Official Report: Minutes of Evidence

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Good morning. I welcome, attending remotely, Professor Joanne McEvoy from the University of Aberdeen and Professor Allison McCulloch from Brandon University, Canada. In person, we have Dr Robin Wilson from University College London and Professor Michael Kerr from King's College London. You are all welcome to this morning's Committee meeting. I ask each participant to make a short opening address of up to 10 minutes maximum. I will start with those in the room, or perhaps you have a particular order. I am happy to take your lead.

You do not have a particular order? We will start with those in the room, Robin and Michael, if that is appropriate.

Dr Robin Wilson (University College London): Thank you very much for the invitation to talk to you. I am conscious of time and want to make sure that we do not cut into the discussion time. Therefore, I will be brief in skating over what is discussed in more detail in my submission.

Of those of us who voted for the Belfast Agreement in 1998, a lot did so with some scepticism as to whether it would build on the platform of what looked like a relative end to violence to bring about reconciliation. Sadly, with the benefit of hindsight, the promise of reconciliation has not been delivered. Not only that but, because we still have polarised politics around the division between unionists and nationalists, it has prevented the political agenda from moving on to the normal European left/right spectrum, which is the only way in which you can have serious issues of public policy debated. On the ground we have the so-called peace walls, flags, murals, paramilitary memorials, just as they were in 1998, and, looking to the next generation, we still have only 8% of children going to integrated schools.

As for policy delivery from Stormont, the Programme for Government is meant to be iterated every year, according to the agreement. However, the last Programme for Government before the recent one was a draft from 2016. By comparison with the Scottish and Welsh Parliaments, the legislative output from the Assembly here has been very poor. The result of that is public disillusionment, which is evident in the responses to the Northern Ireland life and times survey. The last time respondents were asked what they thought the Assembly had achieved, 79% said that it had achieved little or nothing. Therefore, it is not surprising that, when respondents were asked last year whether they thought the post-agreement structures needed reform, which obviously is the agenda of the Committee, 58% said yes, either major or minor, and 20% said no. Therefore, there is a clear majority for structural reforms of the post-agreement institutions.

What should those reforms be? I start with one of them that is never discussed, and that is the voting system. We only have this voting system because it was in the Government of Ireland Act 1920. It was only in that Act because one of its co-designers was British, which may or may not be a good recommendation. Single transferable vote (STV) is used elsewhere only in Malta and the Australian upper House and far-flung parts of the old empire. Much more common around the world among proportional voting systems are list or mixed systems, as in Germany, for example, and, indeed, in Scotland and Wales.

When devolution was introduced there, the additional member system (AMS), as in Germany, was the system chosen. The disadvantage of STV from a Northern Ireland point of view, as Professor Donald Horowitz, a famous expert on ethnic conflict around the world who gave a lecture here in 2000, basically argued, is that, when you have six-Member constituencies — now it is five Members per constituency, but then it was six — you have only to get a seventh of the vote to get to a quota. That incentivises candidates to go for core sectarian support, rather than to reach out to people from whom they might not normally have got support in the past to get more consensual endorsement as candidates who can speak for the whole constituency and then act on behalf of all constituents when they get elected.

The additional member system of only one seat per constituency avoids that problem and has two added advantages. The first is that it supports gender equality. I am glad that this panel is gender-equal, which is not normal in discussions about Northern Ireland politics. With gender equality, it is easier to get women into high positions on the list if they do not get regularly selected at the constituency level. Wales and Scotland have got closer to gender equality than the Northern Ireland Assembly as a result. The second advantage is that it means that some of the elected representatives are focused on policy issues, not on constituency business, and that is also helpful. It is one reform that we need to have.

When the Assembly meets for the first time, one of the first things that Assembly Members do is designate themselves as "Unionist", "Nationalist" or "Other". To my knowledge, only one Protestant has ever designated as "Nationalist" and only one Catholic as "Unionist", so it is really just a proxy for whatever religious background you happen to have been brought up in as a matter of accident. It is not really anything to do with ideology. Again, in the life and times survey, when people were asked whether they thought that the communal designation system kept us stuck in the old sectarian camps, 63% said yes and 10% said no. Clearly, there is public awareness that communal designation is problematic in entrenching sectarianism and preventing the Assembly from moving on to social policy or gender equality issues when it discusses its political agenda. Designation, therefore, should go. It can be replaced, when it comes to concerns about minority rights, by the Council of Europe conventions on minority rights, which are the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Those are currently not justiciable. If they were incorporated into Northern Ireland law, you could take a case to Belfast High Court if, for example, you were an Irish speaker and you thought that you were not getting a proper response to something that you had written in Irish to Stormont, say. That would get us over the long delay in having a bill of rights for Northern Ireland, which has never been implemented as part of the agreement and would be important to achieve.

