Official Report: Minutes of Evidence

The Chairperson (Ms Bradshaw): I welcome from the Executive Office Colin Moffett, who is the director of the civil contingencies division, and Jane Holmes, who is the director of COVID strategy, recovery and inquiry. Thank you for sending through your briefing paper in advance of the meeting. I invite you to make some opening remarks.

Mr Colin Moffett (The Executive Office): Thank you. I will make a start, if that is OK. Unfortunately, Karen Pearson, who is the deputy secretary in TEO and has overarching responsibility for the division, cannot be here today. She sends her apologies.

Thank you for the opportunity to come to the Committee to provide a briefing on the work of the civil contingencies division and on the COVID inquiry, including the implementation of the recommendations from the module 1 report. As you noted, Chair, the Committee received the briefing paper that was prepared in advance. You should also have received the response to the module 1 report that the Executive published on 16 January 2025.

I plan to keep as much time as possible free for comments and questions. I will use my opening remarks to make a few key points. As you said, Chair, I am the director of the civil contingencies division, and I am joined by Jane Holmes, who is over the COVID strategy, recovery and inquiry work.

As the Committee is aware, the civil contingencies division supports the Executive in the delivery of civil contingencies here through the provision of policy, strategy control and coordination. The COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting inquiry shone a light on civil contingencies arrangements across the UK and highlighted improvements that were necessary in order to address adequately the needs of citizens and the population here.

Since the pandemic, progress has been made on enhancing civil contingencies arrangements here as a direct result of the pandemic and, subsequently, the inquiry. A number of improvements that were identified during the pandemic have already been implemented. For instance, the civil contingencies hub, which is an information-sharing mechanism that is deployed during an emergency response to provide situational awareness and to enhance decision-making across all levels, including for Northern Ireland Departments and their key partners, has been operationalised, redeveloped and repurposed. It was formally first stood up in March 2020 in order to coordinate the response during the first wave of the pandemic.

In April 2020, Anthony Harbinson, who was the chief of staff of the civil contingencies hub at the time, commissioned a review of the hub to maximise its effectiveness should it be required in future. That resulted in a streamlined set of arrangements for the hub, which were deployed the following autumn to manage simultaneously the potential impacts of the UK's leaving the European Union and of winter emergencies, alongside the second wave of the pandemic.

Other key improvements that were made following the first wave of the pandemic included the development of the civil contingencies framework, which was first published in August 2021, and the NI-specific civil contingencies risk register. The framework now reflects the standardised approach to dealing with emergencies through the distinct phases of prepare, respond and recover. The framework was most recently updated in November 2023, and a review is planned for the current year. The review will include looking at changes arising from the COVID inquiry, the module 1 report specifically and equality impact assessments, and it will have a renewed focus on the development of a protocol for vulnerable people.

Prior to the pandemic, NI did not have its own bespoke risk register. Instead, we operated under the UK Government (UKG) national security risk assessment, which, truth be told, provided very limited local insight. We have therefore led on the development of a bespoke risk register for Northern Ireland since then. Moreover, a learning and development strategy has been developed and is currently being rolled out. As a result, one cycle of training was delivered in 2023, two cycles were delivered in 2024 and one cycle has been partially completed in the current year, with further cycles due later in the year. Around 395 delegates, drawn from 41 different Departments and agencies, have attended training courses so far.

The pandemic also highlighted the fact that TEO needed additional resources in order to deploy effectively the responsibilities that are associated with civil contingencies here. As a direct result, and as an example of that, the now civil contingencies division was formally headed as a branch at grade 7 level. It was then created as a division and now has grade 5 control. The team has expanded from six people pre-pandemic to 25 people, which represents a very significant investment.

