking. That simply does not stand up to scrutiny as we have heard.

First, as I have said, the NRM shows that over half of those trafficked in Northern Ireland since 2009 were trafficked to meet the demand for paid sex. Secondly, the Bill has never been just about trafficking; it has always been called the Human Trafficking and Exploitation Bill. It addresses challenges where no element of trafficking is present, including the sale of sex. To my mind, it is clear that, regardless of whether an element of trafficking is present, the experience of most people in prostitution is one of exploitation. That was eloquently demonstrated, for example, through the inquiry into prostitution published this year by Westminster's all-party parliamentary group on prostitution and the global sex trade:

"the group took a large volume of consistent and highly compelling evidence that women involved in prostitution were regularly survivors of child sexual abuse; had entered below the age of 18; had problematic patterns of drug and alcohol misuse; or had been targeted having been in care."

Having worked for a long time with young people and children in care, I know that this is a very serious issue and that they are targeted by pimps and traffickers in their area. Extreme poverty was also regularly cited and, in some cases, all those factors were sadly, and horrifically, present. The report was also highly critical of the English offence equivalent to article 64A, saying that it:

"fails to account for the complex nature of coercion. Coercion is often a subtle and manipulative process. The language of ‘choice’ assumes a range of options. More often the decision to enter prostitution is led by poverty, drug or alcohol dependency, or patterns of abusive behaviour."


9.00 pm

For most people entry into prostitution is not the result of a positive choice on the part of the individual but is caused rather by a lack of choice. That point was made eloquently again and again by submissions to the Justice Committee, as we have heard. Annie Campbell of Women's Aid said:

"Prostitution is not a choice; it is a trap that women and girls are lured into or fall into."

And Clare Moore of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions summarised the evidence well when she said:

"Many of the women involved in the sex industry had no real choice. Poverty and life circumstances combined with deception and exploitation are evident in many of their stories. We believe that for, most of those involved, prostitution is rooted in poverty, marginalisation and desperation and linked histories of abuse and violence."

Do we want a law that serves the interests of pimps and traffickers or one that serves the best interests of vulnerable children, men and women and challenges the primary driver for trafficking into Northern Ireland? As the current offence has illustrated so very eloquently, we cannot have a law that serves both interests. We in the House have to make a choice. We need a law that serves the best interests of the vulnerable men, women and children and challenges the primary driver for trafficking into our Province. That is the option presented to us by clause 6.

In closing, I should say that I am glad that Lord Morrow has put forward an amendment to ensure that much-needed support is provided to help people to exit prostitution. That has been of central importance in countries that have criminalised demand, and the need for its provision was actually highlighted by Mr Wells, prior to his becoming Health Minister, at the Second Reading of Lord Morrow's Bill in September last year. The point was also made by a significant number of organisations to the Justice Committee during the Committee Stage — for example, Women's Aid, Ruhama, the ICTU and SPACE International — and Lord Morrow has listened and responded.

I do not claim that criminalising the purchase of sexual services will end prostitution in Northern Ireland. No legislation could achieve that. Laws against theft and murder have not managed to eradicate those crimes, yet they have sent a normative signal that such practices are unacceptable in our society and, crucially, help to reduce their occurrence. I believe that clause 6 can perform a similar function. I urge Members, no matter where you are coming from, to please support — for their sake — clause 6 today and reject the attempt by the Minister of Justice to remove it from the Bill. Finally, I must say that Lord Morrow's vision and tenacity in bringing the Bill forward is a shining example of advocacy to us all.

Ms Lo: My party colleague Stewart Dickson has made a compelling case against clause 6. I am just going to add some of my thoughts.

Human trafficking is, no doubt, one of the severest abuses of human rights, and we must do all we can to stand firmly against any form of modern-day slavery, whether it be sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, forced labour or any other activity. As someone who has spoken out for years about this heinous crime and set up the all-party group in Stormont on human trafficking, I welcome Lord Morrow's commitment to eliminating it. In the 12 months that have elapsed since Second Stage, the Bill has greatly improved. I know that Minister Ford has worked closely with Lord Morrow on the Bill, and I commend them both for their efforts.

It will come as no surprise to the House that, whilst I support the vast majority of the Bill's provisions, I must reiterate my very grave concerns about clause 6. Clause 6, as we all know, would criminalise payment for the sexual services of a man or woman. That has provoked an intense and, at times, emotionally charged debate in the Chamber and in the media. I respect the very different views and opinions on the matter, and I hope to convey my reservations with sensitivity. I firmly state that I support the objective of discouraging the trafficking of persons into Northern Ireland for sexual exploitation. However, I am not convinced that there is sufficient evidence on which to pass legislation such as this, and I will detail why shortly.

We find ourselves in an interesting position where those from a more evangelical persuasion, who possibly seek to ban prostitution for religious and moral reasons, find themselves in agreement with those with a more radical feminist perspective. Some feminists argue that prostitution is a form of male violence against women. They argue that it is physically and psychologically damaging to sell sex and that there are no women who sell sex voluntarily. Furthermore, it has been claimed that, if one wants to achieve a gender-equal society, prostitution must cease to exist, not only for the reasons I have mentioned but because all women in society are harmed as long as men think of women as commodities. I will not disagree with some of those sentiments, but I urge all who support clause 6 for such reasons to ask themselves the following questions. If clause 6 is introduced, what will the implications be? How will they impact on the women involved? What will it mean for women involved in prostitution if they have to leave that form of labour? Are we sure that we are putting protections in place to support women in every way? Those are all questions that Sinn Féin raised at Second Stage. It is disappointing that they have apparently changed their mind despite their previous reservations.

The inclusion of a clause on prostitution in a human trafficking Bill, although the two issues are often cited as being interrelated, is misguided. They are not one and the same issue.

Mr Wilson: Will the Member give way?

Ms Lo: Yes.

Mr Wilson: Given that all of the evidence shows that many of those who are trafficked are trafficked to be sold for sex, how does the Member reach the conclusion that that is an inappropriate issue to address in an anti-slavery Bill? Since she seems to think that this is some crusade by evangelical fundamentalists, perhaps she will tell us which of the following groups are evangelical fundamentalists: Women's Aid, ICTU, Equality Now and the European Women's Lobby. Which of those have joined the evangelical wing of the Protestant Churches in Northern Ireland?

Ms Lo: Would you not agree that the Bill was very much drafted and supported by CARE? That is my answer to you.

Policy and legislative responses should distinguish clearly between human trafficking for sexual exploitation and prostitution. They are not the same. If each is to be targeted effectively, they need to be addressed separately. The notion that sex trafficking is a simple supply-and-demand equation, and if you stop the demand, you stop the supply, is flawed.

A single clause in this Bill is not going to deal comprehensively with the complex social issue of prostitution. A single clause simply cannot formulate exit strategies and other service provisions. A Member from the DUP mentioned counselling, employment and training. Those are the things that need to be in the Bill. A single clause itself is just useless. We need all those provisions and different strategies together to deal with the issue in a wholly realistic manner.

Mr Wilson: Will the Member give way?

Ms Lo: No. I gave way to you once already.

Attempting to tackle a topic as complex as prostitution through one clause in a private Member's Bill is not the best approach.

Clause 6 is, by and large, based on the Swedish model. It is frequently stated — and has been mentioned many times today — that the number of women in visible prostitution in Sweden has decreased since the Sex Purchase Act was introduced in 1999. The Swedish police described the Act as an efficient tool for keeping trafficking away from Sweden. The law has brought support from the general public in Sweden and that has been interpreted as it having had its intended normative effect on opinions of prostitution.

If you look at the available evidence, however, you will see that none of those points is fully convincing. The claim that the number of people involved in prostitution has declined is based largely on the work of organisations that report back on specific groups they work with. Social workers, for example, count and get an impression based on their contact with women in street prostitution in larger cities. That does not take into consideration other forms of prostitution, which, hidden from view, are still going on.

The 2010 Skarhed report, which is regularly cited, acknowledges that there are other forms of prostitution, but it still concludes that the law is a success based on the number of women in contact with social workers and police. Men involved in prostitution, women who operate indoors and those selling sex outside the larger cities are, therefore, excluded from the scope of the report.

This excessive focus on street prostitution ignores the fact that, since 1999 or so, mobile phones and the Internet have meant a decline in face-to-face contact with women selling sex in the traditional sense. That is backed up by the recently published DOJ research, which found that the majority of sex workers in Northern Ireland advertised online and worked from houses. The police can certainly testify to that.

The Swedish Sex Purchase Act is often said to be an effective tool against human trafficking. The evidence for that claim is weak. The official data that does exist is vague. Some authors have also pointed out that the Act may have raised prices for sex, making trafficking for sexual purposes potentially more lucrative than ever.

Mr A Maginness: I thank the Member for giving way. I am interested in the point that she raises that really, in a sense, the Swedish model is not working and is making the situation worse. That is not compatible with the widely acknowledged success of the Swedish model, which many people internationally recognise and are, in fact, copying.


9.15 pm

Ms Lo: I thank the Member for raising those points. It has also been well accepted, in report after report, and I will cite some of them from the document that I have, which is from the Board of Health and Welfare in Sweden. It states:

"We have determined in previous reports ... that prostitution is a multifaceted phenomenon that is affected by several interacting factors. No causal connections can be proven between legislation and changes in prostitution. It is also difficult to identify the impacts of legislation because social processes are affected by several complex and situational factors."

It continues by stating that in recent interviews by the Board of Health and Welfare:

"most men state that the ban has not changed anything for them, but describe it as a 'punch in the air'."

So, it has been criticised, and I urge Members to open their mind and not listen just to what they heard from the government side in Sweden. Many people have come out to cast doubt on the statistics from the Swedish model.

There is the other problem that, if we simply ban something from happening here, it merely moves the problem elsewhere. Exporting a problem is not a solution. We all need to work together, and there are initiatives that enable European member states to work together, because we know that it is a global trade that crosses borders. Country borders are no deterrent to human trafficking. I have long argued that one of the most effective ways to prevent people being trafficked into prostitution is to focus on the source countries. I understand that, in China, there are open advertisements in newspapers in certain provinces, luring young women into applying for bogus posts as nannies and waitresses in the UK and America. What are the Government in China doing to stop people from falling into these traps? Those Governments need to address such issues, and we need to put pressure on them to do more, rather than export women to the west to be exploited. It is a serious crime, and we all need to work together.

It is also important to repeat the PSNI's concerns that passing legislation banning prostitution may have the unintended consequence of diverting resources from tackling trafficking to monitoring prostitution; not to mention just how difficult it could be to enforce the legislation. We should remember that it is already against the law to pay for the sexual services of a prostitute who is subjected to force — irrespective of whether the person had any knowledge of force being used — or to solicit the services of a prostitute in a public place.

My overriding point is that it is bad practice to legislate and to take long-term policy decisions without an evidence base, particularly a local, Northern Ireland-specific evidence base. We do not know the true extent of human trafficking in Northern Ireland or the proportion of prostitutes here who have been trafficked. To legislate in this manner, without a fuller sense of those figures is, in my view, irresponsible. That said, I welcome the recently published DOJ-commissioned research, which is the most comprehensive survey to date of how the sex industry works in Northern Ireland. It surveyed 171 sex workers and 446 clients, and it looked at all aspects of prostitution, including trafficking for sexual exploitation. I know that DUP Members rubbish it, but perhaps that is because they do not like the results. I have, through my constituency work, met women who voluntarily work as sex workers and women who have been trafficked into prostitution. It is a very complex issue. People are driven into it through all sorts of circumstances, be it debt, drug or alcohol addiction, or because they did not get enough help from government, social services or public services. They have no other choice but to go into prostitution. The issue is how we should help those women to prevent them feeling that prostitution is their only option. We need to help them to not fall into the trap of thinking that prostitution is the only way out.

From the DOJ research, we learned that only about 20 people still work as street-based prostitutes in Northern Ireland. The majority of the industry advertises online and works from houses. Between 300 and 350 people are available for sex work every day. There is a significant number of male sex workers in Northern Ireland. Fewer than 1% of those surveyed stated that someone had forced them into prostitution. The majority of sex workers surveyed said that they did not agree that it should be illegal to pay for sex. Interestingly, the research tells us that more than one third of men questioned for the study mistakenly assumed that they were breaking the law by purchasing sex. If people continue to pay for sex thinking that it is illegal, what is to say that they will cease when it is actually illegal?

For the first time in Northern Ireland, prostitutes have been asked about their lives and circumstances and whether the legislation that Lord Morrow proposes would free them from the many vulnerabilities they face. Prostitution is a very complex issue. We still do not know how many people involved in the trade are coerced by human traffickers. It is very hard to determine the extent of what we are dealing with. Further evidence is required. Until then, I cannot, with good conscience, support clause 6. I say that as someone who has advocated and raised awareness of the issue for more than 10 years, when a Chinese woman murdered in north Belfast was widely known to have been a victim of human trafficking. I urge the House to think carefully about clause 6.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: Before I call Steven Agnew, I point out that there is a considerable amount of noise and the buzz of conversation, particularly when women colleagues are trying to make a contribution. It is difficult for them to speak, and it is difficult for the rest of us to follow the debate. I know that it is late in the evening, but we have to pay attention, and we have to allow other people to be able to pay attention.

Mr Agnew: I am not sure whether it is the late hour or the length of the debate, but I do not relish speaking on it. It is a difficult and emotional topic. Everyone who has argued their case has done so with genuine intent and feeling. I go back to what I said earlier: we all abhor human trafficking. Where we may disagree is how best we tackle it. I have seen the body language of some Members — I have probably been guilty of it myself — who, on hearing somebody with whom they disagree, have turned away, sighed or whatever it might be. We should give one another a bit more respect than that. We are coming from a genuine place on what is a very difficult issue. There are many victims, and how best we serve them is at the centre of the debate.

For me, there are two categories of argument in the debate: a moral one about whether prostitution is right or wrong and whether it is inherently exploitative and one based on what the outcomes would be should we criminalise the purchase of sex. On the moral argument, I am conflicted. I will be honest about this: I had prepared a very one-sided speech — I prepare speeches — but I listened to the debate and thought, "No, that is dishonest. This is not one-sided, and no one moral argument holds absolutely".

I listened to Catríona Ruane describe herself as a feminist. She talked about the commodification of women. Of course, I am absolutely opposed to that with every fibre in my body. Whether it is prostitution, page 3 or lads' mags, I oppose the objectification and commodification of women. I listened to Paul Givan speak about his daughters. I have a daughter. Would I wish her to grow up and become a sex worker? Absolutely not. That is not what I want for my daughter. It is not a choice that I would make for her, and I hope that it is not a choice that she will make or have to make.

Equally, I have read the research provided by Queen's University. I understand that people have questioned its legitimacy and intent, and I think that there is a flaw if somebody states a clear position on something before researching it. I accept that, but I do not think that we can completely ignore it for that reason. It says that 98% of those surveyed oppose the criminalisation of the purchasing of sex. Maybe it is not 98%, and maybe the survey is not perfect. Maybe it is only 80%, but can we ignore that? We have an indicator. It is not perfect or absolute. Not every sex worker in Northern Ireland was surveyed, but it is what we have as evidence. I heard Alban Maginness and, I think, Catríona Ruane say that no woman chooses to be a prostitute and sell sex. I do not have the evidence for that, so I cannot go on that argument. I have the research that I have, and I can go only on the evidence there.

Mr Givan: Will the Member give way?

Mr Agnew: Certainly.

Mr Givan: I appreciate the point that the Member is making, and it is one that we posed to the Human Rights Commission. Some will say that clause 6 is an infringement of people's rights and the right to a private life, but, when we put that to the commission, Dr Russell said:

"the question is whether it is reasonable and proportionate for the state, in order to protect the rights of the most vulnerable members of society, to restrict the rights of others. In the commission's view, those who are vulnerable should be the priority in this instance."

That is why the Human Rights Commission said that it was right to support clause 6.

Mr Agnew: I thank the Member for his intervention. I did not say that it was a rights issue, but, again, that is a part of the evidence that we cannot ignore. That is why I say that I am conflicted on the moral arguments.

I get concerned about arguments that absolutely assume that no woman, even if she says that she has chosen to sell sex as a form of work, can have chosen to do so. I get concerned because I fear that, underneath some of the comments, there is still a presumption that sex is something that is done to a woman, that sex by its very nature is violence against women. Individual Members will have to search their conscience on that, but I think that it underpins some of the arguments that no woman would ever choose it.

Mr Givan: I appreciate the Member giving way again. We asked the Irish Congress of Trade Unions that too. Is prostitution — sex work, as you call it — regarded as a valid form of work? In response, Peter Bunting said:

"The clear answer to that, which I think you got from the previous witness as well, is that it is really about exploitation. It is very simple. We could not conceive it to be a valid description of work."

Mr Agnew: Again, I thank the Member for his intervention. I hope that in future debates, when I give evidence from the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, the Members opposite will say, "That is a great organisation, that is. We should listen to what it has to say", particularly tomorrow, when we discuss the living wage. I will quote the ICTU tomorrow.

This is where I come at this: as I said, I would not choose prostitution for my daughter; I would not choose it for anyone. I find it hard to comprehend that anyone would make that choice with the availability of other choices, but I read evidence that says that 32% of those surveyed have degree-level education. I suspect that they have opportunities, although I do not know the individual circumstances. I accept that it might not be 32% — it might be 20% — but it is still a significant number that we cannot ignore of people who are saying that, "We are educated, and we are sex workers". We have a perception —


9.30 pm

Mrs Foster: Will the Member give way?

Mrs Foster: Does the Member accept that somebody with a degree-level education — this picks up on Ms Lo's point — may have come into prostitution through alcoholism, drugs, debt and a myriad of reasons that may mean that it has actually not been a free choice for them to end up in prostitution and that, in actual fact, they are vulnerable people who have ended up in prostitution and now continue with it?

Mr Agnew: I do. I hope that the Member will, equally, accept that there are those who got into prostitution while in university to help to fund their education.

Mrs Foster: Correct.

Mr Agnew: That is regrettable, and it is choice that I would not make. It is a choice that someone else has made, and I do not feel that I can say that they should not make that choice. That is where I get very uncomfortable about legislation.

Mr Humphrey: Will the Member give way?

Mr Agnew: I will give way in a second. I want to finish this point.

When we start saying that, "I would not, so you should not", I get very uncomfortable.

Mr Humphrey: The Member should also remember that many of those being trafficked into prostitution come, for example, from the eastern bloc in Europe. They are highly educated, but they do not have the opportunity to get meaningful employment in the professions in which they have been trained and for which they studied in university.

When Women's Aid came before the Committee during my time there, they made the point about women, for example, from China who had no identity and those from certain sects or castes in India who, equally, have no identity. When we were in Sweden, we had the issue of people from Latvia, Lithuania, the former Soviet states and so on who do not have an identity in their own country. Those people are then trafficked and used; they have no option. We were told of a young lady in Stockholm who, at 19 years old, was servicing upwards of 20 people a day in a filthy, dirty flat. She had no salary; she had to ask for a bottle of water or a packet of cigarettes. She had no choice. The issue is that we have to protect the people who have no choice, the most vulnerable people, who simply can do nothing to protect themselves. It is our duty and responsibility to provide the laws to protect them because they simply cannot protect themselves, especially when they are in a nation other than their own.

Mr Agnew: I thank the Member for his comments. To a large extent, I agree. We are not debating whether trafficking should be illegal: it is illegal. In fact, we have a Bill here that I hope will enhance our action to tackle trafficking. It is the muddying of prostitution and trafficking that I take issue with.

On the point about the nationality of those with degrees etc who were surveyed, perhaps the Minister may comment further; I do not have that level of detail. Again, I suppose that the one fundamental thing that I come down to is that I do not have enough information to say that we should criminalise the purchase of sex because, at this point, I do not feel that I have the evidence to say that it will help those who are most vulnerable, those who are exploited, coerced and driven to prostitution through poverty. I do not have that evidence; it is not evidence that I have seen.

I mentioned at the start of my contribution that I felt that there were two arguments. First, there is the moral one, and, as I said, it is one that I am conflicted on. I do not think it is a simple matter. If I could get rid of prostitution, pornography and the objectification and commodification of women, I would do it. However, I do not think that that is a choice we have in front of us today. The other argument, and I feel I have perhaps a bit more research and evidence around this, is the outcome of what I think would happen for the most vulnerable groups that we have identified should clause 6 be passed today, which I suspect it will.

It may not be exact, but we have an indicative figure that 17,000 men a year purchase sex. We can challenge that figure, but it is probably an indication of the level of purchasing of sex. The number of people guilty of trafficking in Northern Ireland, which is the large focus of the Bill — people have pointed out that it is the exploitation Bill, and we can have the debate about whether prostitution is exploitative — is, I suspect, in the tens. We can widen that by looking at the other vulnerable groups as well as those trafficked and include the perpetrators of rape and coercion. That is a number that we should focus on. It is a number that we should go after. It is a realistic target, if not to eradicate, to turn the screws on those perpetrators.

There has been a lot of debate about the position of the police. The evidence given by Detective Superintendent Philip Marshall has not gone away. The police can change their position, but the points he made are as valid today as they were when he made them. I do not believe that it is viable for the police to pursue and gather evidence on 17,000 men a year. We would be putting a huge strain on them, when what we are talking about is human trafficking, a very specific and heinous crime, as has been pointed out, and one of the most serious crimes.

Whatever we think of prostitution, compare trafficking with two adults who are in a consensual transaction over sex. Whether we think it is right or wrong, on the spectrum of offences, compare two consenting adults with somebody who is trafficked, coerced, enslaved, imprisoned, tortured or raped. Those are the women and men whom we need to protect. Those are the crimes being perpetrated that we need to go after. Yes, we can expand it to prostitution. However, that is a separate Bill and we need more evidence. Those in prostitution who are being exploited, pimped or coerced are protected in law. If they are raped or are suffering domestic violence, we have laws against that. What we are focusing on today is human trafficking.

If we want to better protect the most vulnerable in our society, let us look at our prosecutions around rape. Rape is illegal. We do not need the criminalisation of the purchase of sex to make rape illegal. However, we are not convicting the perpetrators. We hear a lot of debate in the media about entrapment, particularly around footballers but also people in high-profile positions of power. When a woman says that she has been sexually abused or has faced sexually inappropriate behaviour, we have to assume that she is telling the truth and start from that basis. At the minute, our justice model when it comes to rape is absolutely failing. If people genuinely want to protect the most vulnerable in our society, that is something that we have to look at.

However, I believe that, in the case of resources and of getting a good outcome from this legislation around preventing human trafficking and prosecuting people guilty of human trafficking, we need to focus and target our resources on the perpetrators of this most serious of crimes, along with rape and coercion. I will come to the issue of those driven to prostitution through poverty, addiction or debt, which has been referenced. That is wrong, and it is something that we want to oppose.

Mr Humphrey: I am grateful to the Member for giving way. I will just make the point that the Republic's equivalent Committee to the Justice Committee, which we met on a visit to Dublin, is looking to shape legislation to protect people who are trafficked into prostitution. If the Republic of Ireland Government pass legislation through the Dáil that protects those people, and we fail to provide the laws to protect people here in Northern Ireland, what will happen is that Northern Ireland will become the soft underbelly for this illicit, illegal and heinous crime on a much larger scale. We are already having people trafficked from mainland Europe across the United Kingdom and to the Republic. You are talking about resources. If we do not introduce legislation, it will expand exponentially and in a way that we will never control and get a grip of. I make the point again that we have a duty and responsibility to protect the most vulnerable people. The Member has talked much about loopholes and things. We need to turn and look at how we are protecting people. From what I am hearing, you are not doing that.

Mr Agnew: I disagree with the Member. I am absolutely focused on how we protect people in getting the outcomes. I repeat that human trafficking is illegal. This Bill will not change that one way or the other. What this will criminalise is the purchase of sex. Those trafficking, whether it is across the border from the South or wherever it comes from, will still be committing a crime.

What I am saying is that we should focus police resources on those crimes. I go back to the evidence from Philip Marshall; we have evidence from Philip Marshall that says that actually those who are purchasing sex are identifying trafficking. We would lose one of our key witnesses. A trafficked individual, most likely a woman if it is in the sex trade, will have contact with three groups of people: her traffickers, other women who are trafficked, and the clients. If we remove the client, who is there to give evidence? The other people who are trafficked are not in a position to give evidence because they are equally as in danger as they are. The trafficker is not going to give evidence, so we actually rely on the client to give evidence.

So I disagree. I am absolutely focused on tackling human trafficking. What I am not focused on is tackling prostitution because I do not share the same moral outrage at prostitution that some Members of the House have, although I absolutely am outraged when people are exploited. Again, I think that we have to separate the two things. However, I will make the point that those who are driven to prostitution —

Mr Ross: Will the Member give way?

Mr Agnew: Sure.

Mr Ross: Given the issue that he raises, which I take as a genuine issue, about whether or not the client, as he calls it, would give evidence, does he have any evidence that clients have been bringing forward that sort of information to the police? If he does have that evidence, can he present it to the Assembly today?

Mr Agnew: The evidence was presented by Philip Marshall of the PSNI, who heads up the work on human trafficking.

Mr Ross: How many?

Mr Agnew: I do not have the numbers but I can access them. It was cited as one of the police's tools of gathering evidence. We need to be mindful that, if we pass clause 6, we take that tool away.

I come now to the issue of prostitution driven by poverty, addiction and debt. Anyone in that situation is undoubtedly a victim. However, again, if we are genuine about wanting to help those people, we need to look at each of those individual issues. How do we address poverty? How do we address addiction? How do we address debt? Prostitution is the symptom of those things, not the cause. We will not get into those debates now. We will have debates forever and anon about having a strong welfare state; a living wage for workers and making work pay; and proper support for addiction and treating it like an illness, rather than treating those with addictions somehow as criminals or a lesser group in society. If we are genuinely concerned about those people, that is how we will treat these issues.


9.45 pm

I will conclude, Principal Deputy Speaker; I have probably spoken at length. We have to accept the reality that prostitution, whatever we think of it, is the world's oldest profession. The Bill will not get rid of prostitution. We cannot wish it away; we cannot legislate it away. It is a reality in our society. We have to make sure that the best protections possible and the best support available are in place for those engaged in prostitution. I welcome clauses that would help women or men find a pathway out of prostitution, for example. I think that that is the right approach. For some people who are in desperate need, it is their only avenue of earning money. We have to make sure that the alternatives to prostitution are better, whether that be through our welfare system, improvements in pay and working conditions in our, unfortunately, low-paid employment or supporting the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, not on a selective basis. This is the way forward. I do not believe that criminalising the purchase of sex is in the best interests of victims of coercion, rape or exploitation, and I do not think it is the best way to tackle human trafficking.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: I call Mr Basil McCrea.

[Interruption.]

Mr B McCrea: Mr Principal Deputy Speaker, if Mr Givan wants to say something, I am quite happy to let him start. The hour is late. There has been much debate this evening about research and the quality of research. I have listened intently to some fine speeches. Stewart Dickson, Anna Lo, Steven Agnew and some other Members made me think about what is at stake here.

Some other contributions, which I know to be honestly held, seemed to be trying to draw the research to fit the contributor's narrative. If they could find a bit of research that supported their story, that was good research, and research put forward by other people, which did not support the story, was bad research. That does not seem to me to be the right way to go about things. One of the points that Mr Agnew put forward was that, regardless of whether it is 100% correct, there are certainly indicators that some information is better than no information. Of course, Members are right to interrogate it to see whether it is appropriate and relevant to Northern Ireland, and whether we can substantiate it, or whatever, but we should not ignore it.

One of the big arguments that came across was an argument that I heard from Alban Maginness and, I think, Patsy McGlone. They were emphatic in their support for the Swedish model. Yet, Anna Lo was able to come back and say, "There is not emphatic support for the Swedish model". It is not uncontested. Not only do many people say that it does not work but that it is counterproductive.

I did not get to go to Sweden as part of my research, but I talked to some of the media outlets there. This information may be of help to Members. This summer, on 24 July 2014, a Swedish newspaper published the headline, "Police turn blind eye to Swedish 'slave trade'". The article states:

"Police in Gothenburg have confirmed that sex trafficking in the city has developed into a full-blown slave trade - but that they lack the resources to do anything about it."

The article goes on to say:

"Gothenburg police busted a large Romanian pimping network in 2011",

But, not long after that, other people came in and took over.

One week earlier, the Swedish newspaper 'Expressen' stated that human traffickers had gone from "just" selling sex to selling women as lifelong slaves. That is in Gothenburg, the second city of Sweden, where, you are telling me, there has been such a great success. The newspaper said that the cost of a slave for life is €2,000 and that for 700 kronor or $100, one can rent a couple of girls for a day for cooking, cleaning or anything else. One seller reportedly said, "Do what you like with them". This is Sweden. This is Gothenburg. This is where we are supposed to have the panacea and where we are supposed to have it fixed. Human trafficking is an acknowledged problem in large Swedish cities, with well-established red light districts in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö. I do not know whether the Committee managed to get to Rosenlund, which is one of the red light districts in Gothenburg, but, apparently, there is quite a lot of information available there. However, the real problem that they come back with is that there are no clear statistics on how widespread the black market business actually is because much of the trade is now conducted online. However, there was some research done. Some Members opposite have ridiculed the Queen's University research, but they might listen to a report from Lund University in Gothenburg, which, in 2012, found that one in 10 of 5,000 Swedish men surveyed had paid for sex. That one in 10 is not at the same level as the one in 15 that Caitríona Ruane was talking about, but there is still a level of sex that is going on.

Last November, TV4, one of the major Swedish television stations, reported that sex trafficking was on the rise in Sweden, with a quarter of a million sex purchases in Stockholm alone over the course of one year. The report stated that a sum of about kr400 million was exchanged online for sex sales, and there was no way of knowing how many more purchases occurred on the streets. So, the situation is similar in Gothenburg, but police have other priorities. Persistent and warlike gang violence has kept the police force busy, and, in September last year, the police launched Operation Trygg — Operation Safe in English — to combat the shootings. That is part of the issue. The Gothenburg police conclude by saying:

"We have a pile ten centimetres high of tips and reports [about human trafficking], but we don't have the time or resources to handle it so we can't even look. We can read them of course, but then we just feel frustrated because we can't do anything."

All that I will say to those of you who are putting forward the argument that the Swedes have the answer is that this evidence and information that I have tends to suggest the contrary. There are, of course, official reports that Ms Lo talked about from the Department of Health. The real argument that we are coming round to here is that we are pinning all our hopes that we will be able to deal with something with a particular course of action that has not been properly researched, does not have the full support of the international community and may, in fact, be counterproductive. That is the real issue facing us when we talk about prostitution.

Mr Humphrey: Will the Member give way?

Mr B McCrea: Just one moment.

The question about prostitution is one of what to do about it. I thought that Mr Agnew made a really brave speech when he came forward and said that he is morally conflicted about which way he should go. Let us assume that we are not in favour of prostitution and that we want to try to remove it. What is the best way to deal with that? That is the big question, and you can also take the situation as this: what do you do about all those people who, for whatever reason, are already involved? There are those who maybe have had financial difficulties, drug difficulties, difficulties with alcohol abuse or some other issue that has brought them into that situation. How do we deal effectively with the people who are already in an inevitable situation?

Mr Humphrey: I thank the Member for giving way. To be fair to the Stockholm police, they did not say to the Members across the House who were on the trip to Stockholm — we did not go to Gothenburg — that they had the panacea. They said that they could put much more resource into dealing with the problem, which was huge on an international scale. Obviously, because of Sweden's close proximity to the Baltic nations, there was a huge problem, with ferries going in and out regularly to all the Baltic nations. They did say that they had started to make progress in dealing with protecting very vulnerable people, most of whom are nationals other than Swedes. It was also pointed out to us, as Members will recall, that, when people go into a phone box in Stockholm, where there are cards and whatever placed, and phone the number, they think that they are phoning a number in Stockholm but are actually phoning a number in Bucharest. That is how internationally organised these people are.

It is a huge operation, with thousands of girls being exposed, abused and treated in such a heinous way. I accept what the Member is saying. No one who I have listened to who has used the argument of the Swedish example has said that it is the panacea. No one has used that language, but it cannot remain that nothing is done. We have to do something. It is the best option that there is. Part of the problem in Sweden is that the nations that abut Sweden have not introduced laws to protect people. Only one or two prostitutes have been murdered in Stockholm in the past 10 years, but an equivalent where it is legal — it is perfectly legal in the Netherlands — 80 have been murdered in Amsterdam.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: Before you resume, I remind Members of the lateness of the hour. Interventions are meant to be short and to the point. That was verging on a speech. The next time that it happens, I will interrupt.

Mr B McCrea: In response to that, I have a Sinn Féin press release. It states that Sinn Féin endorses the Turn Off the Red Light campaign, which, I understand, was part of the reason why it changed its position. It says in this press release — I realise that Mr Humphrey did not say it:

"In countries, like Sweden, where the purchase of sex is illegal, there has been a massive decline in prostitution"

— wrong —

"and a significant reduction in sex trafficking"

— wrong —

"and organised crime."

— wrong. That is not correct. This information is not right. So when you make —

Ms Ruane: Will the Member give way?

Ms Ruane: Actually, the information that you gave out is incorrect. Sinn Féin did not change its position. We stated that we would reserve our position so that we could use the Committee Stage to scrutinise and genuinely listen. In all fairness, that is what we did.

Mr B McCrea: Far be it from me to contradict the Member, but I think that her colleague Mr McCartney said something slightly different. Be that as it may, it still gets to the situation where this information is not correct. You are making decisions on the basis of improper information. We need to give you the proper information and then reach a decision.

Ms Lo came forward with information, and I have some stuff here. I talk to people with respect. I do not say to you that you are wrong. You are absolutely entitled to reach whatever conclusions you think are appropriate, but, as part of the debate, I would like to say to you, "Here is some information that I have that seems to contradict what you have. Maybe we should talk about this and see if there is a way forward." One of the things that Ms Ruane said that I agree with is that the vast majority of this conversation and this debate has been taking place between people who really care and want to find a way forward. They may have different analyses about what should be done. That is absolutely fine. This is a legislative Assembly. It is absolutely right and proper that those who bring forward legislation should expect to see it scrutinised. That is the purpose of this Chamber, and that is what we should do if we are doing our job.

I have some other points, and it is useful that I follow on from Mr Agnew because he raised some very interesting issues. One of the most telling things that he said, which was really brave, was, "Do you know what, in terms of the difference between people that are trafficked and people that are in consensual prostitution" — I think that that phrase or something like it was used — "there is a big difference". This is something that actually we have to —

[Interruption.]

I think Mr Givan needs a glass of water.

Mr Humphrey: Or something stronger.

Mr B McCrea: Or something stronger.

Look at the numbers that we have. I think that I am right in saying that the information that came back stated that it is 17,000 men in Northern Ireland per year — not per week, as I think Mr Givan said. Look at the numbers in the research from QUB: only 20 people are estimated to be involved in street prostitution, and the total number is 300 to 350. So, given the actual numbers involved in this, is it so important that we have to do it tonight? Can we not do proper research? If you are not happy about the quality of the research, let us do it properly. Let us get it right. Let us go and do something proper. When we come on to the issue of information —

(Mr Deputy Speaker [Mr Dallat] in the Chair)


10.00 pm

Mr Givan: Will the Member give way?

Mr B McCrea: Yes — all right.

Mr Givan: I appreciate the Member giving way. He again referenced the research to justify some of his points. The Queen's University research was carried out and led by the lead researcher, Dr Huschke. When she came to the Committee, she presented evidence using the same methodology of an online survey. Let me read very briefly two of the exchanges. Mr Wells asked Dr Huschke about online surveys and she said:

"The way that online surveys work is that you create an online survey and then you contact people".

Mr Wells said:

"Which they did."

Dr Huschke said:

"Yes. So, you do not have control over who forwards it to whom".

Mr Wells went on to say:

"All I have seen is a prominent pimp urging his prostitutes to complete your form."

Dr Huschke's response was yes.

I put that to Members. The lead researcher for Queen's University admitted to the Committee that her previous research had been actively promoted and circulated by a pimp to his prostitutes. I rest my case.

Mr B McCrea: I am really glad that you have rested your case, because I have some more points that are worth looking at. If we want to talk about peer-reviewed research, I believe that Members will have heard of a publication called 'The Lancet', which is where medical professionals publish their papers. An article was published in 'The Lancet' on 21 July 2014, "Control of HIV Pandemic Will not be Achieved without Radical Improvement in Support for Sex Workers". We were challenged earlier in the debate on whether we can find some reasons why you might not want to do something and whether there are some positives, and I am sure that most Members would join me in wanting to see a reduction in and an eradication of HIV. The article states:

"decriminalization of sex work would have the single greatest effect on the course of HIV epidemics across all settings studied".

That is in 'The Lancet'. It continues:

"and could avert at least a third of HIV infections among sex workers and their clients in the next decade".

By the by, it goes on to say:

"Furthermore, the study finds that partial criminalization, and other criminalization of clients and third parties (often referred to as the 'Swedish approach') reproduces many of the same harms as full criminalization."

I will not bore people with the detail, but that published research in 'The Lancet' states that this is not the right way to go forward on health grounds. There may be other issues that you want to deal with but, on health grounds, that is that.

We talked about the information and the numbers and said that about 20 people are estimated to be involved in street prostitution. We also mentioned the figures of 300 and 350. Members might be interested in this statistic. It is a pity that some DUP Members have left, because they should hear it. A statistic brought out by the Brook and ARK knowledge exchange project states that 60% of males in Northern Ireland and 51% of females have had sex before the age of 16. You could say, "Look at the scale of the issue that we are going to talk about". Is that statistic right or wrong? It needs to be looked at.

I want to deal with points raised about the PSNI. During the debate, I heard people using the word "unequivocal" about the PSNI's support. Mr Givan said that he had a letter from the Chief Constable. I have not had the benefit of that, but I can tell you that I have read through the Official Report of what the Assistant Chief Constable and Detective Chief Superintendent McComb said, and they used words like "nuanced", "qualified", "unsure" and "different". They may not have wanted to get involved in a public spat with the Justice Committee or with legislators, but what I read was not unqualified support. There were at least grounds for further investigation. Some try to say, "We have now turned it all round. We have presented the information to the PSNI, and it is now fully supportive of what we are going to do". I am sorry, but I do not see that in the evidence, but perhaps other Members will bring it further forward.

So you get to the situation of how to go forward. I will make an earnest contribution. I do not think that it is necessary to personalise or have a go at people just because they bring forward a different opinion. In fact, if I was really secure in my arguments, I would welcome and take interventions and not say to people that I have heard enough from them.

I would engage with them because I am not afraid, and I am not intimidated. I will say what I have to say because I think that it is worth saying.

On that point, I will conclude by saying to you that the Swedish model is not proven. It is counterproductive, and the Swedes know it. It was part of a different agenda at a different time. We should not follow straight on just because it appears to suit some other agenda. This is far too important an issue to conflate — that, I think, was the word that you were looking for — prostitution and human trafficking. Human trafficking must be opposed. The debate on prostitution needs further investigation and further research. If you do not like the research that was put forward, do it properly and do it yourself, but have a proper reasoned argument. On that basis, I will oppose clause 6.

Mr Lyttle: I will do my best to be brief at this late hour. As a member of the all-party group on human trafficking, I welcome the opportunity to support the Bill. I welcome the contributions made by my Alliance Party colleagues on the issue — Anna Lo MLA as founding chair of the all-party group on human trafficking and the Alliance Minister of Justice, David Ford, particularly the work that he did to establish the human trafficking engagement group that worked with a number of NGOs and Church groups, including No More Traffik, A21, International Justice Mission (IJM), Active Communities Against Human Trafficking (ACT) and other organisations and people who made an important contribution to raising awareness of this important issue.

I also welcome the work that the Minister has done in collaboration with the proposer of the Bill, Lord Morrow. I recognise the hard work put into the Bill by Lord Morrow and his team, including other NGOs, such as CARE, which contributed positively to many aspects of the Bill.

I recognise many of the Bill's positive contributions. The three key areas of human trafficking that we aim to tackle are prevention, prosecution and protection. Much of the Bill contributes to streamlining offences and improving victim support, in particular, the child trafficking guardian, the discretionary power to extend the reflection and recovery periods for victims of human trafficking and access to health care. However, there are gaps. I believe that the demand and drivers for forced labour have not been paid particular attention by the Bill, nor, indeed, has the awareness raising by many other organisations.

The complex matter of the criminalisation of the purchasing of sex is introduced in clause 6, and that has generated significant and emotive debate. It may be worth noting that some organisations have supported the clause, but other organisations raised concerns, as have many others: for example, the Presbyterian Church, Amnesty International and NEXUS NI have expressed concerns about the adequacy and practicality of some of the proposals. Maybe we can look at what those organisations have said, given the other information that has been referenced this evening. Amnesty International said:

"We are ... concerned that the approach of combining legal measures to address human trafficking with legal measures to address prostitution, both complex issues, will not be an effective nor appropriate approach".

NEXUS NI said:

"Although we accept that people are trafficked to Northern Ireland for sexual exploitation, we recognise that trafficked victims and those who sell sexual services are two separate and complex groups."

The Presbyterian Church said that the case had not been adequately made for a blanket ban on paying for sex. The Church said that it believes that prostitution is, indeed, "an evil in our society", but:

"in the absence of any clear and coherent policy on dealing with the issue of prostitution ... we are not convinced that such a wide-ranging clause should be introduced into a Bill that is primarily dealing with human trafficking."

I was going to intervene when Mr McCrea referred to the Swedish model, but he seemed to be in full flow, so I let him progress. The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention said that it found little or no evidence that criminalising the buying of sex had had any significant impact on decreasing trafficking for sexual exploitation.

I think that we can agree that those are important organisations with information to bring to bear on this issue with work being done to try to reduce human trafficking and prostitution. I have profound concerns about prostitution in our society and for everyone involved in it. However, it is my understanding that the Minister of Justice has given a clear commitment to bring a full review of the law on prostitution in Northern Ireland before the Assembly and to undertake a deeper consideration of the issue than is afforded by the single clause in this, albeit extremely important, anti-human trafficking Bill. I believe that that proposal should have the support of the House, and I will support it.

Mr McCallister: We are at the stage of the debate where everything has been said, but not quite by everyone. My main criticisms at the Second Reading of Lord Morrow's Bill were about the two issues of human trafficking and prostitution being placed in the one Bill. Those were the concerns that I had then and that I still hold today.

I congratulate Lord Morrow, the Minister and the Committee on their work to improve the Bill. Dare I say that that is why I so vehemently oppose accelerated passage for legislation. The debate has probably shown the Assembly at its finest. Whatever you think about other Members' opinions, whether you agree or disagree, I do not think that anyone could suggest that we are not all passionate and agreed that human trafficking is a huge societal evil; in fact, it is a global evil. Mr Givan compared Lord Morrow to Wilberforce, and I think that the fact that there are more people in slavery today than in Wilberforce's time is a huge indictment on the world. We should be grateful for the work that the Department of Justice, the Committee and Lord Morrow have undertaken.

I have heard many passionate speeches throughout the debate from Ms Bradley, Ms Ruane and Mr Agnew, all talking about the sexualisation of our society, the commercialisation of it and the range of ways in which that can happen. Mr Agnew spoke about sexually inappropriate behaviour and crossing the spectrum to prostitution and the difficulties in dealing with that. We have only to look around to see that it is a very male-dominated Assembly making this legislation.

Mr Agnew said that the figures involved in trafficking were probably in the tens and that trafficking is already illegal; however, we have also heard that 17,000 men a year purchase sex. If we have improved the Bill, if the contributions that the Committee and the Minister have made to Lord Morrow's Bill have improved that and if this Assembly has improved that and taken us farther than the rest of the country, that is to the good when dealing with trafficking. However, I still have some concerns, and I am not convinced that the case has been made for clause 6. I suspect, as would seem from the contributions in the debate, that it will go through relatively easily, but I thought that it was worth placing on record my concerns about it. However, I am pleased that so much progress has been made to the Bill in the past year or 13 months; it shows the benefits of having a proper scrutiny process.


10.15 pm

Mr Poots: I seek to be brief. I had the pleasure of working with Lord Morrow on the Bill in my previous role as Minister of Health, and I think that considerable work has been done and progress has been made. I was somewhat driven to speak by a number of Members who spoke and who appeared to sanitise the business of prostitution.

We need to lay bare the lie that prostitution is something that is largely carried out by people willingly, that it is something that is being carried out by people who are doing degrees and starting up businesses and who may be carrying it out in some well-appointed apartment in a reasonably leafy suburb of a city. We need to make it clear just what prostitution really is.

I wish that some of the Members who spoke had listened to some of the evidence given by groups like A21. It is out there seeking to save people from human trafficking and get them out of the situations and circumstances they find themselves in.

More often than not, prostitutes are young women who are many hundreds and maybe thousands of miles from their homes, who have been taken and who have been fooled and deceived into leaving their place of refuge, which is their home, to get a better life, only to find that they are under the control of pimps who expect them to perform sexual acts for men. Those men pay the pimps considerable sums of money and the prostitutes get a very small amount. If prostitutes do not do what the pimps want them to do, they will suffer violence and attacks. That is what we are really talking about. Let us cut away the flimflam and get down to the fact that it is a dirty, seedy business. It is misogynist, and it uses women — largely women, but not exclusively — as a commodity.

If we can do something about it, do something better and take away the apportionment of blame from the victims — which is what we intend to do tonight — and put it to the person who acquired the sex, it will be a significant move forward.

I urge people to read the evidence that was provided to the Committee by Miss Moran. It is compelling and, if people read it with an open mind, I do not see how they could arrive at a decision other than to support what has been proposed by Lord Morrow.

Lord Morrow: The Minister of Justice has consistently opposed this measure and, today, he has set out his reasons for proposing to remove it entirely through opposing the question that clause 6 stand part of the Bill. In its place, the Minister would like to amend the existing article 64A of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 to allow prosecutions to be brought up to three years after the offence has been committed, rather than the current situation in which a prosecution can only be brought within six months of the offence being committed. That would be achieved through the introduction of new clause 6A.

The logic of clause 6 in my Bill is simple. The NRM data clearly demonstrates that, since 2009, not only is the demand for paid sex in Northern Ireland the biggest single driver for trafficking into Northern Ireland but it accounts for over 50% of the victims. In that context, it seems to me that, to ensure that human trafficking is reduced in the future, we should put in place the very best legislative framework to address the demand by making the buying of sex an offence.

Of course, the Minister says that he agrees, and points out that our current law already makes it an offence to pay for sex with someone subject to force which, of course, any trafficked person would be. Moreover, he also says that he recognises that the current law is not working well, and proposes raising the time bar in order to make it work better. I understand his logic, but I suggest that his solution is nothing like as robust and effective as the solution proposed by clause 6. The idea of limiting the offence to paying for sex with someone who is coerced might sound great in principle, but it has not worked in practice. The law was warmly welcomed as a step in the right direction when it was introduced back in 2009, but the stark reality is that it has not resulted in a single conviction.

First, although article 64A has always been a strict liability offence — making it clear that what the buyer believes or knows about the coercion of the seller is irrelevant in terms of a prosecution — the fact remains that proving that the seller has been coerced is difficult in practice. In fact, an all-party group inquiry into the laws on prostitution in England and Wales concluded that, and I quote:

"Section 14 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 is an insufficient measure for protecting victims because coercion is too difficult to prove."

Our article 64A offence is identical to that in England and Wales.

Secondly, if we look at other jurisdictions that have opted for these caveated offences — for example, Finland and England and Wales — none of them have tended to work well in practice, and convictions have been very limited. According to the Solicitor General, the CPS has no record of any prosecutions for this offence in England and Wales in the most recent financial year, 2013-14, yet the national referral mechanism identified 533 victims of trafficking in the same jurisdiction for sexual exploitation in 2013.

In comparison, Gunilla Ekberg, former special adviser to the Swedish Government, told the Justice Committee that in Sweden almost 5,000 people had been arrested for purchasing sex over the past 15 years, with a conviction rate of about two thirds. Moreover, in the time since article 64A was introduced, the number of people identified as potential victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation has increased both in Northern Ireland and in England and Wales. It has not done what we hoped it would do, and I suggest that tinkering around the edges is not going to solve the fundamental problem.

I want to set out for Members why I think that clause 6 is the better option. First, before I leave the discussion on the current article 64A, I want to remind Members that clause 6 introduces tougher penalties than that provision. In a 2009 London study of 103 men who buy sex, 77% agreed that a greater criminal penalty would deter them from purchasing sex, as compared with only 47% who would be deterred by a requirement to attend an educational programme. That shows how effective clause 6 could be at reducing demand.

Secondly, I want to look at the international evidence. Of crucial importance, the criminalising of paying for sex has proved to be an effective strategy in other jurisdictions, particularly Sweden and Norway. I do not claim that this model is perfect. Indeed, as José Mendes Bota, who recently took a resolution calling for the criminalising of paying for sex successfully through the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, put it in evidence to the Canadian Parliament:

"There are no models that are 100% perfect."

I think that he is absolutely right on that, but to my mind, having visited Sweden to find out more about how the Nordic model operates, I think that it provides the best way forward, engaging directly with human trafficking and wider exploitation.

It is particularly worth reflecting on evaluations which have been conducted on the laws in operation in Sweden and Norway.