The Assembly should also be assisted by the Civic Forum, which has never been re-established, despite a legal ruling to that effect. The Civic Forum should be re-established but on the basis set out in the agreement, which was as a social partnership arrangement like the National Economic and Social Council in the Republic, where you have the unions, the employers and the voluntary sector around the table and they bring their collective intelligence to bear on policy issues and ideas.

When it comes to forming the Executive, we have the d'Hondt rule. Again, nowhere else in the world has a Government formed by a d'Hondt rule. That only happened in the mad rush to get the agreement together, because, at that time, the unionists did not want power-sharing. The nationalist side was saying, "We want power-sharing in Cabinet", so we got power-sharing by the d'Hondt rule, because the unionists said, "We want something like the European Parliament, where committee chairs are distributed according to d'Hondt but there is no Executive as such". So we had the Executive positions allocated by d'Hondt, which is like the horse designed by a committee that becomes an elephant.

We need a system that reflects the outcome of an election, so that voters can believe that they get an outcome from elections in that parties come together after an election to form a Government voluntarily and are able to command a majority in the Assembly. The worry about that reproducing all forms of majority rule, which were sectarian, has been overtaken by events, with a society now in Northern Ireland in which there is no possibility of a reconstitution of the unionist bloc as a dominant one or of a nationalist bloc as newly dominant one, because there are so many "Others" and so many people who are "not from here". As we saw first with Belfast City Council and now in the Assembly, there is no real worry about majority rule being abused; in fact, the danger is that minority rights could be abused by being used to stop things such as LGBT+ rights where majority rule should prevail.

In the Executive, we need to have collective responsibility for government to work in any kind of joined-up way. The 1974 Executive agreed collective responsibility at their first meeting. That was no problem. As a result, they were able to agree to integrate the education system. Integrating the education system is what they agreed in 1974 collectively around the table. It is just not possible to have government that works any other way. I remember standing in Dermot Nally's kitchen in Dublin when I was interviewing him years ago — he was a former Cabinet Secretary in Dublin who was heavily involved in issues to do with the North in the early 1970s — and he said, "You just cannot have government without collective responsibility".

We need government around a programme; we need collective responsibility in government for that to deliver; and we need fiscal powers for the Executive to fund what they want to do. Scotland and Wales have the fiscal powers that they demanded. In Northern Ireland, all we have done is demand less corporation tax, which would mean, first, that you would have more inequality, because it is good for business but not good for ordinary taxpayers, and, secondly, that you would reduce your ability to spend money on important public goods. In Scotland, income tax is now largely under Scottish control and has been used to make the system more progressive, so that the people who have broader shoulders have a greater burden. That is as it should be, and that would help deal with the failure to cope with massive failings of government such as the Lough Neagh algal pollution or the hospital waiting lists. I am on a waiting list for cataract surgery that, I was told, is eight years long. That is completely unacceptable. Unless the Executive are willing to address the issue of fiscal powers, that is what will happen.

Finally but not least, I argue that the restrictions in the agreement on how North/South cooperation happens should be abolished and there should be no limit regarding the liaison and cooperation or the executive bodies that could be established between the institutions North and South so that we get to a point at which it would be possible to achieve integration and reconciliation across the island: a "shared island", in what has become a dominant language in the Republic about how to address North/South issues. All of those things put together would ensure better government in Northern Ireland, bring about a process of reconciliation, including Ireland-wide, and I commend them to you on that basis. In my submission, I said that they could be introduced via legislation at Westminster with the involvement of the Irish Government and with public involvement via citizens' assemblies — one in the North and one island-wide — to look at the shared aspects. That should be done before the May 2027 election, if that is possible. I accept that there might be difficulties with moving to AMS because you would need new constituency boundaries set by an impartial commission — that would take time — but the Taoiseach, Micheál Martin, arguably needs to get such reforms in place before the next Assembly election, or similar reforms; he did not specify them the way that I have. That is a good timetable to work to.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): I will change the running order, because I know that Professor McEvoy is under a bit of time pressure, and I am aware that she and Professor McCulloch will present jointly. If you do not mind, Professor Kerr, I will bring you in at the end and allow the two ladies to present now.

Professor Allison McCulloch (Brandon University, Canada): Thank you very much. Our jointly authored submission comes out of our experiences as keen observers of Northern Ireland's politics as well as comparative political scientists who are interested in power-sharing systems. It is also informed by a collaborative project that we are working on regarding citizen inclusion in power-sharing settlements that looks at the opportunities for citizens to be involved in the adoption and adaptation of such settlements.