I will now speak about the COVID inquiry. TEO has provided evidence to seven of the 10 modules of the COVID inquiry. I am sure that the Committee will appreciate that that has been a very significant undertaking for the Department. We are, however, nearing the end of the evidence provision stage. You will be aware that the module 1 report and its recommendations are pitched primarily at a UK-wide level. Our focus is therefore on implementing what will make a difference here. It is important that we continue to factor in constitutional and financial considerations as we consider the next steps for implementation.

To support implementation, a cross-departmental modular steering group, which is made up of representatives from all our Departments, was established in October 2024 to progress consideration of the recommendations in the module 1 report.

That group's work includes a work stream on stakeholder engagement, as we recognise that the views of those on whom the pandemic has had a direct impact are essential for informing actions taken in response to recommendations from the report and how those recommendations are implemented. That work is at an early stage, and it is anticipated that the approach for module 1 will be expanded as future modular reports are published. We have been advised that a report on module 2 will be published this autumn. It will cover four sub-modules: 2, 2A, 2B, and 2C. Those are the modules that will make up module 2 in its totality. Given the modular nature of the inquiry, we will be happy to provide further updates to the Committee as we progress through our response to the module 1 recommendations and on future reports as they are published. We will now take questions.

The Chairperson (Ms Bradshaw): Do you want to make any further opening remarks at this stage?

Ms Jane Holmes (The Executive Office): No, thank you, Chair. Colin spoke for both of us.

The Chairperson (Ms Bradshaw): OK. Thank you very much. The module 1 report, as you said, was primarily UK-wide, but it did indicate in paragraph 2.74 that our system of government here has become too burdensome, too complex and too bureaucratic. What engagement work is the Executive Office doing with other Departments to learn lessons about some of the barriers that impeded quick decision-making during the pandemic?

Mr Moffett: As I said in my opening remarks, a steering group has been established, with all Departments feeding into it. We are also engaging on a range of other structures for civil contingencies that we have to learn from out of the inquiry. We are looking at rationalising the structures. It is not necessarily initially about simplifying them but about rationalising them to make sure that each of the structures that we have has a core purpose that is clearly understood and that the right people are in the right place at the right time with the right information to ensure that we are making effective decisions. That work is ongoing. It will need to go through the Northern Ireland Civil Service (NICS) board and through the Executive in time if we want to make any changes, but, as I said, the work is ongoing.

The Chairperson (Ms Bradshaw): Does that work relate to the civil contingencies group (Northern Ireland) (CCG (NI))? It met in March and is scheduled to meet again in June. Are minutes and reports going to be published from it meetings, or are they just —?

Mr Moffett: I will have to check whether the minutes are published, but notes are taken at its meetings and shared among the membership.

The Chairperson (Ms Bradshaw): They are not put into the public domain, however.

Mr Moffett: I will need to check whether they are. I am not totally sure.

The Chairperson (Ms Bradshaw): Thank you. At the meeting that the deputy First Minister had with the bereaved families from Northern Ireland on 24 February, was there any discussion about having a Northern Ireland-specific COVID inquiry?

Ms Holmes: Yes. The bereaved families raised that as being something of which they would be in favour. An action was taken away from that meeting. My team in the Executive Office is looking at what is being done in other jurisdictions. We are taking into account what is happening in England, Scotland, Wales and the Republic of Ireland and producing a report on potential options.

The Chairperson (Ms Bradshaw): Have you set a target date for when you will be able to report?

Ms Holmes: It is a piece of work that we want to progress within the next three months.

The Chairperson (Ms Bradshaw): It is therefore somewhat imminent. I have just one question. I was at a good event — I am not sure whether anybody else was there — on the use of data capture and sharing information across the UK about non-molestation orders, but it is a similar area, given that it about being able to process information from different parts of the UK from different computer systems into one system and then possibly using technological capabilities, or even AI, to churn out meaningful data. How have you reflected on the recommendations about having a whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience model for data? That is what I am looking at.