In July 2010, the Swedish Government published an evaluation of the operation of the Nordic model in Sweden, which was conducted by the Swedish chancellor of justice and former supreme court judge, Anna Skarhed. The evaluation did not claim that the Nordic model was perfect, but it highlighted the following points. First, street prostitution was found to have been cut in half as a direct result of the criminalisation of sex purchases. Secondly, there was no evidence that the decrease in on-street prostitution had led to an increase in off-street prostitution. Thirdly, fewer men stated that they had purchased sexual services, and over 70% of the Swedish population indicated that they continue to support the law. Fourthly, trafficking in Sweden is on a substantially smaller scale than in other comparable countries, and the Swedish police report that the law on the purchase of sexual services acts as a barrier to human traffickers who consider establishing themselves in Sweden.

Clearly, although prostitution still exists in Sweden, the law in operation in that country has had a positive effect. Nor has the example of Sweden been an isolated one. A 2014 independent evaluation for the Norwegian Government of the operation of the approach in Norway has some noteworthy conclusions. The summary stated that the ban on the purchase of sexual services has reduced demand for sex and thus contributed to the reduction in the extent of prostitution in Norway. The report highlighted that there was a clear declining trend in the market after the law was implemented.

The research also indicated that the law has led to a reduction in the level of human trafficking in Norway. As the summary puts it, a reduced market and an increase in law enforcement posed larger risks for human traffickers. The profit from human trafficking is also reduced due to those factors. The law has thus affected important pull factors and reduced the extent of human trafficking in Norway in comparison to a situation without a law.

I want to be absolutely clear that, while the demand for paid sex is the biggest single driver for trafficking in Northern Ireland, I recognise that it is not the case that the majority of individuals involved in prostitution in Northern Ireland have been trafficked. From the information I have received from the PSNI, a significant minority have been trafficked, but that does not constitute a majority. However, the title of my Bill is not, and crucially has never been, as some seem to believe, the "Human Trafficking Bill". It never was. It is the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Further Provisions and Support for Victims) Bill. It is my contention that the vast majority of individuals in prostitution today are victims of exploitation.

The academic evidence and the evidence submitted to the consultation for my draft Bill and to the Justice Committee make it plain that, for the majority who work in prostitution, doing so has been the consequence of a lack of choice rather than a positive choice. As Annie Campbell, director of Women's Aid in Northern Ireland, which I have found to be a fantastic organisation, said:

"Prostitution is not a choice; it is a trap that women and girls are lured into or fall into. They need a humane society to send out a zero-tolerance message of no abuse to support them to get out of that trap."

Evidence from the Home Office and multiple academic studies demonstrates that the majority of people who sell sex are incredibly vulnerable and subject to real exploitation. Home Office figures reveal that homelessness, living in care, debt and substance abuse are all common experiences prior to entering prostitution. Many of those in prostitution have suffered abuse or violence in the home. Home Office data has shown that as many as 85% of people in prostitution have experienced physical abuse in the family home, with 45% reporting familial sexual abuse. In a 2012 study of 114 women in prostitution in London, 50% said that they had experienced some form of coercion through trafficking or from a partner, pimp or relative. The same study found that 32% of those interviewed had entered the sex industry before the age of 18. Other studies have found higher numbers than that. For example, a 2004 study found the figure to be 52%. Numerous studies have found that between 50% and 95% of women in street prostitution are addicted to class A drugs.


10.30 pm

Some of the evidence given to the Justice Committee also powerfully illustrates the level of exploitation experienced by people in prostitution. I would like to highlight the evidence given by two individuals, some of which has been mentioned. One worked in prostitution and one paid for sex in the past. I think particularly of the contribution from Faoite — I hope that I pronounced that correctly — who entered prostitution at the age of 33 because she had developed a heroin addiction. She told the Committee in stark terms about the reality of what life was like for many who worked in prostitution. She described how she was not seen as fully human and was treated like an object by those who bought her.

I also think of the evidence of a former sex buyer. He stated that he had never met an empowered sex worker. That individual reckoned that between 5% and 7% of the prostitutes who he came across were minors. He also admitted to paying for sex with individuals who he thought were underage. He further suggested that, from a punter's perspective, the women were all the same and they would buy anyway. At the end of the session, he was asked whether criminalisation of the purchase of sexual services would have made a difference to him, and he emphatically said yes. To him, naming and shaming would be a massive deterrent.

Undoubtedly, some people have made a definite choice to work in prostitution. I recognise that. Such individuals gave evidence to the Justice Committee during its hearings on the Bill. They said that they enjoyed working in prostitution and have stridently opposed the introduction of this clause. However, while it is clear from the evidence that this group does not constitute a majority of those working in prostitution, the problem is that the current law is drafted in such a way that, as a matter of practice, it assumes exploitation to be the exception rather than the rule and, therefore, is not designed to protect the vulnerable.

Today, we face a choice. Do we want our legislation regarding the sale of sex to be defined out of regard for the vulnerable majority or out of regard for the privileged minority? There is no doubt in my mind that the current law, which tries to help the vulnerable majority and the privileged minority, effectively helps just the privileged minority. By contrast, the new law that I am proposing is defined out of primary regard for the vulnerable majority: those who have been trafficked or are there due to exploitative circumstances.

The imperative for clause 6 is greatly compounded by the publication on Friday of an Ipsos MORI poll, which referred specifically to my proposal in this Bill and the proportion of victims of trafficking found in sexual exploitation. In that light — not in a vague way, but in the knowledge that this proposal was to be debated in this Assembly — the survey asked whether people believed that we as a country should criminalise the purchase of sexual services. A staggering 78% of those surveyed across Northern Ireland said that they believed or strongly believed that Northern Ireland should criminalise paying for sex. Only 13% did not believe that we should take that step. Moreover, when we look at the views of just women, we see that the 78% rises to 82%. Of particular interest was the fact that support was high amongst young people, at 82% among 16- to 34-year-olds. This data indicates overwhelming public support for this clause.

I must respond to some of the counterarguments. During the course of debate on my Bill over the past months, those opposed to clause 6 have regularly used one particular argument. They allege that criminalising the purchase of sexual services could drive prostitution underground — this argument is commonly heard — making it more difficult to help those working in prostitution. Although this argument seems superficially plausible, it falls apart under scrutiny. I will make two points about this. First, prostitution in Northern Ireland is largely very much an underground activity already. Secondly, it is patently obvious that prostitution can never entirely go underground. For money to be made in prostitution, customers are required, and to obtain customers those involved or controlling prostitution need to advertise sexual services publicly. This may be in newspapers or on the Internet, and if the average punter can find an ad for sexual services, so can the police. This was made clear to us on our trip to Sweden. Consequently, this tired argument needs to be put out to pasture once and for all. It is not credible and not rooted in any evidence whatsoever.

There is the related concern that changing the law would make prostitution more dangerous for individuals working in the industry. The evidence is that prostitution is already extremely dangerous. In the Irish Medical Organisation's 2012 submission to the Dáil Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality, the representative body for 5,000 medical practitioners in the Republic of Ireland pointed to a women's health project in 2007, which showed that the majority of women involved in prostitution who came to the project recorded symptoms related to sexually transmitted infections. It also pointed to the fact that one study in London has found that mortality rates are estimated to be 12 times higher among women involved in prostitution than the national average. In the 2011 DOJ research, the author stated:

"Many women involved in prostitution in Northern Ireland are subjected to extreme violence."

After the Swedish law came into effect, the National Board of Health and Welfare there stated, in 2003:

"Police who have studied the occurrence of violence have not found any evidence of an increase."

The 2008 prostitution inquiry conducted in Sweden also established that the claims made by opponents about a worsening situation were baseless.

Data from Norway shows a decrease in severe violence against those in prostitution. In 2012, research showed a halving of the number of people in prostitution who had experienced rape since purchasing sex was criminalised in 2009, compared to those surveyed in 2008. Violence from pimps was also halved and violence from clients was down from 89% to 74%. The recent evaluation of the Norwegian law states that researchers did not find:

"any evidence of more violence against prostitutes after the ban on buying sex entered into force".

There are those who talk about conflating prostitution and trafficking. Many critics of this clause, including the Minister of Justice, have stated that clause 6 conflates human trafficking and prostitution in an unhelpful fashion. However, it is important to point out that, as José Mendes Bota, the Council of Europe's General Rapporteur on violence against women has put it:

"Although we understand that prostitution and trafficking are separate phenomena, there is a strong link between prostitution and trafficking."

It is also important to have regard for what the EU anti-trafficking coordinator told us, just the week before last, during her trip to Northern Ireland. She said that prostitution, organised crime and human trafficking are linked.

She said that at a Department of Justice public event, and she stated clearly:

"You can quote anything I say".

Indeed, the Department of Justice's 'Research paper investigating the issues for women in Northern Ireland involved in prostitution and exploring best practice elsewhere', which was published in January 2011, outlined on page 8 that those two phenomena are "closely interlinked". The research document is rarely mentioned now by the Department of Justice, officials or the Minister, but it made it very clear that one of the main drivers for human trafficking in this Province is for the purpose of sexual exploitation.

In a context where the NRM figures clearly demonstrate that not only is the demand for paid sex the single biggest driver for trafficking to Northern Ireland but well over 50% of victims suffer sexual exploitation, we must do something to address that demand if we are to see an end to human trafficking. Moreover, in a Bill that seeks to tackle human trafficking and other forms of exploitation, addressing exploitation and prostitution is not merely appropriate, it is something that should be expected. Policymakers have long lambasted the tendency to place everything in policy silos that ignore the relationships between different phenomena that are all tied up together. To that end, I am very proud that my Human Trafficking and Exploitation Bill presents a very effective piece of joined-up government. That is not a weakness; it is a very great strength.

It is asserted by some that we need more research and debate. Let me be very clear: there has actually been a huge amount of debate on this issue. There have been two public consultations: mine and the Justice Committee's. The issue was the subject of six hours' debate at Second Reading. The Justice Committee took the unusual course of extending its proceedings for a full six months to properly look into the evidence. It took written and oral evidence from a wide range of witnesses. It visited Sweden and the Dáil specifically with clause 6 in mind. Its report runs to, I think, almost 1,200 pages, much of which is on clause 6. There have been numerous radio and television interviews and debates on the matter, and, today, we are debating the matter once again. The matter has been debated exhaustively.

Much has been said today about the research into prostitution that was published on Friday. I do not propose to go over all that ground again. Suffice it to say that I agree with the views of those around the House who believe that that research is flawed. It should not cause us to change direction on the matter. As I have outlined today, we have considerable evidence of a much more reliable standard from other jurisdictions than the document that the Minister gave me on Thursday.

Clause 6 sets out for us the best way forward on prostitution law reform. I am delighted that it is supported by such a broad section of Northern Ireland society, including organisations such Women's Aid, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, the hugely impressive Turn Off The Red Light campaign, the Evangelical Alliance, the Catholic Church, SPACE International and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. They have come out in favour of the approach that I have outlined.

I am also overwhelmed by the positive response to the Ipsos MORI poll: 78% in support was far greater than I imagined. I am particularly encouraged that that rises to 82% amongst young people. I am also encouraged to see the support that it is gaining internationally. I noted with interest that, in February this year, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly for the Honeyball report — 349 votes to 139 — which supported criminalising paying for sex, and that, in April this year, the Council of Europe voted overwhelmingly — 82 to 17 — for the Mendes Boata report, which supports criminalising paying for sex. Other countries, such as Canada, are going down the same route. Members, I believe that this is the right approach to take and I believe that we have the evidence to go forward.


10.45 pm

I will end with a quote from ACC Drew Harris. Speaking to the Justice Committee in February, he said:

"A demand now exists for prostitutes, for prostitution in our society and on the island of Ireland as a whole. Crime gangs regard it as high-yielding in hard cash and of low risk."

I hope that the Bill will start changing that situation and I urge Members across the House to vote in favour of clause 6.

Before we come to the question of the vote on whether clause 6 should stand part of the Bill, let me set out the details of the amendments I have tabled and make some comments on the other amendments tabled. There are nine amendments in this group that I have put forward to improve the operation of the clause — amendment No 28 and amendment Nos 30 to 37. It is important to state at the outset that all the amendments I am proposing to the clause have been accepted as legally accurate and workable by the Attorney General.

The amendments I am proposing to clause 6 cover different areas. The first relates to payments. Amendment No 28 inserts a new clause 6(1A). This amendment ensures that the definition of payments set out in article 58 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 does not apply to the new offence of paying for the sexual services of a person. Subsection 3 of the clause contains a definition of "payment" that is to be used for the offence, but, for clarity, the Attorney General advised me that it should also be made clear that the article 58 definition of "payment" does not apply.

Amendment No 34 makes it clear that, in addition to an offence taking place if the payment is offered to the person offering the sexual service, an offence will also take place if the payment is made to someone controlling the person.

Amendment No 35 amends the definition of "payment" in subsection 3 of the clause. This was done to ensure that the clause actually achieved its intended effect. The Attorney General advised me that this phrase could unintentionally broaden the clause to include activities that there was no intention to criminalise, specifically, situations of mutually exchanged sexual activity where no other form of payment, material or financial, had been exchanged, but which could under the law have been viewed as a reciprocal exchange of sexual services. Consequently, I proposed the amendment.

Amendment No 30 deletes the phrase "over the age of 18" from revised article 64A(1). I have proposed this amendment to remove the anomaly, which was highlighted by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, whereby if an individual paid for sex with a child, which is a criminal offence under article 37 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, it would actually be harder to convict a person charged with that offence than it would be to convict someone charged under the proposed article 64A. This is because, if an individual is charged with paying for sex with a person under the age of 18, they can argue that they reasonably believed that the child was over 18. If that defence were successful, the prosecution would fail and no other prosecution route would be available, whereas, if the person had paid for sex with someone over the age of 18, no such defence would be available. Members will not be surprised to hear that that is not what I intended to do when I introduced clause 6 of my Bill. The Attorney General advised me that the best way to solve that problem was simply to delete the phrase "over the age of 18" from the clause.

Amendment Nos 31 and 32 would insert new wording into revised article 64A(2)(a) of the offence to mandate that, if someone is found guilty of paying for sexual services on summary conviction, most commonly in the Magistrates' Court, they may be imprisoned for a term not exceeding six months, receive a fine, or both.

Amendment No 33 would insert new wording to 64A(2)(b) to mandate that a prison term of up to one year or a fine can be applied following a conviction under indictment. The amendment clarifies that a custodial sentence may be imposed on conviction under summary and indictment judgements, differentiating the maximum sentence available in the different courts.

Amendment No 36 introduces a new subsection 3A to the offence. This measure is introduced to deal with the claims that clause 6 could criminalise lap dancing or sexual services using methods of communication such as telephones or webcams. The amendment ensures that the two individuals have to be physically in each other's presence and that the actual physical touching by one party of the other is required. Again, this amendment has been checked by the Attorney General, and he informs me that the amendment will rule out clause 6 applying in these situations.

Amendment No 37 would introduce a new subsection 5, which would require an advertising campaign to ensure public awareness of the change effected by clause 6. To my mind, that amendment is crucial to the success of the approach introduced by clause 6. We need to make it clear to our society that paying for sex is unacceptable. Such advertisement, which played an important role when the law was changed in Sweden, is necessary to ensure that people are aware of the law, why it has been passed and how it now works.

I will turn now to address the other amendments to clause 6. Amendment No 29, proposed by Sinn Féin, would repeal the offence of loitering or soliciting for the purposes of prostitution. I am aware that some Members might have concerns that that amendment amounts to a wholesale decriminalisation of prostitution. Let me reassure Members that that is not the effect of this provision; if it were, I would resist it strongly. What the amendment does is remove the single offence of soliciting on the street for the purpose of selling sex. The existing law does little to address off-street prostitution. In this regard, clause 6 is a vast improvement since it addresses prostitution in all contexts on and off street. Moreover, it is worth emphasising that the amendment does not remove the more serious prostitution offences to do with brothel-keeping and controlling prostitution for gain where one person makes a profit through the prostitution of another. In practice, as Assistant Chief Constable Drew Harris told the Committee for Justice, although there is some very limited on-street prostitution in Northern Ireland, in the vast majority of cases, it is off street. The offence has a limited reach and, in practice, is seldom used. According to data that has been received from the PSNI under a freedom of information request, not a single arrest was made for soliciting for the purposes of prostitution between 2009 and 2013.

It is well understood by academics that those in street prostitution are among some of the most vulnerable people involved in prostitution as a whole. Given that the intention of my Bill is to address exploitation, and in light of the limited practical usage of the soliciting offence, I am content to accept the amendment.

I will speak briefly about amendment No 38, which is also proposed by Sinn Féin. This amendment relates to the provision in subsection 6 of the new offence requiring the Department of Justice to review the data on the operation of the offence and to report to the Assembly. Amendment No 38 sets out specific matters for consideration in that report, namely the nature of trafficking into prostitution, the number of arrests and convictions under the clause 6 offence and the new consolidated trafficking and slavery offences in this Bill, and finally the impact of the offence on those in prostitution. The matters listed in the amendment are all subjects that I would have expected to be covered in a report under subsection 6, but I am very happy to accept this amendment.

I should also make some comments about amendment No 39, which introduces a new clause 6A to increase the time limit for investigating the current article 64A offence to three years. In the event that the House decided to reject clause 6, I would support the Minister's amendment. It is manifestly obvious that giving the police three years to investigate this offence rather than six months will make the current offence more effective. However, as I set out in detail at the beginning of my speech, I want to be very clear that I do not believe that this measure goes far enough. I do not believe that this caveated offence will ever be an effective deterrent against purchasing sexual services in Northern Ireland. Even with the increased time for investigation, it will prove very difficult for the police and prosecution services to convict many individuals for this offence. My prediction is that, if the Assembly supports amendment No 39 over clause 6, we will be back looking at the issue in the future once it becomes apparent that this approach simply does not go far enough.

Mr Ford (The Minister of Justice): A lot has been said on this particular group of amendments. I will try to be finished by midnight.

Perhaps I should start with some of the amendments to clause 6, which did not get an awful lot of attention during the general debate but which have just been referred to by Lord Morrow in some detail.

Certainly, as he highlighted, amendment No 28 is a fairly technical amendment. If clause 6 were to be passed, I would have no particular issues with it. Amendment No 29, as he correctly highlights, repeals the offence of soliciting on the street in circumstances where we know that there are virtually no women working on the streets these days; prostitution tends to be conducted in a different way, such as in a building or advertised on the Internet. The estimate from the Queen's research was that no more than 20 women are working the streets of Northern Ireland. So, by removing that vestige of criminalisation of women, it seems to be in keeping with the proposals of clause 6. However, it is the case that there are other aspects where women may still be criminalised. Lord Morrow referred to brothel-keeping. As I understand the law, it currently prescribes that, if two women are working together, that constitutes a brothel. It may be that those who propose that particular amendment might wish to revisit some of those aspects, because it seems to me that there is a difference between two women working together in the interests of protection and those who are working in a brothel controlled by pimps.

(Mr Principal Deputy Speaker [Mr Mitchel McLaughlin] in the Chair)

For amendment No 30, Lord Morrow has highlighted the issue of removing the age limit of 18. That is an issue that I see no difficulty with whatsoever. The reality is that there are laws on the statute book that deal with the issue. The current law on paying for the sexual services of a prostitute subjected to force applies with no lower age limit, and there are much more serious offences regarding paying for the sexual services of a child, which can actually carry a maximum penalty of up to life imprisonment. Whilst I see nothing wrong with the amendment, it does not add very much, given the offences that already exist. However, the House may well see fit to pass it anyway.

As Lord Morrow highlighted, amendment Nos 31, 32 and 33 relate to penalties. If I am opposing clause 6, it would seem illogical to oppose an increase in the penalties that fall within that. I suspect that other Members will perhaps take their advice from Lord Morrow and not from me.

Amendment Nos 34 and 35 deal with payments, whether through a third party or, as Lord Morrow put it, for mutually-exchanged sexual services. Again, if those amendments are to be passed, I see no reason why those should be abolished.

Amendment No 36 addresses one key concern raised by some of us who have difficulties with the way that clause 6 was opposed. It certainly removes things such as webcam sex or telephone sex. What I am not sure that it necessarily does, although he highlighted it specifically, is relate to issues such as lap dancing. There may be issues that would need to be revisited at Further Consideration Stage in that respect as well. If what he is seeking to do is remove some of the non-physical aspects of sexual services, it is clear that the amendment as it currently stands is doing that. I am not sure that it goes quite as far as he believes it does, and I am happy to discuss that with Lord Morrow, if the amendment goes through, to see whether further refinement to it might be appropriate at a later stage.

The specific issue I have some difficulty with is in amendment No 37. I really have my doubts as to whether we need to have an advertising campaign to raise public awareness of this issue. If this issue is not the one that has attracted the greatest attention from the work done by the Assembly over many years, I would be very surprised. I think that few people would be unaware of the debate or the consequences of the debate, assuming that we finish in time for the morning news bulletins.

Therefore, I have a little difficulty with the suggestion of an advertising campaign. We are well publicising this issue.


11.00 pm

There is also a minor technical detail. There are at least one or two Ministers and former Ministers in the House at the moment. As I understand, under the Executive policy, there is a specific bar on advertising campaigns in general on an economic basis. I believe that the single exception is road safety campaigns; if the Minister of the Environment were here, he might keep me right on that point. So, it runs contrary to policy. I believe that it is possible to publicise what is being done in the fight against trafficking through the kind of work that my staff did when they ran a stall at St George's Market on Saturday and the work being done by our NGO engagement partners and elements of the Organised Crime Task Force. I do not feel that paying for advertising is necessary to ensure that we raise awareness, although I entirely agree that we need to raise awareness.

Amendment No 38 looks at the issue of what might be included in the annual report that the Department must publish. I have no problem with its general principle. There are some slight issues that might require amendment at Further Consideration Stage if the House is minded to support this. If that is the case, I would certainly be happy to discuss with Lord Morrow and Mr McCartney whether some fine-tuning would make it a better amendment than it currently is. However, I am happy with the principle of it as it stands.

It is clear that the issue of prostitution has exercised Members more than the other aspects of the Bill. The fact that we put through 28 amendments in the first group with virtually no dissent anywhere but have had 19 Members speak in the debate on this particular group shows that it is a significant issue. It is clearly a moral issue for many of us. One Member said that he had moral difficulties. I do not think that many of us have moral difficulties in our concerns about prostitution. The issue is the best way to address it.

There are clearly attractions in voting for the proposal as it stands. I doubt that any of us thinks that prostitution is a good thing. In particular, no one wants to see women being subjected to fear, violence, coercion of any kind, threats or the circumstances that forced them into selling sex against their will. That is an issue that is morally reprehensible and that we would all wish to address. No one wants to imagine what that must be like. No one wants to imagine the society that permits men to use women in such a way. On that, we are all agreed. However, the issue is the best and most effective way of dealing with this that deals with trafficking and exploitation and does not become a catch-all that may have problems elsewhere.

Let me just refer briefly to some of the points that have been made during the debate. I will not attribute them to individuals since many of them were made by a number of people.

Whilst clearly there is evidence from groups such as Women's Aid that the women that they see are abused and exploited, whether for sexual services or other things, there is evidence from the research that Queen's provided for us that shows that, for some, entry into prostitution is an issue of choice. That is not something that is attractive or that we wish to hear, but it is a fact. There is no doubt that there are normative effects of a law. However, I think that there are issues around drink-driving, for example, that were accepted to be inappropriate antisocial behaviour at the point that specific breath test limits were introduced and so on. That is different from this. Frankly, it is also the case that those kind of normative effects work when you are trying to lead a large body of society.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: I appeal to Members that we should acknowledge that the Minister has served a heroic stint throughout this debate. He has listened to us. I think that we should listen to him.

Mr Ford: Thank you, Mr Principal Deputy Speaker. The normative effects may apply when there is a body of opinion in society around a change being needed. We know from the statistics from the Queen's research that roughly only 3% of men in Northern Ireland use the services of a prostitute in the course of a year. That is very different from the normative effect where you are seeking to alter the opinions of 25% or 30% of the population.

We also know that there is a variety of different reports on the effects of the Swedish experience. My visit to Stockholm established different views between some of the public agencies, the police and prosecutors, and some of those who were working in support of women involved in prostitution. It was not that clear-cut. What was clear is that the proportion of men who use prostitutes in Sweden is higher than it is in Northern Ireland, despite the law. The number of complaints stood at 1,277 in 2010. That is a significant number of complaints for something that is supposed to have had a significant effect. It may have had an effect, but I also noticed that not one Member — unless they did so during one of my more sleepy moments — made any reference to the point that I made about telephone intercept evidence being a key part of the way in which the Swedish police fight the use of prostitutes. That would simply be impossible within our standards. It would be appropriate to use such telephone intercepts if we were talking about serious organised crimes, though I am happy to say that it would not be the Minister of Justice who would authorise them, if we were talking about trafficking on a scale. It would not be appropriate to use them against ordinary clients or ordinary punters. So, there are real issues with the difficulties that we have that have not been addressed.

It is clear that there is a link into prostitution for women who are trafficked, but it is not clear that prostitution goes back the same way into the issue of trafficking, in general.

I move now to the police position. Nobody has said that the police said that the law would be unenforceable. As Members have said, it is the role of the police to enforce the law as we make it. Police officers, including Deputy Chief Constable Drew Harris, have said that it is hard to quantify how much of a deterrent this law would be. They have said that their focus would be on organised crime groups and serious harm, which is what I, as Minister of Justice, would hope their focus would be on at any time. The evidential opportunities are limited, certainly if evidential opportunities rely on the word of the prostitute. There is also a qualification about impact.

A number of Members, particularly from the DUP Benches, questioned the research that was published last week by my Department, and there were allegations of bias. I certainly regret the time it takes to procure research under our arcane system, which requires multiple tenders and so on. It is unfortunate, but I asked for it to be produced in order to inform the debate. I hoped that Members would have read it for reasons other than to seek something to object to within it.

Comments were made about the research being biased. I consider that those comments impugn the reputation of those who conducted the research. I leave it to Queen's, the University of Berlin and UCG to make their response to that. I believe that it is entirely possible for an academic — and, sometimes, easier than it is for a politician — to have a view yet honestly represent the evidence that is put before them.

As detailed in the report, despite what some Members have said, detailed steps were taken to guard against confirmation bias — the idea that you ensured that the interpretation of data comes out to support pre-existing views. The details of that are set out in chapter 2 of the report, but nobody referred to it. It acknowledges, honestly, the problems that the survey methods were likely to result in, and it makes allowances for them. The number of people who were involved in the online survey, and the detailed interviews that were held with sex workers, clients, experts and service providers, give us a good picture of what the situation is in Northern Ireland, allowing for the fact that many workers and clients are mobile between the different jurisdictions of these islands and, indeed, further afield. Obviously, the websites on which much of the advertising takes place are not confined to one jurisdiction.

Contrary to what some have suggested, the report does not make recommendations. It analyses and reports findings, as it was asked to do. The research was quantitative and qualitative, and, for the first time, it had a focus on Northern Ireland and our particular concerns. I have no doubt that it did not make comfortable reading for many of us, but many Members may have found that it challenged the stereotypical picture of the sex industry.

I do not believe that we can ignore the voices that we heard. We have a responsibility to ensure that what we put into law is not going to make the lives of women, predominantly, and, as others have said, some men who are involved in the sex trade, more difficult or more dangerous. It is clear that many of those who are involved in the sex trade selling sexual services have made an independent, informed choice. That is clearly not the picture for all, but it is clearly the picture for some. We have to ensure that we fully support the measures that target those who are exploiting others and which provide support to those who are involved in the sex trade who are subject to force and coercion. That is what I believe we can do without clause 6 as it stands.

In summary, there are two large pieces of the jigsaw missing from the picture that has been painted today. I believe that those are two major flaws in the policy arguments that we have so far heard about letting this clause stand part of the Bill. One is that we now have evidence from the survey to show that criminalisation will not depress the market. The research report quotes the figure that only 16% of buyers would be prepared to change their behaviour if this law were enacted. We also have seen evidence that over 60% of women selling sexual services fear that criminalisation will make their lives more risky. In addition, we continue to see that there are major problems in enforcing such an offence. Those are problems that have been highlighted in a number of different areas, and I repeat the point that telephone intercepts may work in Sweden and may work against those involved in organised crime, but we could not use them against the individual punters. Resources will have to be devoted to the area in which we all want to see action taken, against those who engage in organised crime and organised trafficking.

My Department will be studying the research commissioned by Queen's and other relevant evidence on the wider issue of prostitution in Northern Ireland. I will consider what legislative change is necessary or appropriate for Northern Ireland in the future, but, at this stage, I remain unconvinced that clause 6 will be the appropriate way to move forward. However, if it is the case that the House is minded to support that, I will certainly look to make the adjustments that I have highlighted in some of my comments, working, as we have done over a period of months with Lord Morrow and with the proposers of some of the other amendments, at Further Consideration Stage.

Finally, in conclusion on this point, I emphasise that my amendment No 39 and the insertion of new clause 6A is not an alternative to clause 6. I believe that it is something that is entirely appropriate to stand, even if clause 6 goes ahead. It may or may not be effective, but there is nothing to suggest that it is not as well worth doing as many as the other amendments to clause 6. So, I trust that we can unite around amendment No 39, whatever minor differences we may have at the point earlier. We are all agreed on the principle. The unfortunate thing is that we have not yet seen the evidence on how we can agree on the method.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: Members, although we have debated opposition to clause 6, we must first dispose of the amendments to the clause before putting the question on clause 6 stand part.

Amendment No 28 made:

In page 3, line 26, at end insert

"(2) In Article 58 (Interpretation of this Part) at the end of paragraph (3) insert "other than in Article 64A".".

Amendment No 29 made:

In clause 6, page 3, line 26, at end insert

"(2) Article 59 (Loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution) is repealed.".

Amendment No 30 made:

In clause 6, page 3, line 31, leave out "over the age of 18".

Amendment No 31 made:

In clause 6, page 3, line 35, after "to" insert

"imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or".

Amendment No 32 made:

In clause 6, page 3, line 36, after "scale" insert ", or both".

Amendment No 33 made:

In clause 6, page 3, line 37, before "to imprisonment" insert "on conviction on indictment".

Amendment No 34 made:

In clause 6, page 3, line 39, after "advantage" insert

"to B or any person other than B".

Amendment No 35 made:

In clause 6, page 3, line 41, leave out "(including sexual services)".

Amendment No 36 made:

In clause 6, page 3, line 41, at end insert

"(3A) No offence is committed under this article unless the sexual services that are provided or are to be provided by B to A involve—

(a) B being physically in A’s presence,

(b) B touching A or A touching B, and

(c) the touching is sexual.".

Amendment No 37 made:

In clause 6, page 4, line 4, leave out "must raise awareness of this offence." and insert

"shall conduct an advertising campaign to ensure public awareness of the change effected by this section.".

Amendment No 38 made:

In clause 6, page 4, line 7, at end insert

"(7) In particular the report must set out—
 
(a) information on the nature and extent of prostitution connected to human trafficking including numbers of arrests and convictions during the period covered by the report in connection with an offence under this Article or section 1A, 1B or 1D of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Further Provisions and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014;
 
(b) the extent to which, in the opinion of the Department, this Article has operated to reduce human trafficking; and
 
(c) the impact of this Article on the safety and well-being of prostitutes.".

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

The Assembly divided:

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 6, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Amendment No 39 not moved.

New Clause

Amendment No 40 made:

After clause 6 insert

"Offence of forced marriage
 
Offence of forced marriage
 
6B.—(1) A person commits an offence if he or she—
 
(a) uses violence, threats or any other form of coercion for the purpose of causing another person to enter into a marriage, and
 
(b) believes, or ought reasonably to believe, that the conduct may cause the other person to enter into the marriage without free and full consent.
 
(2) It is irrelevant whether the conduct mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) is directed at the victim of the offence under that subsection or another person.
 
(3) In relation to a victim who is incapable of consenting by reason of mental disorder, the offence under subsection (1) is capable of being committed by any conduct carried out for the purpose of causing the victim to enter into a marriage (whether or not the conduct amounts to violence, threats or any other form of coercion).
 
(4) In this section—
 
'marriage' means any religious or civil ceremony of marriage (whether or not legally binding);
 
'mental disorder' has the meaning given by the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986.
 
(5) A person commits an offence if he or she—
 
(a) practises any form of deception with the intention of causing another person to leave the United Kingdom, and
 
(b) intends the other person to be subjected to conduct outside the United Kingdom that is an offence under subsection (1) or would be an offence under that subsection if the victim were in Northern Ireland.
 
(6) A person commits an offence under subsection (1) or (5) only if, at the time of the conduct or deception—
 
(a) the person or the victim or both of them are in Northern Ireland,
 
(b) neither the person nor the victim is in Northern Ireland but at least one of them is habitually resident in Northern Ireland, or
 
(c) neither the person nor the victim is in the United Kingdom but at least one of them is a UK national.
 
(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;
 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: Opposition to clause 7 has already been debated.

Question, That the clause stand part of the Bill, put and negatived.

Clause No 7 disagreed to.

Clause 8 (Victim of trafficking in human beings)

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: We now come to the fourth debate, which concerns amendment Nos 41 to 49 and 51to 53 as well as opposition to clauses 8, 9, 10, 12 and 14 standing part. These amendments deal with new duties on the Department to provide support, assistance and protection to potential victims of trafficking, and support for those wishing to exit prostitution. This group also deals with proposals for a child trafficking guardian or independent legal guardian. Members will note that amendment No 41 is mutually exclusive with clause 9 standing part. Amendment No 42 is mutually exclusive with clause 10. Amendment Nos 46 and 47 are mutually exclusive with clause 12 and with each other. Amendment No 48 is mutually exclusive with clause 8 ,and amendment No 53 is mutually exclusive with clause 14 standing part.

If that is perfectly clear, I call Lord Morrow to speak to clause 8 stand part and to address the other amendments and oppositions in the group.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The following amendments stood on the Marshalled List:

No 41:

After clause 9 insert

"Interpretation of this Part
 
9A.—(1) For the purposes of this Part there is a conclusive determination that a person is, or is not, a victim of trafficking in human beings when, on completion of the identification process required by Article 10 of the Trafficking Convention, a competent authority concludes that the person is, or is not, such a victim.
 
(2) In this Part—
 
"competent authority" means a person who is a competent authority of the United Kingdom for the purposes of the Trafficking Convention;
 
"the Trafficking Convention" means the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (done at Warsaw on 16 May 2005);
 
"trafficking in human beings" has the same meaning as in the Trafficking Convention.".

No 42: After clause 10 insert

"Assistance and support pending determination by competent authority

10A.—(1) The Department must ensure that a person to whom this section applies is provided with assistance and support in accordance with this section.

(2) This section applies to a person if—

(a) that person is aged 18 or over or, in a case where the age of the person is uncertain, the Department reasonably believes that person is aged 18 or over; and

(b) a reference relating to that person has been, or is about to be, made to the competent authority for a determination for the purposes of Article 10 of the Trafficking Convention as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is a victim of trafficking in human beings.

(3) Assistance and support is to be provided under this section until there is made in relation to that person—

(a) a determination that there are not reasonable grounds to believe that the person is a victim of trafficking in human beings; or

(b) a conclusive determination that the person is or is not a victim of trafficking in human beings;

but if a conclusive determination that a person is a victim of trafficking in human beings is made within the relevant period, assistance and support is to be provided until the end of that period.

(4) The relevant period is the period of 45 days from the date on which the determination mentioned in subsection (2)(b) is made by the competent authority.

(5) Assistance and support provided to a person under this section—

(a) must not be conditional on the person’s acting as a witness in any criminal proceedings;

(b) must only be provided with the agreement of that person;

(c) must be provided in a manner which takes due account of the needs of that person as regards safety and protection from harm;

(d) must be provided to meet the assessed needs of that person, having regard in particular to any special needs or vulnerabilities of that person caused by gender, pregnancy, physical or mental illness, disability or being the victim of serious violence or serious abuse.

(6) Assistance and support under this section must be offered from a person who is of the same gender as the person receiving it.

(7) The assistance and support which may be provided under this section includes, but is not be restricted to, the provision of—

(a) appropriate and safe accommodation;

(b) material assistance (including financial assistance);

(c) assistance in obtaining healthcare services (including counselling);

(d) appropriate information on any matter of relevance or potential relevance to the particular circumstances of the person;

(e) translation and interpretation services;

(f) assistance in obtaining legal advice or representation;

(g) assistance with repatriation.

(8) Where assistance and support has been provided to any person under this section, it may continue to be provided even if that person leaves Northern Ireland.

(9) Where—

(a) assistance and support has been provided to a person under this section; and

(b) that person ceases, by virtue of a conclusive determination that the person is a victim of trafficking in human beings or the ending of the relevant period, to be a person to whom assistance and support is to be provided under this section,

the Department may nevertheless ensure that assistance and support continues to be provided to that person under this section for such further period as the Department thinks necessary.

(10) Nothing in this section affects the entitlement of any person to assistance and support under any other statutory provision.".


No 43: After clause 10 insert

"Assistance and Support for Exiting Prostitution
 
10B.—(1) The Department of Health, Social Services, and Public Safety must ensure that there is a programme of assistance and support made available to a person who wishes to leave prostitution.

(2) Assistance and support provided under this section—

(a) is not conditional on the person’s willingness to act as a witness;

(b) shall be provided with the agreement of the person; and

(c) shall take due account of the victim’s safety and protection needs, including being offered assistance from a person of the same gender.

(3) Nothing in this section affects the entitlement of any person to assistance and support under any other statutory provision.

(4) For the purposes of this section "prostitution" has the same meaning as in Article 58 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008.".


No 44: After clause 10 insert

"Strategy on assistance and support for exiting prostitution

10B. The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety shall, at least once in every year, publish a strategy, in conjunction with other government departments, to ensure that a programme of assistance and support is made available to a person who wishes to leave prostitution.".

No 45: In clause 11, page 6, line 19, leave out from ", by order" to end of line 25 and insert

"issue guidance as to—
 
(a) the procedures to be followed by a person to whom this section applies to apply for compensation under the Criminal Injuries (Compensation) (Northern Ireland) Order 2002;
 
(b) the grounds on which compensation may be awarded under that Order; and
 
(c) the arrangements available to assist and support such a person in applying for such compensation.
 
(3) This section applies to a person if (and only if) there has been a conclusive determination that the person is a victim of trafficking in human beings.".



No 46: After clause 12 insert

"Child trafficking guardian
 
12A.—(1) The Regional Health and Social Care Board must, in accordance with this section, make arrangements to enable a person (a "child trafficking guardian") to be appointed to assist, represent and support a child to whom this section applies.
 
(2) This section applies to a child if—
 
(a) a reference relating to that child has been, or is about to be, made to a competent authority for a determination for the purposes of Article 10 of the Trafficking Convention as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child is a victim of trafficking in human beings; and
 
(b) there has not been a conclusive determination that the child is not such a victim;
 
and for the purposes of this subsection a determination which has been challenged by way of proceedings for judicial review shall not be treated as conclusive until those proceedings are finally determined.
 
(3) Arrangements under this section must—
 
(a) be made with a registered charity (within the meaning of the Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 2008);
 
(b) provide for the appointment of a person as the child trafficking guardian for a child to whom this section applies to be made by that charity;
 
(c) ensure that a person is not so appointed by that charity unless that person—
 
(i) is an employee of the charity; and
 
(ii) is eligible to be so appointed in accordance with regulations under subsection (4);
 
(d) provide for the appointment of a child trafficking guardian only where the person with parental responsibility for the child—
 
(i) is not in regular contact with the child or is outside the United Kingdom;
 
(ii) is suspected of having committed an offence under section 1B in relation to the child; or
 
(iii) for other reasons has interests which conflict with those of the child;
 
(e) include provision for the termination of the appointment of a child trafficking guardian, including in particular provision for such termination—
 
(i) if the child ceases to be a child to whom this section applies;
 
(ii) on the child attaining the age of 18 (unless subsection (9) applies);
 
(iii) on paragraph (d) ceasing to apply in relation to the child;
 
(iv) where, after consulting the child trafficking guardian, the Regional Health and Social Care Board is of the opinion that it is no longer necessary to continue the appointment because long-term arrangements have been made in relation to the child.
 
(4) The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety shall by regulations make provision for—
 
(a) the training and qualifications required for a person to be eligible for appointment as a child trafficking guardian;
 
(b) the support to be provided for, and the supervision of, a child trafficking guardian.
 
(5) A child trafficking guardian appointed in relation to a child must at all times act in the best interests of the child.
 
(6) The functions of a child trafficking guardian include (where appropriate)—
 
(a) ascertaining the views of the child in relation to matters affecting the child;
 
(b) making representations to, and liaising with, bodies or persons responsible for—
 
(i) providing care, accommodation, health services, education or translation and interpretation services to or in respect of the child; or
 
(ii) otherwise taking decisions in relation to the child;
 
(c) assisting the child to obtain legal or other advice, assistance and representation, including (where necessary) the appointment and instructing of legal representatives to act on behalf of the child;
 
(d) consulting regularly with the child and keeping the child informed of legal and other proceedings affecting the child and any other matters affecting the child;
 
(e) contributing to a plan to safeguard and promote the future welfare of the child based on an individual assessment of that child’s best interests;
 
(f) providing a link between the child and any body or person who may provide services to the child;
 
(g) assisting in establishing contact with members of the child’s family, where the child so wishes and it is in the child’s best interests;
 
(h) accompanying the child to meetings or on other occasions.
 
(7) Any person or body providing services or taking administrative decisions in relation to a child for whom a child trafficking guardian has been appointed under this section must recognise, and pay due regard to, the functions of the child trafficking guardian and must (to the extent otherwise permitted by law) provide the child trafficking guardian with access to such information relating to the child as will enable the child trafficking guardian to carry out his or her functions effectively.
 
(8) The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety may by regulations confer additional functions on child trafficking guardians.
 
(9) The arrangements under this section may provide for a child trafficking guardian appointed in relation to a person under the age of 18 to continue (with the consent of that person) to act in relation to that person after that person attains the age of 18 but is under the age of 21.
 
(10) In this section—
 
"administrative decision" does not include a decision taken by a court or tribunal;
 
"parental responsibility" has the meaning given by Article 6 of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, except that it does not include parental responsibility conferred by a care order (within the meaning of Article 49(1) of that Order).".



No 46: After clause 12 insert

"Child trafficking guardian
 
12A.—(1) The Regional Health and Social Care Board must, in accordance with this section, make arrangements to enable a person (a "child trafficking guardian") to be appointed to assist, represent and support a child to whom this section applies.
 
(2) This section applies to a child if—
 
(a) a reference relating to that child has been, or is about to be, made to a competent authority for a determination for the purposes of Article 10 of the Trafficking Convention as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child is a victim of trafficking in human beings; and
 
(b) there has not been a conclusive determination that the child is not such a victim;
 
and for the purposes of this subsection a determination which has been challenged by way of proceedings for judicial review shall not be treated as conclusive until those proceedings are finally determined.
 
(3) Arrangements under this section must—
 
(a) be made with a registered charity (within the meaning of the Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 2008);
 
(b) provide for the appointment of a person as the child trafficking guardian for a child to whom this section applies to be made by that charity;
 
(c) ensure that a person is not so appointed by that charity unless that person—
 
(i) is an employee of the charity; and
 
(ii) is eligible to be so appointed in accordance with regulations under subsection (4);
 
(d) provide for the appointment of a child trafficking guardian only where the person with parental responsibility for the child—
 
(i) is not in regular contact with the child or is outside the United Kingdom;
 
(ii) is suspected of having committed an offence under section 1B in relation to the child; or
 
(iii) for other reasons has interests which conflict with those of the child;
 
(e) include provision for the termination of the appointment of a child trafficking guardian, including in particular provision for such termination—
 
(i) if the child ceases to be a child to whom this section applies;
 
(ii) on the child attaining the age of 18 (unless subsection (9) applies);
 
(iii) on paragraph (d) ceasing to apply in relation to the child;
 
(iv) where, after consulting the child trafficking guardian, the Regional Health and Social Care Board is of the opinion that it is no longer necessary to continue the appointment because long-term arrangements have been made in relation to the child.
 
(4) The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety shall by regulations make provision for—
 
(a) the training and qualifications required for a person to be eligible for appointment as a child trafficking guardian;
 
(b) the support to be provided for, and the supervision of, a child trafficking guardian.
 
(5) A child trafficking guardian appointed in relation to a child must at all times act in the best interests of the child.
 
(6) The functions of a child trafficking guardian include (where appropriate)—
 
(a) ascertaining the views of the child in relation to matters affecting the child;
 
(b) making representations to, and liaising with, bodies or persons responsible for—
 
(i) providing care, accommodation, health services, education or translation and interpretation services to or in respect of the child; or
 
(ii) otherwise taking decisions in relation to the child;
 
(c) assisting the child to obtain legal or other advice, assistance and representation, including (where necessary) the appointment and instructing of legal representatives to act on behalf of the child;
 
(d) consulting regularly with the child and keeping the child informed of legal and other proceedings affecting the child and any other matters affecting the child;
 
(e) contributing to a plan to safeguard and promote the future welfare of the child based on an individual assessment of that child’s best interests;
 
(f) providing a link between the child and any body or person who may provide services to the child;
 
(g) assisting in establishing contact with members of the child’s family, where the child so wishes and it is in the child’s best interests;
 
(h) accompanying the child to meetings or on other occasions.
 
(7) Any person or body providing services or taking administrative decisions in relation to a child for whom a child trafficking guardian has been appointed under this section must recognise, and pay due regard to, the functions of the child trafficking guardian and must (to the extent otherwise permitted by law) provide the child trafficking guardian with access to such information relating to the child as will enable the child trafficking guardian to carry out his or her functions effectively.
 
(8) The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety may by regulations confer additional functions on child trafficking guardians.
 
(9) The arrangements under this section may provide for a child trafficking guardian appointed in relation to a person under the age of 18 to continue (with the consent of that person) to act in relation to that person after that person attains the age of 18 but is under the age of 21.
 
(10) In this section—
 
"administrative decision" does not include a decision taken by a court or tribunal;
 
"parental responsibility" has the meaning given by Article 6 of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, except that it does not include parental responsibility conferred by a care order (within the meaning of Article 49(1) of that Order).".


No 47: After clause 12 insert

"Independent Legal Guardian
 
12A.—(1) The Regional Health and Social Care Board must, in accordance with this section, make arrangements to enable a person (an "Independent Legal Guardian") to be appointed to assist, represent and support a child to whom this section applies.
 
(2) This section applies to a child if—
 
(a) a reference relating to that child has been, or is about to be, made to a competent authority for a determination for the purposes of Article 10 of the Trafficking Convention as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child is a victim of trafficking in human beings; and
 
(b) there has not been a conclusive determination that the child is not such a victim; and for the purposes of this subsection a determination which has been challenged by way of proceedings for judicial review shall not be treated as conclusive until those proceedings are finally determined; or
 
(c) there is reason to believe that the person is a separated child, in which case the person shall be presumed to be a separated child.
 
(3) Arrangements under this section must—
 
(a) be made with a registered charity (within the meaning of the Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 2008);
 
(b) provide for the appointment of a person as the Independent Legal Guardian for a child to whom this section applies to be made by that charity;
 
(c) ensure that a person is not so appointed by that charity unless that person—
 
(i) is an employee of the charity; and
 
(ii) is eligible to be so appointed in accordance with regulations under subsection (4);
 
(d) provide for the appointment of an Independent Legal Guardian only where the person with parental responsibility for the child—
 
(i) is not in regular contact with the child or is outside the United Kingdom;
 
(ii) is suspected of having committed an offence under section 1B in relation to the child; or
 
(iii) for other reasons has interests which conflict with those of the child;
 
(e) include provision for the termination of the appointment of an Independent Legal Guardian, including in particular provision for such termination—
 
(i) if the child ceases to be a child to whom this section applies;
 
(ii) on the child attaining the age of 18 (unless subsection (9) applies);
 
(iii) on paragraph (d) ceasing to apply in relation to the child;
 
(iv) where, after consulting the Independent Legal Guardian, the Regional Health and Social Care Board is of the opinion that it is no longer necessary to continue the appointment because long-term arrangements have been made in relation to the child.
 
(4) The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety shall by regulations make provision for—
 
(a) the training and qualifications required for a person to be eligible for appointment as an Independent Legal Guardian;
 
(b) the support to be provided for, and the supervision of, an Independent Legal Guardian.
 
(5) An Independent Legal Guardian appointed in relation to a child must at all times act in the best interests of the child.
 
(6) The functions of an Independent Legal Guardian include (where appropriate)—
 
(a) ascertaining the views of the child in relation to matters affecting the child;
 
(b) making representations to, and liaising with, bodies or persons responsible for—
 
(i) providing care, accommodation, health services, education or translation and interpretation services to or in respect of the child; or
 
(ii) otherwise taking decisions in relation to the child;
 
(c) assisting the child to obtain legal or other advice, assistance and representation, including (where necessary) the appointment and instructing of legal representatives to act on behalf of the child;
 
(d) consulting regularly with the child and keeping the child informed of legal and other proceedings affecting the child and any other matters affecting the child;
 
(e) contributing to a plan to safeguard and promote the future welfare of the child based on an individual assessment of that child’s best interests;
 
(f) providing a link between the child and any body or person who may provide services to the child;
 
(g) assisting in establishing contact with members of the child’s family, where the child so wishes and it is in the child’s best interests;
 
(h) accompanying the child to meetings or on other occasions.
 
(7) Any person or body providing services or taking administrative decisions in relation to a child for whom an Independent Legal Guardian has been appointed under this section must recognise, and pay due regard to, the functions of the guardian and must (to the extent otherwise permitted by law) provide the guardian with access to such information relating to the child as will enable the guardian to carry out his or her functions effectively.
 