I will start with a couple of remarks about how to reform, before turning to the question of what could or should be reformed. That is where some of our comparative knowledge is useful. One of the prevailing assumptions in the academic literature is that reforming power-sharing is difficult, if not downright impossible. The technical term that we tend to use is "sticky" — that also came from Donald Horowitz, who was mentioned earlier. Once agreed, a resistance to reform locks in, and it is difficult to make any changes to the initial agreement. That generally seems to be the case in a number of power-sharing systems. However, what is interesting is that Northern Ireland has bucked that trend. There have been changes in order to have a First Minister and deputy First Minister selected; there has been a reduction in the number of Executive portfolios and seats in the Assembly; there has been the creation of an official Opposition; and, of course, there has been the restructuring of the petition of concern. All of those have come about in a similar fashion. There has been a crisis; then a stalemate; then the convening of ad hoc high-level talks with some or most of the political parties along with the British and Irish Governments and, sometimes, an American diplomat; and then a new agreement is reached.

We do not want to devalue the efforts and accomplishments that those high-level talks have achieved — indeed, they have helped to recommit the involved parties to the principles of power-sharing and to getting on with the business of governing — but there are a few risks attached. A crisis might be a moment to get a deal done, but the time crunch and the other pressures attached are not ideal circumstances for changing the rules of the game. All of those institutional choices come with benefits, risks and the need to make trade-offs between them. Crisis moments may not always provide the opportunity for the careful reflection and clear-headed analysis of the trade-offs that are needed. That is particularly the case for how there may be unintended consequences for women or other marginalised or otherwise under-represented groups. Moreover, high-level talks are precisely that: they are high-level and often behind closed doors with little to no room for citizen consultation or input. While those high-level talks will always be needed, there are mechanisms that can supplement that approach.

As noted, citizens' assemblies and other deliberative forums can help to capture some further knowledge as to which reform options would receive sufficient cross-community support and legitimacy. They are also an important way of tapping into the public's desire for authentic consultation. They have been used in a range of places, and their use would be welcome on this topic. We also suggest having more robust public opinion surveys, using something that is called "conjoint experiment" or "analysis". That is a method of running a public opinion survey that involves looking at zones of possible agreement. It offers some feedback on what citizens want, what principles they value and which trade-offs they are prepared to accept. We have just completed such a survey in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we have them running in Cyprus, New Caledonia and Northern Ireland. We expect to be able to analyse the results of those surveys by the beginning of the new year. A final strategy for helping to support reform is through the use of Standing Committees such as this one. Doing that helps to normalise the discussion of reform efforts, rather than reinforcing zero-sum perspectives. It also means that those benefits, risks and trade-offs can be discussed in less fraught conditions than might be featured in crisis moments. Those committees can then inform what is taken on board in talks.

In the absence of the ability to undertake wholesale constitutional reform, there is a need to prioritise which institutions should be the subject of reform efforts. Here, we suggest that there is a need to put your preferences in rank order. The petition of concern has, of course, been a contentious subject in earlier reform efforts but can probably move down that list in terms of its urgency, in large part because the last set of reforms did what it needed to do. It seems to us that, in getting the Assembly and Executive up and running following an election, dealing with the risk of a party refusing to nominate for one of the top two posts is high on the public's list of priorities. With that in mind, we focused our submission primarily on Executive formation practices. As Joanne will emphasise, there is no magic bullet for institutional design: all strategies come with benefits and risks. It is a matter of being clear as to which trade-offs you can live with and which benefits matter most to you. I will turn it over to Joanne for that.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Thank you.

Professor Joanne McEvoy (University of Aberdeen): Thank you, Allison. Thank you, Chair, for the invitation.

As Allison said, we will focus on what could or should be reformed in terms of Executive design and the rules for Executive formation as a priority. First, we suggest that parties may wish to revisit the titles of the top two posts. The "deputy" tag can cause confusion and symbolic problems for some parties, despite the First Minister and deputy First Minister having equal power. It may be prudent now to change the titles to "First Ministers", cementing the fact that the positions are joint and interdependent. The original titles have been applied for some time, with three parties having availed themselves of the title of First Minister. Sinn Féin, as the largest nationalist party, has availed itself of the title of First Minister since February 2024. It may be time to move to a title change.

