Official Report: Minutes of Evidence

The Chairperson (Mr Brett): I am delighted to welcome Lord Murphy to the Committee. On behalf of the Committee, I thank Lord Murphy for making the effort to come to Northern Ireland to outline his report to members. Lord Murphy will need no introduction, but his dedication to public service to the people of Northern Ireland during some of the most difficult times is to be hugely commended. On behalf of the Committee, Lord Murphy, I thank you for your service to the people of Northern Ireland over many years.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen (House of Lords): Thank you.

The Chairperson (Mr Brett): I will hand over to you, Lord Murphy, if you wish to make any opening remarks, sir.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: Thank you very much indeed for asking me along. It has been a rather traumatic morning. The taxi did not turn up. I was inclined to walk here, but I looked outside and thought, "I'm not going to do that". [Laughter.]

It is good to be with you, and thank you very much, Chair, for your kind remarks.

When I came over last night, I was contemplating the fact that the first time I came here in any sort of political capacity was in 1994, which is a few years ago, when Tony Blair asked me to become the deputy to Mo Mowlam, the shadow Secretary of State. Some years later, as you know, I became Minister of State during the time of the Good Friday Agreement, and I then returned in 2002 until 2005. My heart is in the place, and the transformation, as you all know much better than I do, has been absolutely remarkable. It is great that we are meeting in this Building now, because, as you know better than I do, the institutions have been suspended for various reasons. That was a great cause of sadness for all of us, particularly me, because I chaired the strand one talks for the agreement, which set the Executive and Assembly in being. Now that devolution is back at last, that is great news.

Perhaps I can outline why I was doing this job. It came out of the blue, by the way. The Northern Ireland Secretary of State asked me to do a review of the Windsor framework, and I realised that it was not going to be an easy task. It never is, is it? I thought about it for a short time and then thought, "Yes, I would find that very interesting". We had been talking about it in Parliament for some months, and, as you know, the vote that was taken before Christmas did not command cross-community support for the continuance of the arrangements, and that automatically triggered the independent review.

There are two aspects that I ought to mention as an introduction. One is that the period for the review was far too short, particularly because the start of the six-month period was before Christmas. We had the Christmas recess and then all the business of setting it up, including getting people to work on it and so on. That took another month, so, effectively, we were down to about four to five months to look at what are, in many ways, the most complicated issues regarding the economy of Northern Ireland. The second aspect is that the terms of reference were very restricted. It was clear what I had to do, but it was also clear to me that it would not resolve the constitutional political controversy that surrounds the framework.

The task was to find something that would get cross-community support. Inevitably, that meant that I was heavily restricted, because there were such fundamental disagreements on the nature of it, which I talked about in the report. I was not in a position to make any recommendations on the big picture, if you see what I mean. However, I understood and clearly said in the report that there are fundamental differences in Northern Ireland generally between unionism, nationalism and Alliance, but it is not always as simple as that, and I acknowledged that in the report.

In other times, such as when the Good Friday Agreement, the St Andrews Agreement and other agreements were signed, those agreements were formed from political parties in Northern Ireland deciding what they should be. I make the point that the imposition of anything in Northern Ireland is unsatisfactory. The best thing to do is to ensure that everybody gets together and tries to work out a position, however difficult it might be.

I pondered over whether it would have made a difference had the institutions been up and running when all this was decided, the protocol effectively broke down and the Windsor framework had to come in its place. It would have been hard, but it would have been better, because all the agreements — the Good Friday Agreement and the St Andrews Agreement — that were decided upwards rather than downwards were more successful. However, it was not to be, and we had to work with what we had to work with.

I talked to literally hundreds of people in that period of four to five months. There is a list in my report of the individuals and organisations that I talked to, not to mention the 500 written submissions, at least, that I received. In all those cases, sincere views were held, whatever their political position, but there were quite a few common issues, even between those who did not like the Windsor framework and those who wanted to live with it. There was a lot of commonality there.

I tried to make my recommendations — I had to anyway under the terms of reference — on the basis of what people agreed. The 16 recommendations that I made essentially are based on agreement and consensus. I mentioned where there was no agreement on the big picture issue about whether we should have it or not. The constitutional issues surrounding it were talked about, but, obviously, I could not get consensus on that. However, there were other more practical things that I could not get consensus on either. For example, on relationships with the European Parliament, I could not get agreement on whether there should be observer status at the Parliament. There was also no consensus on whether there should be a European Union office in Belfast.

There was agreement on other things that were strictly outside the Windsor framework, such as the electronic travel authorisation (ETA). That was not part of my terms of reference, but I thought that feelings were so high on that that I decided to put that in the text and asked the Government to look at it.

