Official Report: Minutes of Evidence

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): I formally welcome Professor Alan Renwick, University College London (UCL), who is joining us via Zoom; Alan Whysall, honorary senior research associate, UCL; and Dr Conor Kelly, University of Oxford, who also joins us via Zoom.

Gentlemen, you are very welcome to today's Committee. May I just check that Professor Renwick and Dr Kelly can hear us on the Zoom call?

Professor Alan Renwick (University College London): I can hear you very well.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Thank you very much. I advise the witnesses and members that the session will be recorded by Hansard and will form part of the evidence for the Committee's review. I invite the witnesses to brief the Committee in any way and order that they see fit.

Professor Renwick: Thank you so much, Chair. I will start off with some introductory comments and then hand over to Alan Whysall, if that is OK.

First, thank you for inviting us. It is a real privilege to be joining you this morning. I am sorry that I am unable to be with you in Belfast today. I will say a few quick things by way of introduction.

I am the deputy director of the constitution unit at University College London, and the report that we are discussing is a constitution unit report. The constitution unit, broadly speaking, conducts timely, rigorous and independent research into constitutional change and the reform of political institutions, mainly in the UK but sometimes elsewhere as well.

Our goal is to help decision-making about political institutions to be done well. In some cases, we have a view on what the institutions should be, but, in many, we do not, and we seek simply to enable informed discussion of options.

Our work on the Stormont institutions very much falls into the latter category. We look at possible reforms to the strand one institutions without taking a view on whether any particular reforms should happen.

As you will be aware, there is much discussion of reform ideas. We are not aware, though, of any detailed attempt to catalogue those or examine how they might be assessed, and, essentially, we are trying to fill that gap.

We offer a technical analysis of options, but we do not make recommendations. We talk about quite a lot of reform proposals in the report. There are 21 different headings in the report. We will quickly go through those, if you are happy with that, Chair, to give you a sense of the overall architecture.

We cover four areas. We look at possible reforms to the process of Executive formation; other aspects of the functioning of the Executive; the Assembly; and we look quickly at other aspects of strand one as well.

With that, I will hand over to Alan Whysall to take you a little further into how we do that.

Mr Alan Whysall (University College London): Thank you, and thank you to the Committee for the invitation, which is very welcome. I will start by talking a bit about the themes that we use to structure our analysis. Three main sets of arguments tend to be put forward in favour of reforms to the institutions.

First, there are proposals to reduce the likelihood of the institutions collapsing. As everybody around the table knows, if one of the largest parties does not want to participate, the institutions cannot function. The 1998 arrangements have no answer to that except recurrent elections, which may often not be profitable. That is unusual. It is not found in other systems. Of course, some constraints on the authority of a bare majority are the other side of the coin of power-sharing. If you cannot get enough parties to share power, the system does not work.

We have been clear in all the proposals that we looked at that we are working consistently with the principles of the agreement. We have looked, therefore, only at proposals that can reasonably be argued to uphold the power-sharing principle, even if they do it in different ways. There may be trade-offs here, and they need careful analysis.

The second set of themes is that people argue that the institutions do not deliver equity between different parts of the community. Pretty clearly, the agreement is, essentially, built around a binary model. It is about fair shares for unionists and nationalists, and people whose representatives do not designate into those groups feel themselves at a disadvantage: for example, in cross-community votes. Their numbers have increased, and it is said, therefore, that the injustice has increased. On the other hand, giving greater rights to others may lead to arguments that existing protections are being weakened, and it may create opportunities for further obstruction, so, again, there are trade-offs.

The third set of themes that we analyse proposals against is governance. It is widely suggested that the institutions have struggled to provide good public services and effective public policy responses. Most obviously, that is the case when the institutions have not been functioning at all, as in the five recent years when we had civil servants keeping the process of government turning over but with very limited powers and, certainly, no ability to develop new policy.

Even when the institutions were in place, political disagreement often reduced their ability to act decisively. It has taken the focus away from public policy issues. The fact that, for more or less a decade, we did not have an agreed Programme for Government in force is seen by many as a reflection of that weakness.