The question of Executive formation is particularly salient, given the challenge that there has been in recent years of parties opting not to take their posts and therefore preventing Executive formation. Refusing to nominate is a powerful tool that allows the two largest parties the power of veto over Executive formation. We suggest that the question then becomes one of how to design Executive formation rules that prevent institutional collapse when a party refuses to nominate. We suggest that that could be considered in two overarching ways: first, the return to the original mode of appointment, as set out in the 1998 agreement; and, secondly, the creation of new rules in two subsets, which would be the appointment of the top two posts being incorporated either into d'Hondt or into the voluntary coalition negotiations between parties that we just heard about.

A benefit of returning to the 1998 agreement would be that we could strengthen the relationship between the two top parties and, potentially, the wider Executive. It could help to deliver or provide a positive basis for agreeing and developing the Programme for Government, marking the determination to move towards more effective governance and cross-community relations. A joint ticket may support joint government. However, Allison mentioned trade-offs, and reverting to the original rules may pose a challenge. Having a joint ticket depends on the willingness of the top two parties to agree on the positions and secure cross-community support in the Assembly. Parties would also need to consider whether a joint ticket would be more difficult if, say, the second largest party is from the other designation. We are not suggesting that such difficulty is certain, but, if cross-community Assembly support or approval was lacking, it would be important to think through what would happen thereafter.

Secondly, rather than reverting to the original rules, reform around Executive formation could mean designing new rules, and the first option would be to incorporate the top two positions into d’Hondt and allow the next party in line to nominate, should a leading party refuse to do so. The potential benefit of that approach is that it would allow Executive formation to proceed. It might indeed have the effect of encouraging parties to nominate, disincentivising boycott. However, there are potential risks attached. For example, there could be political instability should the party that refused to take the post or chose not to then choose to hamper Executive formation, especially when votes in the Assembly are required. Moreover, a decision to move without a leading party occupying one of the top two posts might be politically contentious. It would be important to be mindful of the potential political and electoral consequences faced by a smaller party from either the nationalist or unionist community that joined an Executive without the largest party in its community.

Alternatively, Executive formation redesign could move to a voluntary coalition, which we heard about from Robin, where parties form an Executive following an election and inter-party negotiations and then proceed with a coalition to be approved by the Assembly rather than using d'Hondt. Again, there are potential benefits to that approach. The combination of parties in the Executive could vary over time and could include parties to varying extents across the different community backgrounds. It would also be important to consider the appropriate threshold for Assembly support, which is usually two thirds of Members voting or 65%. Moreover, there would be no need for community designations in that approach. That change could arguably improve effectiveness and stability, as negotiations would invite the parties to agree on a Programme for Government and reach a shared policy platform. Additionally, no single party could veto Executive formation, provided that no party had more than one third of the seats.

It is important to acknowledge, however, that, in divided and post-conflict societies, a voluntary coalition can be difficult to achieve and can be politically contentious, should the outcome leave out a leading party from one of the main communities. It is also the case that coalition formation via inter-party negotiations can encounter lengthy delays of weeks, months or even years, so it is important to carefully evaluate how that model would work in practice. The parties would need to anticipate the political implications and consider lessons from other places that require post-electoral negotiation for Executive formation.

I will end there, Chair. Thank you again for the invitation. I emphasise that our message is that there are different ways to approach Executive formation and different options, but it is really important to consider the trade-offs — the benefits and risks — that parties can live with.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Thank you both. I will now go to Professor Kerr.

Professor Michael Kerr (King’s College London): Thank you, Chair, and thank you for the invitation to speak on this important topic. My remarks, suggestions and recommendations will assume that, after 25 years of the current system, we will have it for the next 25 years in some form. Also, considering the Troubles that we have overcome, the complete transformation of society to a fully post-conflict phase of positive peace is possible.

I will begin with culture, because institutions are downstream of culture. Since 1998, the present power-sharing arrangements have not delivered the unity and collective purpose that were displayed by the Sunningdale Executive or envisaged in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. Despite stronger safeguards than the 1973 framework, the post-St Andrews era has, in many ways, consolidated institutionalised separateness, rather than fostering joined-up governance in the spirit of reconciliation that might lead to that complete social transformation and integration in a genuine way. I recommend reviving the agreement's original spirit and reimagining a shared future rooted in cooperation and civic trust, treating political culture as the foundation of the stanchions of structural change.

Institutions must follow political will. Institutional design alone is unlikely to suffice. Whether the changes are incremental or ambitious, impact will be limited unless parties move beyond the culture wars, prioritise making Northern Ireland work and invest sustained political capital in institutions. Without that commitment, the risk of renewed division persists regardless of future constitutional outcomes.