(8) The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety may by regulations confer additional functions on Independent Legal Guardians.
 
(9) The arrangements under this section may provide for an Independent Legal Guardian appointed in relation to a person under the age of 18 to continue (with the consent of that person) to act in relation to that person after that person attains the age of 18 but is under the age of 21.
 
(10) In this section—
 
"administrative decision" does not include a decision taken by a court or tribunal;
 
"parental responsibility" has the meaning given by Article 6 of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, except that it does not include parental responsibility conferred by a care order (within the meaning of Article 49(1) of that Order);
 
"separated child" means a child who is outside their country of origin and has been separated from both parents, or from their previous legal or customary care giver, but not necessarily from other relatives. This may include children who have been trafficked, enslaved or exploited but are accompanied by other adults including community members, friends or members of their extended family.".


No 47: After clause 12 insert

"Independent Legal Guardian
 
12A.—(1) The Regional Health and Social Care Board must, in accordance with this section, make arrangements to enable a person (an "Independent Legal Guardian") to be appointed to assist, represent and support a child to whom this section applies.
 
(2) This section applies to a child if—
 
(a) a reference relating to that child has been, or is about to be, made to a competent authority for a determination for the purposes of Article 10 of the Trafficking Convention as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child is a victim of trafficking in human beings; and
 
(b) there has not been a conclusive determination that the child is not such a victim; and for the purposes of this subsection a determination which has been challenged by way of proceedings for judicial review shall not be treated as conclusive until those proceedings are finally determined; or
 
(c) there is reason to believe that the person is a separated child, in which case the person shall be presumed to be a separated child.
 
(3) Arrangements under this section must—
 
(a) be made with a registered charity (within the meaning of the Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 2008);
 
(b) provide for the appointment of a person as the Independent Legal Guardian for a child to whom this section applies to be made by that charity;
 
(c) ensure that a person is not so appointed by that charity unless that person—
 
(i) is an employee of the charity; and
 
(ii) is eligible to be so appointed in accordance with regulations under subsection (4);
 
(d) provide for the appointment of an Independent Legal Guardian only where the person with parental responsibility for the child—
 
(i) is not in regular contact with the child or is outside the United Kingdom;
 
(ii) is suspected of having committed an offence under section 1B in relation to the child; or
 
(iii) for other reasons has interests which conflict with those of the child;
 
(e) include provision for the termination of the appointment of an Independent Legal Guardian, including in particular provision for such termination—
 
(i) if the child ceases to be a child to whom this section applies;
 
(ii) on the child attaining the age of 18 (unless subsection (9) applies);
 
(iii) on paragraph (d) ceasing to apply in relation to the child;
 
(iv) where, after consulting the Independent Legal Guardian, the Regional Health and Social Care Board is of the opinion that it is no longer necessary to continue the appointment because long-term arrangements have been made in relation to the child.
 
(4) The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety shall by regulations make provision for—
 
(a) the training and qualifications required for a person to be eligible for appointment as an Independent Legal Guardian;
 
(b) the support to be provided for, and the supervision of, an Independent Legal Guardian.
 
(5) An Independent Legal Guardian appointed in relation to a child must at all times act in the best interests of the child.
 
(6) The functions of an Independent Legal Guardian include (where appropriate)—
 
(a) ascertaining the views of the child in relation to matters affecting the child;
 
(b) making representations to, and liaising with, bodies or persons responsible for—
 
(i) providing care, accommodation, health services, education or translation and interpretation services to or in respect of the child; or
 
(ii) otherwise taking decisions in relation to the child;
 
(c) assisting the child to obtain legal or other advice, assistance and representation, including (where necessary) the appointment and instructing of legal representatives to act on behalf of the child;
 
(d) consulting regularly with the child and keeping the child informed of legal and other proceedings affecting the child and any other matters affecting the child;
 
(e) contributing to a plan to safeguard and promote the future welfare of the child based on an individual assessment of that child’s best interests;
 
(f) providing a link between the child and any body or person who may provide services to the child;
 
(g) assisting in establishing contact with members of the child’s family, where the child so wishes and it is in the child’s best interests;
 
(h) accompanying the child to meetings or on other occasions.
 
(7) Any person or body providing services or taking administrative decisions in relation to a child for whom an Independent Legal Guardian has been appointed under this section must recognise, and pay due regard to, the functions of the guardian and must (to the extent otherwise permitted by law) provide the guardian with access to such information relating to the child as will enable the guardian to carry out his or her functions effectively.
 
(8) The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety may by regulations confer additional functions on Independent Legal Guardians.
 
(9) The arrangements under this section may provide for an Independent Legal Guardian appointed in relation to a person under the age of 18 to continue (with the consent of that person) to act in relation to that person after that person attains the age of 18 but is under the age of 21.
 
(10) In this section—
 
"administrative decision" does not include a decision taken by a court or tribunal;
 
"parental responsibility" has the meaning given by Article 6 of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, except that it does not include parental responsibility conferred by a care order (within the meaning of Article 49(1) of that Order);
 
"separated child" means a child who is outside their country of origin and has been separated from both parents, or from their previous legal or customary care giver, but not necessarily from other relatives. This may include children who have been trafficked, enslaved or exploited but are accompanied by other adults including community members, friends or members of their extended family.".

 
 
No 48: After clause 12 insert

"Defence for slavery or trafficking victims compelled to commit an offence
 
12B.—(1) Subject to subsection (9), a person is not guilty of an offence if—
 
(a) the person is over the age of 18 when the act which constitutes the offence was done;
 
(b) the person does that act because the person is compelled to do that act,
 
(c) the compulsion is attributable to slavery or to relevant exploitation, and
 
(d) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would have no realistic alternative to doing that act.
 
(2) "Relevant characteristics" means age, sex and any physical or mental illness or disability.
 
(3) A person may be compelled to do something by another person or by the person’s circumstances.
 
(4) Compulsion is attributable to slavery or to relevant exploitation only if—
 
(a) it is, or is part of, conduct which constitutes an offence under section 1A or conduct which constitutes relevant exploitation, or
 
(b) it is a direct consequence of a person being, or having been, a victim of an offence under section 1A or a victim of relevant exploitation.
 
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) "relevant exploitation" is exploitation (within the meaning of section 1C) that is attributable to the exploited person being, or having been, a victim of an offence under section 1B.
 
(6) Subject to subsection (9), a person is not guilty of an offence if—
 
(a) the person is a child at the time the act which constitutes the offence is done; and
 
(b) that act was done as a direct consequence of the person being, or having been, a victim of an offence under section 1A or of relevant exploitation.
 
(7) For the purposes of subsection (6) "relevant exploitation" is exploitation which falls within one or more of subsections (2) to (5) of section 1C and is attributable to the exploited person being, or having been, a victim of an offence under section 1B.
 
(8) In this section references to an act include an omission.
 
(9) This section does not apply to an offence which, in the case of a person over the age of 21, is punishable on indictment with imprisonment for life or for a term of at least 5 years, other than any of the following offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971—
 
(a) an offence under section 4(2) committed in respect of a Class B or Class C drug;
 
(b) an offence under section 5(2) committed in respect of a Class B drug;
 
(c) an offence under section 6(2).
 
(10) The Department may by order amend subsection (9).".

 
 
No 48: After clause 12 insert

"Defence for slavery or trafficking victims compelled to commit an offence
 
12B.—(1) Subject to subsection (9), a person is not guilty of an offence if—
 
(a) the person is over the age of 18 when the act which constitutes the offence was done;
 
(b) the person does that act because the person is compelled to do that act,
 
(c) the compulsion is attributable to slavery or to relevant exploitation, and
 
(d) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would have no realistic alternative to doing that act.
 
(2) "Relevant characteristics" means age, sex and any physical or mental illness or disability.
 
(3) A person may be compelled to do something by another person or by the person’s circumstances.
 
(4) Compulsion is attributable to slavery or to relevant exploitation only if—
 
(a) it is, or is part of, conduct which constitutes an offence under section 1A or conduct which constitutes relevant exploitation, or
 
(b) it is a direct consequence of a person being, or having been, a victim of an offence under section 1A or a victim of relevant exploitation.
 
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) "relevant exploitation" is exploitation (within the meaning of section 1C) that is attributable to the exploited person being, or having been, a victim of an offence under section 1B.
 
(6) Subject to subsection (9), a person is not guilty of an offence if—
 
(a) the person is a child at the time the act which constitutes the offence is done; and
 
(b) that act was done as a direct consequence of the person being, or having been, a victim of an offence under section 1A or of relevant exploitation.
 
(7) For the purposes of subsection (6) "relevant exploitation" is exploitation which falls within one or more of subsections (2) to (5) of section 1C and is attributable to the exploited person being, or having been, a victim of an offence under section 1B.
 
(8) In this section references to an act include an omission.
 
(9) This section does not apply to an offence which, in the case of a person over the age of 21, is punishable on indictment with imprisonment for life or for a term of at least 5 years, other than any of the following offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971—
 
(a) an offence under section 4(2) committed in respect of a Class B or Class C drug;
 
(b) an offence under section 5(2) committed in respect of a Class B drug;
 
(c) an offence under section 6(2).
 
(10) The Department may by order amend subsection (9).".

No 49: In clause 13, page 8, line 6, leave out "chief officer of police" and insert "Chief Constable".

No 51: In clause 13, page 8, line 21, leave out "professionals" and insert "persons".

No 52: In clause 13, page 8, line 28, leave out "a reasoned decision" to end of line 29 and insert

"the police officer in charge of the investigation decides to the contrary and records the reasons for that decision in writing.".



No 53: After clause 14 insert

"Special measures: amendments to the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1999
 
14A.—(1) The Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1999 is amended as follows.
 
(2) In Article 3 after paragraph (1) insert—
 
"(1A) In this Order "a slavery or human trafficking offence" means an offence under—
 
(a) section 57, 58, 58A or 59 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (trafficking for sexual exploitation);
 
(b) section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (trafficking for exploitation);
 
(c) section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour); or
 
(d) section 1A or 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 (slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour and human trafficking).".
 
(3) In Article 5(4) (witnesses eligible for assistance on grounds of fear or distress about testifying) after "sexual offence" insert "or a slavery or human trafficking offence".
 
(4) In Article 13(4)(a) (evidence given in private) after "sexual offence" insert "or or a slavery or human trafficking offence".
 
(5) In Article 21 (interpretation etc. of Part 2) after paragraph (4) insert—
 
"(5) For the purposes of this Part as it applies in relation to a witness who is the complainant in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence, where the age of the witness is uncertain and there are reasons to believe that the witness is under the age of 18, that witness is presumed to be under the age of 18.".
 
(6) In Article 22 (complainants in proceedings for sexual offences) after "sexual offence" insert "or a slavery or human trafficking offence".
 
(7) In Article 23 (child complainants and other child witnesses) in paragraph (3) for sub-paragraph (cc) substitute—
 
"(cc) a slavery or human trafficking offence;".
 
(8) In Article 39 (general supplementary provisions) after paragraph (2) insert—
 
"(3) Paragraph (2) is subject to Article 21(5).".".

Lord Morrow: Thank you, Mr Principal Deputy Speaker. This group of amendments covers clauses in Part 2 to meet international obligations on assistance and support for trafficking victims, and Part 3, which sets out protections for victims within the criminal justice system. I start —

[Interruption.]

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: Order. Sorry, Lord Morrow, please continue.

Lord Morrow: — by seeking the Assembly's agreement to remove clause 8, which seeks to ensure that trafficking victims who committed an offence as a result of being a victim of trafficking should not be prosecuted. It proved to be a clause that gave rise to a lot of concern.

After listening carefully to the evidence given to the Justice Committee, I propose to remove clause 8 and add new clause 12B, which would introduce a statutory defence in its place. Let me provide some context on how I came to this position.

I was reluctant to concede any ground on clause 8 because of the concerns of notable NGOs, such as the Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group, the Law Centre and the Centre for Social Justice, about the prosecution of victims that was taking place. Nevertheless, this was the one clause that the Justice Committee was not able to support in its report, even though it supported the principle.

The Committee's report sets out in detail the comments and concerns about the clause at paragraphs 201-260. I think that I can fairly summarise those concerns, which were that the clause would give blanket immunity to victims of trafficking and setting out a hierarchy of victims. There was a concern that, even if a victim committed a murder, they would not be prosecuted. That was not my intention, but it raised sufficient concerns to warrant further consideration.

I think it safe to say that Members from all sides of the House were sympathetic to the objective of clause 8; it was the detail that ran into difficulties. It is of real importance that victims of human trafficking, who are some of the most vulnerable people in this country, should not be criminalised for offences that they commit as a direct consequence of being trafficked. However, that should have certain limits, and I acknowledge that the clause as initially drafted was flawed in the breadth of offences that it covered.

I informed the Justice Committee, when I gave evidence before it in March, that I would wait to see how the Modern Slavery Bill, which is passing through Westminster, dealt with the subject of non-prosecution. The version of the Bill that was presented to the House of Commons in July this year for its First Reading included, in clause 39, a defence for slavery or trafficking victims compelled to commit an offence. That clause would allow human trafficking victims in England and Wales to raise a defence if they were accused of certain criminal offences that they were forced to commit as a result of being trafficked. That defence could not be used for serious violent offences or sexual offences but could apply to crimes such as cannabis cultivation. Following discussions with the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, it was agreed that a similar clause could be implemented in Northern Ireland. I will cover the detail of new clause 12B later, but I reassure Members that, in removing clause 8 as it stands, I am not proposing to remove the type of protection that I was seeking for victims. I am asking the Assembly to support a different approach at a later point in the Bill. I hope that Members will support that position.

Members will see that there are significant changes to Part 2. Clause 9 was intended to be an administrative clause, setting out definitions for Part 2 on who should be regarded as a victim of trafficking under the national referral mechanism, which is the identification process that the UK uses to meet its obligations under the European Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. The wording I used was based on a definition in Westminster legislation, the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. The revised definition proposed in new clause 9A, through amendment No 41, has the same effect but is set out much more succinctly than my original clause and is favoured by the Department of Justice, so I propose to remove the current clause and add a new clause in its place.

Like clause 9, the purpose of new clause 9A is to provide a definition of a victim of trafficking in order to be clear about who would and who would not be able to access the services I set out in this Part of the Bill. The current regime is that, when a person is referred to the national referral mechanism, they are provided with emergency support, and a decision will be made as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that they may be a victim. That is called a reasonable grounds decision. When a reasonable grounds decision is made that the person may be a victim, he or she can access 45 days of services during the so-called recovery and reflection period. There is then a second stage to the process, whereby it is concluded whether the person is a victim: a conclusive grounds decision. New clause 9A, like clause 9, defines when a conclusive determination is made and will be particularly relevant for determining when a person is eligible for compensation. The clause also provides a definition of the term "competent authority", which is also relevant for new clauses 10A and 12A.

I propose to remove the original clause 10 and replace it with a new clause 10A, through amendment No 42. This requires some explanation. In the original version of my Bill, clause 10 would have impacted a number of Departments. However, in the months following my Bill passing Second Stage, it became apparent that that clause was necessary only with regard to the Department of Justice. The Department of Health, which currently provides support to confirmed victims of human trafficking and child victims, assured me that it was going to bring forward regulations that would allow victims of human trafficking to access primary and secondary health care. I understand that the Health Committee considered the draft Provision of Health Services to Persons not Ordinarily Resident (Amendment) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2014 in September, and we can expect them to come into operation in the coming months. To my mind, this is very much a positive step for some of the most vulnerable victims in our Province. In light of this assurance that children were covered by the Department of Health through the new regulations, I came to the view that it was sensible to remove my original clause and add a new clause, setting out what services the Department of Justice would provide to potential victims of trafficking. My original proposal for a 90-day period of support was made in recognition that it has been widely reported that recovery from the trauma of human trafficking can be a long and painful process. I am very pleased that, through the regulations being proposed by the Department of Health, victims of trafficking with leave to remain will be able to access healthcare support for a much longer period.


11.45 pm

I am also pleased that new clause 10A, which I developed with the Department of Justice, contains discretionary powers that allow the Department to continue providing support to a particular victim beyond the usual 45-day period where the Department considers it necessary to do so. Those two elements go a long way towards addressing the longer-term needs of victims.

I hope that Members will support amendment No 42. If the Assembly chooses to pass this clause, we will be the first part of the United Kingdom to outline in statute the assistance and support provisions that all potential victims of trafficking are entitled to once they are identified. Let me run through precisely what the clause seeks to do. Clause 10A(1) outlines the requirement upon the Department for assistance and support to individuals who satisfy the requirements of clause 10A(2). Under clause 10A(2), the support provisions would apply to individuals who are 18 or over, or who are reasonably believed to be so, and who have been referred or are about to be referred into the national referral mechanism. As the Minister will no doubt point out, currently under the EU directive, the DOJ's responsibilities to provide assistance and support are triggered by a decision by an NRM-competent authority that there are reasonable grounds that an individual is a victim of trafficking. In practice, the Department of Justice already goes beyond the requirement under the directive, ensuring that support is available from the first point of contact with the potential victim. I have always agreed with that approach, and I was keen to ensure that my Bill would enshrine it in statute.

Clause 10A(3) outlines that support and assistance should be provided until either there is a determination that an individual has been given a negative reasonable grounds decision under the NRM process or an individual is granted a conclusive grounds decision confirming whether or not there is clear evidence that they are a victim of human trafficking. In cases where an individual is granted a positive conclusive grounds decision, clauses 10A(3) and 10A(4) would require the Department of Justice to continue to provide support until the end of the 45-day reflection and recovery period. That goes beyond the requirement set out by the European directive and will help to ensure that victims of trafficking in our country have the time to recover to some extent from their ordeal. By putting those amendments in law, the provisions will see Northern Ireland go further than the other parts of the UK. We will be leading the way by guaranteeing that support to victims in the long term.

Clauses 10A(5) and 10A(6) set out how the support under that clause will be provided. First, the support and assistance must not be conditional on a person acting as a witness in criminal proceedings. There are a number of different reasons why a victim of human trafficking may not want to testify in criminal proceedings. Perhaps they do not want to relive the traumatic experience that they have gone through, or perhaps they do not trust the police. Whatever the case may be for a given individual, to my mind, it is imperative that the granting of support and assistance is not conditional on a victim participating as a witness in a trial.

Secondly, the support and assistance must be dependent on the agreement of the person. If an individual does not want the support and assistance available, they cannot be forced to receive it.

Thirdly, the support and assistance must be provided in a manner that takes due account of the needs of the person as regards safety and protection from harm. A lot of evidence shows that victims of human trafficking can remain vulnerable following their identification as a victim. Consequently, the support and assistance must not lead to a risk of re-trafficking or other forms of abuse.

Fourthly, the support must be provided to meet the assessed needs of that person. In some cases, a victim will not need access to particular services. For example, if a trafficking victim's first language is English, it is unlikely that they would require translation services. This provision ensures that only appropriate services will be provided.

Fifthly and finally, under subsection 6, the support and assistance must be offered from a person of the same gender as the person receiving it. This clause has been included to consider the situation facing women in particular who may have been sexually exploited in prostitution. In the vast majority of cases, they will have been exploited by a man. I am informed by a number of charities working in the field that having a support service provided by a man can be traumatic for some of the women concerned.

Proposed clause 10A(7) sets out the types of assistance and support that should be provided under the clause, according to assessed need. There are seven areas specified in the clause: appropriate and safe accommodation; material assistance; assistance in obtaining healthcare services; appropriate information on a matter of relevance to a particular victim's own situation; translation and interpretation services; assistance in obtaining legal advice or representation; and, finally, assistance with repatriation.

Clause 10A(8) would grant the Department a discretionary power to enable it to continue to provide support to potential victims in specific cases where an individual is relocated to another jurisdiction on the advice of the PSNI. It is not difficult to envisage a case where that may occur with regard to this particular form of crime.

As I have already mentioned, clause 10A(9) would grant the Department further power, which it could use at its discretion, to continue to provide support to an individual beyond the point where a conclusive determination is made. That would only come into play when such support would be necessary. Having met some victims of human trafficking, I am aware of the complexity of some of their needs. It is imperative that the level of assistance and support is not cut off just as soon as a conclusive determination is made, if new support arrangements are not in place. It should be stressed that the clause is not envisaged as requiring the Department to provide such services in perpetuity. It is only in place to ensure that there is a smooth transition from one form of support to another.

Finally, proposed clause 10A(10) states that the requirements and powers specific to the Department of Justice under the clause do not affect the individual's existing rights to assistance from other Departments or agencies. With those provisions outlined in statute, victims will be able to see in black and white what they are entitled to. Statutory bodies and NGOs will have a benchmark to work with in the support that victims are entitled to. Finally, the Assembly can be assured that the Department of Justice will not withdraw support and assistance for victims because it would be required to provide such support in statute. I should add that I am not suggesting that the current Minister is thinking of doing such a thing; I am thinking more of potential future holders of that office.

I am proposing a completely new assistance clause, new clause 10B, in amendment No 43, which is a testament to the benefits of our legislative process here at the Assembly. During the course of Second Stage and the subsequent contact that I had with interested charities, and in the very thorough Justice Committee scrutiny of the Bill, it became clear to me that providing support for individuals wishing to leave prostitution should go hand in hand with other measures in my Bill — in particular, clause 6. The Justice Committee stated in its report:

"The overwhelming majority of respondents recognised the importance of ensuring that support services were put in place for those who are in, have exited, or wish to exit prostitution."

The importance of providing those services was raised with the Justice Committee by organisations in favour of and against clause 6. The list of organisations in support of such a measure is long, but includes the Evangelical Alliance, the Law Centre Northern Ireland and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions.

Introducing a legal model that criminalises the purchase of sexual services in conjunction with creating support programmes to assist people to exit prostitution has also been recommended by landmark resolutions from the Council of Europe and the European Parliament this year. A European Parliament resolution on sexual exploitation and prostitution and their impact on gender equality, passed on 26 February 2014, states in paragraph 42 that the European Parliament:

"Recognises that a vast majority of persons in prostitution would like to stop but feel unable to do so; stresses that these persons need appropriate support, particularly psychological and social assistance, to escape the sexual exploitation networks and the dependencies frequently associated with these; suggests, therefore, that the competent authorities put in place programmes to help persons escape prostitution, in close cooperation with the stakeholders".

On 8 April 2014, the Council of Europe resolution on prostitution, trafficking and modern slavery similarly encourages member states to set up exit programmes for those who wish to give up prostitution; its aim is rehabilitation based on a holistic approach, including the provision of mental health, health care, housing support, education and training and employment services.

Academic evidence has shown that a large percentage of women in prostitution would like to leave it if they could, but they face significant barriers and there are very few specialist programmes to help them. New clause 10B will require the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety to ensure that a programme of assistance is available for individuals who wish to leave prostitution.

A recent study produced by experts in this field, led by Professor Roger Matthews of the University of Kent, makes a clear distinction between the effectiveness of programmes specifically focused on helping people to leave prostitution and those who are focused on supporting them through health care and harm minimisation. The study says that harm minimisation approaches tend to focus on minimising immediate harms and typically adopt a reactive approach by responding to requests for support to leave prostitution. It is the case that many existing forms of support operate, essentially, to sustain women in prostitution rather encourage them to move on.

The study later states:

"the claim that the service provided by reactive harm-reduction services are essentially the same as the proactive services provided by specialist exiting agencies is misconceived. We have developed a model that combines the ability to address women's needs and builds up trust and support on one hand with a proactive exiting strategy, which is designed not to perpetuate the involvement of women in prostitution but to facilitate their exit."

I make no criticism of existing programmes in Northern Ireland that provide sexual health care service and harm reduction support to people involved in prostitution. However, we must complement those services with programmes that will signpost people towards routes out of prostitution and offer them support to make that transition. In times when funding is being squeezed, we need to ensure that these vital programmes are protected by establishing them in legislation.

Many critics of clause 6 have claimed that I seek to class all those involved in prostitution as helpless victims. I do not accept that charge. However, for the sake of clarity, let me make it clear: at the heart of this clause is empowering people in prostitution to make a positive change to their lives. Clause 10B(1) makes it clear that these services are to be provided to a person who wishes to leave prostitution. No one will be forced into an exit programme under this new clause.

When I first proposed this amendment at a hearing before the Justice Committee, some members expressed concern that it may inhibit access to services for those who do not wish to leave prostitution. That is not my intention. Clause 10B(3) spells out that a person's right to any other statutory services will not be affected by whether they do or do not access support to exit prostitution under this clause. Similarly, clause 10B(2) makes it clear that access to assistance provided under the clause is not to be conditional on the person acting as a witness. For example, a person may access these services, irrespective of whether they give evidence against someone charged with an offence under clause 6.

As to the development of effective programmes, I highly recommend that the Minister of Health and his officials take a look at the excellent analysis of different models of support undertaken by Professor Matthews and his colleagues in their book 'Exiting Prostitution', which was published in September.

(Mr Deputy Speaker [Mr Dallat] in the Chair)

Finally, although my main motivation in introducing new clause 10B is to provide assistance to people who want to make a positive change in their circumstances be getting out of prostitution, it is important to recognise that there is evidence to suggest that there can also be a cost-saving benefit to exit programmes. Professor Matthews's book acknowledges that estimating the economic cost of prostitution is difficult, but it suggests that a basic calculation indicates the potential savings associated with women exiting are significant.

Intervention that helps people to leave prostitution successfully will, over the long term, bring about cost savings in areas such as healthcare services, drug addiction treatment programmes, social care for children and criminal justice enforcement. I hope that Members will support this measure.


12.00 midnight

I shall also briefly comment on amendment No 44, which would introduce a requirement to produce a strategy to help those who wish to exit prostitution. I welcome the intentions of the Members in tabling this amendment. As I have already stated, I believe that it is extremely important that we provide support for those who wish to leave prostitution to help them to do so. However, I believe that amendment No 43 accomplishes all that the Members are hoping to achieve through their proposed strategy in amendment No 44, with the added advantage that it provides a stronger guarantee that those assistance programmes will be put in place. I hope that the Member for Foyle and his colleagues might feel able to withdraw their amendment and support amendment No 43, which has the same aims.

I turn now to amendment No 45, in the name of the Minister of Justice. It is an amendment that I agree with and support. The amendment requires the Department of Justice to issue guidance regarding how and under what criteria a victim of trafficking may claim compensation under the criminal injuries compensation scheme. The guidance must also set out the assistance that is available to help victims apply for the compensation. The amendment achieves, in a better way, what I had intended with regard to compensation in the initial draft of clause 11. To my mind, too few victims of human trafficking have been able to claim compensation. Only two victims in Northern Ireland received compensation between 2009 and 2013. Compensation is of real importance to victims of trafficking, in that, first, it helps them in a practical way to rebuild their lives, and, secondly, it is an acknowledgement on the part of our society that a heinous crime has been committed against them. It is my hope that the guidance issued by the Department will make it easier for victims to claim compensation.

Clause 12 of my Bill proposes to introduce child trafficking guardians in Northern Ireland. I am grateful for the cooperation of the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety in refining these proposals. This has resulted in a number of amendments to the clause to ensure that the child trafficking guardians will be as effective as possible, although the fundamental principle and nature of the role is unchanged. Due to the number of textual amendments to be made, it has been more convenient to introduce these through a new clause, which is why I am proposing to remove clause 12 to replace it instead with the new 12A. I hope that Members will support the removal of clause 12.

The introduction of child trafficking guardians is internationally recognised by best practice recommended at a global level by the UN and UNICEF and contained in both the EU directive and the European Convention on Human Trafficking. The provision has also received a lot of support from charities and other respondents to my consultation and that of the Justice Committee. Child trafficking guardians will help some of the most vulnerable individuals who come to our Province — trafficked children — to navigate the complexities of engaging with a raft of statutory agencies.

The role proposed by the original clause 12 and retained in new clause 12A is based on the model developed by UNICEF, which states:

"The role of a guardian is to be an advocate for the child in a wide range of discussions and decisions about what should happen to the child, in particular to ensure that the decision-making process primarily considers the best interests of the child. The role is also to be a link between the child and the various agencies the child comes into contact with, to ensure the child is kept informed of any relevant developments with respect to him or her, and to accompany the child in a physical way, in particular when she or he is moved between various places."

That understanding of the role is also accurate in the report 'By Their Side and On Their Side', produced for the Northern Ireland Commissioner for Children and Young people in February. In the definition used in that report, the following sentence particularly stands out for me:

"A Guardian is on the child’s side, can explain what is happening to them, will listen to their views and experiences and speak up for them when needed."

That, for me, is the essence of what we will provide through new clause 12A to children who have been trafficked. The details of the function and purpose of the child trafficking guardian are set out in detail in subsections 5 and 6 of new clause 12A. Establishing the functions of the role clearly in legislation in that way will ensure smooth working relationships between the child trafficking guardian and other professionals with a responsibility towards the child, and will give the child trafficking guardian the necessary recognition and authority to carry out these functions effectively. I note that the handbook for guardianship services that was published by the EU's Agency for Fundamental Rights this summer recommends that national law should include sufficiently precise legal provisions that define a guardian's duties and functions. Aside from a few drafting improvements, those functions remain the same as in my original clause 12.

Two primary changes are introduced by new clause 12A in comparison to the original clause 12. First, new clause 12A establishes clearly when a child trafficking guardian will be appointed for a child and when their work will come to an end. The new clause will ensure that trafficked children are provided with a child trafficking guardian from the moment that they are referred, or are about to be referred, to the national referral mechanism. That means that trafficked children will benefit from that specialised support as soon as a professional identifies that a child shows signs of having been trafficked and begins the process to make that referral. The support will continue until a lasting solution has been found for the child, as long as that child is confirmed as a victim of trafficking. The clause also makes it possible for a child trafficking guardian to continue to work with a trafficked child after they turn 18, if the child wishes and a lasting solution has yet to be found. A large percentage of the trafficked children in Northern Ireland are teenagers, so it makes sense to ensure that child trafficking guardians are able, if necessary, to support young people as they make the difficult transition to adulthood.

The second primary difference in new clause 12A relates to the agencies that will be responsible for providing the support. I am grateful for the input of officials in the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety in that matter. New clause 12A clarifies that it will be the responsibility of the regional Health and Social Care Board, rather than the Department, to ensure that arrangements are in place to provide child trafficking guardians. The new clause also clarifies that child trafficking guardians will be provided by a registered charity that is contracted to do so by the regional Health and Social Care Board and that the individuals who act as child trafficking guardians must be employees of that charity. That approach was one of the possibilities under my original clause 12 and is considered to be the most efficient method by the Department of Health.

That structure also establishes clearly the independence of the child trafficking guardians from local health and social care trusts and all other agencies that will provide services to the child. That independence is a key facet of the international understanding of such a role, which was affirmed last summer by the handbook on guardianship that was published for the European Commission by the Agency for Fundamental Rights, as well as enabling the guardian to advocate for the child's best interests free from any conflict of interest. New clause 12A retains the requirement in the original clause that the Department of Heath should issue regulations that stipulate the training, qualifications, support and supervision of child trafficking guardians. That will ensure that the support is of a high standard.

By supporting the new clause, the Assembly will be taking the lead in the United Kingdom. The Modern Slavery Bill that is going through Westminster covers the option of child trafficking guardians, but they do not need to be independent of local authorities, nor is the provision set out as a legal requirement. I hope that Members will support that improved measure in new clause 12A.

I now turn to amendment No 47. I recognise the concerns that the Member for Foyle and his colleagues have about the needs of separated migrant children. I understand the rationale for extending the scope of guardians to separated children and look forward to hearing what others have to say on that matter. However, in developing amendment No 46, I have been very grateful for the advice and cooperation of the Minister of Health, his predecessor and his Department. As such, in the final analysis, I will be guided by the Department with regard to the potential extension of the services to other children.

I now move on to amendments that relate to the protection of victims in the criminal justice system. Members, I am pleased to table amendment No 48, which will bring in a new defence for slavery or trafficking victims who have been compelled to commit an offence as a result of being a slavery or trafficking victim. As I mentioned at the beginning of my speech on this group of amendments, that is a replacement for my Bill's original clause 8, which dealt with the non-prosecution of victims of trafficking in human beings.

I included the original clause 8 in my Bill to meet the obligations of article 8 of the EU directive, which states:

"Member States shall, in accordance with the basic principles of their legal systems, take the necessary measures to ensure that competent national authorities are entitled not to prosecute or impose penalties on victims of trafficking in human beings for their involvement in criminal activities which they have been compelled to commit as a direct consequence"

of being trafficked.

Article 26 of the European Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings has a similar requirement of member states to:

"provide for the possibility of not imposing penalties on victims for their involvement in unlawful activities, to the extent that they have been compelled to do so".

New clause 12B has the same aims; however, it seeks to respond to some of the concerns expressed about clause 8 during Second Stage and the Justice Committee's scrutiny of the Bill, namely issues of its breadth and offences that it covers. The Justice Committee said that it wanted to consider the outcome of the Westminster Joint Committee's review of the draft Modern Slavery Bill. That Committee concluded, at paragraph 69 of its report:

"that there should be a statutory defence of being a victim of modern slavery".

The Committee suggested a clause that would take this forward, and that has been further amended in clause 39 of the Modern Slavery Bill. New clause 12B reflects a similar principle to the Modern Slavery Bill clause, drafted for the relevant legislation in Northern Ireland, with some variations.

In summary, three key points are to be made in relation to new Clause 12B. Firstly, it proposes that a defence will apply for adults and children for offences with a penalty of less than five years that they might have committed as a result of being victims of trafficking or slavery, with the exception of cannabis production. Hence, the defence is limited to less serious offences. Secondly, adults will need to show that they had been compelled to commit the offence. Thirdly, child victims of exploitation will not need to show that they had been compelled.

Let me set out the detail of each subsection. Clause 12B(1) specifies that an adult is not guilty of an offence that they had been compelled to commit, where the compulsion is attributable to being held in slavery or trafficked and where a reasonable person with the same characteristics, were they in the same situation, would have no realistic alternative other than to commit the same offence. Clause 12B(2) defines "relevant characteristics" for the purposes of subsection (1) as meaning:

"age, sex and any physical or mental illness or disability".

Clause 12B(3) clarifies that an adult may be compelled to do something either by another person or by circumstances. Clause 12B(4) sets out the circumstances in which compulsion is attributable to slavery or relevant exploitation or where the compulsion arises as a direct consequence of the person being or having been a victim of a slavery-type offence or of relevant exploitation. Clause 12B(6) and 12B(7) make separate provision for victims who are children, with the effect that a victim who was a child when the offence took place could use the defence where the offence was committed as a direct consequence of being a victim of a slavery-type offence or of relevant exploitation, as defined by subsections (1) to (5) of clause 3.

I stress to Members that, at this point, clause 12B deviates from the same defence in the Modern Slavery Bill. Children have to show compulsion under its proposed clause. In Northern Ireland, if this new clause were to be passed today, it would mean a child would not need to show that a reasonable person in the same situation would have no realistic alternative other than commit the same criminal act. The law must recognise that the inherent vulnerability of a child is a very different situation to that of the objective, reasonable person. This is consistent with the special position of children in the criminal justice system and in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Members will want to know that this change from the Modern Slavery Bill is not without reason. The UNICEF 'Reference Guide on Protecting the Rights of Child Victims of Trafficking in Europe' states that law enforcement authorities:

"should ensure that child victims are not subjected to criminal procedures or sanctions for offences related to their situation as trafficked persons."

This was further reiterated in a recent UNICEF document, which stated that, under international standards, children should be protected from prosecution for offences that they committed as a consequence of their situation and that that principle should apply, regardless of their role in the events. Clause 12B(8) clarifies that references in the clause to an act include an omission. Clause 12B(9) sets out that the defence, whether for adults or children, applies only to offences that attract a maximum sentence of less than five years as well as to a small number of additional specified offences that are particularly linked with trafficking and exploitation. That, again, deviates from the approach in the Modern Slavery Bill. That Bill still excludes the defence from certain offences, but those offences are listed separately. In this Bill, there is a simpler exclusion with a clear cut-off at a five-year prison sentence that was agreed between the DOJ and the Attorney General.

Clause 12B(10) provides an order-making power for the Department of Justice to amend subsection (9). I hope that I can reassure Members about two potential concerns. First, I know that the clause may not satisfy those who feel that my Bill has lost the non-prosecution principle present in many international instruments. Given the opposition to clause 8 from many quarters, I think that this is a workable alternative for several reasons. The first is that the directive and convention do not mandate non-prosecution but urge member states to make it possible. Paragraph 274 of the explanatory report to the convention states:

"Each Party can comply with the obligation established in Article 26, by providing for a substantive criminal or procedural criminal law provision, or any other measure, allowing for the possibility of not punishing victims".

This amendment does just that. I should add that I hope that only a limited number of cases will get near a courtroom because of the PPS policy that sets out the circumstances under which victims of trafficking should not be prosecuted for offences committed as a result of their trafficking, a policy that the Minister of Justice relied on heavily in his opposition to clause 8 at Second Stage. I hope that the Minister will repeat the assurances that he gave to the Assembly at Second Stage on 24 September last year, when he said:

"prosecutors have the discretion not to prosecute when that is considered to be in the public interest". — [Official Report, Bound Volume 87, p334, col 1].

In many cases, such as those that we are discussing, it will be considered not in the public interest. Should there be some reason why a case does not reach a courtroom, this new clause will give victims a further legal recourse for the prosecution to cease. I realise that that means that victims will be in the courtroom, which is not what many of us want, but it should prevent a conviction and the imposition of penalties in the appropriate circumstances.

The second concern is whether the number of offences excluded by clause 12B(7) is too extensive. The potential for a victim to commit murder and to be excluded from prosecution was raised on a number of occasions during the Justice Committee hearings. Members will also want to know that the model law against trafficking in persons produced by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime contains a clause that allows for "crimes of a particularly serious nature" as defined in national law to be excluded from any non-criminalisation provision, thereby ensuring that there is no defence for serious offences that have a penalty of greater than five years, which, to my mind, is reasonable and proportionate. I hope that Members will feel that that is an acceptable and worktable compromise from the position set out originally in my Bill. I am grateful for the assistance of the Department of Justice and the Attorney General in developing a defence that will work in Northern Ireland. I believe that it strikes the right balance in maintaining the rule of law and protecting the vulnerable.

Clause 13 seeks to protect victims of human trafficking and slavery offences during criminal investigations in accordance with articles 12 and 15 of the EU anti-trafficking directive. It proposes similar measures to regulations that were introduced in England and Wales in 2013 through the Trafficking People for Exploitation Regulations. Following discussions with the Department of Justice, I have tabled a number of amendments to the clause, one of which we have already voted on — amendment No 50 — to ensure that the clause refers to the new consolidated offences in new clauses 1A and 1B.

Amendment Nos 49 and 51 are technical amendments that replace particular words with terms more appropriate for the Northern Ireland context, specifically changing the term "chief officer of police" to "Chief Constable" and the word "professionals" to "persons".

Amendment No 52 changes the wording of clause 13(b)(vi). That change was requested by the Department of Justice to ensure that, if the victim is under 18 and requests that he or she be accompanied by someone, and, if there is reason for concern about the person selected to accompany the victim, the police officer in charge of the investigation can prevent an inappropriate person from attending police interviews.

That would ensure that if a person — say a family member — was accused of being involved in trafficking the young person, that family member could not attend the interview as that may negatively affect any evidence that is given. If a police officer decides to exclude an adult, he must record the reasons for the decision in writing.

Clause 14 proposes extending the current protections offered to adult victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation when they attend court to victims of trafficking for other types of exploitation. The Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1999 sets out those protections. They include giving evidence in private and screening the witness from the accused. At present, only child victims and victims of sexual offences, including trafficking or sexual exploitation, are automatically eligible to receive those protections. For other vulnerable or intimidated witnesses to access those measures, an application must be made to the court.

A report from the Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland on the application of special measures published in 2012 suggested that vulnerable witnesses were not always identified. The report also noted that those victims most commonly receiving special measures were child victims and victims of sexual offences. That suggested to me that the provision of special measures via application was not sufficient to ensure that victims of trafficking for labour exploitation receive that protection if they would like it. However, when, in 2012, I first proposed extending special measures to those trafficked for purposes other than sex, it was seen by some as being a step too far. I feel vindicated in doing so, however, since England and Wales made precisely that change in 2013 through regulations.

Having reflected on that matter since I introduced my Bill, I am convinced that this provision should also be extended to cover victims of the new offences that we have agreed today, which also would be in line with the Modern Slavery Bill. It is, of course, always open to a witness to decline to use these special measures if they so wish.

The many changes to clause 14 necessary to bring this into effect means that it is simpler to replace clause 14 with new clause 14A. So, I am seeking to oppose clause 14.

Amendment No 53 would introduce a new clause 14A, which has the same intended effect as the original clause 14. It ensures that victims of human trafficking and slavery offences outlined in new clauses 1A and 1B, alongside victims of all the trafficking offences that existed prior to this Bill, are automatically eligible for special measures if cases under the new offences or old offences are before the courts. To my mind, that is entirely appropriate considering the ordeal that many victims of human trafficking and slavery offences have been through. Any measure that could be taken to assist these vulnerable victims in testifying would be a positive step.

Let me set out the detail. New clause 14A amends the articles of the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1999 that pertain to a witness's automatic entitlement to special measures. Clause 14A(2) would provide definitions so that the order would apply to all past and present offences of human trafficking and slavery, including the revised and consolidated offences that have been included in clauses 1A and 1B. Clause 14A(3) ensures that witnesses giving testimony in these cases can be granted special protection because they are considered witnesses who need assistance on the grounds of fear or distress about testifying. Clause 14A(4) ensures that evidence can be given in private if the witness is a victim of a trafficking or slavery offence. Clauses 14A(5) and 14A(8) ensure that, if the age of the witness is uncertain, and there are reasons to believe that they are under the age of 18, the witness shall be assumed to be under 18 and given the additional protections available to children. Clause 14A(6) ensures that the person accused may not cross-examine an adult trafficking or slavery victim or, under clause 14A(7), a child victim.

I urge Members on all sides of the House to support the amendments.

I will stop there, because I think I have gone on for long enough.

Mr Givan: I think it was appropriate that Lord Morrow, having moved the Bill some 12 hours ago — in fact, I think it is exactly 12 hours ago — would lead us into Tuesday morning, given the historic vote that I think has just taken place. There is a bit more time left in the debate. As I look around the Chamber, I can see that Members are struggling, but I know that they have the perseverance to keep going. We have started so let us finish, and let me move this on as quickly as I can.

I think that it is right to put on the record the deliberations of the Justice Committee. We spent seven months on the Bill. Given that other Parliaments, I trust, will look back at this debate, and some parliamentarians will read through this, I think that it is right that we put on the record the issues that we considered in great detail, to facilitate other places to be able to take forward the legislation that we are dealing with today.

This group of amendments and the clauses that they relate to are all about providing assistance, support and protection to victims and possible victims of human trafficking and slavery, as already outlined by Lord Morrow. Some Members seemed to have indicated in this debate that the Bill was only ever about one particular clause. Some people made comments that, I think, were unfair. This group of amendments is all about supporting people and providing them with the exit strategies and packages that, I think, everybody in this Chamber will want to support. It is right that we consider them properly so that people recognise that it was not just about clause 6; it is about supporting people as well.

Clause 8 was supported in principle by the majority of stakeholders, with many recognising that a victim of human trafficking should not be unfairly penalised for criminal acts that they are forced to carry out. There are clearly issues regarding how the policy of non-prosecution actually works in practice. It was stated that it had frequently been shown that, even when it was made clear that victims of human trafficking should not be prosecuted for offences, it was often contingent upon their cooperation in investigations, and examples of cases where some victims of trafficking had been charged with criminal offences were cited.

Substantial concerns were, however, raised that clause 8, in effect, provides a blanket immunity from prosecution and that there is no distinction provided regarding the seriousness of the crime committed. While the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission indicated that there was a strong persuasive value as to why human trafficking victims would have immunity from prosecution, given their vulnerability, it noted that the clause did not capture the range and gravity of the offences that could fall within its remit, and it felt that a degree of discretion should be afforded to the Public Prosecution Service regarding which criminal offences it does or does not pursue.

The PPS also stated that it could not provide blanket immunity from prosecution, as the statutory obligations placed on the Director of Public Prosecutions by the Justice Act 2002 required public prosecutors to review each case received from investigators, in accordance with the code for prosecutors, to determine whether criminal proceedings should be instituted or continued, and each case must be considered on its own merits and having regard to the seriousness of the offence committed. It did, however, indicate that if evidence or information were available to support the fact that the person had been trafficked and had committed the offence whilst in a coerced situation, that would be considered a strong public interest factor militating against prosecution. PPS policy outlined the approach to be taken in such cases.

The Department also considered clause 8 as providing blanket immunity and had serious concerns about the impact of it. In the Department’s view, there was a need to ensure greater awareness of human trafficking across the criminal justice system and an understanding of the responsibilities in protecting victims, and it suggested that there was scope to address that by amending clause 15 to ensure that the annual strategy would include actions to raise awareness and highlight the rights and entitlements of victims across the justice system.

When Lord Morrow attended the Committee, he outlined, as he has done tonight, that it was not his policy intention to provide a mechanism for blanket immunity and indicated that he was minded to await the outcome of the consideration of the Joint Committee in Westminster of how non-prosecution of victims should be dealt with as part of its scrutiny of the Modern Slavery Bill before deciding whether to progress with this clause or not. He did, however, indicate that he supported the Department’s proposal to include awareness-raising as part of the annual strategy required by clause 15. Given the concerns raised and the fact that the policy intent behind clause 8 was not to provide a blanket immunity, the Committee decided that it was not in a position to support the clause.

More recently, the Department advised the Committee that, with Lord Morrow and the Attorney General, an approach had been agreed, resulting in amendment No 48, which will introduce new clause 12B and which is an alternative to clause 8. As Lord Morrow has already explained, the new clause provides for a statutory defence for victims of slavery and human trafficking who have been compelled to commit offences, provides the range of offences to which the defence will apply and also how the defence will apply to victims who are children.

I turn to clauses 9 and 10 and amendment Nos 41 and 42. The Committee very much recognises the importance of adequate and appropriate support and assistance to human trafficking victims, whether or not criminal proceedings are taken, and therefore welcomed the inclusion of the original clause 10 in the Bill while recognising that amendments would be required to set out the respective functions and responsibilities of the Department of Justice and the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety. There was also widespread support in the evidence that we received for the emphasis that clause 10 placed on the provision and support for victims, with some organisations suggesting that the time period for support should be extended and that all assistance and protection measures should be available to victims of forced labour as well as victims of trafficking.

Some concerns were, however, raised that the clause appeared to restrict support to victims where there are criminal proceedings, and it was suggested that consideration should also be given to what assistance and support can be provided to people who get a positive reasonable grounds decision but then a negative conclusive grounds decision, as that was a real and challenging issue.

In September, the Department of Justice advised the Committee that, given the substantial revisions required to clause 10, it had agreed with Lord Morrow to bring forward a new clause to replace it. The new clause sets out the requirements on the Department to provide assistance and support to adult potential victims of trafficking who have been referred to the NRM, and ensures that support is provided from the first point of contact with a potential victim and is not conditional on a person acting as a witness in criminal proceedings. The Committee is content with the proposed approach to replace the existing clause 10 with the clause set out in amendment No 42.

Lord Morrow has brought forward amendment No 43 to provide a duty on the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety to ensure that there is a programme of assistance and support for those who wish to leave prostitution. I indicated in the previous debate that the Committee supported the proposal by Lord Morrow when he first outlined his intention to bring forward a new provision to provide support services for those who wish to exit prostitution, and I therefore welcome the amendment.

In the evidence received by the Committee, a range of organisations and individuals highlighted the need for a strategy to provide support for those who wish to exit prostitution if the Bill is to be effective, including former prostitutes, Women's Aid, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, Ruhama, Equality Now, the Turn Off the Red Light campaign and Evangelical Alliance. When the Committee met the Oireachtas Joint Committee, it also emphasised the importance of having such support mechanisms in place. It is clear that the legislation will be improved with the addition of that provision. The intent of amendment No 44 in the names of Mr McCartney, Mr Lynch and Mr Hazzard appears to be similar to Lord Morrow's amendment, and, therefore, I look forward to clarification during the debate on what they wish to achieve with their amendment.

I now want to speak briefly on clause 11, which relates to compensation for victims of human trafficking and the proposed amendments to it. This clause was welcomed by a number of organisations which viewed it as positive and much needed, with Women's Aid indicating that it was not aware of any instance where a victim of human trafficking had been successful in claiming such compensation. Victim Support said that, under the current compensation scheme, there is no specific tariff for the crime of human trafficking. Victims of such crimes have to apply based on their physical and/or mental trauma, and the criteria for a successful application are very strict. It recommended that the Committee look at the provision for compensation alongside the review of compensation legislation that is being undertaken. When the Committee was considering this clause, the Department advised that it had agreed with Lord Morrow that it should be required to bring forward statutory guidance instead of an order, and that it would therefore bring forward an appropriate amendment to the clause.

Some Committee Members expressed concern that the guidance would not be sufficient to make that provision effective and ensure that compensation can be paid to victims of trafficking. The Committee therefore considered the options available to provide the Assembly with a degree of control in relation to the content of the guidance, including an amendment to make the guidance subject to the affirmative or negative resolution procedure. The Committee decided not to amend the clause but to seek a commitment from the Minister of Justice during this Consideration Stage that the Department will consult the Committee on the draft guidance and take full account of its views. I trust that the Minister will give such a commitment when he speaks in the debate shortly. I am sure that the Committee will also closely scrutinise the compensation legislation itself during that review.