I will talk a bit more about good government, which may well be an issue that has more to do with political culture than institutional structures, but the institutions contribute to the performance gap, and some institutional change may help to develop the political culture — the political tradition — towards a greater emphasis on better public policy. It is hard to make the case that the structures objectively facilitate working together to achieve effective policy and good services — it is their nature. The Executive are constituted by a number of mathematical formulae, so Members do not come together with any necessary common purpose. In policy and delivery terms, therefore, the Programme for Government is of particular importance in setting out what the Executive are aiming for. However, in other coalition systems, the Programme for Government is also very important politically — really, the Government are formed on the basis of it, and it has to be settled at the earliest stage — whereas, in our system, it does not have that political importance: parties have a right to go into the Executive anyway, so it gets less priority.

The rules, as we all know, make the institutions more susceptible to collapse. They offer mechanisms for blocking policy initiatives from minorities, and they facilitate even more silo working, which is a problem that we see across Governments around the world generally. Our system, at present, does not offer any alternative government. Again, some of that is an inevitable concomitant of power-sharing. The question is this: how do we do government better within power-sharing structures?

There has not been a lot of public discussion of those questions. One suggestion that comes up quite often is a requirement that the Programme for Government be approved before the Executive are formed. We talk about that, and we canvass the possibility that members of the Executive might be obliged to commit themselves to it in advance. That might have considerable symbolic importance, at least, though you cannot quite legislate to ensure that a Programme for Government is meaningful.

We also set out the option of a body outside government that would generate ideas and public debate around public policy and public services. More adventurously, it might play a part in developing Programmes for Government: it could have initial discussions; perhaps it could produce drafts, which would always, inevitably, be submitted to the Executive and the Assembly; and it might then monitor implementation. There are parallels to some of that in bodies here and elsewhere. However, it is a fairly underexplored area, so we do not claim that those ideas do a lot more than scratch the surface. There may well be other thoughts around, and it is an area where more debate is particularly welcome. Alan will speak next.

Professor Renwick: I shall pick up from there. Thank you very much, Alan.

Let me say a few words now about various options for reform of the Executive formation process. As you know, under the original 1998 agreement, a cross-community vote was used to elect the First Minister and deputy First Minister on a joint slate, and d'Hondt was used for allocation of the other ministerial posts. Of course, d'Hondt is still used, but the current rules for allocating the posts of First Minister and deputy First Minister were introduced in 2007 after the St Andrews Agreement. The main concern about those rules is that they have enabled long periods when the Executive have not functioned, as Alan Whysall has just outlined. There are also some concerns around equity across parties and communities.

When it comes to reform options, of course, the status quo is an option, but there are also four overarching proposals for reform. One is to revert to the pre-St Andrews Agreement arrangements: go back to a cross-community vote.

That would give somewhat more flexibility than the current arrangements. One of the big two parties could decide not to nominate a First Minister or a deputy First Minister but not stand in the way of others doing so. On the other hand, without reform of cross-community voting, that option would be seen by many as inequitable to MLAs who do not designate.

The second and third options both involve moving from the current arrangements or the pre-St Andrews one to a weighted-majority system that, under one option, would be used for the whole Executive and, under the other option, would be used for just the First Minister and the deputy First Minister. The impact of those would depend very much on the level of the threshold. If there was a weighted-majority threshold of 55%, two thirds or 75%, clearly that would have a big effect. The lower the threshold, the easier it would be, at least on paper, to form and maintain an Executive. On the other hand, the likelier it would be that an Executive could be formed over the opposition of a significant party, which, of course, could undermine legitimacy in the system. Either of those options would certainly be a departure from the letter of the 1998 agreement, and there might be debate about the spirit of the agreement.

The final big option for reform of Executive formation is to maintain broadly the current rules — the post-St Andrews rules — but to allow a party to transfer the right to nominate the First Minister or the deputy first Minister to the next largest party. That could prevent collapse of the institutions in some circumstances and could be seen as enhancing equity by limiting the veto powers of the largest parties. However, it might lead to a situation where either unionism or nationalism had neither the First Minister nor the deputy First Minister position, which, again, could undermine legitimacy.

There are a couple of proposals on Executive formation that address more specific concerns about aspects of the composition of the Executive. The first relates to a concern that, under the current rules, the two largest parties are over-represented in the Executive. The idea here is to count the First Minister and the deputy First Minister in the d'Hondt allocation: not including those two positions in the d'Hondt allocation but counting them against the parties that receive them when the d'Hondt allocation is done, which would reduce over-representation of the largest parties.