In that vein, I suggest a phased or rolling programme of reform over time, beginning with measures that perhaps do not require significant amendment to the Belfast Agreement. Restoring pre-St Andrews rules would provide a practical baseline. Think of it as one step backwards to enable several future steps forward. From that baseline, reforms could be reassessed periodically between this and the next two Assemblies through the Committee using structured opinion polling, perhaps bringing in sunset clauses on sensitive issues, civic forums, even citizen juries, and, where appropriate, local consultative referenda, which the mature consociations of Switzerland use regularly. The aim would then be to have a living power-sharing system that evolves towards a shared future rather than one that ossifies and stagnates. The recommendation is to revert to pre-St Andrews as a baseline and embed scheduled review mechanisms.

On the joint office, joint tickets for the First Ministers, as envisaged in 1998, should definitely be coupled with a joint Programme for Government agreed before taking office. Titles matter less than the collective character of leadership. As a long-term aspiration, perhaps consider the idea of a troika — leadership shared by A, the largest party; B, the largest party from the opposite designation; and C, a third leader from the non-aligned group — three First Ministers rotating over the term on a joint Assembly ticket. Those seats could count under d’Hondt, reducing disproportionate dominance by larger parties and broadening representation on the Executive. The rotating First Minister could, if you like, be a first among equals and end the practice of having a joint office that sits above the Executive. The recommendation is to reinstate a joint ticket with a pre-agreed programme and explore that troika idea.

Returning to veto powers and the culture of veto and agenda control, political culture around veto powers perhaps should change. Vetoes really should be insulated from misuse and should concern genuinely vital issues. Neither the First Minister nor the deputy First Minister should be able to block agenda items from reaching the Executive. Perhaps that amounts to an unnecessary veto. In an ideal design, the exercise of a true veto at Executive level would terminate that coalition and trigger fresh Assembly elections or a refresh in the Assembly to see whether another leadership emerged with another Programme for Government, as in Sunningdale — a model that embodies a unity of purpose. Sunningdale embodied a unity of purpose despite ongoing violence and without a comprehensive Anglo-Irish framework. If they were able to do it then, surely it might be possible to think about doing that now. The recommendation is to end agenda blocking, restrict vetoes to vital matters and link any executed veto to the dissolution of the governing coalition as an incentive not to use it.

As regards justice and reconciliation, it might be worth considering preparing to integrate the Department of Justice into d'Hondt, once there is a clear, collective agreement to tackle paramilitarism and organised crime in all forms. Outside d'Hondt, you could consider establishing a permanent Minister for reconciliation, a non-voting external appointment to the Executive with a strong public mandate. Properly empowered, such a portfolio might provide an agreed forum for managing the divisive cultural issues, reducing toxicity in political discourse, and help the Executive to face the security challenges collectively.

On designation and parity of esteem, arguably no community should be institutionally superior to another in a perfect liberal democratic consociational system, and there is an argument that the designation system no longer reflects today's political landscape. A significant and growing share of citizens identify as neither unionist nor nationalist. Power-sharing works best when no community is institutionally superior to another. Therefore, there is an argument to include the non-aligned.

In the long term, I see two reform pathways that might merit consideration. There is an incremental pathway: add a third designation —British/Irish — to recognise dual or hybrid identities. That is consistent with article 1(vi) of the Belfast Agreement, which recognises the right to identify

"British/Irish" is perhaps substantively preferable to "Other", which, in consociational terms, means practically nothing. That would move the system towards a sort of post-binary political culture, with representation, consent and responsibility shared.

A more transformational, longer-term idea would be to replace "Unionist" "Nationalist" and "Other", with "British" or "Irish" or "British/Irish", thus reframing politics beyond the historic binary of republican/loyalist, unionist/nationalist, whilst guaranteeing parity of esteem in consent mechanisms.

Under either path, parallel consent and related safeguards could be adapted so that non-aligned MLAs or British/Irish MLAs hold an equal or proportionate standing in key votes. The test is straightforward: no community, unionist, nationalist or non-aligned, should be structurally privileged above the other.

Concerns about rotation's fairness, given current vote shares, should be set against the benefits: a visible cross-community investment in the institutions; a signal of commitment to a shared future; and the cultural detoxification that enables collective focus on economic and social priorities, akin to norms in established European coalition democracies.

Where should those reform impulses come from? In theory, voluntary coalition is attractive, but, in practice, we already have a de facto voluntary coalition element in Northern Ireland, because not all parties are mandated to serve. It is unlikely that the British and Irish Governments will put Northern Ireland at the top of their agenda in the next decade and prioritise the cajoling or imposing of new reforms. Therefore, reform must emanate from the Assembly.