I will move on to the provision for a child trafficking guardian in clause 12. Lord Morrow outlined to the Committee that it is internationally recognised best practice to have a child trafficking guardian and that, in his view, the position should be set in statute, be appointed as soon as a trafficked child has been identified, be recognised by other agencies as having a legitimate role working in the best interests of the child and be suitably trained. He also believed that the guardian should be someone independent of the health trusts and was therefore intending to bring forward an amendment to exclude an employee of a health trust from being a guardian.

The Department of Health, which would be required to implement the arrangements, was not opposed to the concept or the responsibilities of the guardian as set out in the clause but indicated that some amendments would be needed to clarify that the duty should fall to the health trusts rather than to the Department. It also proposed that the responsibilities of the guardian should be a matter for regulations rather than set out in the Bill. The Committee noted that there was widespread support in the evidence that it received for an independent child trafficking guardian to ensure that effective support can be given to trafficked children and agreed that it supported the concept that is now being taken forward through amendment No 46, which will introduce new clause 12A.

Finally, I want to refer briefly to clauses 13 and 14 and amendment Nos 49, 51, 52 and 53. The Committee recognises that it is vital to put in place practical measures that will minimise the risk of further distress to and re-traumatisation of victims of human trafficking during any investigations and court proceedings. The Committee therefore supports clause 13 and amendment Nos 49, 51 and 52, which extend the provision of special measures to victims of human trafficking during the investigation process, and amendment No 53, which will introduce new clause 14A to ensure provision of special measures to victims of human trafficking during the court process. The Committee is very well aware from its inquiry into the criminal justice services available to victims and witnesses of crime in Northern Ireland how stressful it can be for victims to give evidence in criminal trials and appreciates that that can be especially true for trafficking victims. Any measures that help to make the process easier are valuable and should be welcomed.

I will speak briefly as an individual MLA. I touched earlier on how the Attorney General had played a very important role in dealing with clause 8 in respect of blanket immunity. I want to put on the record that, without prejudice to the Attorney General's views on this, he recognised that the Committee and Lord Morrow wanted to take forward a policy agenda, and he proactively engaged with the Committee, highlighting, in my view, where there were concerns and then helping to assist us and Lord Morrow in developing an amendment that would achieve what he wanted to achieve and what the Committee wanted to support. It is a good example of how officials can engage, even at times on issues that they may not necessarily agree with members on. When they recognise that there is an intent to proceed in a particular way, he has shown that you can proactively engage and develop something that members want to put in place, be practical and implement. It is right that I record my appreciation for the way in which he engaged with the Committee and Lord Morrow in respect of that. I commend the positions outlined by Lord Morrow.

Mr Lynch: Go raibh maith agat, a LeasCheann Comhairle. I rise to speak on amendment Nos 44 and 47. I wish to keep this short, seeing as it is well into another day.

I listened to what Lord Morrow had to say about his new clause 10B, which is created by amendment No 43. We feel that it is fine; however, we believe that our amendment No 44 is stronger. It involves setting out a strategy at least once every year and also involves other Departments. We will vote for the two amendments and then hope that, at Further Consideration Stage, we can come to some agreement on the important issue of support and assistance for those leaving prostitution.

I will move on to amendment No 47, which seeks to broaden and slightly widen the scope of the child trafficking guardian to an independent legal guardian. A legal guardian's role would be a trusted adult who will act in the interests of all separated children, not just victims of trafficking. The Children's Commissioner, who is an expert in that field and who deals with such matters daily, is strongly of the opinion that the amendment presents us with an opportunity to extend protection to all children separated from their legal guardian or parents. The amendment would extend to those vulnerable children, irrespective of whether trafficking or other forms of exploitation have been suspected or identified.

In reality, the provision would apply to only a small number of cases each year. Given that small number, it is difficult to envisage why we would not support extending the provision to vulnerable children not directly linked to trafficking.

I appreciate that the primary aim of Lord Morrow's Bill is to deal with human trafficking. However, it would make no sense, when establishing very worthwhile protection functions, for them not to apply to other vulnerable children in a similar circumstance. The additional resources needed would be minimal, but the benefits to each of those children would be immense.

Mr A Maginness: I will be as brief as I can. The SDLP supports the group 4 amendments that Lord Morrow tabled. As the Chair of the Committee said, they seek to support people in the aftermath of their victimisation. We support the measures that he brought forth, particularly amendment No 48, which deals with a statutory defence for the victims of human trafficking so as to prevent their prosecution. I believe that Lord Morrow has struck the right balance in his amendments to prevent a situation of blanket immunity, particularly in serious cases. We support the position outlined by Lord Morrow in his address to the Assembly. We believe it to be very sensible indeed.

Amendment Nos 43 and 44 are, to some extent, related. Amendment No 43, which creates new clause 10B, is, I believe very important and helpful, but I think that the new clause 10B proposed in amendment No 44 in many ways complements it. We are of the view that it should be supported. Lord Morrow suggested that amendment No 44 not be made, but I think that, in the circumstances, it does no damage to the preceding amendment No 43. Mr Lynch made a good point, which was that, at Further Consideration Stage, we can harmonise the amendments and make them much better.

We take the view that amendment No 47 is helpful. It goes a little further than amendment No 46, and amendment No 47 has, in some ways, been supported by the Children's Commissioner, who feels that it is necessary to go a little further than amendment No 46. She pointed out that there are separated children who are not necessarily the victims of human trafficking, so it is an extension, but not a huge one. There are only a small number of children involved, but we think that it would be sensible to include them. The Children's Commissioner pointed out that no EU member state has a guardianship system only for child victims of trafficking.

Several countries provide guardians for trafficked and separated children in recognition of the inherent vulnerabilities of both groups. It is also a requirement of international good practice and advice of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child that member states should appoint a guardian to all unaccompanied children. She feels that the current clause 12 falls short in that regard. We are supportive of that. Amendment No 47 is to be preferred.


12.45 am

Mr Elliott: I am almost reluctant to say that I will be brief. Everybody has been saying that for the last two hours. Maybe I will just say that I will take as long as is necessary, which, I hope, is not too long.

I had significant and major concern with clause 8 right from the introduction of the Bill. I had discussions with Lord Morrow, and I raised my concern at Committee. Indeed, clause 8 gave me more concern than clause 6. Even though a lot of the debate was around clause 6, clause 8 was more difficult for me to accept. I am pleased that Lord Morrow has agreed to vote against clause 8 standing part and to bring in the new clause 12B. That is much more specific; it is clearer, and it does not give the blanket immunity that clause 8 was providing. I welcome that move.

Amendment Nos 43 and 44 have been touched on. I will briefly mention them as well. At the outset, I felt that you could not vote for both, but it appears that the indication is that you actually can. They are very important; they give help and support to those who wish to leave prostitution. If we are going to make sure that the Bill works, it is important that that help and support mechanism is in place for the people who want to leave prostitution. I am inclined to support both amendments, if possible, and maybe resolve it at the next stage to something better.

Amendment Nos 46 and 47 are of a similar nature, except that amendment No 47 facilitates children who come from another country; those named as "separated" children. My one concern about that issue is about whether it would be open to any abuse of children who may be sent to Northern Ireland on the basis that they would get that help and support. The numbers are very small, and I hope that that would not happen, so I am more inclined to support amendment No 47 on the basis that it will not be open to abuse. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about that aspect. Sinn Féin Members have spoken, but there has not been any clarity around whether that could be open to abuse. If any Member wants to satisfy my mind on that situation, I am happy to give way, but there does not appear to be. Anyway, both of those seem to be very close.

Mr McCartney: Will the Member give way?

Mr Elliott: I am happy to give way.

Mr McCarthy: There is always an opportunity for people to abuse it, but, having spoken to the Children's Commissioner, she is reasonably satisfied that this will be a small number of cases and that it will not be subject to abuse.

Mr Elliott: I thank the Member for that clarity. Again, the indication is that it will be a very small number of cases. We hope that it will not be open to abuse and that it will give extra protection for separated children. Hopefully, it will provide some sort of comfort for them if they find themselves in a very unfortunate situation.

Miss M McIlveen: I would like to comment on clause 12, and amendment No 46, the provision of child trafficking guardians. I do not plan to speak long as it is well past my bedtime.

Members will be aware that I have an interest in issues affecting children. In a great deal of the work that I have done, I have sought to raise awareness of the need to protect children and young people from all forms of exploitation, including sexual exploitation.

Children who have been trafficked are some of the most vulnerable in society. Many are brought here for the sole purpose of being exploited in different ways, and find themselves isolated in an unfamiliar environment. Child trafficking is a form of child abuse, and official figures only ever tell a partial story.

It is challenging to identify and protect child victims. Children who are trafficked may be found in brothels, in forced labour or on the street. Rather than being seen as victims of crime, they are often regarded as perpetrators. We need to be mindful also that English may not necessarily be their first language; their use and understanding of English may not be sufficient to allow them to communicate fully.
They certainly do not understand all the processes that they go through. In that environment, it is important that we recognise that those children cannot be treated like other children under the care of the state. Their experiences, needs and the challenges that they face are distinct. We are right to provide them with specialist support.

Trafficked children are at high risk of being re-trafficked. We should not underestimate the degree to which traffickers can exert control and influence over such vulnerable children. Everything needs to be done to protect these children from further exploitation once they come to the attention of the authorities, and the provision of child trafficking guardians is a vital step forward in that regard. I pay tribute to Lord Morrow for putting this issue on our agenda in the Assembly. I also pay tribute to the former Minister of Health, and his successor, for adopting and supporting this proposal.

By passing this amendment, Northern Ireland will be leading the way among the nations of the United Kingdom in creating such a role in legislation. It demonstrates the commitment that we as a society are making to those extremely vulnerable children, not just for now but for the future.

I want to highlight one aspect of the child trafficking guardian set out in new clause 12A, which I believe is vital: the legal recognition and authority that the child trafficking guardian has in relation to all other public agencies dealing with the child's case, found in 12A(7).

The principal role for a child trafficking guardian is to speak for the best interests of the child. To give a meaningful voice to the best interests of the child in all decisions about their care, immigration status or participation in criminal investigations, the guardian must have the standing and authority to contribute to discussions and to be listened to by other public officials.

It is the setting out of the full list of the functions of the child trafficking guardian in legislation, as this clause does, that is so important; it makes it clear where the responsibilities of the child trafficking guardian begin and end. That will be extremely helpful in avoiding situations where different professionals make assumptions about who will be responsible for what aspect of a child's care and support, with the potential for the child to slip through the gaps.

By establishing the child trafficking guardian as a person with statutory authority and responsibility, they will be able to play a full part in decision-making processes about a child's case, without any uncertainty about their role in relation to social workers, teachers, immigration officials and others who interact with a child.

This new clause will ensure that the role and authority of the child trafficking guardian in advocating for the child and its best interests will be recognised by all those agencies providing services to a child. As I see it, the purpose is not to create an additional barrier for other public sector professionals doing their job; rather, it is to amplify the voice of the child and to ensure that in all contexts the child is supported and their best interests are prioritised and protected.

One other aspect of new clause 12A that I want to mention is the authority in 12A(6)(c), which allows the child trafficking guardian to instruct or appoint a solicitor for a child where appropriate. It can be difficult for lawyers to take instructions from trafficked children, who often do not have, and should not be expected to have, full legal capacity or a complete understanding of the complex situations that they are in.

The child's language skills may be limited, or he or she may have been manipulated by his or her traffickers, who make the child trust them and tell the child not to trust the authorities. Under those circumstances, a child may not be able or willing to give a lawyer instructions that would be in his or her own best interests. A child trafficking guardian can come alongside the child, gain his or her trust and help him or her to engage with the legal process and instruct the child's lawyers when the child is unable to do so. I am very pleased that this new clause gives such authority and responsibility to a child trafficking guardian when it is necessary. This is an excellent addition to the original clause 12.

If we are to protect those extremely vulnerable children to the best abilities of our care system, I believe that a specialist child guardian has a vital role to play. Such a guardian would be accepted, recognised and listened to as having authority to speak up for the best interests of a child. A child trafficking guardian will be there to support and help that child through all the formal, legal and administrative processes that they will face.

That role will be a key part of the safety net that we put around children who have been trafficked, so I am pleased to support amendment No 46.

Mrs Dobson: I wish to make a few short comments. I hope that they will be even shorter than those of my colleague Tom Elliott, who has further to travel home than I have.

In particular, I want to address amendment Nos 43, 44, 46 and 47, which relate to the Department of Health. On amendment Nos 43 and 44, I believe, like everyone else in the House, that there must be appropriate support in place for women, as well as for men, who wish to leave prostitution. Research has shown that people often wish to leave prostitution and do so, but it is not a decision that is taken easily. We need to remember that many of those women did not end up making money in that way out of their own choice. For too many, the route through prostitution includes violence, abuse and coercion, and, in many cases, it has been horrific for them. There may be some who took that decision entirely of their own free will, but they may also find it difficult to leave.

The barriers to leaving are many, not least, as we heard, drugs and alcohol abuse as well as housing factors. Difficult as it may be for some to understand, we need to remember that some of the women involved in prostitution may be operating from their own homes, and, very often, they will not own their properties so that sometimes even their landlords will be involved. However, despite the many obvious problems with leaving, many women still do so, and, equally, many others may be seeking a route out.

At present, however, I am concerned that Northern Ireland may not have the required specialist knowledge and dedicated services to support people exiting prostitution. That is why I support amendment No 43. If that is agreed, it will place a duty on the Department of Health to have a programme in place to support people exiting prostitution. However, I urge the Department to avoid having a strategy just for a strategy's sake. Instead, such a programme must be focused, sufficiently flexible to meet people's needs, and, most importantly, it must put in place measures to allow those people to rebuild their lives.

We must also remember that not only would a dedicated programme provide support to people who want to exit prostitution, but it would be an extremely cost-effective way to prevent further physical harm through continued involvement. I believe that that is an important point to take on board, and I listened intently — it seems like hours ago — as Lord Morrow made that point, and I commend him for it.

I will move to amendment Nos 46 and 47. As we know, there is little difference between the two amendments, apart from points that have already been mentioned. On the broader issue, I can understand the rationale behind them. It is important that children have a custodian who will, as both amendments state, "assist, represent and support" them.

The choice that we are faced with tonight — or tomorrow, whatever time it is — is whether we feel that the clause should also apply to a separated child. Our minds are open to that: we will listen carefully to what the Minister has to say. It may have been helpful had the Health Minister contributed to the debate and put forward his Department's perspective, but that was not the case here tonight.

(Mr Principal Deputy Speaker [Mr Mitchel McLaughlin] in the Chair)


1.00 am

My party is supportive of expanding it to separated children. That seems a reasonable position, not least as children presenting as seeking asylum may be victims of trafficking themselves. I am aware that the numbers included may be small. My colleague Tom Elliott spoke about that earlier. Equally, we would be keen to ensure that, if it were to be included, that would not be exploited.

Mr Ford: I will try to take as long as it requires to deal with the points raised. A number of amendments have been tabled jointly for this section as well by Lord Morrow and me, focusing basically on assisting and protecting victims and potential victims. Given the good work done between my team and Lord Morrow, I trust that those are all matters that will attract the support of the House generally.

In particular, amendment No 41 deals with the interpretation in the new clause 9A, which is a straightforward matter for ensuring that we get the provisions right in this. Amendment No 42 introduces new clause 10A looking at the statutory requirement to provide comprehensive assistance and support to adult potential victims of trafficking who have been, or are about to be, referred to the NRM. There is, of course, a comprehensive package of support already available from the Department in line with our obligations under the EU directive. New clause 10A will enshrine this provision within our law and provide greater assurance to potential victims of continuing commitment.

I am grateful for the positive remarks that Lord Morrow made about my position. I am happy to accept this amendment to bind my successors in ensuring that they continue to work so well. We will then be going beyond our precise obligations under the directive so that we will have support immediately available, rather than when reasonable grounds have been established, and possibly also continuing for some period later. All of that would be a good sign of the work being done in a joined-up and collective way across this jurisdiction, which at least exceeds what is required for the European directive.

Amendment No 45 gives guidance about compensation for victims. It places a specific requirement on my Department to bring forward statutory guidance setting out the procedures for applying for compensation, the arrangements to provide assistance and support to anyone seeking compensation rather than the current requirement that they be set out by order. I am very happy to support the amendment. The intention is to clarify the process so that victims of human trafficking can navigate the process. I am happy to give the commitment that was requested by the Committee Chair in his absence that we will, as usual in the Department of Justice, consult the Committee as that guidance is developed.

Amendment No 46 deals with the issue of the child trafficking guardian, which I have been asked to take forward on behalf of the Minister of Health, Social Services and Public Safety and which is, of course, co-signed by Lord Morrow. In response to the point made just a moment ago by Mrs Dobson, the fact is that, under our normal procedures, only one Minister can speak to a Bill. I have already spoken on behalf of the Minister of Finance and Personnel on certain aspects. I now speak on behalf of the Minister of Health, Social Services and Public Safety in other respects.

Amendment No 46, the child trafficking guardian, is agreed by the Executive. It requires the appointment of a child trafficking guardian in the specified circumstances and defines the role of that guardian principally to assist, support and advise child victims of human trafficking and to work on their behalf. As has already been said by Lord Morrow, it must be independent of both DHSSPS and the health and social care trusts. This is a matter that, I understand, has been worked out in detail between the Health Minister and Lord Morrow. The amendment has been necessary to ensure that the role of the child trafficking guardian complements and adds to other statutory roles, including that, for example, of a social worker responsible for the care and protection of a child or the guardian ad litem responsible for representing the interests of the child in family court proceedings. Key to the new clause 12A is the principle that all decisions made or actions taken by the child trafficking guardian are to be in the best interests of the child.

Amendment No 47 is slightly different. It goes wider to include separated children within the scope of the Bill, which is something that is not supported by the Minister of Health and the Executive's decision at this stage. In the view of DHSSPS, the provision does not sit easily with the Bill, which is about human trafficking offences and exploitation. It goes beyond it in a way that is, at times, confusing. For example, subsection 2(c) of new clause 12A has to be read alongside subsection 2(a), in that it applies if a reference to that child has been, or is about to be, made to the NRM. However, a referral to the NRM will not be made in respect of a separated child who is not considered to be a victim or potential victim of human trafficking. Alternative drafting would be necessary to capture the policy intention.

It is also important to note that a child who is considered to be separated will actually become looked after by one of the five health and social care trusts under the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 and will receive the care and protection provided for under that Order. Figures provided by the Health and Social Care Board show that every child who entered Northern Ireland through an international border in 2012-13, for example, and who was considered to be separated or trafficked, became a looked-after child. Importantly, the Health and Social Care Board is in the process of establishing a specific facility for separated children. It is intended that advocacy services will be central to service provision in that facility. On that basis, the Minister of Health, Social Services and Public Safety and I are of the view that there is no necessity for the guardianship service provided under the Bill to extend to separated children.

There is also the issue that the definition of a separated child contained in the amendment is confusing, in that it defines a separated child as one who may be in the company of other adults, including members of their extended family. By definition, a child who is in the company of other adults cannot be separated. There is a further complication in that the title for the proposed clause 12A reads "Independent Legal Guardian". That could give rise to confusion and cause difficulties between the independent legal guardian and the guardian ad litem. I believe that "Child Trafficking Guardian" is a safer title for the purposes of the Bill. I therefore believe that amendment No 46 is more appropriate than amendment No 47 to meet the needs of the Bill.

Amendment No 43 has been tabled by Lord Morrow to ensure that there is a programme of assistance and support available to a person who wishes to leave prostitution. I am advised that this is being discussed with Lord Morrow by the Minister of Health. I understand that he is supportive, in principle, of amendment No 43, though it has not yet been formally considered by the Executive and may require possible further amendment at Further Consideration Stage. The Minister of Health has advised me that he is not supportive of amendment No 44, tabled by Mr McCartney and colleagues, which he believes would already be incorporated within the effect of amendment No 43. Amendment No 43, from Lord Morrow, provides for a programme of assistance and support for individuals seeking to exit prostitution. The amendment would place lead responsibility for providing the programme with the Minister. As I indicated, it is understood that he is, in principle, supportive. On the other hand, whilst the amendment tabled by Mr McCartney and colleagues is attractive in the sense of drawing in other Departments, the priority is surely to provide the programme of support rather than to produce a strategy annually to do that.

Whilst lead responsibility for the provision of the programme would lie with the Department of Health, there is no reason why the programme could not, in principle, incorporate services that are the responsibility of other Departments; for example, housing or education. The programme could be designed in a way that eases access to those services by thoughtful and facilitative signposting. I am aware that, in speaking to it, Mr Lynch talked about whether it could be amended at Further Consideration Stage. It seems to me that there is a clear case for agreeing amendment No 43, but, if amendment No 44 were added as well, there would undoubtedly be a need for further amendment. I believe that amendment No 43 carries the necessary key services, which is the focus of this section of the Bill.

In addition to those amendments making provision for the welfare and support of victims, amendment Nos 48 to 53, tabled jointly by Lord Morrow and me, are intended to enhance the protection available to victims of trafficking.

Amendment No 48 introduces new clause 12B, a statutory defence for victims of human trafficking and slavery-type offences who have been compelled to commit certain offences. Lord Morrow spoke to it at length, and certainly answered the question, which Members may recall I asked previously, around the significant concerns I had that clause 8, as introduced, goes too far in offering blanket immunity from prosecution for victims of human trafficking, and does not provide a proportionate response.

I am grateful for the engagement that we have had with Lord Morrow and we agree that clause 12B should replace clause 12A. That will be a much more proportionate and appropriate response that will deal with a test for compulsion around how a reasonable person in the same situation, with the same characteristics of age, gender or any physical or mental illness or disability, would have no realistic alternative to act differently. That would not be the case for child victims, as they would not need to show that a reasonable person in the same situation would have no realistic alternative. I believe that is an appropriate distinction between adults and children that is entirely consistent with the position that we hold for children in the justice system and is in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

I should make it clear, as requested by Lord Morrow, that even in the cases in which the proposed defence would not apply, prosecutors would still be able to exercise their existing discretion not to prosecute if they consider that that prosecution would not be in the public interest. The PPS has indicated that where a defendant is a victim of human trafficking and has been compelled to commit criminal activities, that would be considered to be a strong mitigating factor against prosecution.

Amendment Nos 49 to 52 are technical in nature and all seek to amend clause 13. They have been outlined by Lord Morrow, and I do not think that they require further discussion.
Amendment No 53 introduces new clause 14A, which is intended to replace clause 14 and which would amend the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1999 to ensure that victims of human trafficking and slavery-type offences under the Bill, as well as any victims of the existing human trafficking and slavery offences, if those cases may still be before the courts, would be automatically eligible for special measures when giving evidence in court. Those special measures could include provision for the exclusion of persons from court when the witness is giving evidence or that an individual who is charged with an offence may not cross-examine the complainant. I believe that new clause 14A is a useful amendment to clause 14. It renders clause 14 unnecessary, and Lord Morrow and I agree that it should no longer stand part of the Bill.

That deals with the amendments in this group.

Lord Morrow: I have good news for the House: I will not say much very much at all. I see the thumbs going up already opposite me.

It is suffice to say that I think that everything that needs to be said has been said about this group of amendments. I would, however, urge a slight caution at this juncture in relation to amendment No 44, and I know that the Minister also touched on that. Quite frankly, we on this side of the House feel that it is not necessary and all the work has been accomplished in amendment No 43, which introduces a new clause. It is not our intention to divide the House on it at this late hour, but we will want to revisit it and look at it again. I do not know whether I ask in vain, but I will try anyway. I ask the proposer of amendment No 44 not to move it at this stage.

I will not say anything more. The hour has long gone. I will leave it there.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: Lord Morrow and the Minister's opposition to clause 8 has been debated.

Question, That the clause stand part of the Bill, put and negatived.

Clause No 8 disagreed to.

Clause 9 (Victim of trafficking in human beings)

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: The opposition to clause 9 has already been debated.

New Clause

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: Amendment No 41 has already been debated.

Amendment No 41 made:

After clause 9 insert

"Interpretation of this Part
 
9A.—(1) For the purposes of this Part there is a conclusive determination that a person is, or is not, a victim of trafficking in human beings when, on completion of the identification process required by Article 10 of the Trafficking Convention, a competent authority concludes that the person is, or is not, such a victim.
 
(2) In this Part—
 
"competent authority" means a person who is a competent authority of the United Kingdom for the purposes of the Trafficking Convention;
 
"the Trafficking Convention" means the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (done at Warsaw on 16 May 2005);
 
"trafficking in human beings" has the same meaning as in the Trafficking Convention.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10 (Requirements for assistance and support)

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: The opposition to clause 10 has already been debated.

Question, That the clause stand part of the Bill, put and negatived.

Clause No 10 disagreed to.

New Clause

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: Amendment No 42 has already been debated.

Amendment No 42 made:

After clause 10 insert

"Assistance and support pending determination by competent authority

10A.—(1) The Department must ensure that a person to whom this section applies is provided with assistance and support in accordance with this section.

(2) This section applies to a person if—

(a) that person is aged 18 or over or, in a case where the age of the person is uncertain, the Department reasonably believes that person is aged 18 or over; and

(b) a reference relating to that person has been, or is about to be, made to the competent authority for a determination for the purposes of Article 10 of the Trafficking Convention as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is a victim of trafficking in human beings.

(3) Assistance and support is to be provided under this section until there is made in relation to that person—

(a) a determination that there are not reasonable grounds to believe that the person is a victim of trafficking in human beings; or

(b) a conclusive determination that the person is or is not a victim of trafficking in human beings;

but if a conclusive determination that a person is a victim of trafficking in human beings is made within the relevant period, assistance and support is to be provided until the end of that period.

(4) The relevant period is the period of 45 days from the date on which the determination mentioned in subsection (2)(b) is made by the competent authority.

(5) Assistance and support provided to a person under this section—

(a) must not be conditional on the person’s acting as a witness in any criminal proceedings;

(b) must only be provided with the agreement of that person;

(c) must be provided in a manner which takes due account of the needs of that person as regards safety and protection from harm;

(d) must be provided to meet the assessed needs of that person, having regard in particular to any special needs or vulnerabilities of that person caused by gender, pregnancy, physical or mental illness, disability or being the victim of serious violence or serious abuse.

(6) Assistance and support under this section must be offered from a person who is of the same gender as the person receiving it.

(7) The assistance and support which may be provided under this section includes, but is not be restricted to, the provision of—

(a) appropriate and safe accommodation;

(b) material assistance (including financial assistance);

(c) assistance in obtaining healthcare services (including counselling);

(d) appropriate information on any matter of relevance or potential relevance to the particular circumstances of the person;

(e) translation and interpretation services;

(f) assistance in obtaining legal advice or representation;

(g) assistance with repatriation.

(8) Where assistance and support has been provided to any person under this section, it may continue to be provided even if that person leaves Northern Ireland.

(9) Where—

(a) assistance and support has been provided to a person under this section; and

(b) that person ceases, by virtue of a conclusive determination that the person is a victim of trafficking in human beings or the ending of the relevant period, to be a person to whom assistance and support is to be provided under this section,

the Department may nevertheless ensure that assistance and support continues to be provided to that person under this section for such further period as the Department thinks necessary.

(10) Nothing in this section affects the entitlement of any person to assistance and support under any other statutory provision.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause

Amendment No 43 made:

After clause 10 insert

"Assistance and Support for Exiting Prostitution
 
10B.—(1) The Department of Health, Social Services, and Public Safety must ensure that there is a programme of assistance and support made available to a person who wishes to leave prostitution.

(2) Assistance and support provided under this section—

(a) is not conditional on the person’s willingness to act as a witness;

(b) shall be provided with the agreement of the person; and

(c) shall take due account of the victim’s safety and protection needs, including being offered assistance from a person of the same gender.

(3) Nothing in this section affects the entitlement of any person to assistance and support under any other statutory provision.

(4) For the purposes of this section "prostitution" has the same meaning as in Article 58 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause

Amendment No 44 made:

After clause 10 insert

"Strategy on assistance and support for exiting prostitution

10B. The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety shall, at least once in every year, publish a strategy, in conjunction with other government departments, to ensure that a programme of assistance and support is made available to a person who wishes to leave prostitution.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11 (Compensation for victims of trafficking)

Amendment No 45 made:

In page 6, line 19, leave out from ", by order" to end of line 25 and insert

"issue guidance as to—
 
(a) the procedures to be followed by a person to whom this section applies to apply for compensation under the Criminal Injuries (Compensation) (Northern Ireland) Order 2002;
 
(b) the grounds on which compensation may be awarded under that Order; and
 
(c) the arrangements available to assist and support such a person in applying for such compensation.
 
(3) This section applies to a person if (and only if) there has been a conclusive determination that the person is a victim of trafficking in human beings.".

Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12 disagreed to.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: Amendment No 46 has already been debated and is mutually exclusive with amendment No 47.

Question put, That amendment No 46 be made.

The Assembly divided:

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause

Amendment No 47 made:

After clause 12 insert

"Independent Legal Guardian
 
12A.—(1) The Regional Health and Social Care Board must, in accordance with this section, make arrangements to enable a person (an "Independent Legal Guardian") to be appointed to assist, represent and support a child to whom this section applies.
 
(2) This section applies to a child if—
 
(a) a reference relating to that child has been, or is about to be, made to a competent authority for a determination for the purposes of Article 10 of the Trafficking Convention as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child is a victim of trafficking in human beings; and
 
(b) there has not been a conclusive determination that the child is not such a victim; and for the purposes of this subsection a determination which has been challenged by way of proceedings for judicial review shall not be treated as conclusive until those proceedings are finally determined; or
 
(c) there is reason to believe that the person is a separated child, in which case the person shall be presumed to be a separated child.
 
(3) Arrangements under this section must—
 
(a) be made with a registered charity (within the meaning of the Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 2008);
 
(b) provide for the appointment of a person as the Independent Legal Guardian for a child to whom this section applies to be made by that charity;
 
(c) ensure that a person is not so appointed by that charity unless that person—
 
(i) is an employee of the charity; and
 
(ii) is eligible to be so appointed in accordance with regulations under subsection (4);
 
(d) provide for the appointment of an Independent Legal Guardian only where the person with parental responsibility for the child—
 
(i) is not in regular contact with the child or is outside the United Kingdom;
 
(ii) is suspected of having committed an offence under section 1B in relation to the child; or
 
(iii) for other reasons has interests which conflict with those of the child;
 
(e) include provision for the termination of the appointment of an Independent Legal Guardian, including in particular provision for such termination—
 
(i) if the child ceases to be a child to whom this section applies;
 
(ii) on the child attaining the age of 18 (unless subsection (9) applies);
 
(iii) on paragraph (d) ceasing to apply in relation to the child;
 
(iv) where, after consulting the Independent Legal Guardian, the Regional Health and Social Care Board is of the opinion that it is no longer necessary to continue the appointment because long-term arrangements have been made in relation to the child.
 
(4) The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety shall by regulations make provision for—
 
(a) the training and qualifications required for a person to be eligible for appointment as an Independent Legal Guardian;
 
(b) the support to be provided for, and the supervision of, an Independent Legal Guardian.
 
(5) An Independent Legal Guardian appointed in relation to a child must at all times act in the best interests of the child.
 
(6) The functions of an Independent Legal Guardian include (where appropriate)—
 
(a) ascertaining the views of the child in relation to matters affecting the child;
 
(b) making representations to, and liaising with, bodies or persons responsible for—
 
(i) providing care, accommodation, health services, education or translation and interpretation services to or in respect of the child; or
 
(ii) otherwise taking decisions in relation to the child;
 
(c) assisting the child to obtain legal or other advice, assistance and representation, including (where necessary) the appointment and instructing of legal representatives to act on behalf of the child;
 
(d) consulting regularly with the child and keeping the child informed of legal and other proceedings affecting the child and any other matters affecting the child;
 
(e) contributing to a plan to safeguard and promote the future welfare of the child based on an individual assessment of that child’s best interests;
 
(f) providing a link between the child and any body or person who may provide services to the child;
 
(g) assisting in establishing contact with members of the child’s family, where the child so wishes and it is in the child’s best interests;
 
(h) accompanying the child to meetings or on other occasions.
 
(7) Any person or body providing services or taking administrative decisions in relation to a child for whom an Independent Legal Guardian has been appointed under this section must recognise, and pay due regard to, the functions of the guardian and must (to the extent otherwise permitted by law) provide the guardian with access to such information relating to the child as will enable the guardian to carry out his or her functions effectively.
 
(8) The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety may by regulations confer additional functions on Independent Legal Guardians.
 
(9) The arrangements under this section may provide for an Independent Legal Guardian appointed in relation to a person under the age of 18 to continue (with the consent of that person) to act in relation to that person after that person attains the age of 18 but is under the age of 21.
 
(10) In this section—
 
"administrative decision" does not include a decision taken by a court or tribunal;
 
"parental responsibility" has the meaning given by Article 6 of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, except that it does not include parental responsibility conferred by a care order (within the meaning of Article 49(1) of that Order);
 
"separated child" means a child who is outside their country of origin and has been separated from both parents, or from their previous legal or customary care giver, but not necessarily from other relatives. This may include children who have been trafficked, enslaved or exploited but are accompanied by other adults including community members, friends or members of their extended family.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause

Amendment No 48 made:

After clause 12 insert

"Defence for slavery or trafficking victims compelled to commit an offence
 
12B.—(1) Subject to subsection (9), a person is not guilty of an offence if—
 
(a) the person is over the age of 18 when the act which constitutes the offence was done;
 
(b) the person does that act because the person is compelled to do that act,
 
(c) the compulsion is attributable to slavery or to relevant exploitation, and
 
(d) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would have no realistic alternative to doing that act.
 
(2) "Relevant characteristics" means age, sex and any physical or mental illness or disability.
 
(3) A person may be compelled to do something by another person or by the person’s circumstances.
 
(4) Compulsion is attributable to slavery or to relevant exploitation only if—
 
(a) it is, or is part of, conduct which constitutes an offence under section 1A or conduct which constitutes relevant exploitation, or
 
(b) it is a direct consequence of a person being, or having been, a victim of an offence under section 1A or a victim of relevant exploitation.
 
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) "relevant exploitation" is exploitation (within the meaning of section 1C) that is attributable to the exploited person being, or having been, a victim of an offence under section 1B.
 
(6) Subject to subsection (9), a person is not guilty of an offence if—
 
(a) the person is a child at the time the act which constitutes the offence is done; and
 
(b) that act was done as a direct consequence of the person being, or having been, a victim of an offence under section 1A or of relevant exploitation.
 
(7) For the purposes of subsection (6) "relevant exploitation" is exploitation which falls within one or more of subsections (2) to (5) of section 1C and is attributable to the exploited person being, or having been, a victim of an offence under section 1B.
 
(8) In this section references to an act include an omission.
 
(9) This section does not apply to an offence which, in the case of a person over the age of 21, is punishable on indictment with imprisonment for life or for a term of at least 5 years, other than any of the following offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971—
 
(a) an offence under section 4(2) committed in respect of a Class B or Class C drug;
 
(b) an offence under section 5(2) committed in respect of a Class B drug;
 
(c) an offence under section 6(2).
 
(10) The Department may by order amend subsection (9).".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13 (Protection of victims in criminal investigations)

Amendment No 49 made:

In page 8, line 6, leave out "chief officer of police" and insert "Chief Constable".

Amendment No 50 made:

In page 8, line 7, leave out "a human trafficking offence" and insert

"an offence under section 1A or 1B".

Amendment No 51 made:

No 51: In page 8, line 21, leave out "professionals" and insert "persons".

Amendment No 52 made:

No 52: In page 8, line 28, leave out "a reasoned decision" to end of line 29 and insert

"the police officer in charge of the investigation decides to the contrary and records the reasons for that decision in writing.".

Clause 13, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14 disagreed to.

New Clause

Amendment No 53 made:

After clause 14 insert

"Special measures: amendments to the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1999
 
14A.—(1) The Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1999 is amended as follows.
 
(2) In Article 3 after paragraph (1) insert—
 
"(1A) In this Order "a slavery or human trafficking offence" means an offence under—
 
(a) section 57, 58, 58A or 59 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (trafficking for sexual exploitation);
 
(b) section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (trafficking for exploitation);
 
(c) section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour); or
 
(d) section 1A or 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 (slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour and human trafficking).".
 
(3) In Article 5(4) (witnesses eligible for assistance on grounds of fear or distress about testifying) after "sexual offence" insert "or a slavery or human trafficking offence".
 
(4) In Article 13(4)(a) (evidence given in private) after "sexual offence" insert "or or a slavery or human trafficking offence".
 
(5) In Article 21 (interpretation etc. of Part 2) after paragraph (4) insert—
 
"(5) For the purposes of this Part as it applies in relation to a witness who is the complainant in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence, where the age of the witness is uncertain and there are reasons to believe that the witness is under the age of 18, that witness is presumed to be under the age of 18.".
 
(6) In Article 22 (complainants in proceedings for sexual offences) after "sexual offence" insert "or a slavery or human trafficking offence".
 
(7) In Article 23 (child complainants and other child witnesses) in paragraph (3) for sub-paragraph (cc) substitute—
 
"(cc) a slavery or human trafficking offence;".
 
(8) In Article 39 (general supplementary provisions) after paragraph (2) insert—
 
"(3) Paragraph (2) is subject to Article 21(5).".".

After clause 14 insert

"Special measures: amendments to the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1999
 
14A.—(1) The Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1999 is amended as follows.
 
(2) In Article 3 after paragraph (1) insert—
 
"(1A) In this Order "a slavery or human trafficking offence" means an offence under—
 
(a) section 57, 58, 58A or 59 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (trafficking for sexual exploitation);
 
(b) section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (trafficking for exploitation);
 
(c) section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour); or
 
(d) section 1A or 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 (slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour and human trafficking).".
 
(3) In Article 5(4) (witnesses eligible for assistance on grounds of fear or distress about testifying) after "sexual offence" insert "or a slavery or human trafficking offence".
 
(4) In Article 13(4)(a) (evidence given in private) after "sexual offence" insert "or or a slavery or human trafficking offence".
 
(5) In Article 21 (interpretation etc. of Part 2) after paragraph (4) insert—
 
"(5) For the purposes of this Part as it applies in relation to a witness who is the complainant in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence, where the age of the witness is uncertain and there are reasons to believe that the witness is under the age of 18, that witness is presumed to be under the age of 18.".
 
(6) In Article 22 (complainants in proceedings for sexual offences) after "sexual offence" insert "or a slavery or human trafficking offence".
 
(7) In Article 23 (child complainants and other child witnesses) in paragraph (3) for sub-paragraph (cc) substitute—
 
"(cc) a slavery or human trafficking offence;".
 
(8) In Article 39 (general supplementary provisions) after paragraph (2) insert—
 
"(3) Paragraph (2) is subject to Article 21(5).".".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15 disagreed to.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17 (General interpretation)

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: We now come to the fifth debate —

Some Members: Hear, hear.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: — which comprises amendment Nos 54 to 59 and amendment Nos 63 and 64, as well as opposition to clauses 17 and 18 standing part. This group deals with commencement, a new short title for the Bill, orders and regulations and technical schedules. Members will note that amendment No 54 is mutually exclusive with clause 17 standing part and amendment No 56 is mutually exclusive with clause 18 standing part. I call the Minister to speak to opposition to clause 17 and to address the other oppositions and amendments in the group.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The following amendments stood on the Marshalled List:

No 54: After clause 17 insert

"Interpretation of this Act
 
17A.—(1) In this Act—
 
"child" means a person under the age of 18;
 
"country" includes territory or other part of the world;
 
"the Department" means the Department of Justice;
 
"the Human Rights Convention" means the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms agreed by the Council of Europe at Rome on 4th November 1950;
 
"public authority" means any public authority within the meaning of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (other than a court or tribunal) which exercises functions wholly or mainly in Northern Ireland;
 
"UK national" means—
 
(a) a British citizen;
 
(b) a person who is a British subject by virtue of Part 4 of the British Nationality Act 1981 and who has a right of abode in the United Kingdom; or
 
(c) a person who is a British overseas territories citizen by virtue of a connection with Gibraltar;
 
"vulnerable adult" means a person aged 18 or over whose ability to protect himself or herself from violence, abuse or exploitation is significantly impaired through physical or mental disability or illness, old age, addiction to alcohol or drugs or for any other reason.
 
(2) For the purposes of this Act—
 
(a) a person is in a position of trust in relation to another person in the circumstances mentioned in Article 28 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008;
 
(b) a person is a member of another person’s family if the relation of that person to the other person is within Article 34 of that Order.
 
(3) For the purposes of the exercise of any function under this Act relating to a child, if—
 
(a) the age of a person ("P") is uncertain; and
 
(b) the person exercising the function has reason to believe that P is a child,
 
P is to be treated as a child.".

No 55: After clause 17 insert

"Amendments, repeals and consequential provision
 
17B.—(1) The statutory provisions set out in Schedule 4 have effect subject to the amendments in that Schedule.
 
(2) The statutory provisions set out in Schedule 5 are repealed to the extent specified in the second column of that Schedule.
 
(3) The repeal of a provision by this Act does not affect the operation of that provision in relation to an offence committed before the coming into operation of that repeal.
 
(4) The Department may by order make whatever provision the Department thinks appropriate in consequence of this Act.
 
(5) The provision which may be made by order under subsection (4) includes provision amending, repealing or revoking any statutory provision.".

No 56: After clause 18 insert

"Orders and regulations
 
18A.—(1) Subject to subsections (2) to (5), orders made by the Department under this Act and regulations under this Act are subject to negative resolution.
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to an order under section 19 (commencement).
 
(3) Orders to which subsection (4) applies shall not be made unless a draft of the order has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, the Assembly.
 
(4) This subsection applies to—
 
(a) an order under section 12B(10)(power to amend list of offences excluded from defence in section 12B);
 
(b) an order under section 17B(4) (consequential provision) which amends or repeals any provision of an Act or of Northern Ireland legislation;
 
(c) an order under paragraph 1(5) of Schedule 3 (power to amend definition of "slavery or human trafficking offence");
 
(d) an order under paragraph 2(7) of Schedule 3 (provision as to additional applicants for slavery and trafficking prevention orders);
 
(e) an order under paragraph 17 of Schedule 3 (cross-border enforcement of certain court orders).
 
(5) Regulations under section 5F (duty to notify National Crime Agency) or 12A(8) (additional functions for child trafficking guardians) shall not be made unless a draft of the order has been laid before and approved by resolution of the Assembly.
 
(6) Regulations under this Act and orders made by the Department under this Act may include saving, transitional, transitory, supplementary or consequential provision.".

No 57: In clause 19, page 10, leave out line 11 and insert

"(Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014.".

No 58: In clause 19, page 10, line 12, leave out subsection (2) and insert

"(2) The following provisions of this Act come into operation on the day after Royal Assent—
 
(a) section 17A (interpretation);
 
(b) section 17B(4) and (5) (consequential provision);
 
(c) section 18A (orders and regulations);
 
(d) this section.
 
(3) The other provisions of this Act come into operation on such day or days as the Department may by order appoint.".

No 59: at end insert

"or, in the absence of such an order, 6 months after Royal Assent".

No 63: After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 4
 
MINOR AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS
 
PART 1
 
AMENDMENTS RELATING TO OFFENCES UNDER SECTION 1A OR 1B
 
THE CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS ACT (NORTHERN IRELAND) 1968 (C. 34)
 
1. In Schedule 1 (offences against children and young persons to which special provisions of the Act apply) at the end add—
 
"An offence against a child or young person under section 1A or 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 or any attempt to commit such an offence.".
 
THE IMMIGRATION ACT 1971 (C. 77)
 
2. In section 25C (forfeiture of vehicle, ship or aircraft) in subsections (9)(b), (10)(b) and (11) for the words from "a passenger" to the end substitute "the victim of conduct which constitutes an offence under section 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland 2014".
 
THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (NORTHERN IRELAND) ORDER 1989 (NI 12)
 
3. In Article 53A(2) (questioning and treatment of persons by police: meaning of "qualifying offence") at the end add—
 
"(t) an offence under section 1A or 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014.".
 
THE SEXUAL OFFENCES (AMENDMENT) ACT 1992 (C. 34)
 
4. In section 2(3) (offences under law of Northern Ireland to which the Act applies)—
 
(a) after paragraph (hb) insert—
 
"(hc) any offence under section 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014;";
 
(b) in paragraph (i) for "(hb)" substitute "(hc)".
 
THE SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 2003 (C. 42)
 
5. In Schedule 5 (relevant offences for purposes of notification and orders) after paragraph 171B insert—
 
"171C An offence under section 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014."
 
THE ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION (TREATMENT OF CLAIMANTS, ETC.) ACT 2004 (C. 19)
 
6. In section 14(2) (immigration officers’ power of arrest) after paragraph (q) insert—
 
"(r) an offence under section 1A or 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014."
 
THE SERIOUS CRIME ACT 2007 (C. 27)
 
7. In paragraph 18 of Part 2 of Schedule 1 (serious offences in Northern Ireland) at the end add—
 
"(4) An offence under section 1A or 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014."
 
PART 2
 
AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDERS
 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE (NORTHERN IRELAND) ORDER 1994 (NI 15)
 
8. In Article 16(a) (review of compensation orders) for the words from "a confiscation order" to the end substitute "either or both of the following made against him in the same proceedings—
 
(i) a confiscation order under Part 4 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;
 
(ii) a slavery and trafficking reparation order under Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014; or".
 
THE SOCIAL SECURITY (RECOVERY OF BENEFITS) (NORTHERN IRELAND) ORDER 1997 (NI 12)
 
9. In paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 (exempted payments) for "1994 or" substitute "1994, Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 or".
 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE (NORTHERN IRELAND) ORDER 1996 (NI 24)
 
10. In Article 4(5) (absolute and conditional discharge) at the end insert "or a slavery and trafficking reparation order under Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014."
 
11. In Article 13(11) (community service order) at the end insert "or a slavery and trafficking reparation order under Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014."
 
THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT 2002 (C. 29)
 
12.—(1) Section 163 (effect of confiscation order on court’s other powers) is amended as follows.
 
(2) In subsection (3)(a) at the end add "or an order under Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 (slavery and trafficking reparation orders)".
 
(3) In subsection (5)—
 
(a) in paragraph (a) for "both a confiscation order and" substitute "a confiscation order and one or both of" and after "1994 (SI 1994/2795 (N.I. 15)" insert "and a slavery and trafficking reparation order under Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014,";
 
(b) in paragraph (b) for "both the orders" substitute "all the orders".
 
(4) In subsection (6) (priorities of confiscation orders and other orders) for the words from "of the compensation" to "as it specifies" substitute "as it specifies of the amount (or amounts) payable under the other order (or orders) mentioned in subsection (5)(a)".
 
13. In section 182(7)(b) (court’s powers on appeal) at the end insert "so far as they relate to such orders".
 
14. In section 183(9)(b) (appeal to Supreme Court) at the end insert "so far as they relate to such orders".
 
15. In section 205(5) (application of sums received under confiscation order to pay compensation) for the words "of compensation" substitute "payable under any other order (or orders)".
 
16. In section 308 (general exceptions to concept of recoverable property) after subsection (4) insert—
 
"(4A) If—
 
(a) a payment is made to a person in pursuance of a slavery and trafficking reparation order under Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014, and
 
(b) apart from this subsection, the sum received would be recoverable property,
 
the property ceases to be recoverable.".
 
THE RECOVERY OF HEALTH SERVICE CHARGES (NORTHERN IRELAND) ORDER 2006 (NI 13)
 
17. In paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 (recovery of health care charges: exemptions)—
 
(a) omit "or" at the end of sub-paragraph (b);
 
(b) after sub-paragraph (c) insert—
 
"(d) Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 (slavery and trafficking reparation orders).".
 
THE JUSTICE (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 2012 (C. 24)
 
18. In section 1(5) (offender levy) after "1994 (NI 15)" insert "or an order under Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 or both" and for "appropriate compensation" substitute "and appropriate amounts under such of those orders as it would be appropriate to make".".

No 64: After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 5

REPEALS































































Short Title

Extent of Repeal

The Children and Young Persons Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 (c. 38)

In Schedule 1 the entry relating to an offence under any of sections 57 to 59 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 (c.34)

In section 2(3)(ha) the words "57 to 59".

The Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1999 (NI 8)

Article 3(1)(ga).

The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (c. 29)

In Schedule 5, paragraph 4(2) and (3).

The Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42)

Sections 57 to 60C.
In section 142(2) the words "57 to 60C".
In Schedule 5, paragraph 171.
In Schedule 6, paragraphs 42(2) and (3)(a) and 46(4).


The Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (c. 19)

Section 4.
Section 5(3) to (5), (9) and (10).
Section 14(2)(n) and (p).


The Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 (c.38)

Section 54.
Schedule 4.


The Serious Crime Act 2007 (c.27)

In Schedule 1, paragraph 18(2) and (3).

The UK Borders Act 2007 (c. 30)

Section 31.

The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (NI 1)

In Schedule 1 in paragraph 28 the entries for sections 57 to 59.
In Part 2 of Schedule 2 in paragraph 13 the entries for sections 57 to 59.


The Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (NI 2)

In Article 66(2), sub-paragraph (b) and the word "or" immediately before it.
In Schedule 1, paragraph 12(4)(h).


The Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (c.11)

Section 54.

The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (c. 25)

Section 71.

The Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2013 (c. 7)

Sections 6 to 8.

".

No 64: After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 5

REPEALS































































Short Title

Extent of Repeal

The Children and Young Persons Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 (c. 38)

In Schedule 1 the entry relating to an offence under any of sections 57 to 59 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 (c.34)

In section 2(3)(ha) the words "57 to 59".

The Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1999 (NI 8)

Article 3(1)(ga).

The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (c. 29)

In Schedule 5, paragraph 4(2) and (3).

The Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42)

Sections 57 to 60C.
In section 142(2) the words "57 to 60C".
In Schedule 5, paragraph 171.
In Schedule 6, paragraphs 42(2) and (3)(a) and 46(4).


The Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (c. 19)

Section 4.
Section 5(3) to (5), (9) and (10).
Section 14(2)(n) and (p).


The Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 (c.38)

Section 54.
Schedule 4.


The Serious Crime Act 2007 (c.27)

In Schedule 1, paragraph 18(2) and (3).

The UK Borders Act 2007 (c. 30)

Section 31.

The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (NI 1)

In Schedule 1 in paragraph 28 the entries for sections 57 to 59.
In Part 2 of Schedule 2 in paragraph 13 the entries for sections 57 to 59.


The Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (NI 2)

In Article 66(2), sub-paragraph (b) and the word "or" immediately before it.
In Schedule 1, paragraph 12(4)(h).


The Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (c.11)

Section 54.

The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (c. 25)

Section 71.

The Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2013 (c. 7)

Sections 6 to 8.

".

Mr Ford: I am sure that Members of the House — at least, those who are not currently exiting — will welcome the opportunity to debate this final group looking at the supplementary measures to ensure that we have a detailed and considered examination of all of the issues that they contain. I am grateful for the opportunity to finally speak to this small group of amendments.

I formally register my opposition to clause 17, which, Lord Morrow and I agree, should be replaced by the new clause 17A by amendment No 54 and would therefore no longer stand part of the Bill. Amendment Nos 54 to 57 relate to the Bill's supplementary provisions at clauses 17 to 19 and are largely technical in nature. They reflect and, in part, are consequential to the considerable changes that have been agreed to the rest of the Bill. The amendments have the support of Lord Morrow, the Justice Committee and the Executive.

Amendment No 54 introduces new clause 17A, which, as I said, is intended to replace clause 17, which sets out general interpretation provisions. The new clause expands on the original clause, although, given the nature and extent of the necessary amendments, Lord Morrow and I agreed that the clearest way to achieve the changes was to replace clause 17 in its entirety, albeit not its effect. Amendment Nos 55, 63 and 64 introduce new clause 17B and new schedules 4 and 5 respectively. They make provision for amendments, repeals and consequential provision. New clause 17B includes an order-making power that allows the Department to make further consequential provision, if required, and stipulates that the orders must be by way of affirmative resolution.

Amendment No 56, which covers clause 18, deals with orders made by the Department. Again, in view of the significant changes to the Bill, more comprehensive provision must be made. Therefore, amendment No 56 deals with clause 18 and replaces it with new clause 18A. The new clause makes provision in respect of the order-making and regulatory powers provided for under the Bill and specifies that orders and regulations made under the Bill will be subject to negative resolution, except where otherwise specified in subsections (2) to (5).

Clause 19 sets out the Bill's short title and arrangements for commencement. Amendment No 57, tabled jointly by Lord Morrow and me, will change the Bill's short title. Members will agree that the significant body of amendments and new provisions that we have debated yesterday and today will transform the shape of the Bill while preserving its fundamental aims and principles of strengthening law enforcement's capacity to tackle these crimes and protecting and supporting victims. The Bill's original short title is no longer considered appropriate, so amendment No 57 changes the short title to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Bill to reflect its new comprehensive nature.

I have tabled amendment No 58 to make provision for the commencement of most of the provisions under the Bill by order, with the exception of those relating to interpretation, consequential provision and orders and regulations, which should come into operation on the day after Royal Assent. Lord Morrow, the Justice Committee and I share a wish to see the Bill in its entirety commencing as soon as possible after Royal Assent. At this stage, there is clearly a slight difference between the Committee and me, with the Committee having tabled amendment No 55 to bring in a specific time limit. Given the complexity of the amendments that we have passed, it would be better to take the time between now and Further Consideration Stage to see whether we can get agreement. There will be practical issues not only for my Department but for DHSSPS if there were a specific time limit. Given the good work that has been done by the Committee, Lord Morrow, his colleagues and my staff in dealing with the issue, I believe that we can resolve those issues before Further Consideration Stage. Therefore, I will not move amendment No 58.

Mr Givan: As the Minister indicated, this group of amendments is technical in nature. They deal with the general interpretation provisions, make provision in respect of orders to be made by the Department under the Bill, change the short title and set out the commencement provisions.

I will concentrate my remarks on amendment No 59, which the Committee has brought forward today. It deals with the commencement provisions and amends the Minister's amendment to ensure that, if the provisions in the Bill have not been commenced by ministerial order, they will come into operation six months after Royal Assent. The Committee first considered the commencement powers at Committee Stage when the Attorney General suggested that the Assembly may wish to make provision in the Bill for its commencement without reference to action by the Department. That was to avoid placing the Department in the position of having to decide when to commence provisions with which it was not in policy agreement, such as clauses 4 and 6, which the Minister opposed today.

The Committee discussed the matter, and members were of the view that it would be preferable to remove the requirement to commence the Bill from the Department of Justice. Having considered several options, the Committee agreed that the preferred approach would be to build in some time between the Bill receiving Royal Assent and its commencement to enable the Departments and organisations that will be responsible for the implementation of the provisions in the Bill to develop the necessary measures and procedures, particularly in relation to support services and training. The Committee therefore agreed to table an amendment to clause 19 to commence the Bill three months after it receives Royal Assent. It subsequently agreed the wording of the amendment at a meeting just before Committee Stage finished in April.

More recently, Lord Morrow wrote to the Committee regarding the introduction of a new clause. We have just debated that clause, and its purpose is to support those who wish to exit prostitution. He indicated that, to provide the necessary time to put in place effective support measures, it would be helpful if there was a longer time frame for the commencement of the Bill than the three months set out in the Committee's amendment. As I indicated earlier, the Committee recognises the need for a support services package to be in place for those who wish to exit prostitution, and it was sympathetic to that request. The Committee therefore agreed to extend the timescale in our initial amendment from three months to six months.

Given that the Minister was proposing an amendment to the commencement provisions in clause 19, the Committee decided to table amendment No 59, which amends his amendment. The benefit of that approach is that it enables section 17A, sections 17B(4) and (5), section 18A and section 19 to come into operation on the day after Royal Assent, which is something that the Minister has indicated he wants by way his amendment. That provides him with the flexibility to commence other provisions in the Bill within six months if he wishes to do so and achieves the Committee's aim of removing the requirement to commence all the provisions from the Department by providing for any provisions not already commenced by an order to come into effect six months after Royal Assent whilst providing an appropriate time frame to develop the necessary support services.

For the reasons that I have outlined, the Committee's amendment to the Minister's amendment is the most appropriate way to deal with the commencement of the provisions in the Bill. The Minister has now indicated that he will not move his amendment, and therefore I am not in a position, on behalf of the Committee, to move an amendment amending his amendment. Whilst the Minister and the Committee and I have a good relationship, it is fair to say that the House has previously voted on issues and it has been left to the Department to implement the related measures by way of an order, yet that has not happened because those measures did not meet the Department's policy view. I have commented on that in the past, and it is regrettable. Given, therefore, the views of the Department and the Minister on clause 6, which the Assembly passed by 81 votes to 10, with the Alliance Party being the only party that opposed it, the Committee felt that it would be appropriate —

Mr Ford: There are not 10 of us.

Mr Givan: The Alliance Party, Steven Agnew, Basil McCrea and John McCallister. Don't worry, we know who they are and the constituencies they are from.

Given that there were only 10 Members, Members will want to make sure that the will of Parliament is implemented. That is why the Committee was proposing to remove the power of the Department to bring the provisions in by way of an order and to put in place a time limit of six months. Obviously, that was also to facilitate support packages being developed properly so that the two could go in tandem. We will come back to this at Further Consideration Stage. In the spirit in which the Minister has engaged with Lord Morrow and the Committee, I trust that, on this issue, we will be able to engage together and agree an amendment that satisfies everybody. If that is not the case, we will, I trust, table a Committee amendment again at Further Consideration Stage to give effect to the issues that I have just outlined.

Mr Dickson: I do not intend to speak any further in this debate other than to say that I support the Minister.


1.45 am

Lord Morrow: I have good news too for the House: I will be very brief, so we are coming near the end.

Members, by this stage of the debate, will know that I have not been slow to listen and to revise aspects of my Bill when a good case has been made for doing so.

I am grateful for all the constructive input that I have received. As a result of these changes, there are some further definitions that need to be included in the Bill. I am therefore supporting the Minister's intention to oppose clause 17 and introduce new clause 17A in its place and new clause 17B and schedules 4 and 5, which set out the minor and consequential amendments and repeals where there are references to previous legislation. I hope that Members will not find any matters of controversy in those additions. The only issue that might have been of concern is the matter of dealing with a young person whose age is in dispute in new clause 17A. I encourage Members to support the removal of clause 17 and amendment Nos 54, 55, 63 and 64, which introduce those new clauses and amendments.

As a result of amendments that we have agreed today, my Bill now contains more order-making powers, and the Minister of Justice has suggested that it is no longer necessary for all those to be made by affirmative resolution, which is currently required by clause 18. I am fully supportive of the Minister of Justice's proposal to oppose current clause 18 and to replace it with a new clause 18A. I very much agree that certain regulations will still need to be made by affirmative resolution so that the Assembly has an active role in scrutinising changes in powers to, for instance, the functions of a child trafficking guardian. The Minister has already dealt with the detail of new clause 18A, and I encourage Members to oppose clause 18 and to support amendment No 56.

As I said at the start of the debate, I am very grateful for all the cooperation from the Department of Justice on the amendments to my Bill. Many of the amendments arose from its consultation. As a result of the new clauses that we have added to the Bill, it now has a larger criminal justice element than when it was first drafted. To reflect that, I fully support amendment No 57 to change the title of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Further Provisions and Support for Victims) Act.

The issue of how best to commence the provisions of my Bill has been the subject of some debate in recent months. At the current time, I am minded to support both the Minister's amendment No 58 and the Justice Committee's amendment No 59 for all clauses of my Bill to commence six months after Royal Assent is granted unless they have already commenced by order from the relevant Departments. I am of the view that six months should be long enough for the Departments of Health, Finance and Justice to prepare to commence all the clauses of my Bill. I believe that it is important that the relevant Departments be given time to prepare to bring forward the relevant provisions and that there should be a cut-off date as put forward by the Justice Committee.

Mr Ford: It will not take long to respond to the points that were made. I will respond to one point that was made by the Committee Chair, when he referred to issues in a previous piece of legislation that were not commenced by the Department. If he is referring to certain aspects of the first Bill that was passed by the House following devolution relating to young people and firearms, those are issues that are still under consultation with those involved in shooting interests to ensure that we get the best possible legislation. The reality is that, at the moment, the Department of Justice is busy commencing various bits of legislation that have been lying around for a considerable period of years.

On the precise timing, it is my understanding that it is not just an issue for the DOJ or any unwillingness; I am well aware of what the will of the House is. There are real practical issues, especially as one of the amendments passed in the previous group imposes specific requirements on DHSSPS, which went beyond what that Department was expecting. I suspect that it may have more difficulty with commencement times than my Department will. That is why I believe that it is appropriate that we do not push that point today but engage in discussions in the usual constructive way in which we have dealt with matters so far. We shall look to that. Other than that, the amendments in this group are entirely technical, and I commend them to the House.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: The Minister and Lord Morrow's opposition to clause 17 has been debated.

Question, That the clause stand part of the Bill, put and negatived.

Clause 17 disagreed to.

New Clause

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: Amendment No 54 has already been debated.

Amendment No 54 made:

After clause 17 insert

"Interpretation of this Act
 
17A.—(1) In this Act—
 
"child" means a person under the age of 18;
 
"country" includes territory or other part of the world;
 
"the Department" means the Department of Justice;
 
"the Human Rights Convention" means the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms agreed by the Council of Europe at Rome on 4th November 1950;
 
"public authority" means any public authority within the meaning of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (other than a court or tribunal) which exercises functions wholly or mainly in Northern Ireland;
 
"UK national" means—
 
(a) a British citizen;
 
(b) a person who is a British subject by virtue of Part 4 of the British Nationality Act 1981 and who has a right of abode in the United Kingdom; or
 
(c) a person who is a British overseas territories citizen by virtue of a connection with Gibraltar;
 
"vulnerable adult" means a person aged 18 or over whose ability to protect himself or herself from violence, abuse or exploitation is significantly impaired through physical or mental disability or illness, old age, addiction to alcohol or drugs or for any other reason.
 
(2) For the purposes of this Act—
 
(a) a person is in a position of trust in relation to another person in the circumstances mentioned in Article 28 of the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008;
 
(b) a person is a member of another person’s family if the relation of that person to the other person is within Article 34 of that Order.
 
(3) For the purposes of the exercise of any function under this Act relating to a child, if—
 
(a) the age of a person ("P") is uncertain; and
 
(b) the person exercising the function has reason to believe that P is a child,
 
P is to be treated as a child.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause

Amendment No 55 made:

After clause 17 insert

"Amendments, repeals and consequential provision
 
17B.—(1) The statutory provisions set out in Schedule 4 have effect subject to the amendments in that Schedule.
 
(2) The statutory provisions set out in Schedule 5 are repealed to the extent specified in the second column of that Schedule.
 
(3) The repeal of a provision by this Act does not affect the operation of that provision in relation to an offence committed before the coming into operation of that repeal.
 
(4) The Department may by order make whatever provision the Department thinks appropriate in consequence of this Act.
 
(5) The provision which may be made by order under subsection (4) includes provision amending, repealing or revoking any statutory provision.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: Opposition to clause 18 has already been debated.

Clause 18 disagreed to.

New Clause

Amendment No 56 made:

After clause 18 insert

"Orders and regulations
 
18A.—(1) Subject to subsections (2) to (5), orders made by the Department under this Act and regulations under this Act are subject to negative resolution.
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to an order under section 19 (commencement).
 
(3) Orders to which subsection (4) applies shall not be made unless a draft of the order has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, the Assembly.
 
(4) This subsection applies to—
 
(a) an order under section 12B(10)(power to amend list of offences excluded from defence in section 12B);
 
(b) an order under section 17B(4) (consequential provision) which amends or repeals any provision of an Act or of Northern Ireland legislation;
 
(c) an order under paragraph 1(5) of Schedule 3 (power to amend definition of "slavery or human trafficking offence");
 
(d) an order under paragraph 2(7) of Schedule 3 (provision as to additional applicants for slavery and trafficking prevention orders);
 
(e) an order under paragraph 17 of Schedule 3 (cross-border enforcement of certain court orders).
 
(5) Regulations under section 5F (duty to notify National Crime Agency) or 12A(8) (additional functions for child trafficking guardians) shall not be made unless a draft of the order has been laid before and approved by resolution of the Assembly.
 
(6) Regulations under this Act and orders made by the Department under this Act may include saving, transitional, transitory, supplementary or consequential provision.".

New clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19 (Short title and commencement)

Amendment No 57 made:

In clause 19, page 10, leave out line 11 and insert

"(Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014.".

Amendment No 58 not moved.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: I will not call amendment No 59 as it is an amendment to amendment No 58.

Clause 19, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Schedule

Amendment No 60 made:

After clause 19 insert

‘SCHEDULES
 
SCHEDULE 1
 
DETENTION AND FORFEITURE OF CERTAIN VEHICLES, SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT
 
FORFEITURE ON CONVICTION OF OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 1A OR 1B
 
1.—(1) This paragraph applies if a person is convicted of an offence under section 1A or 1B.
 
(2) The court may order the forfeiture of a land vehicle used or intended to be used in connection with the offence if the convicted person—
 
(a) owned the vehicle at the time the offence was committed,
 
(b) was at that time a director, secretary or manager of a company which owned the vehicle,
 
(c) was at that time in possession of the vehicle under a hire-purchase agreement,
 
(d) was at that time a director, secretary or manager of a company which was in possession of the vehicle under a hire-purchase agreement, or
 
(e) was driving the vehicle in the course of the commission of the offence.
 
(3) The court may order the forfeiture of a ship or aircraft used or intended to be used in connection with the offence if the convicted person—
 
(a) owned the ship or aircraft at the time the offence was committed,
 
(b) was at that time a director, secretary or manager of a company which owned the ship or aircraft,
 
(c) was at that time in possession of the ship or aircraft under a hire purchase agreement,
 
(d) was at that time a director, secretary or manager of a company which was in possession of the ship or aircraft under a hire-purchase agreement,
 
(e) was at that time a charterer of the ship or aircraft, or
 
(f) committed the offence while acting as captain of the ship or aircraft.
 
(4) But where sub-paragraph (3)(a) or (b) does not apply to the convicted person, forfeiture of a ship or aircraft may be ordered only if sub-paragraph (5) applies or—
 
(a) in the case of a ship (other than a hovercraft), its gross tonnage is less than 500 tons;
 
(b) in the case of an aircraft, the maximum weight at which it may take off in accordance with its certificate of airworthiness is less than 5,700 kilogrammes.
 
(5) This sub-paragraph applies where a person who, at the time the offence was committed—
 
(a) owned the ship or aircraft, or
 
(b) was a director, secretary or manager of a company which owned it,
 
knew or ought to have known of the intention to use it in the course of the commission of an offence under section 1A or 1B.
 
(6) Where a person who claims to have an interest in a land vehicle, ship or aircraft applies to a court to make representations about its forfeiture, the court may not order its forfeiture without giving the person an opportunity to make representations.
 
DETENTION OF CERTAIN VEHICLES, SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT
 
2.—(1) If a person ("P") has been arrested for an offence under section 1A or 1B, a constable may detain a relevant land vehicle, ship or aircraft.
 
(2) A land vehicle, ship or aircraft is relevant if the constable has reasonable grounds to believe that an order for its forfeiture could be made under paragraph 1 if P were convicted of the offence.
 
(3) The land vehicle, ship or aircraft may be detained—
 
(a) until a decision is taken as to whether or not to charge P with the offence,
 
(b) if P has been charged, until P is acquitted, the charge against P is dismissed or the proceedings are discontinued, or
 
(c) if P has been charged and convicted, until the court decides whether or not to order forfeiture of the vehicle, ship or aircraft.
 
(4) A person (other than P) may apply to the court for the release of the land vehicle, ship or aircraft on the grounds that the person—
 
(a) owns the vehicle, ship or aircraft,
 
(b) was, immediately before the detention of the vehicle, ship or aircraft, in possession of it under a hire-purchase agreement, or
 
(c) is a charterer of the ship or aircraft.
 
(5) The court to which an application is made under sub-paragraph (4) may, if satisfactory security or surety is tendered, release the land vehicle, ship or aircraft on condition that it is made available to the court if—
 
(a) P is convicted, and
 
(b) an order for its forfeiture is made under paragraph 1.
 
(6) In this paragraph "the court" means—
 
(a) if P has not been charged, or P has been charged but proceedings for the offence have not begun to be heard, a magistrates’ court;
 
(b) if P has been charged and proceedings for the offence have begun to be heard, the court hearing the proceedings.
 
INTERPRETATION
 
3.—(1) In this Schedule—
 
"captain" means master (of a ship) or commander (of an aircraft);
 
"land vehicle" means any vehicle other than a ship or aircraft;
 
"ship" includes every description of vessel (including a hovercraft) used in navigation.
 
(2) In this Schedule a reference to being an owner of a vehicle, ship or aircraft includes a reference to being any of a number of persons who jointly own it.".

Schedule 1 agreed to.

New Schedule

Amendment No 61 made:

After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 2
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDERS
 
POWER TO MAKE SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDER
 
1.—(1) The Crown Court may make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against a person if—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D, and
 
(b) the Crown Court makes a confiscation order against the person in respect of the offence.
 
(2) The Crown Court may also make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against a person if—
 
(a) by virtue of section 178 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (defendants who abscond during proceedings) it has made a confiscation order against a person in respect of an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D, and
 
(b) the person is later convicted of the offence.
 
(3) The court may make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against the person in addition to dealing with the person in any other way (subject to paragraph 3(1)).
 
(4) In a case within sub-paragraph (1) the court may make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against the person even if the person has been sentenced for the offence before the confiscation order is made.
 
(5) In determining whether to make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against the person the court must have regard to the person’s means.
 
(6) If the court considers that—
 
(a) it would be appropriate both to impose a fine and to make a slavery and trafficking reparation order, but
 
(b) the person has insufficient means to pay both an appropriate fine and appropriate compensation under such an order,
 
the court must give preference to compensation (although it may impose a fine as well).
 
(7) In any case in which the court has power to make a slavery and trafficking reparation order it must—
 
(a) consider whether to make such an order (whether or not an application for such an order is made), and
 
(b) if it does not make an order, give reasons.
 
(8) In this paragraph—
 
(a) "confiscation order" means a confiscation order under section 156 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;
 
(b) a confiscation order is made in respect of an offence if the offence is the offence (or one of the offences) concerned for the purposes of Part 4 of that Act.
 
EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDER
 
2.—(1) A slavery and trafficking reparation order is an order requiring the person against whom it is made to pay compensation to the victim of a relevant offence for any harm resulting from that offence.
 
(2) "Relevant offence" means—
 
(a) the offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D of which the person is convicted;
 
(b) any other offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D which is taken into consideration in determining the person’s sentence.
 
(3) The amount of the compensation is to be such amount as the court considers appropriate having regard to any evidence and to any representations made by or on behalf of the person or the prosecutor, but subject to sub-paragraph (4).
 
(4) The amount of the compensation payable under the slavery and trafficking reparation order (or if more than one order is made in the same proceedings, the total amount of the compensation payable under those orders) must not exceed the amount the person is required to pay under the confiscation order.
 
(5) In determining the amount to be paid by the person under a slavery and trafficking reparation order the court must have regard to the person’s means.
 
(6) A slavery and trafficking reparation order is enforceable in the same manner as any fine which has been, or might have been, imposed in respect of the offence for which the person has been convicted by the court making the order.
 
(7) In sub-paragraph (4) "the confiscation order" means the confiscation order within paragraph 1(1)(b) or (2)(a) (as the case may be).
 
SUPPLEMENTARY
 
3.—(1) A slavery and trafficking reparation order and a compensation order under Article 14 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1994 may not both be made in respect of the same offence.
 
(2) Where the court makes a slavery and trafficking reparation order as mentioned in paragraph 1(4), for the purposes of the following provisions the person’s sentence is to be regarded as imposed or made on the day on which the order is made—
 
(a) section 16(1) of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 (time limit for notice of appeal or application for leave to appeal);
 
(b) paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (time limit for notice of application for leave to refer a case under section 36 of that Act).
 
(3) Articles 15 to 17 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1994 (appeals, review etc. of compensation orders) apply to slavery and trafficking reparation orders as if—
 
(a) references to a compensation order were references to a slavery and trafficking reparation order;
 
(b) references to injury, loss or damage were references to harm;
 
(c) in Article 16(a) (as amended by Schedule 4) for sub-paragraph (ii) there were substituted—
 
"(ii) a compensation order under Article 14 of this Order; or";
 
(d) in Article 17 the references to service compensation orders or awards were omitted.
 
(4) If under section 171 or 172 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 the court varies a confiscation order so as to increase the amount required to be paid under that order, it may also vary any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order so as to increase the amount required to be paid under the slavery and trafficking reparation order.
 
(5) If under section 173 or 179 of that Act the court varies a confiscation order so as to reduce the amount required to be paid under that order, it may also—
 
(a) vary any relevant slavery and trafficking reparation order so as to reduce the amount which remains to be paid under that order;
 
(b) discharge any relevant slavery and trafficking reparation order.
 
(6) If under section 174 of that Act the court discharges a confiscation order, it may also discharge any relevant slavery and trafficking reparation order.
 
(7) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (5) and (6) a slavery and trafficking reparation order is relevant if it is made by virtue of the confiscation order and some or all of the amount required to be paid under it has not been paid.
 
(8) If on an appeal under section 181 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 the Court of Appeal—
 
(a) quashes a confiscation order, it must also quash any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order;
 
(b) varies a confiscation order, it may also vary any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order;
 
(c) makes a confiscation order, it may make any slavery and trafficking reparation order the Crown Court could have made if it had made the confiscation order.
 
(9) If on an appeal under section 183 of that Act the Supreme Court—
 
(a) quashes a confiscation order, it must also quash any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order;
 
(b) varies a confiscation order, it may also vary any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order.
 
(10) For the purposes of this paragraph—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking reparation order made under paragraph 1(1) is made by virtue of the confiscation order within paragraph 1(1)(b);
 
(b) a slavery and trafficking reparation order made under paragraph 1(2) is made by virtue of the confiscation order within paragraph 1(2)(a).".

New Schedule

Amendment No 61 made:

After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 2
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDERS
 
POWER TO MAKE SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDER
 
1.—(1) The Crown Court may make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against a person if—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D, and
 
(b) the Crown Court makes a confiscation order against the person in respect of the offence.
 
(2) The Crown Court may also make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against a person if—
 
(a) by virtue of section 178 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (defendants who abscond during proceedings) it has made a confiscation order against a person in respect of an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D, and
 
(b) the person is later convicted of the offence.
 
(3) The court may make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against the person in addition to dealing with the person in any other way (subject to paragraph 3(1)).
 
(4) In a case within sub-paragraph (1) the court may make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against the person even if the person has been sentenced for the offence before the confiscation order is made.
 
(5) In determining whether to make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against the person the court must have regard to the person’s means.
 
(6) If the court considers that—
 
(a) it would be appropriate both to impose a fine and to make a slavery and trafficking reparation order, but
 
(b) the person has insufficient means to pay both an appropriate fine and appropriate compensation under such an order,
 
the court must give preference to compensation (although it may impose a fine as well).
 
(7) In any case in which the court has power to make a slavery and trafficking reparation order it must—
 
(a) consider whether to make such an order (whether or not an application for such an order is made), and
 
(b) if it does not make an order, give reasons.
 
(8) In this paragraph—
 
(a) "confiscation order" means a confiscation order under section 156 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;
 
(b) a confiscation order is made in respect of an offence if the offence is the offence (or one of the offences) concerned for the purposes of Part 4 of that Act.
 
EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDER
 
2.—(1) A slavery and trafficking reparation order is an order requiring the person against whom it is made to pay compensation to the victim of a relevant offence for any harm resulting from that offence.
 
(2) "Relevant offence" means—
 
(a) the offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D of which the person is convicted;
 
(b) any other offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D which is taken into consideration in determining the person’s sentence.
 
(3) The amount of the compensation is to be such amount as the court considers appropriate having regard to any evidence and to any representations made by or on behalf of the person or the prosecutor, but subject to sub-paragraph (4).
 
(4) The amount of the compensation payable under the slavery and trafficking reparation order (or if more than one order is made in the same proceedings, the total amount of the compensation payable under those orders) must not exceed the amount the person is required to pay under the confiscation order.
 
(5) In determining the amount to be paid by the person under a slavery and trafficking reparation order the court must have regard to the person’s means.
 
(6) A slavery and trafficking reparation order is enforceable in the same manner as any fine which has been, or might have been, imposed in respect of the offence for which the person has been convicted by the court making the order.
 
(7) In sub-paragraph (4) "the confiscation order" means the confiscation order within paragraph 1(1)(b) or (2)(a) (as the case may be).
 
SUPPLEMENTARY
 
3.—(1) A slavery and trafficking reparation order and a compensation order under Article 14 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1994 may not both be made in respect of the same offence.
 
(2) Where the court makes a slavery and trafficking reparation order as mentioned in paragraph 1(4), for the purposes of the following provisions the person’s sentence is to be regarded as imposed or made on the day on which the order is made—
 
(a) section 16(1) of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 (time limit for notice of appeal or application for leave to appeal);
 
(b) paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (time limit for notice of application for leave to refer a case under section 36 of that Act).
 
(3) Articles 15 to 17 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1994 (appeals, review etc. of compensation orders) apply to slavery and trafficking reparation orders as if—
 
(a) references to a compensation order were references to a slavery and trafficking reparation order;
 
(b) references to injury, loss or damage were references to harm;
 
(c) in Article 16(a) (as amended by Schedule 4) for sub-paragraph (ii) there were substituted—
 
"(ii) a compensation order under Article 14 of this Order; or";
 
(d) in Article 17 the references to service compensation orders or awards were omitted.
 
(4) If under section 171 or 172 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 the court varies a confiscation order so as to increase the amount required to be paid under that order, it may also vary any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order so as to increase the amount required to be paid under the slavery and trafficking reparation order.
 
(5) If under section 173 or 179 of that Act the court varies a confiscation order so as to reduce the amount required to be paid under that order, it may also—
 
(a) vary any relevant slavery and trafficking reparation order so as to reduce the amount which remains to be paid under that order;
 
(b) discharge any relevant slavery and trafficking reparation order.
 
(6) If under section 174 of that Act the court discharges a confiscation order, it may also discharge any relevant slavery and trafficking reparation order.
 
(7) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (5) and (6) a slavery and trafficking reparation order is relevant if it is made by virtue of the confiscation order and some or all of the amount required to be paid under it has not been paid.
 
(8) If on an appeal under section 181 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 the Court of Appeal—
 
(a) quashes a confiscation order, it must also quash any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order;
 
(b) varies a confiscation order, it may also vary any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order;
 
(c) makes a confiscation order, it may make any slavery and trafficking reparation order the Crown Court could have made if it had made the confiscation order.
 
(9) If on an appeal under section 183 of that Act the Supreme Court—
 
(a) quashes a confiscation order, it must also quash any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order;
 
(b) varies a confiscation order, it may also vary any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order.
 
(10) For the purposes of this paragraph—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking reparation order made under paragraph 1(1) is made by virtue of the confiscation order within paragraph 1(1)(b);
 
(b) a slavery and trafficking reparation order made under paragraph 1(2) is made by virtue of the confiscation order within paragraph 1(2)(a).".

New Schedule

Amendment No 61 made:

After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 2
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDERS
 
POWER TO MAKE SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDER
 
1.—(1) The Crown Court may make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against a person if—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D, and
 
(b) the Crown Court makes a confiscation order against the person in respect of the offence.
 
(2) The Crown Court may also make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against a person if—
 
(a) by virtue of section 178 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (defendants who abscond during proceedings) it has made a confiscation order against a person in respect of an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D, and
 
(b) the person is later convicted of the offence.
 
(3) The court may make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against the person in addition to dealing with the person in any other way (subject to paragraph 3(1)).
 
(4) In a case within sub-paragraph (1) the court may make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against the person even if the person has been sentenced for the offence before the confiscation order is made.
 
(5) In determining whether to make a slavery and trafficking reparation order against the person the court must have regard to the person’s means.
 
(6) If the court considers that—
 
(a) it would be appropriate both to impose a fine and to make a slavery and trafficking reparation order, but
 
(b) the person has insufficient means to pay both an appropriate fine and appropriate compensation under such an order,
 
the court must give preference to compensation (although it may impose a fine as well).
 
(7) In any case in which the court has power to make a slavery and trafficking reparation order it must—
 
(a) consider whether to make such an order (whether or not an application for such an order is made), and
 
(b) if it does not make an order, give reasons.
 
(8) In this paragraph—
 
(a) "confiscation order" means a confiscation order under section 156 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;
 
(b) a confiscation order is made in respect of an offence if the offence is the offence (or one of the offences) concerned for the purposes of Part 4 of that Act.
 
EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDER
 
2.—(1) A slavery and trafficking reparation order is an order requiring the person against whom it is made to pay compensation to the victim of a relevant offence for any harm resulting from that offence.
 
(2) "Relevant offence" means—
 
(a) the offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D of which the person is convicted;
 
(b) any other offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D which is taken into consideration in determining the person’s sentence.
 
(3) The amount of the compensation is to be such amount as the court considers appropriate having regard to any evidence and to any representations made by or on behalf of the person or the prosecutor, but subject to sub-paragraph (4).
 
(4) The amount of the compensation payable under the slavery and trafficking reparation order (or if more than one order is made in the same proceedings, the total amount of the compensation payable under those orders) must not exceed the amount the person is required to pay under the confiscation order.
 
(5) In determining the amount to be paid by the person under a slavery and trafficking reparation order the court must have regard to the person’s means.
 
(6) A slavery and trafficking reparation order is enforceable in the same manner as any fine which has been, or might have been, imposed in respect of the offence for which the person has been convicted by the court making the order.
 
(7) In sub-paragraph (4) "the confiscation order" means the confiscation order within paragraph 1(1)(b) or (2)(a) (as the case may be).
 
SUPPLEMENTARY
 
3.—(1) A slavery and trafficking reparation order and a compensation order under Article 14 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1994 may not both be made in respect of the same offence.
 
(2) Where the court makes a slavery and trafficking reparation order as mentioned in paragraph 1(4), for the purposes of the following provisions the person’s sentence is to be regarded as imposed or made on the day on which the order is made—
 
(a) section 16(1) of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 (time limit for notice of appeal or application for leave to appeal);
 
(b) paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (time limit for notice of application for leave to refer a case under section 36 of that Act).
 
(3) Articles 15 to 17 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1994 (appeals, review etc. of compensation orders) apply to slavery and trafficking reparation orders as if—
 
(a) references to a compensation order were references to a slavery and trafficking reparation order;
 
(b) references to injury, loss or damage were references to harm;
 
(c) in Article 16(a) (as amended by Schedule 4) for sub-paragraph (ii) there were substituted—
 
"(ii) a compensation order under Article 14 of this Order; or";
 
(d) in Article 17 the references to service compensation orders or awards were omitted.
 
(4) If under section 171 or 172 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 the court varies a confiscation order so as to increase the amount required to be paid under that order, it may also vary any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order so as to increase the amount required to be paid under the slavery and trafficking reparation order.
 
(5) If under section 173 or 179 of that Act the court varies a confiscation order so as to reduce the amount required to be paid under that order, it may also—
 
(a) vary any relevant slavery and trafficking reparation order so as to reduce the amount which remains to be paid under that order;
 
(b) discharge any relevant slavery and trafficking reparation order.
 
(6) If under section 174 of that Act the court discharges a confiscation order, it may also discharge any relevant slavery and trafficking reparation order.
 
(7) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (5) and (6) a slavery and trafficking reparation order is relevant if it is made by virtue of the confiscation order and some or all of the amount required to be paid under it has not been paid.
 
(8) If on an appeal under section 181 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 the Court of Appeal—
 
(a) quashes a confiscation order, it must also quash any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order;
 
(b) varies a confiscation order, it may also vary any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order;
 
(c) makes a confiscation order, it may make any slavery and trafficking reparation order the Crown Court could have made if it had made the confiscation order.
 
(9) If on an appeal under section 183 of that Act the Supreme Court—
 
(a) quashes a confiscation order, it must also quash any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order;
 
(b) varies a confiscation order, it may also vary any slavery and trafficking reparation order made by virtue of the confiscation order.
 
(10) For the purposes of this paragraph—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking reparation order made under paragraph 1(1) is made by virtue of the confiscation order within paragraph 1(1)(b);
 
(b) a slavery and trafficking reparation order made under paragraph 1(2) is made by virtue of the confiscation order within paragraph 1(2)(a).".

Schedule 2 agreed to.

New Schedule

Amendment No 62 made:

After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 3
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
PART 1
 
MAKING AND EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON DEALING WITH DEFENDANT
 
1.—(1) A court may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") where it deals with the defendant in respect of—
 
(a) a conviction for a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a finding that the defendant is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity, or
 
(c) a finding that the defendant is unfit to plead and has done the act charged against the defendant in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), convictions and findings include those taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(4) In this Schedule a "slavery or human trafficking offence" means any of the following offences—
 
(a) an offence under section 145 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(b) an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (trafficking for sexual exploitation);
 
(c) an offence under section 62 of that Act (committing offence with intent to commit relevant sexual offence), where the relevant sexual offence the person in question intended to commit was an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of that Act;
 
(d) an offence under section 22 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(e) an offence under section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (trafficking for exploitation);
 
(f) an offence under section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(g) an offence under section 47 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(h) an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D of this Act;
 
(i) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence listed above;
 
(j) an offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of an offence so listed;
 
(k) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting) where the offence (or one of the offences) which the person in question intends or believes would be committed is an offence so listed.
 
(5) The Department may by order amend sub-paragraph (4).
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON APPLICATION
 
2.—(1) A court of summary jurisdiction may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") on an application by the Chief Constable.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) the defendant is a relevant offender (see paragraph 3), and
 
(b) since the defendant first became a relevant offender, the defendant has acted in a way which means that the condition in sub-paragraph (3) is met.
 
(3) The condition is that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(4) The Chief Constable may make an application under this paragraph only in respect of a person—
 
(a) who lives in Northern Ireland, or
 
(b) who the Chief Constable believes is in, or is intending to come to, Northern Ireland.
 
(5) An application under this paragraph is to be made by complaint.
 
(6) The acts of the defendant which may be relied on for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b) include acts taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(7) The Department may by order provide that an application under this paragraph may be made by a person or body specified in the order (as well as by the Chief Constable); and such an order may make such consequential amendments to this Schedule as the Department thinks necessary or expedient.
 
MEANING OF "RELEVANT OFFENDER"
 
3.—(1) A person is a "relevant offender" for the purposes of paragraph 2 if sub- paragraph (2) or (3) applies to the person.
 
(2) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a court has made a finding that the person is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if, under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of an equivalent offence (whether or not the person has been punished for it),
 
(b) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of an equivalent offence.
 
(4) An "equivalent offence" means an act which—
 
(a) constituted an offence under the law of the country concerned, and
 
(b) would have constituted a slavery or human trafficking offence under the law of Northern Ireland if it had been done in Northern Ireland, or by a UK national, or as regards the United Kingdom.
 
(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) an act punishable under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom constitutes an offence under that law, however it is described in that law.
 
(6) On an application under paragraph 2 where sub-paragraph (3) is alleged to apply to the defendant, the condition in sub-paragraph (4)(b) is to be taken as met unless—
 
(a) not later than provided by magistrates’ court rules, the defendant serves on the Chief Constable a notice which states that in the defendant’s opinion the condition is not met, shows the grounds for that opinion, and requires the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met, or
 
(b) the court permits the defendant to require the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met without service of such a notice.
 
(7) References in this paragraph to convictions, findings and cautions include those taking place before this paragraph comes into operation.
 
EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
4.—(1) A slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(2) The only prohibitions or requirements that may be included in the order are those which the court is satisfied are necessary for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) Subject to paragraph 5(1), a prohibition or requirement contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order has effect—
 
(a) for a fixed period, specified in the order, of at least 5 years, or
 
(b) until further order.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may specify that some of its prohibitions or requirements have effect until further order and some for a fixed period;
 
(b) may specify different periods for different prohibitions or requirements.
 
(5) If a court makes a slavery and trafficking prevention order in relation to a person who is already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.
 
PROHIBITIONS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL
 
5.—(1) A prohibition on foreign travel contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order must be for a fixed period of not more than 5 years.
 
(2) A "prohibition on foreign travel" means—
 
(a) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom named or described in the order,
 
(b) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom other than a country named or described in the order, or
 
(c) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) Sub-paragraph (1) does not prevent a prohibition on foreign travel from being extended for a further period (of no more than 5 years each time) under paragraph 6.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order that contains a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c) must require the defendant to surrender all of the defendant’s passports at a police station specified in the order—
 
(a) on or before the date when the prohibition takes effect, or
 
(b) within a period specified in the order.
 
(5) Any passports surrendered must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the person ceases to be subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order containing a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c).
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply in relation to—
 
(a) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom if the passport has been returned to those authorities;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of an international organisation if the passport has been returned to that organisation.
 
VARIATION, RENEWAL AND DISCHARGE
 
6.—(1) A person within sub-paragraph (2) may apply to the appropriate court for an order varying, renewing or discharging a slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(2) The persons are—
 
(a) the defendant;
 
(b) the Chief Constable.
 
(3) On the application the court, after hearing—
 
(a) the person making the application, and
 
(b) the other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) (if that person wishes to be heard),
 
may make any order varying, renewing or discharging the slavery and trafficking prevention order that the court considers appropriate.
 
(4) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions or requirements on the defendant, only if the court is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to renew or vary the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(5) Any renewed or varied order may contain only those prohibitions or requirements which the court is satisfied are necessary for that purpose.
 
(6) The court must not discharge an order before the end of 5 years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and the Chief Constable.
 
(7) Sub-paragraph (6) does not apply to an order containing a prohibition on foreign travel and no other prohibitions.
 
(8) In this paragraph "the appropriate court" means—
 
(a) where the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal made the slavery and trafficking prevention order, the Crown Court;
 
(b) in any other case, a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
(9) An application under sub-paragraph (1) may be made—
 
(a) where the appropriate court is the Crown Court, in accordance with Crown Court rules;
 
(b) in any other case, by complaint.
 
INTERIM SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
7.—(1) This paragraph applies where an application under paragraph 2 ("the main application") has not been determined.
 
(2) An application for an "interim slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or
 
(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.
 
(3) The court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(4) An interim slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(5) The order—
 
(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;
 
(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.
 
(6) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.
 
APPEALS
 
8.—(1) A defendant may appeal against the making of a slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(a), as if the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence;
 
(b) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(b) or (c), as if the defendant had been convicted of the offence and the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for that offence;
 
(c) where the order was made on an application under paragraph 2, to the county court.
 
(2) A defendant may appeal to the county court against the making of an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(3) A defendant may appeal against the making of an order under paragraph 6, or the refusal to make such an order—
 
(a) where the application for such an order was made to the Crown Court, to the Court of Appeal;
 
(b) in any other case, to the county court.
 
(4) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c), (2) or (3)(b), the county court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.
 
(5) Any order made by the county court on an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c) or (2) is for the purposes of paragraph 6(8) or 7(6) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought.
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply to an order directing that an application be reheard by a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
PART 2
 
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
OFFENDER SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
9.—(1) References in the following provisions of this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are references to an offender who is for the time being subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order which is in effect under this Schedule.
 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) has effect subject to paragraph 12(7) (which excludes from paragraph 12 an offender subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order).
 
INITIAL NOTIFICATION
 
10.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must notify the required information to the police within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which the slavery and trafficking prevention order or the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order comes into force in relation to the offender ("the relevant date").
 
(2) The "required information" is the following information about the offender—
 
(a) date of birth;
 
(b) national insurance number;
 
(c) name on the relevant date or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(d) home address on the relevant date;
 
(e) name on the date on which the notification is given or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(f) home address on the date on which the notification is given;
 
(g) the address of any other premises in the United Kingdom at which on that date the offender regularly resides or stays;
 
(h) any information prescribed by regulations made by the Department.
 
(3) When determining the period of 3 days mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), there is to be disregarded any time when the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(4) In this Part "home address" means in relation to the offender—
 
(a) the address of the offender’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or
 
(b) if the offender has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the offender can regularly be found or, if there is more than one such place, such one of them as the offender selects.
 
NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES
 
11.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which any notifiable event occurs, notify to the police—
 
(a) the required new information, and
 
(b) the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2).
 
(2) A "notifiable event" means—
 
(a) the use by the offender of a name which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(b) any change of the offender’s home address;
 
(c) the expiry of any qualifying period during which the offender has resided or stayed at any premises in the United Kingdom the address of which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(d) any prescribed change of circumstances; or
 
(e) the release of the offender from custody pursuant to an order of a court or from a custodial sentence or detention in a hospital.
 
(3) The "required new information" is—
 
(a) the name referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(a),
 
(b) the new home address (see sub-paragraph (2)(b)),
 
(c) the address of the premises referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(c),
 
(d) the prescribed details, or
 
(e) the fact that the offender has been released as mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(e),
 
as the case may be.
 
(4) A notification under sub-paragraph (1) may be given before the notifiable event occurs, but in that case the offender must also specify the date when the event is expected to occur.
 
(5) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates occurs more than 2 days before the date specified, the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1).
 
(6) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates has not occurred by the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified—
 
(a) the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1), and
 
(b) the offender must, within the period of 6 days beginning with the date specified, notify to the police the fact that the event did not occur within the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified.
 
(7) Paragraph 10(3) applies to the determination of—
 
(a) any period of 3 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), or
 
(b) any period of 6 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (6),
 
as it applies to the determination of the period of 3 days mentioned in paragraph 10(1).
 
(8) In this paragraph—
 
(a) "prescribed change of circumstances" means any change—
 
(i) occurring in relation to any matter in respect of which information is required to be notified by virtue of paragraph 10(2)(h), and
 
(ii) of a description prescribed by regulations made by the Department;
 
(b) "the prescribed details", in relation to a prescribed change of circumstances, means such details of the change as may be so prescribed.
 
(9) In this paragraph "qualifying period" means—
 
(a) a period of 7 days, or
 
(b) two or more periods, in any period of 12 months, which taken together amount to 7 days.
 
PERIODIC NOTIFICATION
 
12.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the applicable period after each notification date, notify to the police the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2), unless the offender has already given a notification under paragraph 11(1) within that period.
 
(2) A "notification date" means, in relation to the offender, the date of any notification given by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) Where the applicable period would (apart from this paragraph) end while sub-paragraph (4) applies, that period is to be treated as continuing until the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which sub-paragraph (4) first ceases to apply.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court,
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence,
 
(c) detained in a hospital, or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) In this paragraph "the applicable period" means—
 
(a) in any case where sub-paragraph (6) applies, such period as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Department, and
 
(b) in any other case, the period of one year.
 
(6) This sub-paragraph applies if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1) was the address or location of such a place as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(b).
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph applies to an offender who is subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
ABSENCE FROM NOTIFIED RESIDENCE
 
13.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements at any time if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1) was an address in Northern Ireland such as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(a) (sole or main residence).
 
(2) If the offender intends to be absent from that home address for a period of more than 3 days ("the relevant period"), the offender must, not less than 12 hours before leaving that home address, notify to the police the information set out in sub-paragraph (3).
 
(3) The information is—
 
(a) the date on which the offender will leave that home address;
 
(b) such details as the offender holds about—
 
(i) the offender’s travel arrangements during the relevant period;
 
(ii) the offender’s accommodation arrangements during that period;
 
(iii) the offender’s date of return to that address.
 
(4) In this paragraph—
 
"travel arrangements" include, in particular, the means of transport to be used and the dates of travel,
 
"accommodation arrangements" include, in particular, the address of any accommodation at which the relevant offender will spend the night during the relevant period and the nature of that accommodation.
 
(5) Where—
 
(a) an offender has given a notification under sub-paragraph (2), and
 
(b) at any time before that mentioned in that sub-paragraph, the information notified becomes inaccurate or incomplete,
 
the offender must give a further notification under sub-paragraph (2).
 
(6) Where an offender—
 
(a) has notified a date of return to the offender’s home address, but
 
(b) returns to that home address on a date other than that notified,
 
the offender must notify the date of the offender’s actual return to the police within 3 days of the actual return.
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph requires an offender to notify any information which falls to be notified in accordance with a requirement imposed by regulations under paragraph 14.
 
(8) In calculating the relevant period for the purposes of this paragraph there is to be disregarded—
 
(a) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, an address of the kind mentioned in paragraph 10(2)(g) notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1);
 
(b) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, any premises, if his stay at those premises would give rise to a requirement to notify the address of those premises under paragraph 11(2)(c).
 
TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM
 
14.—(1) The Department may by regulations make provision with respect to offenders subject to notification requirements, or any description of such offenders—
 
(a) requiring such persons, before they leave the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (2);
 
(b) requiring such persons, if they subsequently return to the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (3).
 
(2) A notification under this paragraph must disclose—
 
(a) the date on which the offender proposes to leave the United Kingdom;
 
(b) the country (or, if there is more than one, the first country) to which the offender proposes to travel and the proposed point of arrival (determined in accordance with the regulations) in that country;
 
(c) any other information prescribed by the regulations which the offender holds about the offender’s departure from or return to the United Kingdom, or about the offender’s movements while outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) A notification under this sub-paragraph must disclose any information prescribed by the regulations about the offender’s return to the United Kingdom.
 
METHOD OF NOTIFICATION AND RELATED MATTERS
 
15.—(1) An offender gives a notification to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6) by—
 
(a) attending at any police station in Northern Ireland prescribed by regulations under section 87(1)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and
 
(b) giving an oral notification to any police officer, or to any person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station.
 
(2) Any notification given in accordance with this paragraph must be acknowledged; and the acknowledgement must be—
 
(a) in writing, and
 
(b) in such form as the Department may direct.
 
(3) Where a notification is given under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), the offender must, if requested to do so by the police officer or other person mentioned in paragraph (1)(b), allow that officer or person to—
 
(a) take the offender’s fingerprints,
 
(b) photograph any part of the offender, or
 
(c) do both of those things,
 
in order to verify the offender's identity.
 
(4) Fingerprints taken from a person under this paragraph (and any copies of those fingerprints) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(5) Photographs taken of any part of the offender under this paragraph (and any copies of such photographs) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(6) In this paragraph "photograph" includes any process by means of which an image may be produced.
 
PART 3
 
SUPPLEMENTARY
 
OFFENCES
 
16.—(1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with any prohibition or requirement contained in—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order, or
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
commits an offence.
 