At the end of the day, it boiled down to two main themes on which I could get some sort of agreement: one was on the democratic deficit, insofar as it applies, particularly to this place; and the second was with regard to how the framework is affecting large, medium and small businesses. That is essentially what the recommendations surround.

On the democratic deficit, there is no question that there is an issue. The decision to leave the European Union, whatever your views — for or against — meant that people did not think enough about Northern Ireland. Certainly, in Britain, they did not. What had to be put in place were we to leave the EU had not been thought about enough. We ended up with the protocol, and that did not work. Then this came along as an improvement. Generally speaking, most people to whom I spoke saw it as an improvement on the protocol for all sorts of reasons, but it is still something that you would not make up unless you had to. It is almost — how can I put it? — putting a plaster on it to make things work here in a highly complicated situation.

On the issue of democratic deficit, insofar as we can influence it, it struck me that the Windsor Framework Democratic Scrutiny Committee is under severe pressure; there is no question about that. I attended a session and talked to the Committee. If I were a parliamentarian, the last Committee that I would want to sit on is the Democratic Scrutiny Committee, because it is so difficult and overwhelming.

Mr Buckley: Make sure that that is noted. [Laughter.]

The Chairperson (Mr Brett): Emma is nodding remotely. [Laughter.]

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: Masses of material comes to it, and there is too little time to scrutinise it. Insufficient, inadequate resources are attached to the advice given to it, and there is not a sufficiently good relationship between Belfast and Whitehall. I have made recommendations about timing, resources and personnel attached to it to ensure that it gets a better opportunity to do it more effectively.

The second part of that, of course, is about when the best time is to influence European Union legislation that affects Northern Ireland. The sooner the better, basically. You do that when it is being written, and that is in Brussels, so part of my recommendations is that the Northern Ireland Office in Brussels should be strengthened with more people and more expertise. It is pretty good as it operates, to be fair. They do a lot of networking and have a lot of influence in trying to get Northern Ireland's voice heard. That is a substantial recommendation that I have made.

Incidentally, I appeared before the House of Lords Committee on the same issue two weeks ago. In fact, I appeared before the House of Commons Committee at 9.30 am; the House of Lords Committee at 10.30 am; and now I am before you a couple of weeks later. The House of Lords report is really worth reading, if you have not already done so. A lot of the recommendations that I have made and they have made are the same and overlap; in fact, they have gone into a bit more detail on some of them.

Then there is the Stormont brake and the applicability motion and, essentially, big political issues. My main recommendation there is that there should be constant dialogue between the Government and the political parties to ensure that it is trusted, which is the best word that I could use. As you know, last week, Queen's University Belfast came out with a survey on what people think about the Windsor framework and what they thought about me as well, which is interesting. That is about what people think, and, as you know, when the Stormont brake was not applied some months ago — it was not allowed by the Secretary of State — certainly, in the unionist community, there was a drop in support. There is obviously an issue of trust in all that. Therefore, the more the political parties and the Executive are involved in those issues, the better.

Before members ask me questions, I will say that the other more general issue is obviously about how it affects business. It depends a bit on the size of the business. Bigger businesses — very large businesses on a Northern Ireland scale — tended to be happier with the situation. They were also able to use the dual access more effectively, because a lot of them are international companies as well and are able to deal with it effectively. However, for medium and small businesses, which form the backbone of Northern Ireland, it was a different picture altogether.

The big thing that struck me was the burdens of bureaucracy that were on, in particular, small businesses. They could not cope with them, and that is interesting for British businesses, by which I mean businesses based in Great Britain that want to trade with Northern Ireland. In the end, they found it and are finding it very burdensome, and, to a large extent, they do not bother because they cannot cope with it any more. I have made recommendations regarding that. I suspect that the biggest one is for a one-stop shop. People did not know where to go to. I remember that, in Ballymena, I met a woman who had been a teacher and had set up a new business. She was in tears with me about the fact that she could not find the answers to questions on all these things. A lot of money has been spent by government, either here or in Whitehall, on all the schemes that exist, but it seems to me that they are not working as well as they could. I hope that the Government, when they are considering their response to me and to the Committee's report, look seriously at that one. There really has to be streamlining of advice so that there is a single point where people can go for advice.

It is also helped considerably, of course, by the sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) agreement that the United Kingdom Government have signed with the European Union. I could not get a meeting with the European Union, by the way. I did ask, but they said that this was a matter for the United Kingdom, so I carried on with the United Kingdom. By 2027, hopefully, that agreement will be in force. That should make a very practical difference on goods, particularly agricultural and SPS goods, coming into the United Kingdom. The same will then apply to GB as to Northern Ireland, so that is a definite plus coming along the line.