I turn to consultation, legitimacy and citizens' assemblies. A full restoration of pre-St Andrews rules is not immediately feasible or practicable. By reconnecting the joint office by requiring the election of the First Minister and deputy First Minister on a two-thirds Assembly vote, one could, from that platform, convene a tiered programme of citizens' assemblies to examine designation reform, veto scope, justice integration and leadership thresholds. Pilots could be facilitated via time-limited provisions to learn and adjust.

I will make a final point, if I may. As a fact-finding mission, I recommend that the Executive take a trip to Lebanon to look at what could be described as the grandfather of consociational democracy and see what happens when a power-sharing system does not reform over a 50-to-60-year period and then, maybe, visit Switzerland to see what happens when it does.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Thank you very much. That travel itinerary certainly sounds interesting.

Thank you all. You each gave interesting and unique perspectives. I am conscious that Committee members will have other business to attend to soon, so I will move on quickly. Are there any questions that anyone, particularly those who are under time pressure, would like to ask the panel before they leave?

Ms Ennis: Unfortunately, I have to leave.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Do you want to ask a question?

Ms Ennis: It is more about the fact that, in the previous two briefings, members have focused on the titles of FM and DFM, a subject that, I think, was described as "low-hanging fruit". Given that, in practical terms, the titles are equal anyway, will a cosmetic change make any practical, real-life difference to stability, without some of the other infrastructure that you described being put in around it? Would that, on its own, have any practical impact on this place to make it more stable?

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): I will ask each of the panel or whomever particularly wants to answer to respond. We will start with you, Robin.

Dr Wilson: Something that is not understood about the FM/DFM issue is the origin of those titles. Mark Durkan proposed them in the 1998 talks. When he proposed that, he had in mind the killings that had happened in Poyntzpass a few weeks earlier. Those were killings by a loyalist paramilitary group in which one Catholic and one Protestant were killed. Séamus Mallon and David Trimble found themselves in Poyntzpass, consoling the families of the victims, and Mark Durkan thought, "Ah. That's a symbol of reconciliation". That is what the jointly selected FM/DFM arrangement was meant to be. Unfortunately, that was filleted out in 2006 by the St Andrews Agreement. It is important to get back to that.

In 1974, Ken Bloomfield was the Cabinet Secretary. One thing that made him almost tearful when I was interviewing him about the experience was that he had been so impressed by the empathy between Brian Faulkner and Gerry Fitt — the Chief Executive and Deputy Chief Executive, as they were then called. It is important that that chemistry is at the heart of power-sharing. At the same time, however, I agree that that is only one part of the set of structural changes that need to take place.

Professor Kerr: It would not make any difference without the joined-up nature being recreated and reimagined, with that arising from cross-community votes in the Assembly.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Joanne or Allison, do you have any points to make?

Professor McEvoy: The symbolism is essential. Those interpersonal relations are key to the way in which people can work together and implement a plan. We suggest, however, that it is not necessarily just about symbolism but about stability. The Assembly has come at the need to look at institutional reform with both effectiveness and stability as criteria. We anticipate that it would be more than just symbolic, but the symbolic aspect is important.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): OK. I think that Joanne has answered on behalf of you, Allison. Do you have anything to add? No; you are happy.

Mr Sheehan: Thanks to the four of you for your presentation. I want to come on to a couple of issues that Robin raised.

Robin, you quoted a survey in which people were asked what the Assembly and Executive had achieved. If I understood you correctly, a high percentage said that they had achieved nothing. Let us take, however, the previous mandate. An issue that you majored on in your presentation was integrated education. In that mandate, the Assembly passed the Integrated Education Bill and repealed the fair employment exemption for teachers. Do you not agree that those were positive moves?

Dr Wilson: On the second point, you are absolutely right. That was always a problem with the Fair Employment Act. It was evident at the time, and that is absolutely an important change. On the first, it is progress but certainly those who have been involved in the integrated education movement see it as limited and partial progress. I think that they are right, but it is obviously better to have that than not have it.

The difficulty is, Pat, when you look over the length of it all. I was part of a project in the first decade after the Belfast Agreement where we looked at Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales together. You have to say that the general legislative output of the Assembly has been poor, and there is no getting away from that. Those individual items are fine, large and valuable, but, overall, it is not sufficient.

Mr Sheehan: During one of my previous appearances in the Committee, probably 10 years ago, the Assembly research staff carried out a comparative study of the legislative output of all the devolved legislatures. The Assembly compared favourably with its counterparts across the water. Perhaps you have other research that suggests otherwise, but, certainly in the two years of the last mandate, a huge raft of legislation went through. A lot of it was, admittedly, private Members' Bills, but that is the nature of the beast that we have here.