(2) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or (6)(b), 12(1), 13(2) or (6) or 15(3), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
commits an offence.
 
(3) A person who notifies to the police, in purported compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
any information which the person knows to be false, commits an offence.
 
(4) As regards an offence under sub-paragraph (2), so far as it relates to non-compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
a person commits such an offence on the first day on which the person first fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the provision mentioned in paragraph (a) or (as the case may be) the requirement mentioned in paragraph (b), and continues to commit it throughout any period during which the failure continues.
 
(5) But a person must not be prosecuted under sub-paragraph (2) more than once in respect of the same failure.
 
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this paragraph is liable—
 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years;
 
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
 
(7) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this paragraph, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make an order for conditional discharge in respect of the offence.
 
CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT WITHIN UK
 
17.—(1) The Department may by order amend paragraph 16(1) so as to add to or remove from the list of orders in that paragraph any relevant UK order.
 
(2) "Relevant UK order" means an order under the law of Scotland or England and Wales which appears to the Department to be equivalent or similar to—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION TO RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
18.—(1) This paragraph applies to information notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1).
 
(2) The Chief Constable may, for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Schedule, supply information to which this paragraph applies to—
 
(a) a relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners,
 
(d) a person providing services to a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with a relevant function,
 
for use for the purpose of verifying the information.
 
(3) In relation to information supplied to any person under sub-paragraph (2), the reference to verifying the information is a reference to—
 
(a) checking its accuracy by comparing it with information held—
 
(i) in the case of a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners by that department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(ii) in the case of a person within sub-paragraph (2)(d), by that person in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there, and
 
(b) compiling a report of that comparison.
 
(4) Subject to sub-paragraph (5), the supply of information under this paragraph is to be taken not to breach any restriction on the disclosure of information (however arising).
 
(5) This paragraph does not authorise the doing of anything that contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998.
 
(6) This paragraph does not affect any power to supply information that exists apart from this paragraph.
 
(7) In this paragraph—
 
"the Commissioners" means Her Majesty’s Commissioners for Revenue and Customs;
 
"relevant Northern Ireland department" means the Department for Employment and Learning, the Department of the Environment, the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety or the Department for Social Development;
 
"relevant function" means—
 
(a) in relation to the Department for Employment and Learning, a function relating to employment or training,
 
(b) in relation to the Department of the Environment, a function under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981;
 
(c) in relation to the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, a function relating to health or social care;
 
(d) in relation to the Department for Social Development, a function relating to social security or child support;
 
(e) in relation to the Secretary of State, a function relating to passports or the Gangmasters Licensing Authority;
 
(f) in relation to the Commissioners, any of their functions.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION BY RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
19.—(1) A report compiled under paragraph 18 may be supplied to the Chief Constable by—
 
(a) the relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners, or
 
(d) a person within paragraph 18(2)(d).
 
(2) Such a report may contain any information held—
 
(a) by the relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(b) by a person within paragraph 18(2)(d) in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there.
 
(3) Where such a report contains information within sub-paragraph (2), the Chief Constable—
 
(a) may retain the information, whether or not used for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Part, and
 
(b) may use the information for any purpose related to the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences (whether or not under this Part), but for no other purpose.
 
(4) Sub-paragraphs (4) to (7) of paragraph 18 apply in relation to this paragraph as they apply in relation to paragraph 18.
 
INFORMATION ABOUT RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF OFFENDER
 
20.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements who is—
 
(a) serving a custodial sentence; or
 
(b) detained in a hospital.
 
(2) The Department may by regulations make provision requiring the person who is responsible for such an offender to give notice to specified persons—
 
(a) of the fact that that person has become responsible for the offender; and
 
(b) of any occasion when—
 
(i) the offender is released, or
 
(ii) a different person is to become responsible for the offender.
 
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) "specified persons" means persons specified, or of a description specified, in the regulations.
 
(4) The regulations may make provision for determining who is to be taken for the purposes of this paragraph as being responsible for an offender.
 
POWER OF ENTRY AND SEARCH OF OFFENDER’S HOME ADDRESS
 
21.—(1) If, on an application made by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above, a lay magistrate is satisfied that the requirements in sub-paragraph (2) are met in relation to any premises, the lay magistrate may issue a warrant authorising a constable—
 
(a) to enter the premises for the purpose of assessing the risks posed by the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates; and
 
(b) to search the premises for that purpose.
 
(2) The requirements are—
 
(a) that the address of each set of premises specified in the application is an address falling within sub-paragraph (3);
 
(b) that the offender is not one to whom sub-paragraph (4) applies;
 
(c) that it is necessary for a constable to enter and search the premises for the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a); and
 
(d) that on at least two occasions a constable has sought entry to the premises in order to search them for that purpose and has been unable to obtain entry for that purpose.
 
(3) An address falls within this sub-paragraph if—
 
(a) it is the address which was last notified in accordance with this Schedule by the offender to the police as the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies to an offender if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) A warrant issued under this paragraph must specify the one or more sets of premises to which it relates.
 
(6) The warrant may authorise the constable executing it to use reasonable force if necessary to enter and search the premises.
 
(7) The warrant may authorise entry to and search of premises on more than one occasion if, on the application, the lay magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary to authorise multiple entries in order to achieve the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
 
(8) Where a warrant issued under this paragraph authorises multiple entries, the number of entries authorised may be unlimited or limited to a maximum.
 
(9) In this paragraph a reference to the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates is a reference to the offender—
 
(a) who has in accordance with this Schedule notified the police that the premises specified in the warrant are the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
GUIDANCE
 
22.—(1) The Department must issue guidance to the Chief Constable in relation to the exercise of the powers of the Chief Constable under this Schedule.
 
(2) The Department may, from time to time, revise the guidance issued under sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) The Department must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this paragraph to be published in a way the Department considers appropriate.
 
INTERPRETATION OF THIS SCHEDULE
 
23.—(1) In this Schedule—
 
"cautioned" means cautioned after the person concerned has admitted the offence;
 
"custodial sentence" means—
 
(a) a sentence of imprisonment,
 
(b) a sentence of detention in a young offenders centre;
 
(c) a sentence of detention under Article 13(4)(b) or 14(5) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008;
 
(d) a sentence of detention under Article 45 of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998;
 
(e) an order under Article 39A of that Order sending the offender to a juvenile justice centre;
 
(f) any other sentence under which a person is detained in custody;
 
"detained in a hospital" means detained in a hospital under Part 3 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
"home address" has the meaning given by paragraph 10(4);
 
"interim slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 7;
 
"slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 1 or 2;
 
"slavery or human trafficking offence" has the meaning given by paragraph 1(4).
 
(2) In this Schedule "passport" means—
 
(a) United Kingdom passport within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
 
(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.
 
(3) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a conviction for an offence in respect of which an order for conditional discharge is made, despite—
 
(a) Article 6(1) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (conviction with conditional discharge deemed not to be a conviction), or
 
(b) section 14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (equivalent provision for England and Wales).
 
(4) Sub-paragraph (3) applies only to convictions after this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(5) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a finding of a court in summary proceedings that the accused did the act charged, where the court makes an order under—
 
(a) Article 44(4) of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
 
(b) section 37(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983, or
 
(c) section 58(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
 
(hospital and guardianship orders).
 
(6) In relation to an offence under the law of Scotland, a reference in this Schedule to a person being found not guilty by reason of insanity is to be treated as a reference to a person being acquitted by reason of the special defence in section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
 
(7) References in this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are to be read in accordance with paragraph 9.
 
(8) In this Schedule, a reference to a finding that a person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence includes a finding that a person is under a disability or insane and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence.
 
(9) A person’s age is to be treated for the purposes of this Schedule as being that which it appears to the court to be after considering any available evidence.".

New Schedule

Amendment No 62 made:

After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 3
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
PART 1
 
MAKING AND EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON DEALING WITH DEFENDANT
 
1.—(1) A court may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") where it deals with the defendant in respect of—
 
(a) a conviction for a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a finding that the defendant is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity, or
 
(c) a finding that the defendant is unfit to plead and has done the act charged against the defendant in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), convictions and findings include those taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(4) In this Schedule a "slavery or human trafficking offence" means any of the following offences—
 
(a) an offence under section 145 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(b) an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (trafficking for sexual exploitation);
 
(c) an offence under section 62 of that Act (committing offence with intent to commit relevant sexual offence), where the relevant sexual offence the person in question intended to commit was an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of that Act;
 
(d) an offence under section 22 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(e) an offence under section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (trafficking for exploitation);
 
(f) an offence under section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(g) an offence under section 47 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(h) an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D of this Act;
 
(i) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence listed above;
 
(j) an offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of an offence so listed;
 
(k) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting) where the offence (or one of the offences) which the person in question intends or believes would be committed is an offence so listed.
 
(5) The Department may by order amend sub-paragraph (4).
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON APPLICATION
 
2.—(1) A court of summary jurisdiction may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") on an application by the Chief Constable.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) the defendant is a relevant offender (see paragraph 3), and
 
(b) since the defendant first became a relevant offender, the defendant has acted in a way which means that the condition in sub-paragraph (3) is met.
 
(3) The condition is that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(4) The Chief Constable may make an application under this paragraph only in respect of a person—
 
(a) who lives in Northern Ireland, or
 
(b) who the Chief Constable believes is in, or is intending to come to, Northern Ireland.
 
(5) An application under this paragraph is to be made by complaint.
 
(6) The acts of the defendant which may be relied on for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b) include acts taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(7) The Department may by order provide that an application under this paragraph may be made by a person or body specified in the order (as well as by the Chief Constable); and such an order may make such consequential amendments to this Schedule as the Department thinks necessary or expedient.
 
MEANING OF "RELEVANT OFFENDER"
 
3.—(1) A person is a "relevant offender" for the purposes of paragraph 2 if sub- paragraph (2) or (3) applies to the person.
 
(2) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a court has made a finding that the person is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if, under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of an equivalent offence (whether or not the person has been punished for it),
 
(b) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of an equivalent offence.
 
(4) An "equivalent offence" means an act which—
 
(a) constituted an offence under the law of the country concerned, and
 
(b) would have constituted a slavery or human trafficking offence under the law of Northern Ireland if it had been done in Northern Ireland, or by a UK national, or as regards the United Kingdom.
 
(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) an act punishable under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom constitutes an offence under that law, however it is described in that law.
 
(6) On an application under paragraph 2 where sub-paragraph (3) is alleged to apply to the defendant, the condition in sub-paragraph (4)(b) is to be taken as met unless—
 
(a) not later than provided by magistrates’ court rules, the defendant serves on the Chief Constable a notice which states that in the defendant’s opinion the condition is not met, shows the grounds for that opinion, and requires the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met, or
 
(b) the court permits the defendant to require the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met without service of such a notice.
 
(7) References in this paragraph to convictions, findings and cautions include those taking place before this paragraph comes into operation.
 
EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
4.—(1) A slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(2) The only prohibitions or requirements that may be included in the order are those which the court is satisfied are necessary for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) Subject to paragraph 5(1), a prohibition or requirement contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order has effect—
 
(a) for a fixed period, specified in the order, of at least 5 years, or
 
(b) until further order.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may specify that some of its prohibitions or requirements have effect until further order and some for a fixed period;
 
(b) may specify different periods for different prohibitions or requirements.
 
(5) If a court makes a slavery and trafficking prevention order in relation to a person who is already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.
 
PROHIBITIONS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL
 
5.—(1) A prohibition on foreign travel contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order must be for a fixed period of not more than 5 years.
 
(2) A "prohibition on foreign travel" means—
 
(a) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom named or described in the order,
 
(b) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom other than a country named or described in the order, or
 
(c) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) Sub-paragraph (1) does not prevent a prohibition on foreign travel from being extended for a further period (of no more than 5 years each time) under paragraph 6.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order that contains a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c) must require the defendant to surrender all of the defendant’s passports at a police station specified in the order—
 
(a) on or before the date when the prohibition takes effect, or
 
(b) within a period specified in the order.
 
(5) Any passports surrendered must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the person ceases to be subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order containing a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c).
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply in relation to—
 
(a) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom if the passport has been returned to those authorities;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of an international organisation if the passport has been returned to that organisation.
 
VARIATION, RENEWAL AND DISCHARGE
 
6.—(1) A person within sub-paragraph (2) may apply to the appropriate court for an order varying, renewing or discharging a slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(2) The persons are—
 
(a) the defendant;
 
(b) the Chief Constable.
 
(3) On the application the court, after hearing—
 
(a) the person making the application, and
 
(b) the other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) (if that person wishes to be heard),
 
may make any order varying, renewing or discharging the slavery and trafficking prevention order that the court considers appropriate.
 
(4) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions or requirements on the defendant, only if the court is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to renew or vary the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(5) Any renewed or varied order may contain only those prohibitions or requirements which the court is satisfied are necessary for that purpose.
 
(6) The court must not discharge an order before the end of 5 years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and the Chief Constable.
 
(7) Sub-paragraph (6) does not apply to an order containing a prohibition on foreign travel and no other prohibitions.
 
(8) In this paragraph "the appropriate court" means—
 
(a) where the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal made the slavery and trafficking prevention order, the Crown Court;
 
(b) in any other case, a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
(9) An application under sub-paragraph (1) may be made—
 
(a) where the appropriate court is the Crown Court, in accordance with Crown Court rules;
 
(b) in any other case, by complaint.
 
INTERIM SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
7.—(1) This paragraph applies where an application under paragraph 2 ("the main application") has not been determined.
 
(2) An application for an "interim slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or
 
(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.
 
(3) The court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(4) An interim slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(5) The order—
 
(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;
 
(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.
 
(6) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.
 
APPEALS
 
8.—(1) A defendant may appeal against the making of a slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(a), as if the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence;
 
(b) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(b) or (c), as if the defendant had been convicted of the offence and the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for that offence;
 
(c) where the order was made on an application under paragraph 2, to the county court.
 
(2) A defendant may appeal to the county court against the making of an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(3) A defendant may appeal against the making of an order under paragraph 6, or the refusal to make such an order—
 
(a) where the application for such an order was made to the Crown Court, to the Court of Appeal;
 
(b) in any other case, to the county court.
 
(4) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c), (2) or (3)(b), the county court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.
 
(5) Any order made by the county court on an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c) or (2) is for the purposes of paragraph 6(8) or 7(6) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought.
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply to an order directing that an application be reheard by a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
PART 2
 
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
OFFENDER SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
9.—(1) References in the following provisions of this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are references to an offender who is for the time being subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order which is in effect under this Schedule.
 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) has effect subject to paragraph 12(7) (which excludes from paragraph 12 an offender subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order).
 
INITIAL NOTIFICATION
 
10.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must notify the required information to the police within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which the slavery and trafficking prevention order or the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order comes into force in relation to the offender ("the relevant date").
 
(2) The "required information" is the following information about the offender—
 
(a) date of birth;
 
(b) national insurance number;
 
(c) name on the relevant date or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(d) home address on the relevant date;
 
(e) name on the date on which the notification is given or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(f) home address on the date on which the notification is given;
 
(g) the address of any other premises in the United Kingdom at which on that date the offender regularly resides or stays;
 
(h) any information prescribed by regulations made by the Department.
 
(3) When determining the period of 3 days mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), there is to be disregarded any time when the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(4) In this Part "home address" means in relation to the offender—
 
(a) the address of the offender’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or
 
(b) if the offender has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the offender can regularly be found or, if there is more than one such place, such one of them as the offender selects.
 
NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES
 
11.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which any notifiable event occurs, notify to the police—
 
(a) the required new information, and
 
(b) the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2).
 
(2) A "notifiable event" means—
 
(a) the use by the offender of a name which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(b) any change of the offender’s home address;
 
(c) the expiry of any qualifying period during which the offender has resided or stayed at any premises in the United Kingdom the address of which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(d) any prescribed change of circumstances; or
 
(e) the release of the offender from custody pursuant to an order of a court or from a custodial sentence or detention in a hospital.
 
(3) The "required new information" is—
 
(a) the name referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(a),
 
(b) the new home address (see sub-paragraph (2)(b)),
 
(c) the address of the premises referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(c),
 
(d) the prescribed details, or
 
(e) the fact that the offender has been released as mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(e),
 
as the case may be.
 
(4) A notification under sub-paragraph (1) may be given before the notifiable event occurs, but in that case the offender must also specify the date when the event is expected to occur.
 
(5) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates occurs more than 2 days before the date specified, the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1).
 
(6) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates has not occurred by the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified—
 
(a) the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1), and
 
(b) the offender must, within the period of 6 days beginning with the date specified, notify to the police the fact that the event did not occur within the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified.
 
(7) Paragraph 10(3) applies to the determination of—
 
(a) any period of 3 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), or
 
(b) any period of 6 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (6),
 
as it applies to the determination of the period of 3 days mentioned in paragraph 10(1).
 
(8) In this paragraph—
 
(a) "prescribed change of circumstances" means any change—
 
(i) occurring in relation to any matter in respect of which information is required to be notified by virtue of paragraph 10(2)(h), and
 
(ii) of a description prescribed by regulations made by the Department;
 
(b) "the prescribed details", in relation to a prescribed change of circumstances, means such details of the change as may be so prescribed.
 
(9) In this paragraph "qualifying period" means—
 
(a) a period of 7 days, or
 
(b) two or more periods, in any period of 12 months, which taken together amount to 7 days.
 
PERIODIC NOTIFICATION
 
12.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the applicable period after each notification date, notify to the police the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2), unless the offender has already given a notification under paragraph 11(1) within that period.
 
(2) A "notification date" means, in relation to the offender, the date of any notification given by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) Where the applicable period would (apart from this paragraph) end while sub-paragraph (4) applies, that period is to be treated as continuing until the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which sub-paragraph (4) first ceases to apply.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court,
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence,
 
(c) detained in a hospital, or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) In this paragraph "the applicable period" means—
 
(a) in any case where sub-paragraph (6) applies, such period as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Department, and
 
(b) in any other case, the period of one year.
 
(6) This sub-paragraph applies if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1) was the address or location of such a place as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(b).
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph applies to an offender who is subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
ABSENCE FROM NOTIFIED RESIDENCE
 
13.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements at any time if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1) was an address in Northern Ireland such as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(a) (sole or main residence).
 
(2) If the offender intends to be absent from that home address for a period of more than 3 days ("the relevant period"), the offender must, not less than 12 hours before leaving that home address, notify to the police the information set out in sub-paragraph (3).
 
(3) The information is—
 
(a) the date on which the offender will leave that home address;
 
(b) such details as the offender holds about—
 
(i) the offender’s travel arrangements during the relevant period;
 
(ii) the offender’s accommodation arrangements during that period;
 
(iii) the offender’s date of return to that address.
 
(4) In this paragraph—
 
"travel arrangements" include, in particular, the means of transport to be used and the dates of travel,
 
"accommodation arrangements" include, in particular, the address of any accommodation at which the relevant offender will spend the night during the relevant period and the nature of that accommodation.
 
(5) Where—
 
(a) an offender has given a notification under sub-paragraph (2), and
 
(b) at any time before that mentioned in that sub-paragraph, the information notified becomes inaccurate or incomplete,
 
the offender must give a further notification under sub-paragraph (2).
 
(6) Where an offender—
 
(a) has notified a date of return to the offender’s home address, but
 
(b) returns to that home address on a date other than that notified,
 
the offender must notify the date of the offender’s actual return to the police within 3 days of the actual return.
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph requires an offender to notify any information which falls to be notified in accordance with a requirement imposed by regulations under paragraph 14.
 
(8) In calculating the relevant period for the purposes of this paragraph there is to be disregarded—
 
(a) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, an address of the kind mentioned in paragraph 10(2)(g) notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1);
 
(b) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, any premises, if his stay at those premises would give rise to a requirement to notify the address of those premises under paragraph 11(2)(c).
 
TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM
 
14.—(1) The Department may by regulations make provision with respect to offenders subject to notification requirements, or any description of such offenders—
 
(a) requiring such persons, before they leave the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (2);
 
(b) requiring such persons, if they subsequently return to the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (3).
 
(2) A notification under this paragraph must disclose—
 
(a) the date on which the offender proposes to leave the United Kingdom;
 
(b) the country (or, if there is more than one, the first country) to which the offender proposes to travel and the proposed point of arrival (determined in accordance with the regulations) in that country;
 
(c) any other information prescribed by the regulations which the offender holds about the offender’s departure from or return to the United Kingdom, or about the offender’s movements while outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) A notification under this sub-paragraph must disclose any information prescribed by the regulations about the offender’s return to the United Kingdom.
 
METHOD OF NOTIFICATION AND RELATED MATTERS
 
15.—(1) An offender gives a notification to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6) by—
 
(a) attending at any police station in Northern Ireland prescribed by regulations under section 87(1)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and
 
(b) giving an oral notification to any police officer, or to any person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station.
 
(2) Any notification given in accordance with this paragraph must be acknowledged; and the acknowledgement must be—
 
(a) in writing, and
 
(b) in such form as the Department may direct.
 
(3) Where a notification is given under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), the offender must, if requested to do so by the police officer or other person mentioned in paragraph (1)(b), allow that officer or person to—
 
(a) take the offender’s fingerprints,
 
(b) photograph any part of the offender, or
 
(c) do both of those things,
 
in order to verify the offender's identity.
 
(4) Fingerprints taken from a person under this paragraph (and any copies of those fingerprints) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(5) Photographs taken of any part of the offender under this paragraph (and any copies of such photographs) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(6) In this paragraph "photograph" includes any process by means of which an image may be produced.
 
PART 3
 
SUPPLEMENTARY
 
OFFENCES
 
16.—(1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with any prohibition or requirement contained in—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order, or
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
commits an offence.
 
(2) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or (6)(b), 12(1), 13(2) or (6) or 15(3), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
commits an offence.
 
(3) A person who notifies to the police, in purported compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
any information which the person knows to be false, commits an offence.
 
(4) As regards an offence under sub-paragraph (2), so far as it relates to non-compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
a person commits such an offence on the first day on which the person first fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the provision mentioned in paragraph (a) or (as the case may be) the requirement mentioned in paragraph (b), and continues to commit it throughout any period during which the failure continues.
 
(5) But a person must not be prosecuted under sub-paragraph (2) more than once in respect of the same failure.
 
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this paragraph is liable—
 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years;
 
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
 
(7) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this paragraph, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make an order for conditional discharge in respect of the offence.
 
CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT WITHIN UK
 
17.—(1) The Department may by order amend paragraph 16(1) so as to add to or remove from the list of orders in that paragraph any relevant UK order.
 
(2) "Relevant UK order" means an order under the law of Scotland or England and Wales which appears to the Department to be equivalent or similar to—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION TO RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
18.—(1) This paragraph applies to information notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1).
 
(2) The Chief Constable may, for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Schedule, supply information to which this paragraph applies to—
 
(a) a relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners,
 
(d) a person providing services to a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with a relevant function,
 
for use for the purpose of verifying the information.
 
(3) In relation to information supplied to any person under sub-paragraph (2), the reference to verifying the information is a reference to—
 
(a) checking its accuracy by comparing it with information held—
 
(i) in the case of a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners by that department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(ii) in the case of a person within sub-paragraph (2)(d), by that person in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there, and
 
(b) compiling a report of that comparison.
 
(4) Subject to sub-paragraph (5), the supply of information under this paragraph is to be taken not to breach any restriction on the disclosure of information (however arising).
 
(5) This paragraph does not authorise the doing of anything that contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998.
 
(6) This paragraph does not affect any power to supply information that exists apart from this paragraph.
 
(7) In this paragraph—
 
"the Commissioners" means Her Majesty’s Commissioners for Revenue and Customs;
 
"relevant Northern Ireland department" means the Department for Employment and Learning, the Department of the Environment, the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety or the Department for Social Development;
 
"relevant function" means—
 
(a) in relation to the Department for Employment and Learning, a function relating to employment or training,
 
(b) in relation to the Department of the Environment, a function under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981;
 
(c) in relation to the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, a function relating to health or social care;
 
(d) in relation to the Department for Social Development, a function relating to social security or child support;
 
(e) in relation to the Secretary of State, a function relating to passports or the Gangmasters Licensing Authority;
 
(f) in relation to the Commissioners, any of their functions.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION BY RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
19.—(1) A report compiled under paragraph 18 may be supplied to the Chief Constable by—
 
(a) the relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners, or
 
(d) a person within paragraph 18(2)(d).
 
(2) Such a report may contain any information held—
 
(a) by the relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(b) by a person within paragraph 18(2)(d) in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there.
 
(3) Where such a report contains information within sub-paragraph (2), the Chief Constable—
 
(a) may retain the information, whether or not used for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Part, and
 
(b) may use the information for any purpose related to the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences (whether or not under this Part), but for no other purpose.
 
(4) Sub-paragraphs (4) to (7) of paragraph 18 apply in relation to this paragraph as they apply in relation to paragraph 18.
 
INFORMATION ABOUT RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF OFFENDER
 
20.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements who is—
 
(a) serving a custodial sentence; or
 
(b) detained in a hospital.
 
(2) The Department may by regulations make provision requiring the person who is responsible for such an offender to give notice to specified persons—
 
(a) of the fact that that person has become responsible for the offender; and
 
(b) of any occasion when—
 
(i) the offender is released, or
 
(ii) a different person is to become responsible for the offender.
 
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) "specified persons" means persons specified, or of a description specified, in the regulations.
 
(4) The regulations may make provision for determining who is to be taken for the purposes of this paragraph as being responsible for an offender.
 
POWER OF ENTRY AND SEARCH OF OFFENDER’S HOME ADDRESS
 
21.—(1) If, on an application made by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above, a lay magistrate is satisfied that the requirements in sub-paragraph (2) are met in relation to any premises, the lay magistrate may issue a warrant authorising a constable—
 
(a) to enter the premises for the purpose of assessing the risks posed by the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates; and
 
(b) to search the premises for that purpose.
 
(2) The requirements are—
 
(a) that the address of each set of premises specified in the application is an address falling within sub-paragraph (3);
 
(b) that the offender is not one to whom sub-paragraph (4) applies;
 
(c) that it is necessary for a constable to enter and search the premises for the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a); and
 
(d) that on at least two occasions a constable has sought entry to the premises in order to search them for that purpose and has been unable to obtain entry for that purpose.
 
(3) An address falls within this sub-paragraph if—
 
(a) it is the address which was last notified in accordance with this Schedule by the offender to the police as the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies to an offender if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) A warrant issued under this paragraph must specify the one or more sets of premises to which it relates.
 
(6) The warrant may authorise the constable executing it to use reasonable force if necessary to enter and search the premises.
 
(7) The warrant may authorise entry to and search of premises on more than one occasion if, on the application, the lay magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary to authorise multiple entries in order to achieve the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
 
(8) Where a warrant issued under this paragraph authorises multiple entries, the number of entries authorised may be unlimited or limited to a maximum.
 
(9) In this paragraph a reference to the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates is a reference to the offender—
 
(a) who has in accordance with this Schedule notified the police that the premises specified in the warrant are the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
GUIDANCE
 
22.—(1) The Department must issue guidance to the Chief Constable in relation to the exercise of the powers of the Chief Constable under this Schedule.
 
(2) The Department may, from time to time, revise the guidance issued under sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) The Department must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this paragraph to be published in a way the Department considers appropriate.
 
INTERPRETATION OF THIS SCHEDULE
 
23.—(1) In this Schedule—
 
"cautioned" means cautioned after the person concerned has admitted the offence;
 
"custodial sentence" means—
 
(a) a sentence of imprisonment,
 
(b) a sentence of detention in a young offenders centre;
 
(c) a sentence of detention under Article 13(4)(b) or 14(5) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008;
 
(d) a sentence of detention under Article 45 of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998;
 
(e) an order under Article 39A of that Order sending the offender to a juvenile justice centre;
 
(f) any other sentence under which a person is detained in custody;
 
"detained in a hospital" means detained in a hospital under Part 3 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
"home address" has the meaning given by paragraph 10(4);
 
"interim slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 7;
 
"slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 1 or 2;
 
"slavery or human trafficking offence" has the meaning given by paragraph 1(4).
 
(2) In this Schedule "passport" means—
 
(a) United Kingdom passport within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
 
(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.
 
(3) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a conviction for an offence in respect of which an order for conditional discharge is made, despite—
 
(a) Article 6(1) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (conviction with conditional discharge deemed not to be a conviction), or
 
(b) section 14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (equivalent provision for England and Wales).
 
(4) Sub-paragraph (3) applies only to convictions after this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(5) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a finding of a court in summary proceedings that the accused did the act charged, where the court makes an order under—
 
(a) Article 44(4) of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
 
(b) section 37(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983, or
 
(c) section 58(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
 
(hospital and guardianship orders).
 
(6) In relation to an offence under the law of Scotland, a reference in this Schedule to a person being found not guilty by reason of insanity is to be treated as a reference to a person being acquitted by reason of the special defence in section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
 
(7) References in this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are to be read in accordance with paragraph 9.
 
(8) In this Schedule, a reference to a finding that a person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence includes a finding that a person is under a disability or insane and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence.
 
(9) A person’s age is to be treated for the purposes of this Schedule as being that which it appears to the court to be after considering any available evidence.".

New Schedule

Amendment No 62 made:

After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 3
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
PART 1
 
MAKING AND EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON DEALING WITH DEFENDANT
 
1.—(1) A court may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") where it deals with the defendant in respect of—
 
(a) a conviction for a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a finding that the defendant is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity, or
 
(c) a finding that the defendant is unfit to plead and has done the act charged against the defendant in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), convictions and findings include those taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(4) In this Schedule a "slavery or human trafficking offence" means any of the following offences—
 
(a) an offence under section 145 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(b) an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (trafficking for sexual exploitation);
 
(c) an offence under section 62 of that Act (committing offence with intent to commit relevant sexual offence), where the relevant sexual offence the person in question intended to commit was an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of that Act;
 
(d) an offence under section 22 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(e) an offence under section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (trafficking for exploitation);
 
(f) an offence under section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(g) an offence under section 47 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(h) an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D of this Act;
 
(i) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence listed above;
 
(j) an offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of an offence so listed;
 
(k) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting) where the offence (or one of the offences) which the person in question intends or believes would be committed is an offence so listed.
 
(5) The Department may by order amend sub-paragraph (4).
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON APPLICATION
 
2.—(1) A court of summary jurisdiction may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") on an application by the Chief Constable.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) the defendant is a relevant offender (see paragraph 3), and
 
(b) since the defendant first became a relevant offender, the defendant has acted in a way which means that the condition in sub-paragraph (3) is met.
 
(3) The condition is that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(4) The Chief Constable may make an application under this paragraph only in respect of a person—
 
(a) who lives in Northern Ireland, or
 
(b) who the Chief Constable believes is in, or is intending to come to, Northern Ireland.
 
(5) An application under this paragraph is to be made by complaint.
 
(6) The acts of the defendant which may be relied on for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b) include acts taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(7) The Department may by order provide that an application under this paragraph may be made by a person or body specified in the order (as well as by the Chief Constable); and such an order may make such consequential amendments to this Schedule as the Department thinks necessary or expedient.
 
MEANING OF "RELEVANT OFFENDER"
 
3.—(1) A person is a "relevant offender" for the purposes of paragraph 2 if sub- paragraph (2) or (3) applies to the person.
 
(2) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a court has made a finding that the person is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if, under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of an equivalent offence (whether or not the person has been punished for it),
 
(b) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of an equivalent offence.
 
(4) An "equivalent offence" means an act which—
 
(a) constituted an offence under the law of the country concerned, and
 
(b) would have constituted a slavery or human trafficking offence under the law of Northern Ireland if it had been done in Northern Ireland, or by a UK national, or as regards the United Kingdom.
 
(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) an act punishable under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom constitutes an offence under that law, however it is described in that law.
 
(6) On an application under paragraph 2 where sub-paragraph (3) is alleged to apply to the defendant, the condition in sub-paragraph (4)(b) is to be taken as met unless—
 
(a) not later than provided by magistrates’ court rules, the defendant serves on the Chief Constable a notice which states that in the defendant’s opinion the condition is not met, shows the grounds for that opinion, and requires the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met, or
 
(b) the court permits the defendant to require the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met without service of such a notice.
 
(7) References in this paragraph to convictions, findings and cautions include those taking place before this paragraph comes into operation.
 
EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
4.—(1) A slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(2) The only prohibitions or requirements that may be included in the order are those which the court is satisfied are necessary for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) Subject to paragraph 5(1), a prohibition or requirement contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order has effect—
 
(a) for a fixed period, specified in the order, of at least 5 years, or
 
(b) until further order.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may specify that some of its prohibitions or requirements have effect until further order and some for a fixed period;
 
(b) may specify different periods for different prohibitions or requirements.
 
(5) If a court makes a slavery and trafficking prevention order in relation to a person who is already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.
 
PROHIBITIONS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL
 
5.—(1) A prohibition on foreign travel contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order must be for a fixed period of not more than 5 years.
 
(2) A "prohibition on foreign travel" means—
 
(a) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom named or described in the order,
 
(b) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom other than a country named or described in the order, or
 
(c) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) Sub-paragraph (1) does not prevent a prohibition on foreign travel from being extended for a further period (of no more than 5 years each time) under paragraph 6.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order that contains a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c) must require the defendant to surrender all of the defendant’s passports at a police station specified in the order—
 
(a) on or before the date when the prohibition takes effect, or
 
(b) within a period specified in the order.
 
(5) Any passports surrendered must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the person ceases to be subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order containing a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c).
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply in relation to—
 
(a) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom if the passport has been returned to those authorities;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of an international organisation if the passport has been returned to that organisation.
 
VARIATION, RENEWAL AND DISCHARGE
 
6.—(1) A person within sub-paragraph (2) may apply to the appropriate court for an order varying, renewing or discharging a slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(2) The persons are—
 
(a) the defendant;
 
(b) the Chief Constable.
 
(3) On the application the court, after hearing—
 
(a) the person making the application, and
 
(b) the other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) (if that person wishes to be heard),
 
may make any order varying, renewing or discharging the slavery and trafficking prevention order that the court considers appropriate.
 
(4) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions or requirements on the defendant, only if the court is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to renew or vary the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(5) Any renewed or varied order may contain only those prohibitions or requirements which the court is satisfied are necessary for that purpose.
 
(6) The court must not discharge an order before the end of 5 years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and the Chief Constable.
 
(7) Sub-paragraph (6) does not apply to an order containing a prohibition on foreign travel and no other prohibitions.
 
(8) In this paragraph "the appropriate court" means—
 
(a) where the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal made the slavery and trafficking prevention order, the Crown Court;
 
(b) in any other case, a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
(9) An application under sub-paragraph (1) may be made—
 
(a) where the appropriate court is the Crown Court, in accordance with Crown Court rules;
 
(b) in any other case, by complaint.
 
INTERIM SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
7.—(1) This paragraph applies where an application under paragraph 2 ("the main application") has not been determined.
 
(2) An application for an "interim slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or
 
(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.
 
(3) The court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(4) An interim slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(5) The order—
 
(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;
 
(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.
 
(6) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.
 
APPEALS
 
8.—(1) A defendant may appeal against the making of a slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(a), as if the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence;
 
(b) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(b) or (c), as if the defendant had been convicted of the offence and the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for that offence;
 
(c) where the order was made on an application under paragraph 2, to the county court.
 
(2) A defendant may appeal to the county court against the making of an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(3) A defendant may appeal against the making of an order under paragraph 6, or the refusal to make such an order—
 
(a) where the application for such an order was made to the Crown Court, to the Court of Appeal;
 
(b) in any other case, to the county court.
 
(4) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c), (2) or (3)(b), the county court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.
 
(5) Any order made by the county court on an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c) or (2) is for the purposes of paragraph 6(8) or 7(6) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought.
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply to an order directing that an application be reheard by a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
PART 2
 
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
OFFENDER SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
9.—(1) References in the following provisions of this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are references to an offender who is for the time being subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order which is in effect under this Schedule.
 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) has effect subject to paragraph 12(7) (which excludes from paragraph 12 an offender subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order).
 
INITIAL NOTIFICATION
 
10.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must notify the required information to the police within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which the slavery and trafficking prevention order or the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order comes into force in relation to the offender ("the relevant date").
 
(2) The "required information" is the following information about the offender—
 
(a) date of birth;
 
(b) national insurance number;
 
(c) name on the relevant date or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(d) home address on the relevant date;
 
(e) name on the date on which the notification is given or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(f) home address on the date on which the notification is given;
 
(g) the address of any other premises in the United Kingdom at which on that date the offender regularly resides or stays;
 
(h) any information prescribed by regulations made by the Department.
 
(3) When determining the period of 3 days mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), there is to be disregarded any time when the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(4) In this Part "home address" means in relation to the offender—
 
(a) the address of the offender’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or
 
(b) if the offender has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the offender can regularly be found or, if there is more than one such place, such one of them as the offender selects.
 
NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES
 
11.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which any notifiable event occurs, notify to the police—
 
(a) the required new information, and
 
(b) the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2).
 
(2) A "notifiable event" means—
 
(a) the use by the offender of a name which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(b) any change of the offender’s home address;
 
(c) the expiry of any qualifying period during which the offender has resided or stayed at any premises in the United Kingdom the address of which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(d) any prescribed change of circumstances; or
 
(e) the release of the offender from custody pursuant to an order of a court or from a custodial sentence or detention in a hospital.
 
(3) The "required new information" is—
 
(a) the name referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(a),
 
(b) the new home address (see sub-paragraph (2)(b)),
 
(c) the address of the premises referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(c),
 
(d) the prescribed details, or
 
(e) the fact that the offender has been released as mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(e),
 
as the case may be.
 
(4) A notification under sub-paragraph (1) may be given before the notifiable event occurs, but in that case the offender must also specify the date when the event is expected to occur.
 
(5) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates occurs more than 2 days before the date specified, the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1).
 
(6) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates has not occurred by the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified—
 
(a) the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1), and
 
(b) the offender must, within the period of 6 days beginning with the date specified, notify to the police the fact that the event did not occur within the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified.
 
(7) Paragraph 10(3) applies to the determination of—
 
(a) any period of 3 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), or
 
(b) any period of 6 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (6),
 
as it applies to the determination of the period of 3 days mentioned in paragraph 10(1).
 
(8) In this paragraph—
 
(a) "prescribed change of circumstances" means any change—
 
(i) occurring in relation to any matter in respect of which information is required to be notified by virtue of paragraph 10(2)(h), and
 
(ii) of a description prescribed by regulations made by the Department;
 
(b) "the prescribed details", in relation to a prescribed change of circumstances, means such details of the change as may be so prescribed.
 
(9) In this paragraph "qualifying period" means—
 
(a) a period of 7 days, or
 
(b) two or more periods, in any period of 12 months, which taken together amount to 7 days.
 
PERIODIC NOTIFICATION
 
12.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the applicable period after each notification date, notify to the police the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2), unless the offender has already given a notification under paragraph 11(1) within that period.
 
(2) A "notification date" means, in relation to the offender, the date of any notification given by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) Where the applicable period would (apart from this paragraph) end while sub-paragraph (4) applies, that period is to be treated as continuing until the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which sub-paragraph (4) first ceases to apply.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court,
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence,
 
(c) detained in a hospital, or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) In this paragraph "the applicable period" means—
 
(a) in any case where sub-paragraph (6) applies, such period as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Department, and
 
(b) in any other case, the period of one year.
 
(6) This sub-paragraph applies if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1) was the address or location of such a place as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(b).
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph applies to an offender who is subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
ABSENCE FROM NOTIFIED RESIDENCE
 
13.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements at any time if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1) was an address in Northern Ireland such as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(a) (sole or main residence).
 
(2) If the offender intends to be absent from that home address for a period of more than 3 days ("the relevant period"), the offender must, not less than 12 hours before leaving that home address, notify to the police the information set out in sub-paragraph (3).
 
(3) The information is—
 
(a) the date on which the offender will leave that home address;
 
(b) such details as the offender holds about—
 
(i) the offender’s travel arrangements during the relevant period;
 
(ii) the offender’s accommodation arrangements during that period;
 
(iii) the offender’s date of return to that address.
 
(4) In this paragraph—
 
"travel arrangements" include, in particular, the means of transport to be used and the dates of travel,
 
"accommodation arrangements" include, in particular, the address of any accommodation at which the relevant offender will spend the night during the relevant period and the nature of that accommodation.
 
(5) Where—
 
(a) an offender has given a notification under sub-paragraph (2), and
 
(b) at any time before that mentioned in that sub-paragraph, the information notified becomes inaccurate or incomplete,
 
the offender must give a further notification under sub-paragraph (2).
 
(6) Where an offender—
 
(a) has notified a date of return to the offender’s home address, but
 
(b) returns to that home address on a date other than that notified,
 
the offender must notify the date of the offender’s actual return to the police within 3 days of the actual return.
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph requires an offender to notify any information which falls to be notified in accordance with a requirement imposed by regulations under paragraph 14.
 
(8) In calculating the relevant period for the purposes of this paragraph there is to be disregarded—
 
(a) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, an address of the kind mentioned in paragraph 10(2)(g) notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1);
 
(b) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, any premises, if his stay at those premises would give rise to a requirement to notify the address of those premises under paragraph 11(2)(c).
 
TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM
 
14.—(1) The Department may by regulations make provision with respect to offenders subject to notification requirements, or any description of such offenders—
 
(a) requiring such persons, before they leave the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (2);
 
(b) requiring such persons, if they subsequently return to the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (3).
 
(2) A notification under this paragraph must disclose—
 
(a) the date on which the offender proposes to leave the United Kingdom;
 
(b) the country (or, if there is more than one, the first country) to which the offender proposes to travel and the proposed point of arrival (determined in accordance with the regulations) in that country;
 
(c) any other information prescribed by the regulations which the offender holds about the offender’s departure from or return to the United Kingdom, or about the offender’s movements while outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) A notification under this sub-paragraph must disclose any information prescribed by the regulations about the offender’s return to the United Kingdom.
 
METHOD OF NOTIFICATION AND RELATED MATTERS
 
15.—(1) An offender gives a notification to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6) by—
 
(a) attending at any police station in Northern Ireland prescribed by regulations under section 87(1)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and
 
(b) giving an oral notification to any police officer, or to any person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station.
 
(2) Any notification given in accordance with this paragraph must be acknowledged; and the acknowledgement must be—
 
(a) in writing, and
 
(b) in such form as the Department may direct.
 
(3) Where a notification is given under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), the offender must, if requested to do so by the police officer or other person mentioned in paragraph (1)(b), allow that officer or person to—
 
(a) take the offender’s fingerprints,
 
(b) photograph any part of the offender, or
 
(c) do both of those things,
 
in order to verify the offender's identity.
 
(4) Fingerprints taken from a person under this paragraph (and any copies of those fingerprints) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(5) Photographs taken of any part of the offender under this paragraph (and any copies of such photographs) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(6) In this paragraph "photograph" includes any process by means of which an image may be produced.
 
PART 3
 
SUPPLEMENTARY
 
OFFENCES
 
16.—(1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with any prohibition or requirement contained in—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order, or
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
commits an offence.
 
(2) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or (6)(b), 12(1), 13(2) or (6) or 15(3), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
commits an offence.
 
(3) A person who notifies to the police, in purported compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
any information which the person knows to be false, commits an offence.
 
(4) As regards an offence under sub-paragraph (2), so far as it relates to non-compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
a person commits such an offence on the first day on which the person first fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the provision mentioned in paragraph (a) or (as the case may be) the requirement mentioned in paragraph (b), and continues to commit it throughout any period during which the failure continues.
 
(5) But a person must not be prosecuted under sub-paragraph (2) more than once in respect of the same failure.
 
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this paragraph is liable—
 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years;
 
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
 
(7) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this paragraph, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make an order for conditional discharge in respect of the offence.
 
CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT WITHIN UK
 
17.—(1) The Department may by order amend paragraph 16(1) so as to add to or remove from the list of orders in that paragraph any relevant UK order.
 
(2) "Relevant UK order" means an order under the law of Scotland or England and Wales which appears to the Department to be equivalent or similar to—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION TO RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
18.—(1) This paragraph applies to information notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1).
 
(2) The Chief Constable may, for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Schedule, supply information to which this paragraph applies to—
 
(a) a relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners,
 
(d) a person providing services to a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with a relevant function,
 
for use for the purpose of verifying the information.
 
(3) In relation to information supplied to any person under sub-paragraph (2), the reference to verifying the information is a reference to—
 
(a) checking its accuracy by comparing it with information held—
 
(i) in the case of a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners by that department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(ii) in the case of a person within sub-paragraph (2)(d), by that person in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there, and
 
(b) compiling a report of that comparison.
 
(4) Subject to sub-paragraph (5), the supply of information under this paragraph is to be taken not to breach any restriction on the disclosure of information (however arising).
 
(5) This paragraph does not authorise the doing of anything that contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998.
 
(6) This paragraph does not affect any power to supply information that exists apart from this paragraph.
 
(7) In this paragraph—
 
"the Commissioners" means Her Majesty’s Commissioners for Revenue and Customs;
 
"relevant Northern Ireland department" means the Department for Employment and Learning, the Department of the Environment, the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety or the Department for Social Development;
 
"relevant function" means—
 
(a) in relation to the Department for Employment and Learning, a function relating to employment or training,
 
(b) in relation to the Department of the Environment, a function under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981;
 
(c) in relation to the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, a function relating to health or social care;
 
(d) in relation to the Department for Social Development, a function relating to social security or child support;
 
(e) in relation to the Secretary of State, a function relating to passports or the Gangmasters Licensing Authority;
 
(f) in relation to the Commissioners, any of their functions.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION BY RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
19.—(1) A report compiled under paragraph 18 may be supplied to the Chief Constable by—
 
(a) the relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners, or
 
(d) a person within paragraph 18(2)(d).
 
(2) Such a report may contain any information held—
 
(a) by the relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(b) by a person within paragraph 18(2)(d) in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there.
 
(3) Where such a report contains information within sub-paragraph (2), the Chief Constable—
 
(a) may retain the information, whether or not used for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Part, and
 
(b) may use the information for any purpose related to the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences (whether or not under this Part), but for no other purpose.
 
(4) Sub-paragraphs (4) to (7) of paragraph 18 apply in relation to this paragraph as they apply in relation to paragraph 18.
 
INFORMATION ABOUT RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF OFFENDER
 
20.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements who is—
 
(a) serving a custodial sentence; or
 
(b) detained in a hospital.
 
(2) The Department may by regulations make provision requiring the person who is responsible for such an offender to give notice to specified persons—
 
(a) of the fact that that person has become responsible for the offender; and
 
(b) of any occasion when—
 
(i) the offender is released, or
 
(ii) a different person is to become responsible for the offender.
 
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) "specified persons" means persons specified, or of a description specified, in the regulations.
 
(4) The regulations may make provision for determining who is to be taken for the purposes of this paragraph as being responsible for an offender.
 
POWER OF ENTRY AND SEARCH OF OFFENDER’S HOME ADDRESS
 
21.—(1) If, on an application made by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above, a lay magistrate is satisfied that the requirements in sub-paragraph (2) are met in relation to any premises, the lay magistrate may issue a warrant authorising a constable—
 
(a) to enter the premises for the purpose of assessing the risks posed by the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates; and
 
(b) to search the premises for that purpose.
 
(2) The requirements are—
 
(a) that the address of each set of premises specified in the application is an address falling within sub-paragraph (3);
 
(b) that the offender is not one to whom sub-paragraph (4) applies;
 
(c) that it is necessary for a constable to enter and search the premises for the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a); and
 
(d) that on at least two occasions a constable has sought entry to the premises in order to search them for that purpose and has been unable to obtain entry for that purpose.
 
(3) An address falls within this sub-paragraph if—
 
(a) it is the address which was last notified in accordance with this Schedule by the offender to the police as the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies to an offender if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) A warrant issued under this paragraph must specify the one or more sets of premises to which it relates.
 
(6) The warrant may authorise the constable executing it to use reasonable force if necessary to enter and search the premises.
 
(7) The warrant may authorise entry to and search of premises on more than one occasion if, on the application, the lay magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary to authorise multiple entries in order to achieve the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
 
(8) Where a warrant issued under this paragraph authorises multiple entries, the number of entries authorised may be unlimited or limited to a maximum.
 
(9) In this paragraph a reference to the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates is a reference to the offender—
 
(a) who has in accordance with this Schedule notified the police that the premises specified in the warrant are the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
GUIDANCE
 
22.—(1) The Department must issue guidance to the Chief Constable in relation to the exercise of the powers of the Chief Constable under this Schedule.
 
(2) The Department may, from time to time, revise the guidance issued under sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) The Department must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this paragraph to be published in a way the Department considers appropriate.
 
INTERPRETATION OF THIS SCHEDULE
 
23.—(1) In this Schedule—
 
"cautioned" means cautioned after the person concerned has admitted the offence;
 
"custodial sentence" means—
 
(a) a sentence of imprisonment,
 
(b) a sentence of detention in a young offenders centre;
 
(c) a sentence of detention under Article 13(4)(b) or 14(5) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008;
 
(d) a sentence of detention under Article 45 of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998;
 
(e) an order under Article 39A of that Order sending the offender to a juvenile justice centre;
 
(f) any other sentence under which a person is detained in custody;
 
"detained in a hospital" means detained in a hospital under Part 3 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
"home address" has the meaning given by paragraph 10(4);
 
"interim slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 7;
 
"slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 1 or 2;
 
"slavery or human trafficking offence" has the meaning given by paragraph 1(4).
 