Finally, I will say one word about the constitutional issue. I was not really in a position to report on that, but I will give you a couple of thoughts of my own on that. My interpretation of the term "consent" was that it is the consent necessary for where the people of Northern Ireland want to go constitutionally. It stays in the United Kingdom so long as it wants to stay in the United Kingdom; it does not if it does not. That is an absolute commitment by any Government, I think. Sometimes, that gets mixed up with the principle of parity of esteem, which is often forgotten but was an essential part of the Good Friday Agreement. That is that equal weight is given to everybody in their views and their constitutional position, and I am not totally convinced that that has been the case over the past number of years. Whatever happens and whatever the changes to the constitutional status regarding, say, the Windsor framework, it has to be done in the context of people getting together and sorting it out.

I repeat what I said earlier: the only way that things can change in Northern Ireland — we all know this — is by agreement between everyone. That applies as much to the Windsor framework as it does to anything else. The survey that came out last week still points to the fact that most people in Northern Ireland seem to think that this is a barrier in terms of people's view of the constitutional future of Northern Ireland. Therefore, in some way or other, it needs to be resolved by you, not by me or, indeed, by government. An acknowledgement of it is so important.

Having said that, I hope that the 16 recommendations that I made will be accepted by the Government and by the Executive to make it easier for people to live with the framework, which is a complicated business and affects people, through businesses, in a very direct way.

That is a long-winded introduction. Sorry about that.

The Chairperson (Mr Brett): Thank you very much indeed, Lord Murphy. I know that I speak on behalf of the Committee in thanking you and your team for all the vital work that you have done.

I will not use this as an opportunity to re-fight the Brexit wars, because that would not do you or the cause that, hopefully, we are all united on in trying to resolve the issues any service. I will pick up on a number of points that you made, sir.

Imposition never works: you said that in your opening remarks and in the report. We should all be cognisant of that and of the fact that we need a solution that commands the support of all sections of the community in Northern Ireland. That brings me on to the terms of reference. I know that you did not write the terms of reference, Lord Murphy, but I am keen to understand whether you had any discussions with the Secretary of State in advance of their publication, because I believe that you were sent out to bat with a broken bat and that the terms of reference limited what you could do, putting in place vetoes when you should have been allowed to go out, carry out your work and make recommendations based on your expertise and the evidence that you received rather than on terms of reference that clearly limited what you could and could not do.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: The answer is no. Hilary asked me to do it before it all came up and before I did it, if you know what I mean. He asked me to do it after the vote had taken place in the Assembly, but I was not in any way involved in drafting the terms of reference. I knew what those terms of reference were, of course, and, to be honest, I also knew that, in some ways, whatever one was to do on it, it would be necessary to strive for consensus and agreement but that the central constitutional issue was too big to address. Although the terms of reference refer to the constitutional issue, they immediately reference cross-community agreement. You do not have to be a genius to work out that you ain't gonna sort that out in four months, and I knew that that would be the case.

I also knew that it would be a burden for me, in some ways, to try to disentangle what I proposed and what was necessary to solve the much bigger issue of the Windsor framework. I had meetings with every political party and with businesses and so on. In every meeting with a political party, I made it clear that, "I can't touch that". I would have if I could have, but I knew, from my instinct, that I was not going to get agreement on it in a couple of months and that it would take much longer to deal with because it was such a big issue. At the same time, however, there were so many things that needed to be addressed to do with the operation and working of the framework — I discovered that that was very much so — that it was worth doing it. That is why I decided to take the task on.

While the argument about whether the Windsor framework is a constitutional burden because of the border in the Irish Sea will continue, there is a lot of work to be done, while it goes on, to improve the lives of the ordinary people in Northern Ireland who are affected by it. Furthermore, the hugely complex arrangements that have been set up to deal with the democratic deficit, however well meaning they may be, do not seem to work as well as they should. I hope that the recommendations will improve that. There may, indeed, be further ways of looking at how to improve it.

The answer is no: I was not involved in the terms of reference. I knew what they were and accepted that it would be difficult, but I thought, "Let's carry on and see if we can improve the burdensome nature of the framework".