Mr Moffett: I will take advice about data and come back to you in writing about the position of the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA). From our perspective, however, data has been identified as being a key area and is one of the recommendations in the report. It is key for preparing for and responding to future pandemics, or any emergency, for that matter. Quite a lot of work is going on in that area, but, as you said, Chair, it is a very complex area. There are huge administrative and legal barriers. Different IT systems are being used, be that in different trust areas, in different agencies or in different Departments. That all needs to be worked through. You will appreciate that I do not have the information on that that NISRA holds, but —.

The Chairperson (Ms Bradshaw): It is being looked at, however.

Mr Moffett: Yes, it is being looked at under recommendation 5. It is therefore an area of focus.

The Chairperson (Ms Bradshaw): The presentation that I attended yesterday was on non-molestation orders, but I am conscious that a lot of the issues during the pandemic related to, for example, the sharing of information between North and South about the cross-border spread of the virus. Although the inquiry into COVID is UK-wide, to what degree are you engaging with your counterparts in the Republic of Ireland on some of the new structures or learning that you will be taking forward?

Mr Moffett: Jane, do you want to say something about the pandemic?

Ms Holmes: During the pandemic, there were statistics that were relevant to the cross-border area. We were aware that there were different non-pharmaceutical interventions in place that people might take advantage of in order to make it easier for them to travel. One particular difficulty related to the passenger locator form for people flying into Ireland and then travelling on to the North. Engagement therefore took place at a very senior level with the Republic of Ireland to try to resolve those matters. That engagement included ministerial meetings. It is therefore a piece of work that we want to pick up on. We have made the point in our response to the module 1 report that we are talking about not just about the four nations but the common travel area.

The Chairperson (Ms Bradshaw): That is therefore something that will be taken forward in the future. I am conscious that some of the recommendations would probably work well in GB, and even in Northern Ireland, but that there are peculiar circumstances to taking an all-island approach to such emergencies.

Mr Moffett: There absolutely are. We are having conversations with the Office of Emergency Planning in the Republic of Ireland on issues that are more broad than being just about the pandemic. We have ongoing engagement with that office. In fact, we engaged with it as recently as this week. We are identifying some of the same sorts of issues as those that came of the recommendations here, so we will also need to consider them on a cross-border basis.

The Chairperson (Ms Bradshaw): That is reassuring.

Mr Dickson: This has been useful. The bulk of what you have been talking to us about has been to do with the COVID experience, the inquiry and the likely learning points from it. Your briefing paper states:

In the absence of that facility, what is the current situation? Were no legacy facilities handed over from direct rule arrangements?

Mr Moffett: There are no legacy arrangements in place. I would describe the current arrangements as "workarounds". They are not fit for the purpose of having all Ministers around the table receiving the same briefing at the same time. There are workarounds to facilitate that happening, but that bid has been made in order to achieve best practice around co-location.

Mr Dickson: In broad terms, what is your relationship with the Northern Ireland Office like? You have said that you are in regular contact with your colleagues in the Republic of Ireland. What is the civil contingencies division's contact with the Northern Ireland Office specifically and with the wider United Kingdom?

Mr Moffett: It is similar, in that we have quite a bit of engagement with the NIO and, more broadly, with the UK Government, primarily through the Cabinet Office. There are risks that we are thinking about but not necessarily dealing with that are to do with non-devolved matters but would have an impact here if realised. We therefore have that ongoing conversation with NIO. There are currently meetings happening with the NIO on a couple of issues that are fairly routine. It is the same with the Cabinet Office. That engagement therefore happens North/South and east-west.

Mr Dickson: Are there clear rules and guidance in place — I hope that there are — that determine who has responsibility when a specific incident occurs? Who is at the top? I am thinking particularly about the police. They have a strong command structure: gold, silver and all of that.

Mr Moffett: There are very clear structures, rules, procedures, guidance and protocols in place that determine where responsibility sits, be it UKG-led through the Cabinet Office or led from here. Some of that is driven by where the operational responsibility sits, be it with the PSNI or with others. That is fairly clear, however.