You also mentioned female representation in the Assembly. The female representation of the Sinn Féin cohort here is over 56%. Therefore, it angers me at times when commentators, in particular, and, sometimes, academics as well use only broad strokes to the effect that there is no proper female representation, instead of saying, "Why do the other parties not look at what Sinn Féin has done?". It did not happen by accident that we have the level of female representation that we have. Rather than trying to reform the whole system, why not say to political parties, "Sinn Féin did this. Why can you not do it?". Effectively, you should name and shame, instead of just branding all political parties by not singling out those who have made progress on an issue like that.

Dr Wilson: I am certainly not trying to do that, Pat —

Mr Sheehan: I know that you are not trying to do it, but, by not mentioning it, you, effectively, are doing it.

Dr Wilson: The folks intended us to look at the structures of the Assembly and the Executive, and one of those key structures is a voting system. What I said was that, by comparison with Scotland and Wales and elsewhere, we know that the voting system that we have does not incentivise gender equality. That is a separate issue from what individual parties do, and, yes, Sinn Féin is to be commended for what it has done in that regard. Regardless of the electoral system, other parties should do that, and, in particular, unionist parties should do it because they have a poor record on gender equality. Therefore, yes, I am with you on that, but it is a separate argument, if you like, even though I am with you.

Mr Sheehan: Fair enough but —

Dr Wilson: On the point about legislation, I am not talking so much about the quantity but rather the substantive significance of it. A lot of what has been done in the legislation passed here is stuff that would have had to be done just to copy what was being done in London and not much else. There have been more innovative ideas in legislation of substance from Scotland and Wales than there has been in Northern Ireland, I am afraid.

Mr Sheehan: OK. You mentioned a couple of other issues: the transfer of fiscal powers and the Justice Minister's appointment being outside the d'Hondt process. Why is that? Why do we not have fiscal powers, and why is the Justice Minister outside the d'Hondt process? Again, it sounds as though everybody here is to blame for that, but it is actually because of unionist opposition to both the transfer of fiscal powers and the Justice Minister being appointed through the d'Hondt system. Is that not the case?

Professor Kerr: I was not making that point; I was saying that it should be considered over the next 25 years, preferably in the next two Assemblies. My remarks on that, on a Minister of reconciliation and on many other points were really made to stress the point that you, collectively, have the agency to do that. The question of whose fault it is is up to you to work out. That is not my business; I am just making the point.

Mr Sheehan: It would be fair, when you make the point, if you were to identify where the problem lies.

Professor Kerr: I am not here for political point-scoring.

Mr Sheehan: Well, everything is political. OK, I will leave it there.

I have one final question, which is one that the Committee has raised with stakeholders who have given evidence previously. It is on the role of the Speaker, their powers and their accountability. The Speaker is a powerful position in the Assembly. He or she is accountable to no one. They do not have to give any rationale for the decisions that they make.

There was an example of that recently in relation to the Education Minister's School Uniforms (Guidelines and Allowances) Bill. The Committee tabled amendments to the Bill, most of which were rejected by the Speaker. That set a precedent: it has never happened here before. In the whole time that the Assembly has been here, no Speaker has rejected a Committee amendment. That means that, if there were to be a Speaker who was not impartial, he or she could, effectively, shape the legislation that comes through the Assembly to reflect their own party political policies or background. One question that I have asked previous witnesses who have given evidence to the Committee is this: are there examples anywhere in the world in which the role of the Speaker is subject to scrutiny or independent oversight or where a Speaker would have to give written rationale for decisions that they have made?

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Whoever answers or if a couple of people are going to answer, I ask that they keep their answer brief to keep it moving, because there is other business. Who wants to go first?

Professor Kerr: The question on the Speaker speaks to the idea of a living agreement and a living system of consociation. In the context of the case that you referred to, which I have heard you reference before, it would be desirable for there to be, perhaps, a change in political culture so that the scenario that you have suggested does not happen again in the future. Again, it is up to this Review Committee to —

Mr Sheehan: What do you mean by "a change in political culture"?

Professor Kerr: I mean a change in culture whereby it is agreed on whether the Speaker has the statutory right to do that. Look at the Westminster system — the British system. There is no written constitution there. We have a written agreement, but it is a living agreement as well, so you can reform it, and, through the Committee, you can make recommendations for change.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Does anybody else have a point to make? OK.

Pat, I will move on to Michelle for questions.

Mr Sheehan: Sure. Thank you.

Mrs Guy: Thank you all for your evidence, which, obviously, is compelling to me. To an Alliance rep like me, this all feels straightforward, but politics here will be the greatest barrier to achieving any of this.

There seems to be consensus between all of you that designations could go. Can you be really clear and explain how that would help us to have better government and, therefore, better services for people and how it would help reconciliation?