The Chairperson (Mr Brett): I know that you were not able to touch the constitutional issue. As a constitutional unionist, I object, in the strongest terms, to the division of our country by a border in the Irish Sea. From an economic perspective, however, did you give any thought to making a recommendation that the Secretary of State or the Government should legislate to fully restore Northern Ireland's place in the UK internal market? I ask that not from a political perspective — from that perspective, obviously, I would be supportive — but from an economic perspective, given the clear evidence that was submitted to you about the economic damage that was being caused as a result of the border in the Irish Sea.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: Not in terms of legislation. The issue was raised generally, but it was not in that context, and I was conscious all the time that it was a parallel process. There was the process of talking to the parties about the constitution, which I did; of course I did. From my experience, I knew that I was not going to resolve that straight away, but I acknowledged it as an issue. As I said earlier, it may have been the case that, had the institutions been up and running when it all started, a more Northern Ireland-centred agreement could have been made. I repeat that, I think, making the agreements on the protocol — on this too, but mainly on the protocol — above the heads of the representatives of the people of Northern Ireland was a grave error. It was such an important issue. I am not trying to say for one second that it is an easy issue, but none of the other stuff that we have negotiated over the past 30 years has been easy either, has it? If we can do what we have done, why can we not address this as well?

The framework is an attempt to do that, but there is a lot of work still to be done on trying to ensure that the issue is addressed. That point came through last week, with the Queen's University survey on attitudes showing that it is still a major issue that needs to be addressed. However, at the same time, we must not forget the practicalities. If the democratic deficit issue is broken, that has to be mended. No matter how important the constitutional issue might be, we cannot forget the actual burdens on individuals and their businesses, because that is about the prosperity of Northern Ireland. We should never forget that.

There is an awful lot of work to be done in dealing with the constitutional issue. It is not for me to suggest how that is done, but it needs to be addressed. It is a very delicate and sensitive issue and something that goes to the heart of politics here, but it can be done only by agreement.

The Chairperson (Mr Brett): I have a final two points before we hear from my colleagues. Of the many people whom you met in person and the 500 written responses that you received, how many said that the Windsor framework is the best thing since sliced bread and does not need any changes?

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: I did not have many who said that the Windsor framework was the best thing since sliced bread. I am not sure that anybody said that, to be honest. People said that it was better than the protocol and that something had to be done. There were differing views as to whether the dual access was meaningful. Generally, nationalists, Alliance and others tend to say that it is meaningful, and unionists tend to say that it has been overplayed. As a Welshman and Welsh politician, in some ways, I would rather like dual access for Wales. I am not sure that I would like all the hassle that goes with the Windsor framework for Wales, but the idea of being able to trade with the EU in a special and favoured way is not a bad thing.

The Chairperson (Mr Brett): With all due respect, it is a bad thing if you cannot trade freely within your own country.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: No, no, I will come to the internal market side. That is a different kettle of fish altogether. I have a feeling that the independent monitoring panel (IMP) is reporting today. I met the panel and InterTrade UK, which is chaired by Arlene Foster. The independent monitoring panel told me that 80%-plus is the figure for those who are unaffected by that. I do not know what figure the panel will come up with today. We will have to wait and see.

Yes, of course, it is a hugely important issue. As I said, the impact on British businesses has been underrated. I talked to Arlene Foster and her colleagues about that, and I see a role for her body in ensuring that the equivalent of a one-stop shop is available in Britain for companies that regularly trade with Northern Ireland. There is a lot of work to be done on that.

The majority of the written responses from individuals were generally anti-Windsor framework. The responses from businesses, groups and organisations depended a bit on what they were. I do not need to tell you what political parties think about it, because you know that. Generally speaking, there was agreement that it was better and overwhelming agreement that there was work to be done to improve it. If you are in a business, politics is not your trade. Business people often made the point to me that they did not want to get involved in the political side of it, because their job was to run their business. However, they wanted to get heavily involved with trying to make it easier for business. I listened very carefully to those people.

The Chairperson (Mr Brett): Thank you very much, sir.

Ms McLaughlin: Thank you very much, Lord Murphy, for your evidence and report. I very much welcome those. The Windsor framework is not perfect — no one said that it was — but it was necessary to protect the all-island economy and prevent a hard border on the island. We need to do everything that we can to prevent barriers east and west. That is why the recommendations on that are really important.

I welcome the fact that you talked about dual market access and how bigger businesses perhaps benefit from that in a way that small businesses cannot. Do you believe that the UK Government should maybe give extra resources to, for example, the Department for the Economy, to maximise support for smaller businesses so that they can make the best use of the opportunities that now prevail?

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: Yes, there is a case for that. Anybody who is arguing for extra money two weeks before the Budget might be in some difficulty, but I agree that help should be given. I certainly agree with the principle that the UK Government can help Departments in Northern Ireland financially and through expertise. That is very important, because, given that Departments are much smaller organisations in Northern Ireland, it is inevitable that they do not have the same number of resources, particularly when it comes to human resources and expertise that can be called on. That struck me as being particularly important.