Ms Ní Chuilín: I declare an interest. I was on the Executive during COVID, from June 2020 until December 2020. I appeared in front of the COVID inquiry.

On page 20 of the Executive response to the module 1 report, the Executive state that they are:

They are keen to assure themselves:

What does that mean?

Mr Moffett: That relates to recommendation 10 of the inquiry's report, which is for the UKG, in consultation with the devolved Administrations, to establish a new statutory body. What that language means is that the Cabinet Office will lead on that. We will be consulted and will provide views. There is, however, possible tension, although not full tension, with recommendation 1, which, given that we are being asked to establish a new statutory body under recommendation 10, talks about simplifying structures.

Ms Ní Chuilín: That is why I ask.

Mr Moffett: We think that it needs more work, at a policy level, in order to make sure that we are not, on the one hand, simplifying structures while, on the other hand, adding a new layer somewhere else. There are very clear roles and responsibilities, and we are fully engaged in those conversations, which are happening on a four nations basis, about the new body.

Ms Ní Chuilín: The reason that I ask about that is that I have read the recommendations in full. As, thankfully, you referred to, recommendation 1 and recommendation 10, but particularly the paragraph from the response that I quoted, are at odds with each other. I understand that each of the devolved Administrations will take their own approach, which they should do. If, however, we are to take a more simplified approach and be as transparent as possible, to have the need to establish a new statutory body dropped in like that, without any explanation, does not read well.

I will move on to lessons learned. It relates to module 1, and module 2 will report on lessons learned. My question is about how information is presented to you. For example, in the case of what is referred to somewhere as a "novel infection" — I cannot remember the correct term — what facilities do you have to interrogate what, for example, the Chief Scientific Adviser tells you?

Mr Moffett: We are in a stronger position now than we were. I talked members through the development of the NI civil contingencies hub and how the number of TEO staff has grown from six people pre-pandemic to 25 now. We therefore have policy officers looking at a number of those issues in detail.

We also have statisticians embedded in the team in the hub, even now. We are therefore able to interrogate datasets as they come through and consider them. The other key development has been the appointment of a Chief Scientific and Technical Adviser (CSTA) in TEO. Part of that role is to provide oversight and to give another perspective. There are a couple of new —.

Ms Ní Chuilín: Is the Chief Scientific Adviser in TEO now rather than in the Department of Health?

Mr Moffett: Three Departments have their own scientific and technical advisers. The Department of Health has one, the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs has one and now TEO has one as well.

Ms Ní Chuilín: OK. In the event of another pandemic — God forbid — which scientific adviser will have the greatest influence? In my experience, the way in which information came in meant that we constantly had to ask for refinement in order to make a decision.

Mr Moffett: I am not sure that I can answer that question, to be honest.

Ms Ní Chuilín: OK.

Mr Moffett: The CSTA appointment in TEO was made relatively recently. There is, however, now a network of scientific advisers operating across the Civil Service.

If, God forbid, there were to be another pandemic, the Department of Health would continue to be the lead Department, so it would, clearly, have a role. It would then be about the broader role of TEO on the societal impacts. There will be a balance, but I cannot say definitively who would take primacy.

Ms Ní Chuilín: It mentions a:

My concern is that that recommendation is effectively being left in the hands of two people — the Chief Medical Officer and the Chief Scientific Adviser — who are acting on behalf of Health and are providing information to the Executive. How can you ensure that Ministers will be better prepared and more resilient when it comes to being able to question what those two people say?

Mr Moffett: The pandemic resilience programme board is like Ronseal: it does exactly what it says on the tin. Its role is to ensure more resilience for a future pandemic. It is a cross-departmental board, so it has representatives from all Departments. It is there not to just consider lessons learnt from COVID but to plan for the next pandemic, whenever it comes. It will hopefully take the lessons learnt and the experience to put us in a better place, with better information and better data, where we can be more professional in some of the disciplines people

there. That is the ethos of the board. Some of that will be tested. The response to module 1 talks about recommendation 6 and the whole-system test of Exercise PEGASUS later in the year. I expect some of that to play through then.