Finally, as you know, the Justice Minister position is currently allocated not through d'Hondt but by a cross-community vote. Perhaps that could change, and the Justice Minister could go into the d'Hondt process. That may be seen as fairer, and it may be thought that the extra safeguards for that role are no longer needed 15 years on from the Hillsborough Castle accord.

Those are all points relating to Executive formation. I will now hand over to Conor to discuss some other parts of the report.

Dr Conor Kelly (Oxford University): Hello. Thank you for the invitation to speak. I will talk through some other areas of Executive reform, the areas related to Assembly reform and other areas of strand one. I will start with the other areas of Executive reform.

One of the most prominent reform proposals that we analysed was the proposal to rename the First Minister and the deputy First Minister as joint First Ministers. Those two positions are legally and politically equal and are paid the same. It is often said that the First Minister cannot sign a letter without the co-signature of the deputy First Minister. The proposal is to have the names of the titles reflected in that and that the two positions would be known as joint First Ministers. Under the themes that Alan Whysall outlined, you may think that, under the equity theme, that proposal performs quite well, in that it would underline that parity of esteem between unionism and nationalism in the top two positions. However, if you are interested in the theme of collapse or the theme of good governance, you could argue that it is a purely superficial change and that it would not do anything, beyond the equity point, to improve how politics works in Northern Ireland. There are trade-offs, and people will come to different conclusions on the merits of that.

The other areas of the Executive that we looked at include vetoes used at the Executive table. It was noted by a couple of different people from whom we read proposals and with whom we spoke that the petition of concern reforms that were brought in by the New Decade, New Approach agreement had worked quite well, but there was a concern that the veto point had moved from the Assembly to the Executive. Therefore, we looked at decision-making at the Executive table and whether that could be reformed.

I do not have time to go into all the options that we looked at on Assembly reforms, but two broad options are worth highlighting. The first picks up on what Alan Renwick was just discussing: moving towards a two-thirds majority threshold for decision-making. That would be a move away from the designation system and the cross-community vote system to a system where every Assembly Member has an equal vote for all decisions but where some decisions are taken on the basis of a two-thirds majority to ensure a degree of cross-community buy-in. The alternative to that, rather than moving away from the designation system and the cross-community vote system, is to expand the designation system to incorporate the others. Therefore, in the new cross-community vote procedures, rather than needing 50% of nationalists and 50% of unionists, you would need 50% from all three designations, including the others. Under the equity theme, again, you might see that as a positive step, in that it would bring the others into the cross-community voting procedures. However, under the theme of collapse, you might look at this unfavourably, because, if anything, it entrenches vetoes into the system and brings the Alliance Party and remaining others into the cross-community vote mechanism, which creates more veto points in the system. Again, people will have different perspectives on the merits and drawbacks of those options.

I will now move to other areas of strand one reforms. Our primary focus in the report is on the Executive and the Assembly, but we also looked at some other areas of strand one. That included ways that there could be civic participation in politics in Northern Ireland. Members of the Committee will be aware that the agreement set out the establishment of the Civic Forum, which met in the early years after the agreement but has not met since 2002. We looked at the option of reviving the Civic Forum. There were proposals that suggested that a new innovation in civic participation in politics and public participation in politics, which is citizens' assemblies, might be a better option to allow for more public input into politics. So, as an alternative to the Civic Forum idea or as something that could run alongside the Civic Forum idea, we looked at the option of citizens' assemblies. Those are representative groups of society that convene in order to have an input into the policymaking process and advise politicians on policy options.

The final area of strand one that we looked at was a bill of rights. A bill of rights is contained in the agreement under the strand one section. We thought that this was a little bit beyond the scope of our main focus, so we did not spend too much time looking at the issue. However, we noted that, if a bill of rights were ever agreed and implemented, it could inform how the petition of concern works and how the cross-community vote system works. You could say that only in areas where the contents of the bill of rights were touched upon would you use the petition of concern or cross-community votes, or it could inform where cross-community votes or the petition of concern were used. Those are some of the other areas of the report that we looked at.

I will hand over to Alan Whysall to talk about implementation.