(2) In this Schedule "passport" means—
 
(a) United Kingdom passport within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
 
(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.
 
(3) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a conviction for an offence in respect of which an order for conditional discharge is made, despite—
 
(a) Article 6(1) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (conviction with conditional discharge deemed not to be a conviction), or
 
(b) section 14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (equivalent provision for England and Wales).
 
(4) Sub-paragraph (3) applies only to convictions after this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(5) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a finding of a court in summary proceedings that the accused did the act charged, where the court makes an order under—
 
(a) Article 44(4) of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
 
(b) section 37(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983, or
 
(c) section 58(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
 
(hospital and guardianship orders).
 
(6) In relation to an offence under the law of Scotland, a reference in this Schedule to a person being found not guilty by reason of insanity is to be treated as a reference to a person being acquitted by reason of the special defence in section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
 
(7) References in this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are to be read in accordance with paragraph 9.
 
(8) In this Schedule, a reference to a finding that a person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence includes a finding that a person is under a disability or insane and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence.
 
(9) A person’s age is to be treated for the purposes of this Schedule as being that which it appears to the court to be after considering any available evidence.".

New Schedule

Amendment No 62 made:

After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 3
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
PART 1
 
MAKING AND EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON DEALING WITH DEFENDANT
 
1.—(1) A court may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") where it deals with the defendant in respect of—
 
(a) a conviction for a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a finding that the defendant is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity, or
 
(c) a finding that the defendant is unfit to plead and has done the act charged against the defendant in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), convictions and findings include those taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(4) In this Schedule a "slavery or human trafficking offence" means any of the following offences—
 
(a) an offence under section 145 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(b) an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (trafficking for sexual exploitation);
 
(c) an offence under section 62 of that Act (committing offence with intent to commit relevant sexual offence), where the relevant sexual offence the person in question intended to commit was an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of that Act;
 
(d) an offence under section 22 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(e) an offence under section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (trafficking for exploitation);
 
(f) an offence under section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(g) an offence under section 47 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(h) an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D of this Act;
 
(i) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence listed above;
 
(j) an offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of an offence so listed;
 
(k) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting) where the offence (or one of the offences) which the person in question intends or believes would be committed is an offence so listed.
 
(5) The Department may by order amend sub-paragraph (4).
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON APPLICATION
 
2.—(1) A court of summary jurisdiction may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") on an application by the Chief Constable.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) the defendant is a relevant offender (see paragraph 3), and
 
(b) since the defendant first became a relevant offender, the defendant has acted in a way which means that the condition in sub-paragraph (3) is met.
 
(3) The condition is that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(4) The Chief Constable may make an application under this paragraph only in respect of a person—
 
(a) who lives in Northern Ireland, or
 
(b) who the Chief Constable believes is in, or is intending to come to, Northern Ireland.
 
(5) An application under this paragraph is to be made by complaint.
 
(6) The acts of the defendant which may be relied on for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b) include acts taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(7) The Department may by order provide that an application under this paragraph may be made by a person or body specified in the order (as well as by the Chief Constable); and such an order may make such consequential amendments to this Schedule as the Department thinks necessary or expedient.
 
MEANING OF "RELEVANT OFFENDER"
 
3.—(1) A person is a "relevant offender" for the purposes of paragraph 2 if sub- paragraph (2) or (3) applies to the person.
 
(2) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a court has made a finding that the person is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if, under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of an equivalent offence (whether or not the person has been punished for it),
 
(b) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of an equivalent offence.
 
(4) An "equivalent offence" means an act which—
 
(a) constituted an offence under the law of the country concerned, and
 
(b) would have constituted a slavery or human trafficking offence under the law of Northern Ireland if it had been done in Northern Ireland, or by a UK national, or as regards the United Kingdom.
 
(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) an act punishable under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom constitutes an offence under that law, however it is described in that law.
 
(6) On an application under paragraph 2 where sub-paragraph (3) is alleged to apply to the defendant, the condition in sub-paragraph (4)(b) is to be taken as met unless—
 
(a) not later than provided by magistrates’ court rules, the defendant serves on the Chief Constable a notice which states that in the defendant’s opinion the condition is not met, shows the grounds for that opinion, and requires the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met, or
 
(b) the court permits the defendant to require the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met without service of such a notice.
 
(7) References in this paragraph to convictions, findings and cautions include those taking place before this paragraph comes into operation.
 
EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
4.—(1) A slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(2) The only prohibitions or requirements that may be included in the order are those which the court is satisfied are necessary for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) Subject to paragraph 5(1), a prohibition or requirement contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order has effect—
 
(a) for a fixed period, specified in the order, of at least 5 years, or
 
(b) until further order.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may specify that some of its prohibitions or requirements have effect until further order and some for a fixed period;
 
(b) may specify different periods for different prohibitions or requirements.
 
(5) If a court makes a slavery and trafficking prevention order in relation to a person who is already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.
 
PROHIBITIONS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL
 
5.—(1) A prohibition on foreign travel contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order must be for a fixed period of not more than 5 years.
 
(2) A "prohibition on foreign travel" means—
 
(a) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom named or described in the order,
 
(b) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom other than a country named or described in the order, or
 
(c) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) Sub-paragraph (1) does not prevent a prohibition on foreign travel from being extended for a further period (of no more than 5 years each time) under paragraph 6.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order that contains a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c) must require the defendant to surrender all of the defendant’s passports at a police station specified in the order—
 
(a) on or before the date when the prohibition takes effect, or
 
(b) within a period specified in the order.
 
(5) Any passports surrendered must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the person ceases to be subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order containing a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c).
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply in relation to—
 
(a) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom if the passport has been returned to those authorities;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of an international organisation if the passport has been returned to that organisation.
 
VARIATION, RENEWAL AND DISCHARGE
 
6.—(1) A person within sub-paragraph (2) may apply to the appropriate court for an order varying, renewing or discharging a slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(2) The persons are—
 
(a) the defendant;
 
(b) the Chief Constable.
 
(3) On the application the court, after hearing—
 
(a) the person making the application, and
 
(b) the other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) (if that person wishes to be heard),
 
may make any order varying, renewing or discharging the slavery and trafficking prevention order that the court considers appropriate.
 
(4) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions or requirements on the defendant, only if the court is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to renew or vary the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(5) Any renewed or varied order may contain only those prohibitions or requirements which the court is satisfied are necessary for that purpose.
 
(6) The court must not discharge an order before the end of 5 years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and the Chief Constable.
 
(7) Sub-paragraph (6) does not apply to an order containing a prohibition on foreign travel and no other prohibitions.
 
(8) In this paragraph "the appropriate court" means—
 
(a) where the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal made the slavery and trafficking prevention order, the Crown Court;
 
(b) in any other case, a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
(9) An application under sub-paragraph (1) may be made—
 
(a) where the appropriate court is the Crown Court, in accordance with Crown Court rules;
 
(b) in any other case, by complaint.
 
INTERIM SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
7.—(1) This paragraph applies where an application under paragraph 2 ("the main application") has not been determined.
 
(2) An application for an "interim slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or
 
(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.
 
(3) The court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(4) An interim slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(5) The order—
 
(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;
 
(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.
 
(6) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.
 
APPEALS
 
8.—(1) A defendant may appeal against the making of a slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(a), as if the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence;
 
(b) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(b) or (c), as if the defendant had been convicted of the offence and the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for that offence;
 
(c) where the order was made on an application under paragraph 2, to the county court.
 
(2) A defendant may appeal to the county court against the making of an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(3) A defendant may appeal against the making of an order under paragraph 6, or the refusal to make such an order—
 
(a) where the application for such an order was made to the Crown Court, to the Court of Appeal;
 
(b) in any other case, to the county court.
 
(4) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c), (2) or (3)(b), the county court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.
 
(5) Any order made by the county court on an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c) or (2) is for the purposes of paragraph 6(8) or 7(6) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought.
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply to an order directing that an application be reheard by a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
PART 2
 
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
OFFENDER SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
9.—(1) References in the following provisions of this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are references to an offender who is for the time being subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order which is in effect under this Schedule.
 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) has effect subject to paragraph 12(7) (which excludes from paragraph 12 an offender subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order).
 
INITIAL NOTIFICATION
 
10.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must notify the required information to the police within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which the slavery and trafficking prevention order or the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order comes into force in relation to the offender ("the relevant date").
 
(2) The "required information" is the following information about the offender—
 
(a) date of birth;
 
(b) national insurance number;
 
(c) name on the relevant date or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(d) home address on the relevant date;
 
(e) name on the date on which the notification is given or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(f) home address on the date on which the notification is given;
 
(g) the address of any other premises in the United Kingdom at which on that date the offender regularly resides or stays;
 
(h) any information prescribed by regulations made by the Department.
 
(3) When determining the period of 3 days mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), there is to be disregarded any time when the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(4) In this Part "home address" means in relation to the offender—
 
(a) the address of the offender’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or
 
(b) if the offender has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the offender can regularly be found or, if there is more than one such place, such one of them as the offender selects.
 
NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES
 
11.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which any notifiable event occurs, notify to the police—
 
(a) the required new information, and
 
(b) the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2).
 
(2) A "notifiable event" means—
 
(a) the use by the offender of a name which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(b) any change of the offender’s home address;
 
(c) the expiry of any qualifying period during which the offender has resided or stayed at any premises in the United Kingdom the address of which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(d) any prescribed change of circumstances; or
 
(e) the release of the offender from custody pursuant to an order of a court or from a custodial sentence or detention in a hospital.
 
(3) The "required new information" is—
 
(a) the name referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(a),
 
(b) the new home address (see sub-paragraph (2)(b)),
 
(c) the address of the premises referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(c),
 
(d) the prescribed details, or
 
(e) the fact that the offender has been released as mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(e),
 
as the case may be.
 
(4) A notification under sub-paragraph (1) may be given before the notifiable event occurs, but in that case the offender must also specify the date when the event is expected to occur.
 
(5) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates occurs more than 2 days before the date specified, the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1).
 
(6) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates has not occurred by the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified—
 
(a) the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1), and
 
(b) the offender must, within the period of 6 days beginning with the date specified, notify to the police the fact that the event did not occur within the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified.
 
(7) Paragraph 10(3) applies to the determination of—
 
(a) any period of 3 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), or
 
(b) any period of 6 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (6),
 
as it applies to the determination of the period of 3 days mentioned in paragraph 10(1).
 
(8) In this paragraph—
 
(a) "prescribed change of circumstances" means any change—
 
(i) occurring in relation to any matter in respect of which information is required to be notified by virtue of paragraph 10(2)(h), and
 
(ii) of a description prescribed by regulations made by the Department;
 
(b) "the prescribed details", in relation to a prescribed change of circumstances, means such details of the change as may be so prescribed.
 
(9) In this paragraph "qualifying period" means—
 
(a) a period of 7 days, or
 
(b) two or more periods, in any period of 12 months, which taken together amount to 7 days.
 
PERIODIC NOTIFICATION
 
12.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the applicable period after each notification date, notify to the police the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2), unless the offender has already given a notification under paragraph 11(1) within that period.
 
(2) A "notification date" means, in relation to the offender, the date of any notification given by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) Where the applicable period would (apart from this paragraph) end while sub-paragraph (4) applies, that period is to be treated as continuing until the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which sub-paragraph (4) first ceases to apply.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court,
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence,
 
(c) detained in a hospital, or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) In this paragraph "the applicable period" means—
 
(a) in any case where sub-paragraph (6) applies, such period as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Department, and
 
(b) in any other case, the period of one year.
 
(6) This sub-paragraph applies if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1) was the address or location of such a place as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(b).
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph applies to an offender who is subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
ABSENCE FROM NOTIFIED RESIDENCE
 
13.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements at any time if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1) was an address in Northern Ireland such as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(a) (sole or main residence).
 
(2) If the offender intends to be absent from that home address for a period of more than 3 days ("the relevant period"), the offender must, not less than 12 hours before leaving that home address, notify to the police the information set out in sub-paragraph (3).
 
(3) The information is—
 
(a) the date on which the offender will leave that home address;
 
(b) such details as the offender holds about—
 
(i) the offender’s travel arrangements during the relevant period;
 
(ii) the offender’s accommodation arrangements during that period;
 
(iii) the offender’s date of return to that address.
 
(4) In this paragraph—
 
"travel arrangements" include, in particular, the means of transport to be used and the dates of travel,
 
"accommodation arrangements" include, in particular, the address of any accommodation at which the relevant offender will spend the night during the relevant period and the nature of that accommodation.
 
(5) Where—
 
(a) an offender has given a notification under sub-paragraph (2), and
 
(b) at any time before that mentioned in that sub-paragraph, the information notified becomes inaccurate or incomplete,
 
the offender must give a further notification under sub-paragraph (2).
 
(6) Where an offender—
 
(a) has notified a date of return to the offender’s home address, but
 
(b) returns to that home address on a date other than that notified,
 
the offender must notify the date of the offender’s actual return to the police within 3 days of the actual return.
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph requires an offender to notify any information which falls to be notified in accordance with a requirement imposed by regulations under paragraph 14.
 
(8) In calculating the relevant period for the purposes of this paragraph there is to be disregarded—
 
(a) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, an address of the kind mentioned in paragraph 10(2)(g) notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1);
 
(b) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, any premises, if his stay at those premises would give rise to a requirement to notify the address of those premises under paragraph 11(2)(c).
 
TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM
 
14.—(1) The Department may by regulations make provision with respect to offenders subject to notification requirements, or any description of such offenders—
 
(a) requiring such persons, before they leave the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (2);
 
(b) requiring such persons, if they subsequently return to the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (3).
 
(2) A notification under this paragraph must disclose—
 
(a) the date on which the offender proposes to leave the United Kingdom;
 
(b) the country (or, if there is more than one, the first country) to which the offender proposes to travel and the proposed point of arrival (determined in accordance with the regulations) in that country;
 
(c) any other information prescribed by the regulations which the offender holds about the offender’s departure from or return to the United Kingdom, or about the offender’s movements while outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) A notification under this sub-paragraph must disclose any information prescribed by the regulations about the offender’s return to the United Kingdom.
 
METHOD OF NOTIFICATION AND RELATED MATTERS
 
15.—(1) An offender gives a notification to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6) by—
 
(a) attending at any police station in Northern Ireland prescribed by regulations under section 87(1)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and
 
(b) giving an oral notification to any police officer, or to any person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station.
 
(2) Any notification given in accordance with this paragraph must be acknowledged; and the acknowledgement must be—
 
(a) in writing, and
 
(b) in such form as the Department may direct.
 
(3) Where a notification is given under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), the offender must, if requested to do so by the police officer or other person mentioned in paragraph (1)(b), allow that officer or person to—
 
(a) take the offender’s fingerprints,
 
(b) photograph any part of the offender, or
 
(c) do both of those things,
 
in order to verify the offender's identity.
 
(4) Fingerprints taken from a person under this paragraph (and any copies of those fingerprints) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(5) Photographs taken of any part of the offender under this paragraph (and any copies of such photographs) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(6) In this paragraph "photograph" includes any process by means of which an image may be produced.
 
PART 3
 
SUPPLEMENTARY
 
OFFENCES
 
16.—(1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with any prohibition or requirement contained in—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order, or
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
commits an offence.
 
(2) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or (6)(b), 12(1), 13(2) or (6) or 15(3), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
commits an offence.
 
(3) A person who notifies to the police, in purported compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
any information which the person knows to be false, commits an offence.
 
(4) As regards an offence under sub-paragraph (2), so far as it relates to non-compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
a person commits such an offence on the first day on which the person first fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the provision mentioned in paragraph (a) or (as the case may be) the requirement mentioned in paragraph (b), and continues to commit it throughout any period during which the failure continues.
 
(5) But a person must not be prosecuted under sub-paragraph (2) more than once in respect of the same failure.
 
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this paragraph is liable—
 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years;
 
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
 
(7) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this paragraph, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make an order for conditional discharge in respect of the offence.
 
CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT WITHIN UK
 
17.—(1) The Department may by order amend paragraph 16(1) so as to add to or remove from the list of orders in that paragraph any relevant UK order.
 
(2) "Relevant UK order" means an order under the law of Scotland or England and Wales which appears to the Department to be equivalent or similar to—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION TO RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
18.—(1) This paragraph applies to information notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1).
 
(2) The Chief Constable may, for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Schedule, supply information to which this paragraph applies to—
 
(a) a relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners,
 
(d) a person providing services to a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with a relevant function,
 
for use for the purpose of verifying the information.
 
(3) In relation to information supplied to any person under sub-paragraph (2), the reference to verifying the information is a reference to—
 
(a) checking its accuracy by comparing it with information held—
 
(i) in the case of a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners by that department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(ii) in the case of a person within sub-paragraph (2)(d), by that person in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there, and
 
(b) compiling a report of that comparison.
 
(4) Subject to sub-paragraph (5), the supply of information under this paragraph is to be taken not to breach any restriction on the disclosure of information (however arising).
 
(5) This paragraph does not authorise the doing of anything that contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998.
 
(6) This paragraph does not affect any power to supply information that exists apart from this paragraph.
 
(7) In this paragraph—
 
"the Commissioners" means Her Majesty’s Commissioners for Revenue and Customs;
 
"relevant Northern Ireland department" means the Department for Employment and Learning, the Department of the Environment, the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety or the Department for Social Development;
 
"relevant function" means—
 
(a) in relation to the Department for Employment and Learning, a function relating to employment or training,
 
(b) in relation to the Department of the Environment, a function under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981;
 
(c) in relation to the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, a function relating to health or social care;
 
(d) in relation to the Department for Social Development, a function relating to social security or child support;
 
(e) in relation to the Secretary of State, a function relating to passports or the Gangmasters Licensing Authority;
 
(f) in relation to the Commissioners, any of their functions.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION BY RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
19.—(1) A report compiled under paragraph 18 may be supplied to the Chief Constable by—
 
(a) the relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners, or
 
(d) a person within paragraph 18(2)(d).
 
(2) Such a report may contain any information held—
 
(a) by the relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(b) by a person within paragraph 18(2)(d) in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there.
 
(3) Where such a report contains information within sub-paragraph (2), the Chief Constable—
 
(a) may retain the information, whether or not used for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Part, and
 
(b) may use the information for any purpose related to the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences (whether or not under this Part), but for no other purpose.
 
(4) Sub-paragraphs (4) to (7) of paragraph 18 apply in relation to this paragraph as they apply in relation to paragraph 18.
 
INFORMATION ABOUT RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF OFFENDER
 
20.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements who is—
 
(a) serving a custodial sentence; or
 
(b) detained in a hospital.
 
(2) The Department may by regulations make provision requiring the person who is responsible for such an offender to give notice to specified persons—
 
(a) of the fact that that person has become responsible for the offender; and
 
(b) of any occasion when—
 
(i) the offender is released, or
 
(ii) a different person is to become responsible for the offender.
 
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) "specified persons" means persons specified, or of a description specified, in the regulations.
 
(4) The regulations may make provision for determining who is to be taken for the purposes of this paragraph as being responsible for an offender.
 
POWER OF ENTRY AND SEARCH OF OFFENDER’S HOME ADDRESS
 
21.—(1) If, on an application made by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above, a lay magistrate is satisfied that the requirements in sub-paragraph (2) are met in relation to any premises, the lay magistrate may issue a warrant authorising a constable—
 
(a) to enter the premises for the purpose of assessing the risks posed by the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates; and
 
(b) to search the premises for that purpose.
 
(2) The requirements are—
 
(a) that the address of each set of premises specified in the application is an address falling within sub-paragraph (3);
 
(b) that the offender is not one to whom sub-paragraph (4) applies;
 
(c) that it is necessary for a constable to enter and search the premises for the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a); and
 
(d) that on at least two occasions a constable has sought entry to the premises in order to search them for that purpose and has been unable to obtain entry for that purpose.
 
(3) An address falls within this sub-paragraph if—
 
(a) it is the address which was last notified in accordance with this Schedule by the offender to the police as the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies to an offender if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) A warrant issued under this paragraph must specify the one or more sets of premises to which it relates.
 
(6) The warrant may authorise the constable executing it to use reasonable force if necessary to enter and search the premises.
 
(7) The warrant may authorise entry to and search of premises on more than one occasion if, on the application, the lay magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary to authorise multiple entries in order to achieve the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
 
(8) Where a warrant issued under this paragraph authorises multiple entries, the number of entries authorised may be unlimited or limited to a maximum.
 
(9) In this paragraph a reference to the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates is a reference to the offender—
 
(a) who has in accordance with this Schedule notified the police that the premises specified in the warrant are the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
GUIDANCE
 
22.—(1) The Department must issue guidance to the Chief Constable in relation to the exercise of the powers of the Chief Constable under this Schedule.
 
(2) The Department may, from time to time, revise the guidance issued under sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) The Department must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this paragraph to be published in a way the Department considers appropriate.
 
INTERPRETATION OF THIS SCHEDULE
 
23.—(1) In this Schedule—
 
"cautioned" means cautioned after the person concerned has admitted the offence;
 
"custodial sentence" means—
 
(a) a sentence of imprisonment,
 
(b) a sentence of detention in a young offenders centre;
 
(c) a sentence of detention under Article 13(4)(b) or 14(5) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008;
 
(d) a sentence of detention under Article 45 of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998;
 
(e) an order under Article 39A of that Order sending the offender to a juvenile justice centre;
 
(f) any other sentence under which a person is detained in custody;
 
"detained in a hospital" means detained in a hospital under Part 3 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
"home address" has the meaning given by paragraph 10(4);
 
"interim slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 7;
 
"slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 1 or 2;
 
"slavery or human trafficking offence" has the meaning given by paragraph 1(4).
 
(2) In this Schedule "passport" means—
 
(a) United Kingdom passport within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
 
(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.
 
(3) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a conviction for an offence in respect of which an order for conditional discharge is made, despite—
 
(a) Article 6(1) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (conviction with conditional discharge deemed not to be a conviction), or
 
(b) section 14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (equivalent provision for England and Wales).
 
(4) Sub-paragraph (3) applies only to convictions after this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(5) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a finding of a court in summary proceedings that the accused did the act charged, where the court makes an order under—
 
(a) Article 44(4) of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
 
(b) section 37(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983, or
 
(c) section 58(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
 
(hospital and guardianship orders).
 
(6) In relation to an offence under the law of Scotland, a reference in this Schedule to a person being found not guilty by reason of insanity is to be treated as a reference to a person being acquitted by reason of the special defence in section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
 
(7) References in this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are to be read in accordance with paragraph 9.
 
(8) In this Schedule, a reference to a finding that a person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence includes a finding that a person is under a disability or insane and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence.
 
(9) A person’s age is to be treated for the purposes of this Schedule as being that which it appears to the court to be after considering any available evidence.".

New Schedule

Amendment No 62 made:

After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 3
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
PART 1
 
MAKING AND EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON DEALING WITH DEFENDANT
 
1.—(1) A court may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") where it deals with the defendant in respect of—
 
(a) a conviction for a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a finding that the defendant is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity, or
 
(c) a finding that the defendant is unfit to plead and has done the act charged against the defendant in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), convictions and findings include those taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(4) In this Schedule a "slavery or human trafficking offence" means any of the following offences—
 
(a) an offence under section 145 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(b) an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (trafficking for sexual exploitation);
 
(c) an offence under section 62 of that Act (committing offence with intent to commit relevant sexual offence), where the relevant sexual offence the person in question intended to commit was an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of that Act;
 
(d) an offence under section 22 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(e) an offence under section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (trafficking for exploitation);
 
(f) an offence under section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(g) an offence under section 47 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(h) an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D of this Act;
 
(i) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence listed above;
 
(j) an offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of an offence so listed;
 
(k) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting) where the offence (or one of the offences) which the person in question intends or believes would be committed is an offence so listed.
 
(5) The Department may by order amend sub-paragraph (4).
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON APPLICATION
 
2.—(1) A court of summary jurisdiction may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") on an application by the Chief Constable.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) the defendant is a relevant offender (see paragraph 3), and
 
(b) since the defendant first became a relevant offender, the defendant has acted in a way which means that the condition in sub-paragraph (3) is met.
 
(3) The condition is that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(4) The Chief Constable may make an application under this paragraph only in respect of a person—
 
(a) who lives in Northern Ireland, or
 
(b) who the Chief Constable believes is in, or is intending to come to, Northern Ireland.
 
(5) An application under this paragraph is to be made by complaint.
 
(6) The acts of the defendant which may be relied on for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b) include acts taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(7) The Department may by order provide that an application under this paragraph may be made by a person or body specified in the order (as well as by the Chief Constable); and such an order may make such consequential amendments to this Schedule as the Department thinks necessary or expedient.
 
MEANING OF "RELEVANT OFFENDER"
 
3.—(1) A person is a "relevant offender" for the purposes of paragraph 2 if sub- paragraph (2) or (3) applies to the person.
 
(2) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a court has made a finding that the person is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if, under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of an equivalent offence (whether or not the person has been punished for it),
 
(b) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of an equivalent offence.
 
(4) An "equivalent offence" means an act which—
 
(a) constituted an offence under the law of the country concerned, and
 
(b) would have constituted a slavery or human trafficking offence under the law of Northern Ireland if it had been done in Northern Ireland, or by a UK national, or as regards the United Kingdom.
 
(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) an act punishable under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom constitutes an offence under that law, however it is described in that law.
 
(6) On an application under paragraph 2 where sub-paragraph (3) is alleged to apply to the defendant, the condition in sub-paragraph (4)(b) is to be taken as met unless—
 
(a) not later than provided by magistrates’ court rules, the defendant serves on the Chief Constable a notice which states that in the defendant’s opinion the condition is not met, shows the grounds for that opinion, and requires the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met, or
 
(b) the court permits the defendant to require the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met without service of such a notice.
 
(7) References in this paragraph to convictions, findings and cautions include those taking place before this paragraph comes into operation.
 
EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
4.—(1) A slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(2) The only prohibitions or requirements that may be included in the order are those which the court is satisfied are necessary for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) Subject to paragraph 5(1), a prohibition or requirement contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order has effect—
 
(a) for a fixed period, specified in the order, of at least 5 years, or
 
(b) until further order.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may specify that some of its prohibitions or requirements have effect until further order and some for a fixed period;
 
(b) may specify different periods for different prohibitions or requirements.
 
(5) If a court makes a slavery and trafficking prevention order in relation to a person who is already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.
 
PROHIBITIONS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL
 
5.—(1) A prohibition on foreign travel contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order must be for a fixed period of not more than 5 years.
 
(2) A "prohibition on foreign travel" means—
 
(a) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom named or described in the order,
 
(b) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom other than a country named or described in the order, or
 
(c) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) Sub-paragraph (1) does not prevent a prohibition on foreign travel from being extended for a further period (of no more than 5 years each time) under paragraph 6.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order that contains a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c) must require the defendant to surrender all of the defendant’s passports at a police station specified in the order—
 
(a) on or before the date when the prohibition takes effect, or
 
(b) within a period specified in the order.
 
(5) Any passports surrendered must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the person ceases to be subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order containing a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c).
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply in relation to—
 
(a) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom if the passport has been returned to those authorities;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of an international organisation if the passport has been returned to that organisation.
 
VARIATION, RENEWAL AND DISCHARGE
 
6.—(1) A person within sub-paragraph (2) may apply to the appropriate court for an order varying, renewing or discharging a slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(2) The persons are—
 
(a) the defendant;
 
(b) the Chief Constable.
 
(3) On the application the court, after hearing—
 
(a) the person making the application, and
 
(b) the other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) (if that person wishes to be heard),
 
may make any order varying, renewing or discharging the slavery and trafficking prevention order that the court considers appropriate.
 
(4) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions or requirements on the defendant, only if the court is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to renew or vary the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(5) Any renewed or varied order may contain only those prohibitions or requirements which the court is satisfied are necessary for that purpose.
 
(6) The court must not discharge an order before the end of 5 years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and the Chief Constable.
 
(7) Sub-paragraph (6) does not apply to an order containing a prohibition on foreign travel and no other prohibitions.
 
(8) In this paragraph "the appropriate court" means—
 
(a) where the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal made the slavery and trafficking prevention order, the Crown Court;
 
(b) in any other case, a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
(9) An application under sub-paragraph (1) may be made—
 
(a) where the appropriate court is the Crown Court, in accordance with Crown Court rules;
 
(b) in any other case, by complaint.
 
INTERIM SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
7.—(1) This paragraph applies where an application under paragraph 2 ("the main application") has not been determined.
 
(2) An application for an "interim slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or
 
(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.
 
(3) The court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(4) An interim slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(5) The order—
 
(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;
 
(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.
 
(6) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.
 
APPEALS
 
8.—(1) A defendant may appeal against the making of a slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(a), as if the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence;
 
(b) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(b) or (c), as if the defendant had been convicted of the offence and the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for that offence;
 
(c) where the order was made on an application under paragraph 2, to the county court.
 
(2) A defendant may appeal to the county court against the making of an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(3) A defendant may appeal against the making of an order under paragraph 6, or the refusal to make such an order—
 
(a) where the application for such an order was made to the Crown Court, to the Court of Appeal;
 
(b) in any other case, to the county court.
 
(4) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c), (2) or (3)(b), the county court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.
 
(5) Any order made by the county court on an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c) or (2) is for the purposes of paragraph 6(8) or 7(6) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought.
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply to an order directing that an application be reheard by a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
PART 2
 
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
OFFENDER SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
9.—(1) References in the following provisions of this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are references to an offender who is for the time being subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order which is in effect under this Schedule.
 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) has effect subject to paragraph 12(7) (which excludes from paragraph 12 an offender subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order).
 
INITIAL NOTIFICATION
 
10.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must notify the required information to the police within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which the slavery and trafficking prevention order or the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order comes into force in relation to the offender ("the relevant date").
 
(2) The "required information" is the following information about the offender—
 
(a) date of birth;
 
(b) national insurance number;
 
(c) name on the relevant date or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(d) home address on the relevant date;
 
(e) name on the date on which the notification is given or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(f) home address on the date on which the notification is given;
 
(g) the address of any other premises in the United Kingdom at which on that date the offender regularly resides or stays;
 
(h) any information prescribed by regulations made by the Department.
 
(3) When determining the period of 3 days mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), there is to be disregarded any time when the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(4) In this Part "home address" means in relation to the offender—
 
(a) the address of the offender’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or
 
(b) if the offender has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the offender can regularly be found or, if there is more than one such place, such one of them as the offender selects.
 
NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES
 
11.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which any notifiable event occurs, notify to the police—
 
(a) the required new information, and
 
(b) the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2).
 
(2) A "notifiable event" means—
 
(a) the use by the offender of a name which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(b) any change of the offender’s home address;
 
(c) the expiry of any qualifying period during which the offender has resided or stayed at any premises in the United Kingdom the address of which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(d) any prescribed change of circumstances; or
 
(e) the release of the offender from custody pursuant to an order of a court or from a custodial sentence or detention in a hospital.
 
(3) The "required new information" is—
 
(a) the name referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(a),
 
(b) the new home address (see sub-paragraph (2)(b)),
 
(c) the address of the premises referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(c),
 
(d) the prescribed details, or
 
(e) the fact that the offender has been released as mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(e),
 
as the case may be.
 
(4) A notification under sub-paragraph (1) may be given before the notifiable event occurs, but in that case the offender must also specify the date when the event is expected to occur.
 
(5) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates occurs more than 2 days before the date specified, the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1).
 
(6) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates has not occurred by the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified—
 
(a) the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1), and
 
(b) the offender must, within the period of 6 days beginning with the date specified, notify to the police the fact that the event did not occur within the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified.
 
(7) Paragraph 10(3) applies to the determination of—
 
(a) any period of 3 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), or
 
(b) any period of 6 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (6),
 
as it applies to the determination of the period of 3 days mentioned in paragraph 10(1).
 
(8) In this paragraph—
 
(a) "prescribed change of circumstances" means any change—
 
(i) occurring in relation to any matter in respect of which information is required to be notified by virtue of paragraph 10(2)(h), and
 
(ii) of a description prescribed by regulations made by the Department;
 
(b) "the prescribed details", in relation to a prescribed change of circumstances, means such details of the change as may be so prescribed.
 
(9) In this paragraph "qualifying period" means—
 
(a) a period of 7 days, or
 
(b) two or more periods, in any period of 12 months, which taken together amount to 7 days.
 
PERIODIC NOTIFICATION
 
12.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the applicable period after each notification date, notify to the police the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2), unless the offender has already given a notification under paragraph 11(1) within that period.
 
(2) A "notification date" means, in relation to the offender, the date of any notification given by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) Where the applicable period would (apart from this paragraph) end while sub-paragraph (4) applies, that period is to be treated as continuing until the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which sub-paragraph (4) first ceases to apply.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court,
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence,
 
(c) detained in a hospital, or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) In this paragraph "the applicable period" means—
 
(a) in any case where sub-paragraph (6) applies, such period as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Department, and
 
(b) in any other case, the period of one year.
 
(6) This sub-paragraph applies if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1) was the address or location of such a place as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(b).
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph applies to an offender who is subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
ABSENCE FROM NOTIFIED RESIDENCE
 
13.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements at any time if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1) was an address in Northern Ireland such as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(a) (sole or main residence).
 
(2) If the offender intends to be absent from that home address for a period of more than 3 days ("the relevant period"), the offender must, not less than 12 hours before leaving that home address, notify to the police the information set out in sub-paragraph (3).
 
(3) The information is—
 
(a) the date on which the offender will leave that home address;
 
(b) such details as the offender holds about—
 
(i) the offender’s travel arrangements during the relevant period;
 
(ii) the offender’s accommodation arrangements during that period;
 
(iii) the offender’s date of return to that address.
 
(4) In this paragraph—
 
"travel arrangements" include, in particular, the means of transport to be used and the dates of travel,
 
"accommodation arrangements" include, in particular, the address of any accommodation at which the relevant offender will spend the night during the relevant period and the nature of that accommodation.
 
(5) Where—
 
(a) an offender has given a notification under sub-paragraph (2), and
 
(b) at any time before that mentioned in that sub-paragraph, the information notified becomes inaccurate or incomplete,
 
the offender must give a further notification under sub-paragraph (2).
 
(6) Where an offender—
 
(a) has notified a date of return to the offender’s home address, but
 
(b) returns to that home address on a date other than that notified,
 
the offender must notify the date of the offender’s actual return to the police within 3 days of the actual return.
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph requires an offender to notify any information which falls to be notified in accordance with a requirement imposed by regulations under paragraph 14.
 
(8) In calculating the relevant period for the purposes of this paragraph there is to be disregarded—
 
(a) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, an address of the kind mentioned in paragraph 10(2)(g) notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1);
 
(b) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, any premises, if his stay at those premises would give rise to a requirement to notify the address of those premises under paragraph 11(2)(c).
 
TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM
 
14.—(1) The Department may by regulations make provision with respect to offenders subject to notification requirements, or any description of such offenders—
 
(a) requiring such persons, before they leave the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (2);
 
(b) requiring such persons, if they subsequently return to the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (3).
 
(2) A notification under this paragraph must disclose—
 
(a) the date on which the offender proposes to leave the United Kingdom;
 
(b) the country (or, if there is more than one, the first country) to which the offender proposes to travel and the proposed point of arrival (determined in accordance with the regulations) in that country;
 
(c) any other information prescribed by the regulations which the offender holds about the offender’s departure from or return to the United Kingdom, or about the offender’s movements while outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) A notification under this sub-paragraph must disclose any information prescribed by the regulations about the offender’s return to the United Kingdom.
 
METHOD OF NOTIFICATION AND RELATED MATTERS
 
15.—(1) An offender gives a notification to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6) by—
 
(a) attending at any police station in Northern Ireland prescribed by regulations under section 87(1)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and
 
(b) giving an oral notification to any police officer, or to any person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station.
 
(2) Any notification given in accordance with this paragraph must be acknowledged; and the acknowledgement must be—
 
(a) in writing, and
 
(b) in such form as the Department may direct.
 
(3) Where a notification is given under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), the offender must, if requested to do so by the police officer or other person mentioned in paragraph (1)(b), allow that officer or person to—
 
(a) take the offender’s fingerprints,
 
(b) photograph any part of the offender, or
 
(c) do both of those things,
 
in order to verify the offender's identity.
 
(4) Fingerprints taken from a person under this paragraph (and any copies of those fingerprints) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(5) Photographs taken of any part of the offender under this paragraph (and any copies of such photographs) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(6) In this paragraph "photograph" includes any process by means of which an image may be produced.
 
PART 3
 
SUPPLEMENTARY
 
OFFENCES
 
16.—(1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with any prohibition or requirement contained in—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order, or
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
commits an offence.
 
(2) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or (6)(b), 12(1), 13(2) or (6) or 15(3), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
commits an offence.
 
(3) A person who notifies to the police, in purported compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
any information which the person knows to be false, commits an offence.
 
(4) As regards an offence under sub-paragraph (2), so far as it relates to non-compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
a person commits such an offence on the first day on which the person first fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the provision mentioned in paragraph (a) or (as the case may be) the requirement mentioned in paragraph (b), and continues to commit it throughout any period during which the failure continues.
 
(5) But a person must not be prosecuted under sub-paragraph (2) more than once in respect of the same failure.
 
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this paragraph is liable—
 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years;
 
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
 
(7) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this paragraph, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make an order for conditional discharge in respect of the offence.
 
CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT WITHIN UK
 
17.—(1) The Department may by order amend paragraph 16(1) so as to add to or remove from the list of orders in that paragraph any relevant UK order.
 
(2) "Relevant UK order" means an order under the law of Scotland or England and Wales which appears to the Department to be equivalent or similar to—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION TO RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
18.—(1) This paragraph applies to information notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1).
 
(2) The Chief Constable may, for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Schedule, supply information to which this paragraph applies to—
 
(a) a relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners,
 
(d) a person providing services to a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with a relevant function,
 
for use for the purpose of verifying the information.
 
(3) In relation to information supplied to any person under sub-paragraph (2), the reference to verifying the information is a reference to—
 
(a) checking its accuracy by comparing it with information held—
 
(i) in the case of a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners by that department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(ii) in the case of a person within sub-paragraph (2)(d), by that person in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there, and
 
(b) compiling a report of that comparison.
 
(4) Subject to sub-paragraph (5), the supply of information under this paragraph is to be taken not to breach any restriction on the disclosure of information (however arising).
 
(5) This paragraph does not authorise the doing of anything that contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998.
 
(6) This paragraph does not affect any power to supply information that exists apart from this paragraph.
 
(7) In this paragraph—
 
"the Commissioners" means Her Majesty’s Commissioners for Revenue and Customs;
 
"relevant Northern Ireland department" means the Department for Employment and Learning, the Department of the Environment, the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety or the Department for Social Development;
 
"relevant function" means—
 
(a) in relation to the Department for Employment and Learning, a function relating to employment or training,
 
(b) in relation to the Department of the Environment, a function under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981;
 
(c) in relation to the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, a function relating to health or social care;
 
(d) in relation to the Department for Social Development, a function relating to social security or child support;
 
(e) in relation to the Secretary of State, a function relating to passports or the Gangmasters Licensing Authority;
 
(f) in relation to the Commissioners, any of their functions.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION BY RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
19.—(1) A report compiled under paragraph 18 may be supplied to the Chief Constable by—
 
(a) the relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners, or
 
(d) a person within paragraph 18(2)(d).
 
(2) Such a report may contain any information held—
 
(a) by the relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(b) by a person within paragraph 18(2)(d) in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there.
 
(3) Where such a report contains information within sub-paragraph (2), the Chief Constable—
 
(a) may retain the information, whether or not used for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Part, and
 
(b) may use the information for any purpose related to the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences (whether or not under this Part), but for no other purpose.
 
(4) Sub-paragraphs (4) to (7) of paragraph 18 apply in relation to this paragraph as they apply in relation to paragraph 18.
 
INFORMATION ABOUT RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF OFFENDER
 
20.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements who is—
 
(a) serving a custodial sentence; or
 
(b) detained in a hospital.
 
(2) The Department may by regulations make provision requiring the person who is responsible for such an offender to give notice to specified persons—
 
(a) of the fact that that person has become responsible for the offender; and
 
(b) of any occasion when—
 
(i) the offender is released, or
 
(ii) a different person is to become responsible for the offender.
 
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) "specified persons" means persons specified, or of a description specified, in the regulations.
 
(4) The regulations may make provision for determining who is to be taken for the purposes of this paragraph as being responsible for an offender.
 
POWER OF ENTRY AND SEARCH OF OFFENDER’S HOME ADDRESS
 
21.—(1) If, on an application made by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above, a lay magistrate is satisfied that the requirements in sub-paragraph (2) are met in relation to any premises, the lay magistrate may issue a warrant authorising a constable—
 
(a) to enter the premises for the purpose of assessing the risks posed by the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates; and
 
(b) to search the premises for that purpose.
 
(2) The requirements are—
 
(a) that the address of each set of premises specified in the application is an address falling within sub-paragraph (3);
 
(b) that the offender is not one to whom sub-paragraph (4) applies;
 
(c) that it is necessary for a constable to enter and search the premises for the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a); and
 
(d) that on at least two occasions a constable has sought entry to the premises in order to search them for that purpose and has been unable to obtain entry for that purpose.
 
(3) An address falls within this sub-paragraph if—
 
(a) it is the address which was last notified in accordance with this Schedule by the offender to the police as the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies to an offender if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) A warrant issued under this paragraph must specify the one or more sets of premises to which it relates.
 
(6) The warrant may authorise the constable executing it to use reasonable force if necessary to enter and search the premises.
 
(7) The warrant may authorise entry to and search of premises on more than one occasion if, on the application, the lay magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary to authorise multiple entries in order to achieve the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
 
(8) Where a warrant issued under this paragraph authorises multiple entries, the number of entries authorised may be unlimited or limited to a maximum.
 
(9) In this paragraph a reference to the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates is a reference to the offender—
 
(a) who has in accordance with this Schedule notified the police that the premises specified in the warrant are the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
GUIDANCE
 
22.—(1) The Department must issue guidance to the Chief Constable in relation to the exercise of the powers of the Chief Constable under this Schedule.
 
(2) The Department may, from time to time, revise the guidance issued under sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) The Department must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this paragraph to be published in a way the Department considers appropriate.
 
INTERPRETATION OF THIS SCHEDULE
 
23.—(1) In this Schedule—
 
"cautioned" means cautioned after the person concerned has admitted the offence;
 
"custodial sentence" means—
 
(a) a sentence of imprisonment,
 
(b) a sentence of detention in a young offenders centre;
 
(c) a sentence of detention under Article 13(4)(b) or 14(5) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008;
 
(d) a sentence of detention under Article 45 of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998;
 
(e) an order under Article 39A of that Order sending the offender to a juvenile justice centre;
 
(f) any other sentence under which a person is detained in custody;
 
"detained in a hospital" means detained in a hospital under Part 3 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
"home address" has the meaning given by paragraph 10(4);
 
"interim slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 7;
 
"slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 1 or 2;
 
"slavery or human trafficking offence" has the meaning given by paragraph 1(4).
 
(2) In this Schedule "passport" means—
 
(a) United Kingdom passport within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
 
(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.
 
(3) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a conviction for an offence in respect of which an order for conditional discharge is made, despite—
 
(a) Article 6(1) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (conviction with conditional discharge deemed not to be a conviction), or
 
(b) section 14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (equivalent provision for England and Wales).
 
(4) Sub-paragraph (3) applies only to convictions after this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(5) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a finding of a court in summary proceedings that the accused did the act charged, where the court makes an order under—
 
(a) Article 44(4) of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
 
(b) section 37(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983, or
 
(c) section 58(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
 
(hospital and guardianship orders).
 
(6) In relation to an offence under the law of Scotland, a reference in this Schedule to a person being found not guilty by reason of insanity is to be treated as a reference to a person being acquitted by reason of the special defence in section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
 
(7) References in this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are to be read in accordance with paragraph 9.
 
(8) In this Schedule, a reference to a finding that a person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence includes a finding that a person is under a disability or insane and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence.
 
(9) A person’s age is to be treated for the purposes of this Schedule as being that which it appears to the court to be after considering any available evidence.".

New Schedule

Amendment No 62 made:

After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 3
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
PART 1
 
MAKING AND EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON DEALING WITH DEFENDANT
 
1.—(1) A court may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") where it deals with the defendant in respect of—
 
(a) a conviction for a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a finding that the defendant is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity, or
 
(c) a finding that the defendant is unfit to plead and has done the act charged against the defendant in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), convictions and findings include those taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(4) In this Schedule a "slavery or human trafficking offence" means any of the following offences—
 
(a) an offence under section 145 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(b) an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (trafficking for sexual exploitation);
 
(c) an offence under section 62 of that Act (committing offence with intent to commit relevant sexual offence), where the relevant sexual offence the person in question intended to commit was an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of that Act;
 
(d) an offence under section 22 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(e) an offence under section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (trafficking for exploitation);
 
(f) an offence under section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(g) an offence under section 47 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(h) an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D of this Act;
 
(i) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence listed above;
 
(j) an offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of an offence so listed;
 
(k) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting) where the offence (or one of the offences) which the person in question intends or believes would be committed is an offence so listed.
 
(5) The Department may by order amend sub-paragraph (4).
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON APPLICATION
 
2.—(1) A court of summary jurisdiction may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") on an application by the Chief Constable.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) the defendant is a relevant offender (see paragraph 3), and
 
(b) since the defendant first became a relevant offender, the defendant has acted in a way which means that the condition in sub-paragraph (3) is met.
 
(3) The condition is that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(4) The Chief Constable may make an application under this paragraph only in respect of a person—
 
(a) who lives in Northern Ireland, or
 
(b) who the Chief Constable believes is in, or is intending to come to, Northern Ireland.
 
(5) An application under this paragraph is to be made by complaint.
 
(6) The acts of the defendant which may be relied on for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b) include acts taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(7) The Department may by order provide that an application under this paragraph may be made by a person or body specified in the order (as well as by the Chief Constable); and such an order may make such consequential amendments to this Schedule as the Department thinks necessary or expedient.
 
MEANING OF "RELEVANT OFFENDER"
 
3.—(1) A person is a "relevant offender" for the purposes of paragraph 2 if sub- paragraph (2) or (3) applies to the person.
 
(2) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a court has made a finding that the person is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if, under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of an equivalent offence (whether or not the person has been punished for it),
 
(b) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of an equivalent offence.
 
(4) An "equivalent offence" means an act which—
 
(a) constituted an offence under the law of the country concerned, and
 
(b) would have constituted a slavery or human trafficking offence under the law of Northern Ireland if it had been done in Northern Ireland, or by a UK national, or as regards the United Kingdom.
 
(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) an act punishable under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom constitutes an offence under that law, however it is described in that law.
 
(6) On an application under paragraph 2 where sub-paragraph (3) is alleged to apply to the defendant, the condition in sub-paragraph (4)(b) is to be taken as met unless—
 
(a) not later than provided by magistrates’ court rules, the defendant serves on the Chief Constable a notice which states that in the defendant’s opinion the condition is not met, shows the grounds for that opinion, and requires the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met, or
 
(b) the court permits the defendant to require the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met without service of such a notice.
 
(7) References in this paragraph to convictions, findings and cautions include those taking place before this paragraph comes into operation.
 
EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
4.—(1) A slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(2) The only prohibitions or requirements that may be included in the order are those which the court is satisfied are necessary for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) Subject to paragraph 5(1), a prohibition or requirement contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order has effect—
 
(a) for a fixed period, specified in the order, of at least 5 years, or
 
(b) until further order.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may specify that some of its prohibitions or requirements have effect until further order and some for a fixed period;
 
(b) may specify different periods for different prohibitions or requirements.
 
(5) If a court makes a slavery and trafficking prevention order in relation to a person who is already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.
 
PROHIBITIONS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL
 
5.—(1) A prohibition on foreign travel contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order must be for a fixed period of not more than 5 years.
 
(2) A "prohibition on foreign travel" means—
 
(a) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom named or described in the order,
 
(b) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom other than a country named or described in the order, or
 
(c) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) Sub-paragraph (1) does not prevent a prohibition on foreign travel from being extended for a further period (of no more than 5 years each time) under paragraph 6.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order that contains a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c) must require the defendant to surrender all of the defendant’s passports at a police station specified in the order—
 
(a) on or before the date when the prohibition takes effect, or
 
(b) within a period specified in the order.
 
(5) Any passports surrendered must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the person ceases to be subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order containing a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c).
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply in relation to—
 
(a) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom if the passport has been returned to those authorities;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of an international organisation if the passport has been returned to that organisation.
 
VARIATION, RENEWAL AND DISCHARGE
 
6.—(1) A person within sub-paragraph (2) may apply to the appropriate court for an order varying, renewing or discharging a slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(2) The persons are—
 
(a) the defendant;
 
(b) the Chief Constable.
 
(3) On the application the court, after hearing—
 
(a) the person making the application, and
 
(b) the other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) (if that person wishes to be heard),
 
may make any order varying, renewing or discharging the slavery and trafficking prevention order that the court considers appropriate.
 