Ms Ní Chuilín: Thank you.

Mr Harvey: Have any recommendations or actions been put in place for civil contingencies, or are you waiting until everything is together?

Mr Moffett: We were implementing changes to civil contingencies — to the group and to the hub — on an iterative basis throughout the pandemic. We have not necessarily waited for recommendations to be made before starting to do those things. For example, the civil contingencies framework was developed during the pandemic. It was published in 2021 and revised in 2023, and it will be revised again to take account of those recommendations, so we are not necessarily waiting. Obviously, if new recommendations are made that we have not had sight of, the work will start when we get sight of them, but a lot of work is ongoing.

Mr Harvey: As new stuff comes in —.

Mr Moffett: Our work programme may expand, but that does not mean that nothing will happen until then.

Mr Harvey: Thank you.

Ms Murphy: Recommendation 9 refers to red teams. Will you expand on how their development came about?

Mr Moffett: May I say a bit about what a red team is, first, in case that helps?

Ms Murphy: Absolutely, yes.

Mr Moffett: Will you pick up on how that recommendation came about, Jane, from the inquiry's perspective?

Ms Holmes: Yes.

Mr Moffett: The concept of a red team is that it is an independent group of people who will live-test and challenge plans. That is used quite a lot in the cyberworld, with ethical hackers and things like that, and we have applied the same sort of ideas to plans here. There are volumes of material about how they should operate, and there are different scales for where it is most appropriate to use a red team. That could be on cross-societal emergencies or individual emergency plans; there are tiers that can be applied. That is the background.

My view on how that recommendation came about from the inquiry's perspective — Jane can correct me if I am wrong on this — is that, when we consider our plans and prepare not just for a pandemic but for any emergency, it was about getting external assurance that somebody else is going to test, poke and probe your plan to see whether it holds up to scrutiny and identify the weaknesses early, so that they can be addressed. I might be wrong about that, though.

Ms Holmes: No, that is exactly right. It is not only about plans; it is about policies and making sure that, as they develop, what ends up being implemented has been tested before it hits the ground. Red teams on their own are not sufficient to do that. There is definitely a place for them, but there are other assurance mechanisms that can be used in conjunction with that to make sure that things are sufficiently and independently tested.

Ms Murphy: Jane, you touched on independence. How do you scout those individuals? Are there any set criteria?

Ms Holmes: Not at the moment. That is a work in progress.

Mr Moffett: We are in a slightly different position with the use of red teams. The UK Government use them in a lot of disciplines, so there is a pool of knowledge there. A methodology for deploying red teams here is being developed, and we are learning from best practice elsewhere.

Ms Murphy: I am not going to dwell on the red teams. You mentioned that there are also ethical considerations, and I assume that those individuals will be privy to information and data at a high level. Therefore, I assume that there is vetting, if you want to put it like that. Is that still being developed?

Mr Moffett: I expect that there is vetting but that it is still being developed. The nature of some civil contingency work means that vetting is required, and clearances are required to access some of it, so I expect there to be vetting.

Ms Murphy: That is OK. Has there been scientific modelling of future pandemics? Granted, that is probably a question that the Department of Health may be able to answer rather than yourselves, but has there been any new modelling based on pandemic modelling?

Mr Moffett: The question on specific modelling is more appropriate for the Department of Health. On the pandemic resilience programme board, we have seen a more sophisticated approach to modelling early on. Better warning systems are in place for the early anticipation of an emerging issue on a global level that might develop into a pandemic but also might not get that far. However, there definitely are more sophisticated systems in place.

Ms Murphy: Thank you.

Mr Kingston: Recommendation 6 is entitled:

I think that it is Exercise PEGASUS that is taking place this autumn, which I presume that you are taking the lead on. Will the public be aware that that is taking place or is it just happening behind the scenes amongst the statutory agencies? Will the public be affected by that exercise being under way?