Mr Whysall: This is the last chunk of our introductory comments, people may be relieved to hear. In chapter 4 of the report, we offer some analysis of how reform might come about. Our one substantive recommendation is that there should be wider, more coherent and more informed discussion about reform options. That is what the report is aimed at encouraging, because, in the past, reforms have generally been discussed behind closed doors among a relatively small number of people who understood the systems. It is not always clear that all the consequences of reforms have been understood, so it is very good that this Committee is looking at the issues. I hope that it may spawn further debate in the Assembly and beyond, because, as we made clear in the report, there may be some areas where we are not that close to the operation of the institutions. Some people who are may well have other perspectives to offer. If we were to have another collapse in the institutions, of course, the issues would become very topical indeed. I hope that that moment does not arrive, but it is important to have the discussion, if we can, before it does, if it does. We had a bit of a discussion about the proper process for reform. The text of the agreement offers little help on that. There is no amendment clause, but the agreement has multiple provisions for review, which means, clearly, that it was envisaged that things might change. Indeed, a number of changes have taken place at St Andrews and elsewhere, and, after 25 or more years, fairly obviously, there may be things in need of change.

The criteria for reaching the agreement originally emphasised a large degree of consensus. In pursuing later agreements, the Governments have acknowledged that. The political legitimacy of any change probably depends on a wide measure of consensus. If we have a collapse, however, there is no agreement-blessed solution for Northern Ireland government. Direct rule is not so blessed, nor is the arrangement that we had in the past two collapses. We therefore canvass the possibilities of temporary changes to ensure that the institutions, in some form near to their original configuration, could function while the search goes on for a more widely agreed basis for government.

Thanks again for listening. That concludes our introductory remarks, unless my colleagues have anything to add.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Thank you very much, gentlemen. We will open for questions. A number of members have indicated.

Mr O'Toole: I thank the two Alans and Conor Kelly for that really instructive presentation. Thank you for the work that you have done in this area, including, when the institutions were collapsed, to keep the subject on the agenda. I acknowledge that you are not advocating or proselytising any particular change but setting out challenges and potential remedies.

I will pick up a couple of the themes in the constitution unit report that you mentioned in your remarks. If I understand it correctly, you said that there is a trade-off between consensus and, if not effectiveness, certainly decisiveness. From the work that you did, is there a limit to how much reform can do to promote decisiveness, which includes the existence of an Executive, without trading off some basic tenet? Where is that threshold, if you see what I mean?

Mr Whysall: The answer is yes. The system that we have, the power-sharing requirement, makes the process of government particularly involved. We should not throw our hands up at that and say, "Well, there is nothing more that we can do". There may be ways in which the institutions could be reconfigured slightly, still achieving their original objectives but delivering a different sort of performance on good government issues. As we made clear, raising the profile of public policy issues, which is one of the objectives behind the suggestion of setting up a public policy council as a body outside government, could itself result in the existing structures delivering more effectively. That gives a higher focus on subjects that are, perhaps, sometimes displaced by the traditional themes of politics in Northern Ireland but have a substantial long-term importance.

Mr O'Toole: Do Dr Kelly or Professor Renwick want to come in on that? The question is really about a trade-off. This is one of the questions that always come up: if you reform, are you trading off a fundamental consensus principle? I do not necessarily agree with that, but I am interested to hear your reflections.

Professor Renwick: Mathematically speaking, there is a trade-off, in the sense that the easier that you make it to make a decision, by removing barriers, removing vetoes and lowering the threshold for making a decision, by definition, the more that you increase decisiveness, but, clearly, you are making it easier to make a decision without such a broad level of consensus. When it comes to the underlying mathematical principles, yes, there is a trade-off.

In practice, of course, things are often a bit more complicated than that. If, by lowering the mathematical threshold, you reduce the legitimacy of the decisions that are reached, you may, in practice, not make the system better at delivering decisions and effective governance. It is also the case that, in practice, how the institutions function depends not just on the rules but on culture, as Alan Whysall suggested, and the willingness of those who operate within those institutions to cooperate effectively with each other to ensure that the institutions can function and deliver.

Mr O'Toole: OK. My next question is about what happens if we collapse again. It is impossible to predict how a collapse might happen: particular issues tend to become totemic and difficult, and then politics takes on a momentum of its own. Part of the purpose of having this review process now is so that we can, hopefully, come to some form of solid proposals, if not agreement, on which we can have momentum ahead of any future collapse. One proposal is that we change the mechanism by which a Speaker is elected. We had repeated recalls during the nearly two years of the previous collapse. I think that that made the situation worse — although my party submitted several of the recalls — because it drew attention to the fact that there was no mechanism to debate things, let alone pass laws or make Executive decisions. This is reflected in your report, because you acknowledge that the election of a Speaker is not covered by the agreement. Would changing the rules for electing a Speaker, so that there are no circumstances in which you cannot even have an Assembly, be a useful first step towards building in some level of resilience?