(4) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions or requirements on the defendant, only if the court is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to renew or vary the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(5) Any renewed or varied order may contain only those prohibitions or requirements which the court is satisfied are necessary for that purpose.
 
(6) The court must not discharge an order before the end of 5 years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and the Chief Constable.
 
(7) Sub-paragraph (6) does not apply to an order containing a prohibition on foreign travel and no other prohibitions.
 
(8) In this paragraph "the appropriate court" means—
 
(a) where the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal made the slavery and trafficking prevention order, the Crown Court;
 
(b) in any other case, a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
(9) An application under sub-paragraph (1) may be made—
 
(a) where the appropriate court is the Crown Court, in accordance with Crown Court rules;
 
(b) in any other case, by complaint.
 
INTERIM SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
7.—(1) This paragraph applies where an application under paragraph 2 ("the main application") has not been determined.
 
(2) An application for an "interim slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or
 
(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.
 
(3) The court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(4) An interim slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(5) The order—
 
(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;
 
(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.
 
(6) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.
 
APPEALS
 
8.—(1) A defendant may appeal against the making of a slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(a), as if the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence;
 
(b) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(b) or (c), as if the defendant had been convicted of the offence and the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for that offence;
 
(c) where the order was made on an application under paragraph 2, to the county court.
 
(2) A defendant may appeal to the county court against the making of an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(3) A defendant may appeal against the making of an order under paragraph 6, or the refusal to make such an order—
 
(a) where the application for such an order was made to the Crown Court, to the Court of Appeal;
 
(b) in any other case, to the county court.
 
(4) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c), (2) or (3)(b), the county court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.
 
(5) Any order made by the county court on an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c) or (2) is for the purposes of paragraph 6(8) or 7(6) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought.
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply to an order directing that an application be reheard by a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
PART 2
 
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
OFFENDER SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
9.—(1) References in the following provisions of this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are references to an offender who is for the time being subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order which is in effect under this Schedule.
 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) has effect subject to paragraph 12(7) (which excludes from paragraph 12 an offender subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order).
 
INITIAL NOTIFICATION
 
10.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must notify the required information to the police within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which the slavery and trafficking prevention order or the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order comes into force in relation to the offender ("the relevant date").
 
(2) The "required information" is the following information about the offender—
 
(a) date of birth;
 
(b) national insurance number;
 
(c) name on the relevant date or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(d) home address on the relevant date;
 
(e) name on the date on which the notification is given or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(f) home address on the date on which the notification is given;
 
(g) the address of any other premises in the United Kingdom at which on that date the offender regularly resides or stays;
 
(h) any information prescribed by regulations made by the Department.
 
(3) When determining the period of 3 days mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), there is to be disregarded any time when the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(4) In this Part "home address" means in relation to the offender—
 
(a) the address of the offender’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or
 
(b) if the offender has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the offender can regularly be found or, if there is more than one such place, such one of them as the offender selects.
 
NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES
 
11.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which any notifiable event occurs, notify to the police—
 
(a) the required new information, and
 
(b) the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2).
 
(2) A "notifiable event" means—
 
(a) the use by the offender of a name which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(b) any change of the offender’s home address;
 
(c) the expiry of any qualifying period during which the offender has resided or stayed at any premises in the United Kingdom the address of which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(d) any prescribed change of circumstances; or
 
(e) the release of the offender from custody pursuant to an order of a court or from a custodial sentence or detention in a hospital.
 
(3) The "required new information" is—
 
(a) the name referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(a),
 
(b) the new home address (see sub-paragraph (2)(b)),
 
(c) the address of the premises referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(c),
 
(d) the prescribed details, or
 
(e) the fact that the offender has been released as mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(e),
 
as the case may be.
 
(4) A notification under sub-paragraph (1) may be given before the notifiable event occurs, but in that case the offender must also specify the date when the event is expected to occur.
 
(5) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates occurs more than 2 days before the date specified, the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1).
 
(6) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates has not occurred by the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified—
 
(a) the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1), and
 
(b) the offender must, within the period of 6 days beginning with the date specified, notify to the police the fact that the event did not occur within the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified.
 
(7) Paragraph 10(3) applies to the determination of—
 
(a) any period of 3 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), or
 
(b) any period of 6 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (6),
 
as it applies to the determination of the period of 3 days mentioned in paragraph 10(1).
 
(8) In this paragraph—
 
(a) "prescribed change of circumstances" means any change—
 
(i) occurring in relation to any matter in respect of which information is required to be notified by virtue of paragraph 10(2)(h), and
 
(ii) of a description prescribed by regulations made by the Department;
 
(b) "the prescribed details", in relation to a prescribed change of circumstances, means such details of the change as may be so prescribed.
 
(9) In this paragraph "qualifying period" means—
 
(a) a period of 7 days, or
 
(b) two or more periods, in any period of 12 months, which taken together amount to 7 days.
 
PERIODIC NOTIFICATION
 
12.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the applicable period after each notification date, notify to the police the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2), unless the offender has already given a notification under paragraph 11(1) within that period.
 
(2) A "notification date" means, in relation to the offender, the date of any notification given by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) Where the applicable period would (apart from this paragraph) end while sub-paragraph (4) applies, that period is to be treated as continuing until the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which sub-paragraph (4) first ceases to apply.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court,
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence,
 
(c) detained in a hospital, or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) In this paragraph "the applicable period" means—
 
(a) in any case where sub-paragraph (6) applies, such period as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Department, and
 
(b) in any other case, the period of one year.
 
(6) This sub-paragraph applies if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1) was the address or location of such a place as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(b).
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph applies to an offender who is subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
ABSENCE FROM NOTIFIED RESIDENCE
 
13.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements at any time if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1) was an address in Northern Ireland such as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(a) (sole or main residence).
 
(2) If the offender intends to be absent from that home address for a period of more than 3 days ("the relevant period"), the offender must, not less than 12 hours before leaving that home address, notify to the police the information set out in sub-paragraph (3).
 
(3) The information is—
 
(a) the date on which the offender will leave that home address;
 
(b) such details as the offender holds about—
 
(i) the offender’s travel arrangements during the relevant period;
 
(ii) the offender’s accommodation arrangements during that period;
 
(iii) the offender’s date of return to that address.
 
(4) In this paragraph—
 
"travel arrangements" include, in particular, the means of transport to be used and the dates of travel,
 
"accommodation arrangements" include, in particular, the address of any accommodation at which the relevant offender will spend the night during the relevant period and the nature of that accommodation.
 
(5) Where—
 
(a) an offender has given a notification under sub-paragraph (2), and
 
(b) at any time before that mentioned in that sub-paragraph, the information notified becomes inaccurate or incomplete,
 
the offender must give a further notification under sub-paragraph (2).
 
(6) Where an offender—
 
(a) has notified a date of return to the offender’s home address, but
 
(b) returns to that home address on a date other than that notified,
 
the offender must notify the date of the offender’s actual return to the police within 3 days of the actual return.
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph requires an offender to notify any information which falls to be notified in accordance with a requirement imposed by regulations under paragraph 14.
 
(8) In calculating the relevant period for the purposes of this paragraph there is to be disregarded—
 
(a) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, an address of the kind mentioned in paragraph 10(2)(g) notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1);
 
(b) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, any premises, if his stay at those premises would give rise to a requirement to notify the address of those premises under paragraph 11(2)(c).
 
TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM
 
14.—(1) The Department may by regulations make provision with respect to offenders subject to notification requirements, or any description of such offenders—
 
(a) requiring such persons, before they leave the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (2);
 
(b) requiring such persons, if they subsequently return to the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (3).
 
(2) A notification under this paragraph must disclose—
 
(a) the date on which the offender proposes to leave the United Kingdom;
 
(b) the country (or, if there is more than one, the first country) to which the offender proposes to travel and the proposed point of arrival (determined in accordance with the regulations) in that country;
 
(c) any other information prescribed by the regulations which the offender holds about the offender’s departure from or return to the United Kingdom, or about the offender’s movements while outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) A notification under this sub-paragraph must disclose any information prescribed by the regulations about the offender’s return to the United Kingdom.
 
METHOD OF NOTIFICATION AND RELATED MATTERS
 
15.—(1) An offender gives a notification to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6) by—
 
(a) attending at any police station in Northern Ireland prescribed by regulations under section 87(1)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and
 
(b) giving an oral notification to any police officer, or to any person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station.
 
(2) Any notification given in accordance with this paragraph must be acknowledged; and the acknowledgement must be—
 
(a) in writing, and
 
(b) in such form as the Department may direct.
 
(3) Where a notification is given under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), the offender must, if requested to do so by the police officer or other person mentioned in paragraph (1)(b), allow that officer or person to—
 
(a) take the offender’s fingerprints,
 
(b) photograph any part of the offender, or
 
(c) do both of those things,
 
in order to verify the offender's identity.
 
(4) Fingerprints taken from a person under this paragraph (and any copies of those fingerprints) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(5) Photographs taken of any part of the offender under this paragraph (and any copies of such photographs) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(6) In this paragraph "photograph" includes any process by means of which an image may be produced.
 
PART 3
 
SUPPLEMENTARY
 
OFFENCES
 
16.—(1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with any prohibition or requirement contained in—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order, or
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
commits an offence.
 
(2) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or (6)(b), 12(1), 13(2) or (6) or 15(3), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
commits an offence.
 
(3) A person who notifies to the police, in purported compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
any information which the person knows to be false, commits an offence.
 
(4) As regards an offence under sub-paragraph (2), so far as it relates to non-compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
a person commits such an offence on the first day on which the person first fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the provision mentioned in paragraph (a) or (as the case may be) the requirement mentioned in paragraph (b), and continues to commit it throughout any period during which the failure continues.
 
(5) But a person must not be prosecuted under sub-paragraph (2) more than once in respect of the same failure.
 
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this paragraph is liable—
 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years;
 
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
 
(7) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this paragraph, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make an order for conditional discharge in respect of the offence.
 
CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT WITHIN UK
 
17.—(1) The Department may by order amend paragraph 16(1) so as to add to or remove from the list of orders in that paragraph any relevant UK order.
 
(2) "Relevant UK order" means an order under the law of Scotland or England and Wales which appears to the Department to be equivalent or similar to—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION TO RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
18.—(1) This paragraph applies to information notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1).
 
(2) The Chief Constable may, for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Schedule, supply information to which this paragraph applies to—
 
(a) a relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners,
 
(d) a person providing services to a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with a relevant function,
 
for use for the purpose of verifying the information.
 
(3) In relation to information supplied to any person under sub-paragraph (2), the reference to verifying the information is a reference to—
 
(a) checking its accuracy by comparing it with information held—
 
(i) in the case of a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners by that department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(ii) in the case of a person within sub-paragraph (2)(d), by that person in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there, and
 
(b) compiling a report of that comparison.
 
(4) Subject to sub-paragraph (5), the supply of information under this paragraph is to be taken not to breach any restriction on the disclosure of information (however arising).
 
(5) This paragraph does not authorise the doing of anything that contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998.
 
(6) This paragraph does not affect any power to supply information that exists apart from this paragraph.
 
(7) In this paragraph—
 
"the Commissioners" means Her Majesty’s Commissioners for Revenue and Customs;
 
"relevant Northern Ireland department" means the Department for Employment and Learning, the Department of the Environment, the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety or the Department for Social Development;
 
"relevant function" means—
 
(a) in relation to the Department for Employment and Learning, a function relating to employment or training,
 
(b) in relation to the Department of the Environment, a function under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981;
 
(c) in relation to the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, a function relating to health or social care;
 
(d) in relation to the Department for Social Development, a function relating to social security or child support;
 
(e) in relation to the Secretary of State, a function relating to passports or the Gangmasters Licensing Authority;
 
(f) in relation to the Commissioners, any of their functions.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION BY RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
19.—(1) A report compiled under paragraph 18 may be supplied to the Chief Constable by—
 
(a) the relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners, or
 
(d) a person within paragraph 18(2)(d).
 
(2) Such a report may contain any information held—
 
(a) by the relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(b) by a person within paragraph 18(2)(d) in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there.
 
(3) Where such a report contains information within sub-paragraph (2), the Chief Constable—
 
(a) may retain the information, whether or not used for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Part, and
 
(b) may use the information for any purpose related to the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences (whether or not under this Part), but for no other purpose.
 
(4) Sub-paragraphs (4) to (7) of paragraph 18 apply in relation to this paragraph as they apply in relation to paragraph 18.
 
INFORMATION ABOUT RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF OFFENDER
 
20.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements who is—
 
(a) serving a custodial sentence; or
 
(b) detained in a hospital.
 
(2) The Department may by regulations make provision requiring the person who is responsible for such an offender to give notice to specified persons—
 
(a) of the fact that that person has become responsible for the offender; and
 
(b) of any occasion when—
 
(i) the offender is released, or
 
(ii) a different person is to become responsible for the offender.
 
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) "specified persons" means persons specified, or of a description specified, in the regulations.
 
(4) The regulations may make provision for determining who is to be taken for the purposes of this paragraph as being responsible for an offender.
 
POWER OF ENTRY AND SEARCH OF OFFENDER’S HOME ADDRESS
 
21.—(1) If, on an application made by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above, a lay magistrate is satisfied that the requirements in sub-paragraph (2) are met in relation to any premises, the lay magistrate may issue a warrant authorising a constable—
 
(a) to enter the premises for the purpose of assessing the risks posed by the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates; and
 
(b) to search the premises for that purpose.
 
(2) The requirements are—
 
(a) that the address of each set of premises specified in the application is an address falling within sub-paragraph (3);
 
(b) that the offender is not one to whom sub-paragraph (4) applies;
 
(c) that it is necessary for a constable to enter and search the premises for the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a); and
 
(d) that on at least two occasions a constable has sought entry to the premises in order to search them for that purpose and has been unable to obtain entry for that purpose.
 
(3) An address falls within this sub-paragraph if—
 
(a) it is the address which was last notified in accordance with this Schedule by the offender to the police as the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies to an offender if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) A warrant issued under this paragraph must specify the one or more sets of premises to which it relates.
 
(6) The warrant may authorise the constable executing it to use reasonable force if necessary to enter and search the premises.
 
(7) The warrant may authorise entry to and search of premises on more than one occasion if, on the application, the lay magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary to authorise multiple entries in order to achieve the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
 
(8) Where a warrant issued under this paragraph authorises multiple entries, the number of entries authorised may be unlimited or limited to a maximum.
 
(9) In this paragraph a reference to the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates is a reference to the offender—
 
(a) who has in accordance with this Schedule notified the police that the premises specified in the warrant are the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
GUIDANCE
 
22.—(1) The Department must issue guidance to the Chief Constable in relation to the exercise of the powers of the Chief Constable under this Schedule.
 
(2) The Department may, from time to time, revise the guidance issued under sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) The Department must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this paragraph to be published in a way the Department considers appropriate.
 
INTERPRETATION OF THIS SCHEDULE
 
23.—(1) In this Schedule—
 
"cautioned" means cautioned after the person concerned has admitted the offence;
 
"custodial sentence" means—
 
(a) a sentence of imprisonment,
 
(b) a sentence of detention in a young offenders centre;
 
(c) a sentence of detention under Article 13(4)(b) or 14(5) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008;
 
(d) a sentence of detention under Article 45 of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998;
 
(e) an order under Article 39A of that Order sending the offender to a juvenile justice centre;
 
(f) any other sentence under which a person is detained in custody;
 
"detained in a hospital" means detained in a hospital under Part 3 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
"home address" has the meaning given by paragraph 10(4);
 
"interim slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 7;
 
"slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 1 or 2;
 
"slavery or human trafficking offence" has the meaning given by paragraph 1(4).
 
(2) In this Schedule "passport" means—
 
(a) United Kingdom passport within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
 
(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.
 
(3) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a conviction for an offence in respect of which an order for conditional discharge is made, despite—
 
(a) Article 6(1) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (conviction with conditional discharge deemed not to be a conviction), or
 
(b) section 14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (equivalent provision for England and Wales).
 
(4) Sub-paragraph (3) applies only to convictions after this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(5) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a finding of a court in summary proceedings that the accused did the act charged, where the court makes an order under—
 
(a) Article 44(4) of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
 
(b) section 37(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983, or
 
(c) section 58(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
 
(hospital and guardianship orders).
 
(6) In relation to an offence under the law of Scotland, a reference in this Schedule to a person being found not guilty by reason of insanity is to be treated as a reference to a person being acquitted by reason of the special defence in section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
 
(7) References in this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are to be read in accordance with paragraph 9.
 
(8) In this Schedule, a reference to a finding that a person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence includes a finding that a person is under a disability or insane and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence.
 
(9) A person’s age is to be treated for the purposes of this Schedule as being that which it appears to the court to be after considering any available evidence.".

New Schedule

Amendment No 62 made:

After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 3
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
PART 1
 
MAKING AND EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON DEALING WITH DEFENDANT
 
1.—(1) A court may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") where it deals with the defendant in respect of—
 
(a) a conviction for a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a finding that the defendant is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity, or
 
(c) a finding that the defendant is unfit to plead and has done the act charged against the defendant in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), convictions and findings include those taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(4) In this Schedule a "slavery or human trafficking offence" means any of the following offences—
 
(a) an offence under section 145 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(b) an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (trafficking for sexual exploitation);
 
(c) an offence under section 62 of that Act (committing offence with intent to commit relevant sexual offence), where the relevant sexual offence the person in question intended to commit was an offence under section 57, 58, 58A, 59 or 59A of that Act;
 
(d) an offence under section 22 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (trafficking for prostitution);
 
(e) an offence under section 4 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (trafficking for exploitation);
 
(f) an offence under section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(g) an offence under section 47 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour);
 
(h) an offence under section 1A, 1B or 1D of this Act;
 
(i) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence listed above;
 
(j) an offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of an offence so listed;
 
(k) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting) where the offence (or one of the offences) which the person in question intends or believes would be committed is an offence so listed.
 
(5) The Department may by order amend sub-paragraph (4).
 
SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS ON APPLICATION
 
2.—(1) A court of summary jurisdiction may make a slavery and trafficking prevention order against a person aged 18 or over ("the defendant") on an application by the Chief Constable.
 
(2) The court may make the order only if it is satisfied that—
 
(a) the defendant is a relevant offender (see paragraph 3), and
 
(b) since the defendant first became a relevant offender, the defendant has acted in a way which means that the condition in sub-paragraph (3) is met.
 
(3) The condition is that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to make the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(4) The Chief Constable may make an application under this paragraph only in respect of a person—
 
(a) who lives in Northern Ireland, or
 
(b) who the Chief Constable believes is in, or is intending to come to, Northern Ireland.
 
(5) An application under this paragraph is to be made by complaint.
 
(6) The acts of the defendant which may be relied on for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b) include acts taking place before this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(7) The Department may by order provide that an application under this paragraph may be made by a person or body specified in the order (as well as by the Chief Constable); and such an order may make such consequential amendments to this Schedule as the Department thinks necessary or expedient.
 
MEANING OF "RELEVANT OFFENDER"
 
3.—(1) A person is a "relevant offender" for the purposes of paragraph 2 if sub- paragraph (2) or (3) applies to the person.
 
(2) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of a slavery or human trafficking offence,
 
(b) a court has made a finding that the person is not guilty of a slavery or human trafficking offence by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) This sub-paragraph applies to a person if, under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom—
 
(a) the person has been convicted of an equivalent offence (whether or not the person has been punished for it),
 
(b) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity,
 
(c) a court has made, in relation to an equivalent offence, a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person, or
 
(d) the person has been cautioned in respect of an equivalent offence.
 
(4) An "equivalent offence" means an act which—
 
(a) constituted an offence under the law of the country concerned, and
 
(b) would have constituted a slavery or human trafficking offence under the law of Northern Ireland if it had been done in Northern Ireland, or by a UK national, or as regards the United Kingdom.
 
(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) an act punishable under the law of a country outside the United Kingdom constitutes an offence under that law, however it is described in that law.
 
(6) On an application under paragraph 2 where sub-paragraph (3) is alleged to apply to the defendant, the condition in sub-paragraph (4)(b) is to be taken as met unless—
 
(a) not later than provided by magistrates’ court rules, the defendant serves on the Chief Constable a notice which states that in the defendant’s opinion the condition is not met, shows the grounds for that opinion, and requires the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met, or
 
(b) the court permits the defendant to require the Chief Constable to prove that the condition is met without service of such a notice.
 
(7) References in this paragraph to convictions, findings and cautions include those taking place before this paragraph comes into operation.
 
EFFECT OF SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
4.—(1) A slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(2) The only prohibitions or requirements that may be included in the order are those which the court is satisfied are necessary for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed a slavery or human trafficking offence.
 
(3) Subject to paragraph 5(1), a prohibition or requirement contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order has effect—
 
(a) for a fixed period, specified in the order, of at least 5 years, or
 
(b) until further order.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may specify that some of its prohibitions or requirements have effect until further order and some for a fixed period;
 
(b) may specify different periods for different prohibitions or requirements.
 
(5) If a court makes a slavery and trafficking prevention order in relation to a person who is already subject to such an order (whether made by that court or another), the earlier order ceases to have effect.
 
PROHIBITIONS ON FOREIGN TRAVEL
 
5.—(1) A prohibition on foreign travel contained in a slavery and trafficking prevention order must be for a fixed period of not more than 5 years.
 
(2) A "prohibition on foreign travel" means—
 
(a) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom named or described in the order,
 
(b) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom other than a country named or described in the order, or
 
(c) a prohibition on travelling to any country outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) Sub-paragraph (1) does not prevent a prohibition on foreign travel from being extended for a further period (of no more than 5 years each time) under paragraph 6.
 
(4) A slavery and trafficking prevention order that contains a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c) must require the defendant to surrender all of the defendant’s passports at a police station specified in the order—
 
(a) on or before the date when the prohibition takes effect, or
 
(b) within a period specified in the order.
 
(5) Any passports surrendered must be returned as soon as reasonably practicable after the person ceases to be subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order containing a prohibition within sub-paragraph (2)(c).
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply in relation to—
 
(a) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom if the passport has been returned to those authorities;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of an international organisation if the passport has been returned to that organisation.
 
VARIATION, RENEWAL AND DISCHARGE
 
6.—(1) A person within sub-paragraph (2) may apply to the appropriate court for an order varying, renewing or discharging a slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(2) The persons are—
 
(a) the defendant;
 
(b) the Chief Constable.
 
(3) On the application the court, after hearing—
 
(a) the person making the application, and
 
(b) the other person mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) (if that person wishes to be heard),
 
may make any order varying, renewing or discharging the slavery and trafficking prevention order that the court considers appropriate.
 
(4) An order may be renewed, or varied so as to impose additional prohibitions or requirements on the defendant, only if the court is satisfied that—
 
(a) there is a risk that the defendant may commit a slavery or human trafficking offence; and
 
(b) it is necessary to renew or vary the order for the purpose of protecting persons generally, or particular persons, from the physical or psychological harm which would be likely to occur if the defendant committed such an offence.
 
(5) Any renewed or varied order may contain only those prohibitions or requirements which the court is satisfied are necessary for that purpose.
 
(6) The court must not discharge an order before the end of 5 years beginning with the day on which the order was made, without the consent of the defendant and the Chief Constable.
 
(7) Sub-paragraph (6) does not apply to an order containing a prohibition on foreign travel and no other prohibitions.
 
(8) In this paragraph "the appropriate court" means—
 
(a) where the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal made the slavery and trafficking prevention order, the Crown Court;
 
(b) in any other case, a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
(9) An application under sub-paragraph (1) may be made—
 
(a) where the appropriate court is the Crown Court, in accordance with Crown Court rules;
 
(b) in any other case, by complaint.
 
INTERIM SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING PREVENTION ORDERS
 
7.—(1) This paragraph applies where an application under paragraph 2 ("the main application") has not been determined.
 
(2) An application for an "interim slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) may be made by the complaint by which the main application is made, or
 
(b) if the main application has been made, may be made by the person who has made that application, by complaint to the court to which that application has been made.
 
(3) The court may, if it considers it just to do so, make an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(4) An interim slavery and trafficking prevention order is an order prohibiting the defendant from doing anything described in the order or requiring the defendant to do anything described in the order (or both).
 
(5) The order—
 
(a) has effect only for a fixed period, specified in the order;
 
(b) ceases to have effect, if it has not already done so, on the determination of the main application.
 
(6) The applicant or the defendant may by complaint apply to the court that made the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order for the order to be varied, renewed or discharged.
 
APPEALS
 
8.—(1) A defendant may appeal against the making of a slavery and trafficking prevention order—
 
(a) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(a), as if the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for the offence;
 
(b) where the order was made under paragraph 1(1)(b) or (c), as if the defendant had been convicted of the offence and the order were a sentence passed on the defendant for that offence;
 
(c) where the order was made on an application under paragraph 2, to the county court.
 
(2) A defendant may appeal to the county court against the making of an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
(3) A defendant may appeal against the making of an order under paragraph 6, or the refusal to make such an order—
 
(a) where the application for such an order was made to the Crown Court, to the Court of Appeal;
 
(b) in any other case, to the county court.
 
(4) On an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c), (2) or (3)(b), the county court may make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and may also make such incidental or consequential orders as appear to it to be just.
 
(5) Any order made by the county court on an appeal under sub-paragraph (1)(c) or (2) is for the purposes of paragraph 6(8) or 7(6) (respectively) to be treated as if it were an order of the court from which the appeal was brought.
 
(6) Sub-paragraph (5) does not apply to an order directing that an application be reheard by a court of summary jurisdiction.
 
PART 2
 
NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
OFFENDER SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
 
9.—(1) References in the following provisions of this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are references to an offender who is for the time being subject to a slavery and trafficking prevention order or an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order which is in effect under this Schedule.
 
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) has effect subject to paragraph 12(7) (which excludes from paragraph 12 an offender subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order).
 
INITIAL NOTIFICATION
 
10.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must notify the required information to the police within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which the slavery and trafficking prevention order or the interim slavery and trafficking prevention order comes into force in relation to the offender ("the relevant date").
 
(2) The "required information" is the following information about the offender—
 
(a) date of birth;
 
(b) national insurance number;
 
(c) name on the relevant date or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(d) home address on the relevant date;
 
(e) name on the date on which the notification is given or, if the offender used two or more names on that date, each of those names;
 
(f) home address on the date on which the notification is given;
 
(g) the address of any other premises in the United Kingdom at which on that date the offender regularly resides or stays;
 
(h) any information prescribed by regulations made by the Department.
 
(3) When determining the period of 3 days mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), there is to be disregarded any time when the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(4) In this Part "home address" means in relation to the offender—
 
(a) the address of the offender’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or
 
(b) if the offender has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the offender can regularly be found or, if there is more than one such place, such one of them as the offender selects.
 
NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES
 
11.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which any notifiable event occurs, notify to the police—
 
(a) the required new information, and
 
(b) the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2).
 
(2) A "notifiable event" means—
 
(a) the use by the offender of a name which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(b) any change of the offender’s home address;
 
(c) the expiry of any qualifying period during which the offender has resided or stayed at any premises in the United Kingdom the address of which has not been notified to the police under paragraph 10 or this paragraph;
 
(d) any prescribed change of circumstances; or
 
(e) the release of the offender from custody pursuant to an order of a court or from a custodial sentence or detention in a hospital.
 
(3) The "required new information" is—
 
(a) the name referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(a),
 
(b) the new home address (see sub-paragraph (2)(b)),
 
(c) the address of the premises referred to in sub-paragraph (2)(c),
 
(d) the prescribed details, or
 
(e) the fact that the offender has been released as mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(e),
 
as the case may be.
 
(4) A notification under sub-paragraph (1) may be given before the notifiable event occurs, but in that case the offender must also specify the date when the event is expected to occur.
 
(5) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates occurs more than 2 days before the date specified, the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1).
 
(6) If a notification is given in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) and the event to which it relates has not occurred by the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified—
 
(a) the notification does not affect the duty imposed by sub-paragraph (1), and
 
(b) the offender must, within the period of 6 days beginning with the date specified, notify to the police the fact that the event did not occur within the period of 3 days beginning with the date specified.
 
(7) Paragraph 10(3) applies to the determination of—
 
(a) any period of 3 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), or
 
(b) any period of 6 days for the purposes of sub-paragraph (6),
 
as it applies to the determination of the period of 3 days mentioned in paragraph 10(1).
 
(8) In this paragraph—
 
(a) "prescribed change of circumstances" means any change—
 
(i) occurring in relation to any matter in respect of which information is required to be notified by virtue of paragraph 10(2)(h), and
 
(ii) of a description prescribed by regulations made by the Department;
 
(b) "the prescribed details", in relation to a prescribed change of circumstances, means such details of the change as may be so prescribed.
 
(9) In this paragraph "qualifying period" means—
 
(a) a period of 7 days, or
 
(b) two or more periods, in any period of 12 months, which taken together amount to 7 days.
 
PERIODIC NOTIFICATION
 
12.—(1) An offender subject to notification requirements must, within the applicable period after each notification date, notify to the police the information mentioned in paragraph 10(2), unless the offender has already given a notification under paragraph 11(1) within that period.
 
(2) A "notification date" means, in relation to the offender, the date of any notification given by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) Where the applicable period would (apart from this paragraph) end while sub-paragraph (4) applies, that period is to be treated as continuing until the end of the period of 3 days beginning with the date on which sub-paragraph (4) first ceases to apply.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court,
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence,
 
(c) detained in a hospital, or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) In this paragraph "the applicable period" means—
 
(a) in any case where sub-paragraph (6) applies, such period as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Department, and
 
(b) in any other case, the period of one year.
 
(6) This sub-paragraph applies if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1) or 11(1) or sub-paragraph (1) was the address or location of such a place as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(b).
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph applies to an offender who is subject to an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
ABSENCE FROM NOTIFIED RESIDENCE
 
13.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements at any time if the last home address notified by the offender under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1) was an address in Northern Ireland such as is mentioned in paragraph 10(4)(a) (sole or main residence).
 
(2) If the offender intends to be absent from that home address for a period of more than 3 days ("the relevant period"), the offender must, not less than 12 hours before leaving that home address, notify to the police the information set out in sub-paragraph (3).
 
(3) The information is—
 
(a) the date on which the offender will leave that home address;
 
(b) such details as the offender holds about—
 
(i) the offender’s travel arrangements during the relevant period;
 
(ii) the offender’s accommodation arrangements during that period;
 
(iii) the offender’s date of return to that address.
 
(4) In this paragraph—
 
"travel arrangements" include, in particular, the means of transport to be used and the dates of travel,
 
"accommodation arrangements" include, in particular, the address of any accommodation at which the relevant offender will spend the night during the relevant period and the nature of that accommodation.
 
(5) Where—
 
(a) an offender has given a notification under sub-paragraph (2), and
 
(b) at any time before that mentioned in that sub-paragraph, the information notified becomes inaccurate or incomplete,
 
the offender must give a further notification under sub-paragraph (2).
 
(6) Where an offender—
 
(a) has notified a date of return to the offender’s home address, but
 
(b) returns to that home address on a date other than that notified,
 
the offender must notify the date of the offender’s actual return to the police within 3 days of the actual return.
 
(7) Nothing in this paragraph requires an offender to notify any information which falls to be notified in accordance with a requirement imposed by regulations under paragraph 14.
 
(8) In calculating the relevant period for the purposes of this paragraph there is to be disregarded—
 
(a) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, an address of the kind mentioned in paragraph 10(2)(g) notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1);
 
(b) any period or periods which the offender intends to spend at, or travelling directly to or from, any premises, if his stay at those premises would give rise to a requirement to notify the address of those premises under paragraph 11(2)(c).
 
TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM
 
14.—(1) The Department may by regulations make provision with respect to offenders subject to notification requirements, or any description of such offenders—
 
(a) requiring such persons, before they leave the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (2);
 
(b) requiring such persons, if they subsequently return to the United Kingdom, to give in accordance with the regulations a notification under sub-paragraph (3).
 
(2) A notification under this paragraph must disclose—
 
(a) the date on which the offender proposes to leave the United Kingdom;
 
(b) the country (or, if there is more than one, the first country) to which the offender proposes to travel and the proposed point of arrival (determined in accordance with the regulations) in that country;
 
(c) any other information prescribed by the regulations which the offender holds about the offender’s departure from or return to the United Kingdom, or about the offender’s movements while outside the United Kingdom.
 
(3) A notification under this sub-paragraph must disclose any information prescribed by the regulations about the offender’s return to the United Kingdom.
 
METHOD OF NOTIFICATION AND RELATED MATTERS
 
15.—(1) An offender gives a notification to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6) by—
 
(a) attending at any police station in Northern Ireland prescribed by regulations under section 87(1)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and
 
(b) giving an oral notification to any police officer, or to any person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station.
 
(2) Any notification given in accordance with this paragraph must be acknowledged; and the acknowledgement must be—
 
(a) in writing, and
 
(b) in such form as the Department may direct.
 
(3) Where a notification is given under paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), the offender must, if requested to do so by the police officer or other person mentioned in paragraph (1)(b), allow that officer or person to—
 
(a) take the offender’s fingerprints,
 
(b) photograph any part of the offender, or
 
(c) do both of those things,
 
in order to verify the offender's identity.
 
(4) Fingerprints taken from a person under this paragraph (and any copies of those fingerprints) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(5) Photographs taken of any part of the offender under this paragraph (and any copies of such photographs) must be destroyed no later than the date on which the offender ceases to be subject to notification requirements.
 
(6) In this paragraph "photograph" includes any process by means of which an image may be produced.
 
PART 3
 
SUPPLEMENTARY
 
OFFENCES
 
16.—(1) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with any prohibition or requirement contained in—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order, or
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
commits an offence.
 
(2) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or (6)(b), 12(1), 13(2) or (6) or 15(3), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
commits an offence.
 
(3) A person who notifies to the police, in purported compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
any information which the person knows to be false, commits an offence.
 
(4) As regards an offence under sub-paragraph (2), so far as it relates to non-compliance with—
 
(a) paragraph 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) or 13(2) or (6), or
 
(b) any requirement imposed by regulations made under paragraph 14(1),
 
a person commits such an offence on the first day on which the person first fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the provision mentioned in paragraph (a) or (as the case may be) the requirement mentioned in paragraph (b), and continues to commit it throughout any period during which the failure continues.
 
(5) But a person must not be prosecuted under sub-paragraph (2) more than once in respect of the same failure.
 
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this paragraph is liable—
 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years;
 
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
 
(7) Where a person is convicted of an offence under this paragraph, it is not open to the court by or before which the person is convicted to make an order for conditional discharge in respect of the offence.
 
CROSS-BORDER ENFORCEMENT WITHIN UK
 
17.—(1) The Department may by order amend paragraph 16(1) so as to add to or remove from the list of orders in that paragraph any relevant UK order.
 
(2) "Relevant UK order" means an order under the law of Scotland or England and Wales which appears to the Department to be equivalent or similar to—
 
(a) a slavery and trafficking prevention order,
 
(b) an interim slavery and trafficking prevention order.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION TO RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
18.—(1) This paragraph applies to information notified to the police under paragraph 10(1), 11(1) or 12(1).
 
(2) The Chief Constable may, for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Schedule, supply information to which this paragraph applies to—
 
(a) a relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners,
 
(d) a person providing services to a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with a relevant function,
 
for use for the purpose of verifying the information.
 
(3) In relation to information supplied to any person under sub-paragraph (2), the reference to verifying the information is a reference to—
 
(a) checking its accuracy by comparing it with information held—
 
(i) in the case of a relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners by that department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(ii) in the case of a person within sub-paragraph (2)(d), by that person in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there, and
 
(b) compiling a report of that comparison.
 
(4) Subject to sub-paragraph (5), the supply of information under this paragraph is to be taken not to breach any restriction on the disclosure of information (however arising).
 
(5) This paragraph does not authorise the doing of anything that contravenes the Data Protection Act 1998.
 
(6) This paragraph does not affect any power to supply information that exists apart from this paragraph.
 
(7) In this paragraph—
 
"the Commissioners" means Her Majesty’s Commissioners for Revenue and Customs;
 
"relevant Northern Ireland department" means the Department for Employment and Learning, the Department of the Environment, the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety or the Department for Social Development;
 
"relevant function" means—
 
(a) in relation to the Department for Employment and Learning, a function relating to employment or training,
 
(b) in relation to the Department of the Environment, a function under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981;
 
(c) in relation to the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, a function relating to health or social care;
 
(d) in relation to the Department for Social Development, a function relating to social security or child support;
 
(e) in relation to the Secretary of State, a function relating to passports or the Gangmasters Licensing Authority;
 
(f) in relation to the Commissioners, any of their functions.
 
SUPPLY OF INFORMATION BY RELEVANT NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS, SECRETARY OF STATE, THE COMMISSIONERS, ETC.
 
19.—(1) A report compiled under paragraph 18 may be supplied to the Chief Constable by—
 
(a) the relevant Northern Ireland department,
 
(b) the Secretary of State,
 
(c) the Commissioners, or
 
(d) a person within paragraph 18(2)(d).
 
(2) Such a report may contain any information held—
 
(a) by the relevant Northern Ireland department, the Secretary of State or the Commissioners in connection with the exercise of a relevant function, or
 
(b) by a person within paragraph 18(2)(d) in connection with the provision of services as mentioned there.
 
(3) Where such a report contains information within sub-paragraph (2), the Chief Constable—
 
(a) may retain the information, whether or not used for the purposes of the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences under this Part, and
 
(b) may use the information for any purpose related to the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences (whether or not under this Part), but for no other purpose.
 
(4) Sub-paragraphs (4) to (7) of paragraph 18 apply in relation to this paragraph as they apply in relation to paragraph 18.
 
INFORMATION ABOUT RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF OFFENDER
 
20.—(1) This paragraph applies to an offender subject to notification requirements who is—
 
(a) serving a custodial sentence; or
 
(b) detained in a hospital.
 
(2) The Department may by regulations make provision requiring the person who is responsible for such an offender to give notice to specified persons—
 
(a) of the fact that that person has become responsible for the offender; and
 
(b) of any occasion when—
 
(i) the offender is released, or
 
(ii) a different person is to become responsible for the offender.
 
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) "specified persons" means persons specified, or of a description specified, in the regulations.
 
(4) The regulations may make provision for determining who is to be taken for the purposes of this paragraph as being responsible for an offender.
 
POWER OF ENTRY AND SEARCH OF OFFENDER’S HOME ADDRESS
 
21.—(1) If, on an application made by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above, a lay magistrate is satisfied that the requirements in sub-paragraph (2) are met in relation to any premises, the lay magistrate may issue a warrant authorising a constable—
 
(a) to enter the premises for the purpose of assessing the risks posed by the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates; and
 
(b) to search the premises for that purpose.
 
(2) The requirements are—
 
(a) that the address of each set of premises specified in the application is an address falling within sub-paragraph (3);
 
(b) that the offender is not one to whom sub-paragraph (4) applies;
 
(c) that it is necessary for a constable to enter and search the premises for the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a); and
 
(d) that on at least two occasions a constable has sought entry to the premises in order to search them for that purpose and has been unable to obtain entry for that purpose.
 
(3) An address falls within this sub-paragraph if—
 
(a) it is the address which was last notified in accordance with this Schedule by the offender to the police as the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies to an offender if the offender is—
 
(a) remanded in or committed to custody by order of a court;
 
(b) serving a custodial sentence;
 
(c) detained in a hospital; or
 
(d) outside the United Kingdom.
 
(5) A warrant issued under this paragraph must specify the one or more sets of premises to which it relates.
 
(6) The warrant may authorise the constable executing it to use reasonable force if necessary to enter and search the premises.
 
(7) The warrant may authorise entry to and search of premises on more than one occasion if, on the application, the lay magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary to authorise multiple entries in order to achieve the purpose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
 
(8) Where a warrant issued under this paragraph authorises multiple entries, the number of entries authorised may be unlimited or limited to a maximum.
 
(9) In this paragraph a reference to the offender subject to notification requirements to whom the warrant relates is a reference to the offender—
 
(a) who has in accordance with this Schedule notified the police that the premises specified in the warrant are the offender’s home address; or
 
(b) in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offender resides there or may regularly be found there.
 
GUIDANCE
 
22.—(1) The Department must issue guidance to the Chief Constable in relation to the exercise of the powers of the Chief Constable under this Schedule.
 
(2) The Department may, from time to time, revise the guidance issued under sub-paragraph (1).
 
(3) The Department must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this paragraph to be published in a way the Department considers appropriate.
 
INTERPRETATION OF THIS SCHEDULE
 
23.—(1) In this Schedule—
 
"cautioned" means cautioned after the person concerned has admitted the offence;
 
"custodial sentence" means—
 
(a) a sentence of imprisonment,
 
(b) a sentence of detention in a young offenders centre;
 
(c) a sentence of detention under Article 13(4)(b) or 14(5) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008;
 
(d) a sentence of detention under Article 45 of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998;
 
(e) an order under Article 39A of that Order sending the offender to a juvenile justice centre;
 
(f) any other sentence under which a person is detained in custody;
 
"detained in a hospital" means detained in a hospital under Part 3 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
"home address" has the meaning given by paragraph 10(4);
 
"interim slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 7;
 
"slavery and trafficking prevention order" means an order under paragraph 1 or 2;
 
"slavery or human trafficking offence" has the meaning given by paragraph 1(4).
 
(2) In this Schedule "passport" means—
 
(a) United Kingdom passport within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971;
 
(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country outside the United Kingdom, or by or on behalf of an international organisation;
 
(c) a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.
 
(3) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a conviction for an offence in respect of which an order for conditional discharge is made, despite—
 
(a) Article 6(1) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (conviction with conditional discharge deemed not to be a conviction), or
 
(b) section 14(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (equivalent provision for England and Wales).
 
(4) Sub-paragraph (3) applies only to convictions after this Schedule comes into operation.
 
(5) In this Schedule a reference to a conviction includes a finding of a court in summary proceedings that the accused did the act charged, where the court makes an order under—
 
(a) Article 44(4) of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;
 
(b) section 37(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983, or
 
(c) section 58(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
 
(hospital and guardianship orders).
 
(6) In relation to an offence under the law of Scotland, a reference in this Schedule to a person being found not guilty by reason of insanity is to be treated as a reference to a person being acquitted by reason of the special defence in section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
 
(7) References in this Schedule to an offender subject to notification requirements are to be read in accordance with paragraph 9.
 
(8) In this Schedule, a reference to a finding that a person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence includes a finding that a person is under a disability or insane and has done the act charged against the person in respect of an offence.
 
(9) A person’s age is to be treated for the purposes of this Schedule as being that which it appears to the court to be after considering any available evidence.".

Schedule 3 agreed to.

New Schedule

Amendment No 63 made:

After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 4
 
MINOR AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS
 
PART 1
 
AMENDMENTS RELATING TO OFFENCES UNDER SECTION 1A OR 1B
 
THE CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS ACT (NORTHERN IRELAND) 1968 (C. 34)
 
1. In Schedule 1 (offences against children and young persons to which special provisions of the Act apply) at the end add—
 
"An offence against a child or young person under section 1A or 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 or any attempt to commit such an offence.".
 
THE IMMIGRATION ACT 1971 (C. 77)
 
2. In section 25C (forfeiture of vehicle, ship or aircraft) in subsections (9)(b), (10)(b) and (11) for the words from "a passenger" to the end substitute "the victim of conduct which constitutes an offence under section 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland 2014".
 
THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (NORTHERN IRELAND) ORDER 1989 (NI 12)
 
3. In Article 53A(2) (questioning and treatment of persons by police: meaning of "qualifying offence") at the end add—
 
"(t) an offence under section 1A or 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014.".
 
THE SEXUAL OFFENCES (AMENDMENT) ACT 1992 (C. 34)
 
4. In section 2(3) (offences under law of Northern Ireland to which the Act applies)—
 
(a) after paragraph (hb) insert—
 
"(hc) any offence under section 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014;";
 
(b) in paragraph (i) for "(hb)" substitute "(hc)".
 
THE SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 2003 (C. 42)
 
5. In Schedule 5 (relevant offences for purposes of notification and orders) after paragraph 171B insert—
 
"171C An offence under section 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014."
 
THE ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION (TREATMENT OF CLAIMANTS, ETC.) ACT 2004 (C. 19)
 
6. In section 14(2) (immigration officers’ power of arrest) after paragraph (q) insert—
 
"(r) an offence under section 1A or 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014."
 
THE SERIOUS CRIME ACT 2007 (C. 27)
 
7. In paragraph 18 of Part 2 of Schedule 1 (serious offences in Northern Ireland) at the end add—
 
"(4) An offence under section 1A or 1B of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014."
 
PART 2
 
AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING REPARATION ORDERS
 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE (NORTHERN IRELAND) ORDER 1994 (NI 15)
 
8. In Article 16(a) (review of compensation orders) for the words from "a confiscation order" to the end substitute "either or both of the following made against him in the same proceedings—
 
(i) a confiscation order under Part 4 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;
 
(ii) a slavery and trafficking reparation order under Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014; or".
 
THE SOCIAL SECURITY (RECOVERY OF BENEFITS) (NORTHERN IRELAND) ORDER 1997 (NI 12)
 
9. In paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 (exempted payments) for "1994 or" substitute "1994, Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 or".
 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE (NORTHERN IRELAND) ORDER 1996 (NI 24)
 
10. In Article 4(5) (absolute and conditional discharge) at the end insert "or a slavery and trafficking reparation order under Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014."
 
11. In Article 13(11) (community service order) at the end insert "or a slavery and trafficking reparation order under Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014."
 
THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT 2002 (C. 29)
 
12.—(1) Section 163 (effect of confiscation order on court’s other powers) is amended as follows.
 
(2) In subsection (3)(a) at the end add "or an order under Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 (slavery and trafficking reparation orders)".
 
(3) In subsection (5)—
 
(a) in paragraph (a) for "both a confiscation order and" substitute "a confiscation order and one or both of" and after "1994 (SI 1994/2795 (N.I. 15)" insert "and a slavery and trafficking reparation order under Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014,";
 
(b) in paragraph (b) for "both the orders" substitute "all the orders".
 
(4) In subsection (6) (priorities of confiscation orders and other orders) for the words from "of the compensation" to "as it specifies" substitute "as it specifies of the amount (or amounts) payable under the other order (or orders) mentioned in subsection (5)(a)".
 
13. In section 182(7)(b) (court’s powers on appeal) at the end insert "so far as they relate to such orders".
 
14. In section 183(9)(b) (appeal to Supreme Court) at the end insert "so far as they relate to such orders".
 
15. In section 205(5) (application of sums received under confiscation order to pay compensation) for the words "of compensation" substitute "payable under any other order (or orders)".
 
16. In section 308 (general exceptions to concept of recoverable property) after subsection (4) insert—
 
"(4A) If—
 
(a) a payment is made to a person in pursuance of a slavery and trafficking reparation order under Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014, and
 
(b) apart from this subsection, the sum received would be recoverable property,
 
the property ceases to be recoverable.".
 
THE RECOVERY OF HEALTH SERVICE CHARGES (NORTHERN IRELAND) ORDER 2006 (NI 13)
 
17. In paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 (recovery of health care charges: exemptions)—
 
(a) omit "or" at the end of sub-paragraph (b);
 
(b) after sub-paragraph (c) insert—
 
"(d) Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 (slavery and trafficking reparation orders).".
 
THE JUSTICE (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 2012 (C. 24)
 
18. In section 1(5) (offender levy) after "1994 (NI 15)" insert "or an order under Schedule 2 to the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 or both" and for "appropriate compensation" substitute "and appropriate amounts under such of those orders as it would be appropriate to make".".

Schedule 4 agreed to.

New Schedule
 
Amendment No 64 made:

After clause 19 insert

"SCHEDULE 5

REPEALS































































Short Title

Extent of Repeal

The Children and Young Persons Act (Northern Ireland) 1968 (c. 38)

In Schedule 1 the entry relating to an offence under any of sections 57 to 59 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 (c.34)

In section 2(3)(ha) the words "57 to 59".

The Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1999 (NI 8)

Article 3(1)(ga).

The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (c. 29)

In Schedule 5, paragraph 4(2) and (3).

The Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42)

Sections 57 to 60C.
In section 142(2) the words "57 to 60C".
In Schedule 5, paragraph 171.
In Schedule 6, paragraphs 42(2) and (3)(a) and 46(4).


The Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (c. 19)

Section 4.
Section 5(3) to (5), (9) and (10).
Section 14(2)(n) and (p).


The Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 (c.38)

Section 54.
Schedule 4.


The Serious Crime Act 2007 (c.27)

In Schedule 1, paragraph 18(2) and (3).

The UK Borders Act 2007 (c. 30)

Section 31.

The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (NI 1)

In Schedule 1 in paragraph 28 the entries for sections 57 to 59.
In Part 2 of Schedule 2 in paragraph 13 the entries for sections 57 to 59.


The Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (NI 2)

In Article 66(2), sub-paragraph (b) and the word "or" immediately before it.
In Schedule 1, paragraph 12(4)(h).


The Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (c.11)

Section 54.

The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (c. 25)

Section 71.

The Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2013 (c. 7)

Sections 6 to 8.

".

Schedule 5 agreed to.

Long title agreed to.

Mr Principal Deputy Speaker: That concludes the Consideration Stage of the Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Further Provisions and Support for Victims) Bill. The Bill stands referred to the Speaker.

Adjourned at 1.54 am.

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