Mr Moffett: The first thing to say is that we are not leading on it. The Department of Health is the lead because it is related to a pandemic, although TEO will definitely offer support and be the next lead, if you want to call it that, on the societal impacts.

Mr Kingston: You will have a role in it, though.

Mr Moffett: Absolutely, but it will not be just us that has a role. All Departments will have a role. There is the potential for it to involve Ministers as well as [Inaudible.]

That is the information that has been provided publicly so far. As for public awareness of the exercise, it was published in our response that it was going to happen. It was in the UK Government's response that it was happening. I am not sure of any engagement plans broader than that. It is a whole-system exercise involving all four nations and will take place for a period of three months.

Mr Kingston: Three months?

Mr Moffett: It will not be three months all together. There will be set days when things will be happening. I expect it to get some sort of attention.

Mr Kingston: OK, thank you.

Mr Gaston: Just so that I have this right in my head, was the response to the UK COVID inquiry's 10 recommendations agreed by the First Minister and deputy First Minister or by the Executive?

Ms Holmes: The Executive. Our response to it went through the Executive.

Mr Gaston: You compiled the response for the Executive Office and got sign-off to it —.

Ms Holmes: It was compiled on a cross-departmental basis, and then went through the NICS board to the Executive.

Mr Gaston: It seems that the Executive were happy to take money during COVID for any of the schemes for

and whatever else came out to help businesses and support people, but they do not seem happy to take direction from the Cabinet Office. That is what comes across in the response.

One of the issues with COVID was that unionists were keen to follow the Cabinet Office and nationalists were keen to follow what was being done down South. Has that been resolved, or do you see that still being a problem in the future?

Ms Holmes: I did not hear the last bit of your question, sorry. Would you mind repeating it?

Mr Gaston: One of the problems with COVID was that unionists focused on looking at what the Cabinet Office was doing, whereas nationalists focused on what the Irish Republic was doing. Has that issue been resolved, or will we have the same problem if there is another outbreak of COVID or something similar?

Ms Holmes: I am not sure that I can answer that, I am afraid. Everything with that kind of impact would be considered on an Executive basis and would therefore take all views into account.

Mr Gaston: The Executive's response to the module 1 report states:

— Northern is spelt wrong —

My problem with that statement is that we see absolutely no recognition of the role that the First Minister, who headed up the Government, played in undermining the COVID restrictions by her attendance at the mass IRA funeral while the bereaved in the rest of the population were unable to have funerals for their loved ones. This is a confidence issue. Despite the response saying:

and a number of years having passed since COVID and those flagrant breaches, many families will never forgive what they saw on the streets of Belfast that day. Many families who were bereaved could not give their loved ones the burial that they wished to, yet the First Minister took part in a funeral procession in Belfast. Regardless of what happens, therefore, confidence has been shattered in the Executive and certainly in the First Minister's ability to head up an Executive that say that they are:

I will move on to recommendation 1. TEO rejects it, and that has come about because, once again, there is a First Minister who could not follow the guidance that was in place at the time. It appears to me that half the Executive do not want to follow the Cabinet Office, because they think that it is unionist, and, instead, want to follow what is being done down South. It is the same with recommendation 3: apparently TEO knows better than the Cabinet Office.

Recommendation 6 refers to the recurring reports that will come out every three years. When can we expect to see the first one?

Ms Holmes: Do you mean the reports for the Assembly?

Mr Gaston: Yes.

Mr Moffett: We are developing a proposal for the format of those reports, which will go to the Executive, because there are quite a number of factors that need to be included.

May I come back to something that you mentioned earlier? You said that the Executive rejected recommendation 1, but page 3 of the response specifically states:

in relation to recommendation 1.