Mr Whysall: Clearly, there might well be some benefit in that if it enables the institutions to function to some degree and in some form. It is one of the areas in which we say that more work is needed, because a number of rule changes, which might be controversial and difficult, may be required to enable the Assembly to function properly in those circumstances. More thought is needed there; it is not absolutely straightforward.

Mr O'Toole: You also mentioned three options for trying to reduce or eliminate the possibility of one party bringing down the institutions, which is, obviously, something that I and, increasingly, people in Northern Ireland want. Whilst acknowledging that, inevitably, that would mean losing some of the veto and theoretical political communal power, it would guarantee the resilience of governance. It would require not just the parties here but the British and Irish Governments to engage on it. Do you sense any willingness in London and Dublin to have that conversation? I am afraid that I do not yet, certainly not from London and not all that much from Dublin.

Dr Kelly: Chapter 2 of the report goes through the various reviews on reform that have been expressed by political parties, academics, civic society leaders and politicians in London and Dublin. In the Republic of Ireland, Micheál Martin, when he was Tánaiste, spoke a couple of times about the need for reform. The then Conservative British Government responded to a House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee report on the subject a couple of years ago, and it is fair to say that they did not indicate an interest in having a conversation about reform — in the short term anyway. There is a new Government in London now, of course, and they have not said much on the subject. I do not want to comment on what their view might be.

In chapter 4 at the end of the report, we return to the point that politics in Northern Ireland tends to be more stable when London and Dublin have a cooperative and stable relationship. In the past couple of years, following some turbulent years because of Brexit, that good working relationship between officials and politicians in Dublin and London seems to have been back in place. It would be no bad thing if they could play a role in helping the debate, although it will probably be centred among the political parties in Northern Ireland. We also talked about whether there is scope for there to be more public input into the process from people in Northern Ireland, so that they can have a say in the democratic institutions that govern them. That is why I welcome the work that this Committee is doing through its public consultation: it is a fantastic opportunity for members of the public to provide input. The more voices that go into it, the better.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Professor Renwick, you talked about the proposal to transfer nomination rights if a party were to refuse to nominate a First Minister or deputy First Minister. What is your view on whether that would be in keeping with the principles of the Belfast Agreement? Would it really be a tenable situation if that left unionism or nationalism under-represented?

Professor Renwick: Thank you. On the first question, the current arrangements are, of course, not the arrangements that were in the agreement. The original arrangements allowed a bit more flexibility than the current arrangements do. The current arrangements are clear that only the largest party and the largest party from the other of the two largest designations can appoint someone to those positions, whereas, originally, under the cross-community vote, it would have been possible, in principle at least, for others to be nominated to those posts. In a sense, therefore, it could be argued that reform to allow the transfer would introduce some of the flexibility that existed in the 1998 arrangements but does not exist in the 2007 arrangements. You are right, however, that that would also open the way to go further in that direction than was the case in the 1998 agreement. Indeed, in the current circumstances, that would lead to the Alliance Party having one of those positions. I am not the best person to judge what the impact of that might be; the Committee and both my colleagues are much better placed to comment on that. Perhaps Alan Whysall or Conor would like to come in on it.

Mr Whysall: I will just say that, of course, the current arrangements lead to the possibility of there being that imbalance. Were the largest party to be non-designated, you would get a top table with neither unionists nor nationalists. That is the result of the changes post St Andrews Agreement and would, indeed, create a situation that may well not be manageable. We draw attention to that in the report.

Dr Kelly: The current St Andrews arrangements — we draw attention to this in the report — essentially leave the two largest parties with no option but to go into the Executive or collapse the institutions. At the moment, Sinn Féin and the DUP are faced with the choice of joining the Executive or, by not joining it, creating a situation where the institutions cannot be formed. If you were to go back to the 1998 arrangement or take on a new arrangement, which might be a two-thirds majority vote, that would at least leave the option open for those parties to allow the institutions to work while they enter into opposition for a term. In some ways, it would take away the unenviable choice that the two parties face.

Mr Stewart: Thank you very much for coming along today, gentlemen. It is a really useful session. We could probably hold a weekend conference on the subject and still not bottom it out, never mind doing so in a one-hour evidence session. I am sure that we will get enough out of today's session to satisfy us, however.