Dr Wilson: To go back to Michael's point, it is partly about political culture, in the sense that, for as long as there is community designation, there will be "Us and them" politics, not politics about the best way to address long-term unemployment and social exclusion, build reconciliation and share the island more. It is about getting that mental shift to a normal political agenda, and getting community designation out of the way seems to be a key aspect of doing that.

Professor Kerr: I was not suggesting that they could go; I was suggesting that their salience could be reduced or that their use could be reduced and they could change to recognise changes in society incrementally.

Professor McCulloch: I do not think that we are suggesting that community designations need to go. It is a matter of thinking again, as Michael said, about their salience and thinking about the diversity, in particular of that "Other" category, and how that is reflected in other voting procedures, such as the petition of concern.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Joanne, do you have a point to add?

Professor McEvoy: Sorry, my volume is not wonderful.

On the point about community designations, the parties would need to explore the implications of moving away from designations. The life and times survey data was mentioned earlier regarding popular support for moving away, but it really comes down to the parties being comfortable about whether that is moving away from the letter of the 1998 agreement or from the spirit of the agreement or whether it is now time that the parties could live with the consequences of doing so. Again, it goes back to the wider point about trade-offs and the main benefits to doing that. We would have to look carefully at what implications might arise from that too.

Mrs Guy: I have one last question. I am trying to capture the answer from you all quickly because we have constrained time here. You all referenced citizens assemblies and civic engagement as a valuable way to progress reform. Can whoever is best placed explain and be clear about the difference between a citizens' assembly approach to civic engagement and, for example, the kind of consultation exercise that we have already done, where you ask people to come and speak to us? Can you be really clear about why and how that is different and why it would be beneficial?

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Who wants to start on that one? I think that Joanne indicated first.

Professor McEvoy: That is a good question. A citizens' assembly is about popular deliberation on a question. Something thorny or difficult for political parties to decide or work through can go to a citizens' assembly. Usually, a citizens' assembly is designed around a random selection of the population, but it is meant to be proportional to the population. If there is an issue or question for deliberation, the idea is that citizens who participate are informed about that issue and then deliberate on that issue. The objective is to see whether there is any shift in citizens' perspectives and preferences about that issue.

In a way, citizens come to a question with a predefined or comfortable perspective or position on an issue. They deliberate, they get lots of information about that issue, and then we assess the extent to which that position has shifted. It allows politicians to capture what that shift might look like on a particular issue. It is usually quite a predefined issue. For example, it could be on community designation, and people are brought together to talk about that and are asked a question based on the deliberation and the information provided. They work through all the implications and are asked to what extent they support a change.

There are different ways of doing deliberation. Some forms are much looser and more flexible, but a citizens' assembly works around a particular question.

Professor Kerr: I will just add that they have been effectively used in the Republic in recent years to address a lot of challenging constitutional issues successfully.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): I will wrap that up, unless anyone else wants to come in.

We will go to Gary briefly. I know that the Agriculture Minister is making a statement in the Chamber at the moment.

Mr Middleton: Thanks for your presentations.

Professor McCulloch, you talked about how a lot of the existing reforms came about. Obviously, there was crisis, then there were talks, and then there was agreement. What forum do you suggest? Obviously, a lot of it comes down to relationships between political parties and talking. When the Assembly is restored, a lot of Ministers and elected representatives get on with the job in hand, so the focus tends to be on delivering, as opposed to trying to get on with reform. What type of forum do you see being set up? Would it be a party leaders-type forum? What type of forum would progress some of those issues?

Professor McCulloch: Thank you for the question. First, a Committee such as this is really important for laying out the options available. It is both: as you say, outside of a crisis moment, it is convening those high-level discussions among party leaders in conjunction with more deliberative forums with citizens in a citizens' assembly or other mechanisms. It needs to happen at multiple levels. It is about getting a sense of the available options and the trade-offs and then coming together outside the heat of those brinkmanship moments to discuss how feasible the options are and what people are prepared to accept.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Would anybody like to add to that?

Dr Wilson: Yes, very quickly. It would be important to engage the Northern Ireland Secretary quickly, because, while the Taoiseach is already on board with this, as I said in my submission, there has to be engagement with the British authorities at Westminster and the Government. Time would have to be found at Westminster for a new Northern Ireland Act, if you were to recommend substantive changes, for example, and if those were acceptable. The Northern Ireland Secretary would need to be brought on board quickly.

Mr Middleton: Thank you.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Thank you very much, particularly to those who have joined remotely from far-flung corners. We really appreciate your time. Thank you both for joining us in person. We will continue with our deliberations. Thank you.