The description of the Executive as being "ideally placed" to coordinate — Jane can correct me if I am wrong — relates specifically to the first bullet point of the inquiry's recommendation, which states:

which we have through the Executive. That is what that relates to. It is not replacing anything else or duplicating or confusing structures. It is saying that we have a structure that can be used like that.

Ms Holmes: That recognised the fact that we were asked to look at the structures to make sure that they are as streamlined as possible. We were keen not to create another ministerial group but to use the existing one.

Mr Moffett: You talked about people not following the Cabinet Office. Again, Jane is probably more familiar with some of the language that we have used in the response, but I do not think that there is any language in it that says that we disagree with the Cabinet Office. In fact, we continually reiterate that we are committed to working on a four-nations basis: UKG, Scotland, Wales and us. To be totally clear, the Cabinet Office has not made those recommendations; it is the lead Department for implementing some of them, and we are working with it. It is not a case of TEO's falling out of step with it; in fact, we have committed throughout to working with it.

Mr Gaston: The response to recommendation 10 states:

What bearing does that have?

Ms Holmes: The recommendation is that there be an independent statutory commission or body set up to have oversight of civil contingencies. We know from experience that that is a very expensive undertaking. We want to ensure that the public are aware that, although we are looking at how we at least can meet the spirit of the recommendation, we have to make sure that the public purse is protected as well.

Mr Gaston: Can you put a price on that?

Ms Holmes: No, I do not have one to hand.

Mr Moffett: That has not been costed, to my knowledge.

Mr Gaston: You say that you cannot put a cost on that at the minute, but, last week, we heard that the Climate Commissioner is going to cost £1 million. We were told in the Assembly this week that the cost would be a minimum of £1 million. However, in this case the response is:

financially. It seems as though the priorities are not in the right places.

I have a couple of final questions. In the papers, there is mention of a bid for £580,000 of capital funding. Has that been accepted? Has that been successful?

Mr Moffett: I have not yet received confirmation of our budget for next year, so, at this stage, it is still a bid.

Mr Gaston: Can you give us a breakdown of what that £580,000 would be spent on? Following on from what Stewart said, that will give us an idea of what we will not get if the bid is not successful.

Mr Moffett: I do not know whether I can provide an itemised breakdown. That figure was arrived at in consultation with Construction and Procurement Delivery in DOF about capital works, so it is a reasonable estimate of the cost, but I do not know whether we even have an itemised breakdown to provide you with.

What was the second question, sorry?

Mr Gaston: If the bid is not successful —.

Mr Moffett: What the options are. We can come back to that. That project is well advanced in its development. We expect it to commence. We also expect confirmation of where we are at with the budget for it within days, so, we will be able to plan.

Mr Gaston: Finally, one of the papers states:

Is that internal training? Who provides the oversight and expertise for that?

Mr Moffett: The expertise is provided by someone whom we have appointed on a special contract. They have experience of delivering training in that area across a number of sectors. The training has been delivered not only to civil servants but to people in multiple agencies, including councils, the police, the Fire and Rescue Service and the Ambulance Service. It is broader; it is the whole public sector.

Mr Gaston: It is a consultation piece: you have brought somebody in to carry that out, who has, as you said, the necessary expertise.

Mr Moffett: The nature of their contract is not something that I am going to go into, but they have the relevant expertise to deliver that training and development.

Mr Gaston: Instead of bringing somebody in, could we get somebody within our structures to do that? Is that a need that you would identify?

Mr Moffett: Ideally, that is the position to which we would like to get. Train-the-trainer programmes have been mentioned, and we will be delivering those this year not just to expand and professionalise the competence and discipline in the civil contingencies division but to make sure that that is continual and part of personal development. We are working on that to make sure that, right across Departments, we are not relying on one or two people; it is about a whole-system approach, with trainers embedded in all Departments.

Mr Gaston: Thank you.

The Chairperson (Ms Bradshaw): Thank you so much for your work. If you could keep us posted, we would appreciate it.