From my party's point of view, we have seen that the changes that have been implemented since 1998 are often made at times of political crisis, which, invariably, leads to bad decisions and decisions that are politically advantageous to the parties involved. For example, in 2007, the changes that were made suited the British Government and the two big parties at the time, and they drove a horse and cart through the principles of the Good Friday Agreement. You set out a proposal, Professor Renwick, that might have been an option, and I certainly would not be opposed to seeing that happen.

My first question is for Mr Whysall: I know that you were involved in 1998 as an adviser to the British Government. At the time, how did you see the Good Friday Agreement maturing 26 years on? Did you look at that then? Was it ever anticipated that anything like the changes that were made in 2007 would happen so soon? How did those changes affect the gentle and sensitive balance that was set out in 1998?

Mr Whysall: Oof, that is a good question. We were far from sure that any of it was going to stick, of course. A poll was conducted a few weeks before the agreement was concluded that showed that 90% of the population of Northern Ireland did not think that it would be achieved. In that sense, it has been a remarkable success. We say somewhere that it is the least imperfect system that we have found for governing Northern Ireland. People were not looking very far forward; they were looking to solve the crucial political issue — the next step — which was to get a Government of any sort in place such as we had not had in the past and that would have sufficient legitimacy to be viable. Ultimately, that has been achieved, and things are much better in consequence of that.

In 1998, people gave no thought at all to the issue of good government. There was just an assumption that, with the massive momentum, goodwill and quite a lot of money that the agreement brought, things would necessarily get better. Clearly, however, some time on, that is worth looking at further. In the ultimately compressed negotiating period that we had, little long-term thought was given to how matters would turn out. Notionally, it was a two-year negotiation, but most of the work was done in the last few months.

Mr Stewart: OK, thank you. Professor Renwick, you set out the different options. I know that, as a group, you are not advocating for any particular option. Which option do you think might be easiest to achieve and deliver the most bang for our buck in trying to achieve the stability that, given the number of hiatus periods that we have had since 1998, we clearly do not have?

Professor Renwick: I am very much the non-Northern-Ireland-expert author, so I will let Conor or Alan pick up that question.

Dr Kelly: The options that are easiest to achieve might be those that are hardest to sustain. There is a trade-off in that options that might be seen as low-hanging fruit may not have sufficient buy-in in order for them to endure and work long-term in the system. It is tempting to look for the options that might be quick wins, but you have to balance that against the need to get as much consensus across politics as you can. Everyone on this Committee is more versed than we are in the fact that it is difficult to get that in Northern Ireland. It is really important to get buy-in from the different political actors in Northern Ireland in order for the system to continue to be seen as legitimate and to work in the medium and long run, rather than to just get over an immediate crisis that faces the institutions. Quick wins and easily achievable measures are one thing, but reforms that will stand the test of time require buy-in from different people.

Mr Stewart: I agree 100%. That takes me back to my point that, to date, changes seem to have taken place at times of political turbulence. Those changes get you over short-term hurdles but do not lead to long-term, meaningful and substantial reform. We need buy-in and clear heads in order to make the necessary changes. Thank you: I appreciate your giving your time today.

Mr Sheehan: I have a short question. Am I correct in saying that any reforms or changes would have to be legislated for at Westminster?

Mr Whysall: Almost certainly, yes. The agreement was effectively translated into domestic law in the Northern Ireland Act 1998. It is likely that anything that results —. Conceivably, some of the reforms that we canvass, such as the public policy council, could be enacted at Stormont. Generally speaking, however, changes to the structures are excepted matters and would need approval at Westminster.

Mr Sheehan: Thank you. That is all.

Mrs Guy: Thank you so much for the presentation. I am an Alliance Party rep, and, as you note in your report, we have a particular focus on and a real commitment to this area. I like that you reference the damaging impact of persistent collapses on progress on healthcare and other public services. I am also grateful to you for acknowledging the inelegance of using the term "others" when trying to capture the diversity of those of us who reject the premise that politics here can and must be defined only by two communities or, more aptly, the two sides of the conflict. It is fair to say that the Good Friday Agreement delivered peace, but I do not think that we can argue that it ended the conflict, which we have, basically, institutionalised. That is at the heart of the dysfunction that we repeatedly experience here.

My first question is about the democratic deficit in cross-community voting. What, in your assessment, would be the most effective way of overcoming that? Is weighted majority the simplest way of reducing it?

Mr Whysall: We are declining to answer your question, because we will not get into which of the reforms is best.

Mrs Guy: In your assessment, what do you think would be the most effective way of overcoming it?

Mr Whysall: You have just asked the same question. [Laughter.]

Mrs Guy: I am trying to get you to answer it.

Mr Whysall: We can say only that there are different ways of doing things that may have different results. They all need more working through. Although we wrote 37,000 words, that is not really enough. There is an awful lot more work to do and a lot more debate to be had.

Mrs Guy: Do you agree that there is a democratic deficit? The Chair's question on consensus was about nationalism and unionism, and completely ignored the fact that I am sitting here and that we represent people who do not subscribe to either. It feels as though that ought to be overcome.

Mr Whysall: It is widely argued that there is such a deficit. We have not reached a judgement on that.

Mrs Guy: OK. There is another argument that we are not making a lot of progress in governance and effective government in Northern Ireland because of a failure of reconciliation. To what extent have our institutions helped or hindered that process? Would there be merit in some of the civic initiatives that you described progressing that and taking it out of the hands of politicians?

Mr Whysall: I do not want to exclude my colleagues, but I will kick off again. Looking back — inviting an old man to reminisce is dangerous, because he can go on for a long time — we see that the existence of the institutions, with people whom we could never in a million years have seen working together doing so, was overwhelmingly positive. That was rather more the case in the early days, and we have perhaps lost some of the momentum that underlaid it.

These institutions continuing to function is important to reconciliation in broader society, but that does not mean that we should not look at whether other things should be done. In my late days in the Northern Ireland Office, when we had political crises, we tended to focus closely on resolving the immediate political issue and did not look enough at the underpinnings of the agreement, which were possibly becoming less secure in some ways. Those broader themes also need to be looked at, but the contribution of the institutions to society's working and vice versa is an important theme.

Professor Renwick: I will build on that a little. I speak from the general perspective rather than as a specialist on Northern Ireland. There is often a trade-off — Mr O'Toole referred to trade-offs — between, on the one hand, seeking to accommodate existing differences and divisions and, on the other, seeking institutions that will allow what you described in your question as reconciliation and, potentially, if it is what people want, open the way towards a diminishing of the salience of those divisions. In the early stages of an arrangement such as the power-sharing arrangement in Northern Ireland, the emphasis is often on the first of those. We see that in Alan Whysall's description of the priorities in 1998. As time goes on, people often think more about the second of those things, but there is a hard trade-off between them in that, if you try to remove some of the protections that allow you to accommodate difference in order to enable reconciliation, you risk causing harm rather than good. That trade-off needs to be thought about. As Alan Whysall says, further investigation is required to get answers.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Folks, I have to leave to participate in Matters of the Day. The Deputy Chair will take the chair for the remaining time. One other member, Michelle McIlveen, has indicated that she wishes to speak when Michelle Guy has finished.

The Deputy Chairperson (Mr Sheehan): Are you finished, Michelle?

Mrs Guy: If the witnesses are finished answering, I am finished.

Miss McIlveen: Thank you for your presentation this morning. There is an acknowledgement in the report:

Do you agree that, even in this instance, any future reform should be via agreement rather than imposition?

Mr Whysall: As we say in the report, the system's political legitimacy probably depends on a high degree of consensus, and that is what we should be looking for. We also make the point, however, that, if the institutions collapse, there is no consensus-approved, agreement-blessed system of government to take over. At that stage, by way of temporary measures, the Governments might have to consider what they do. Direct rule is highly unsatisfactory in various ways. As regards good government, the system that we had in the last two hiatuses is extremely damaging, because no effort was being made to address the serious social, economic and public service problems that we have.

The system here has not been self-sustaining. It has repeatedly needed the intervention of outsiders: the two Governments, essentially, and, sometimes, people from further afield who come in to help get things moving. It would be highly valuable if Northern Ireland could generate the capacity to resolve its own issues without needing to be led in that way, not least because, at the moment, the Governments have lots of other things to preoccupy them, and we are not likely to get the same sort of attention that we got back in the late 1990s.

Miss McIlveen: Thank you.

The Deputy Chairperson (Mr Sheehan): OK. I think that that is all our questions. Thank you for your input into our review: for your report and for briefing the Committee.

Mr Whysall: Thanks for the opportunity.

Professor Renwick: Thank you very much.

Dr Kelly: Thank you.