It does not come as a surprise to find that bigger manufacturing industries, which are very often international companies, feel that dual access is of more use to them. A lot of small and medium-sized companies do not necessarily export a great deal. Some do, but a lot of them do not. The more that we can help businesses, the better. The issue is whether that help can be easily found, and, at the moment, it cannot. For example, when you look at the language that a lot of that stuff is in, you see that it is not plain English. It is gobbledygook. That has to be simplified — it really does. Also —. What is the name of the scheme that I made recommendations on?

Ms McLaughlin: The Trader Support Service (TSS).

The Chairperson (Mr Brett): The trusted trader scheme and the UK internal market scheme (UKIMS).

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: Give me a second. You know the one that I mean. It is the duty reimbursement scheme.

The Chairperson (Mr Brett): The duty reimbursement stuff.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: It is particularly important if the tariff situation gets more complicated. Universally, that scheme was felt to be slow. Although the money eventually comes through, the pace causes serious cash-flow problems, particularly for smaller businesses. That has to be looked at very carefully as well. There is no question that there was good intent in all those schemes, but what matters is getting effective everyday access to them. The more that that happens, the better.

Having the SPS thing by 2027 should make a huge difference to a lot of that as well. The sooner that that comes, the better. That, too, is always slow. I made a recommendation about the importance of always putting pressure on the British Government and the European Union to be as quick as they possibly can on that deal so that it comes forward in a timely manner and people can benefit from it.

Ms McLaughlin: I agree entirely. This place was not sitting when there was the imposition of the frameworks. When people and parties are not united, this place is not good and rarely works effectively. There is, however, a unity of purpose when it comes to supporting businesses east to west. I am really concerned that a lot of GB businesses, for example, choose not to trade in Northern Ireland because of the added bureaucracy. Anything that we can collectively do to mitigate those barriers, therefore, is really important, because we want to see the flow of trade both ways.

My party has very much wanted to see an EU office set up in Belfast, because we thought that it would also be helpful. The more institutions that we have here to help, the better. You talked about there being a one-stop shop for smaller businesses to go to. You did not really make any recommendations on that, because there was no consensus in the responses, but what are your thoughts on opening up those communication lines closer to here and to businesses?

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: The big issue on the democratic deficit side is that, like anything and any law that you make, if you want to influence a law in any Parliament, you do that before it goes to the parliamentary procedure — before the amendments come and all the rest. You influence it in the early stages. It strikes me that that is the most effective way that Northern Ireland could say, "Look, this ain't good for us". The dental issue is a good example of that. It just did not fit. The fact that that was identified at an early stage meant that it never happened. It seems that that would be a much more effective way of looking at whether a law should work in Northern Ireland, and that means influencing them when they are made in Brussels. The Office of the Northern Ireland Executive in Brussels does a very good job. Aodhán Connolly is an excellent head of that office. As with all these things, he knows his way around, but he needs more people to help him out on the technical detail, because, as I said, the laws that the EU makes are hugely technical and complicated. There should be people who are able to help out, spot the red lights at an early stage and say, "Be careful on this one". It is so important to do that.

If you are asking how Brussels can be influenced, that must be done within the context of what can be agreed. That is the issue — what can be agreed. That is the way to do it. Yes, ideas were put to me, but I could not recommend them, because they did not command consensus. However, I mentioned them, and they were issued from the unionist side, which did not necessarily command consensus, on the way in which we deal with, for example, the democratic deficit. I also mentioned that. It is worth looking at those ideas, but you can do that only if you have general agreement. One idea that some of the businesses referred to was having an EU office in Belfast, but that was seen to be politically unacceptable from the unionist point of view, so that was difficult.

The general point that you make is that, had a lot of these issues been decided on at an early stage by people here, they would be done here, in this Building, probably. There would be a hell of a row and all sorts of things happening, but that was the answer, even though it was not to be. We cannot rewrite history. That is what happened. It is important that this place is involved in the process more through your Committees and so on. The issues should be discussed openly, and, even though there are substantial disagreements in principle, there is nothing wrong in talking about them.

I was not involved in the St Andrews Agreement, but, obviously, I was involved in the Good Friday Agreement. I have often said that I could have written that agreement in two or three weeks, more or less. However, nobody would have agreed with it — nobody. The reason why they agreed it in the end was because they wrote it and they owned it. The political parties in Northern Ireland owned it after lots and lots of discussion and heartache. It was so difficult; it took years. Nevertheless, it came from the people who represent the people of Northern Ireland, and that is what is important. I was a Welsh MP, so why should I take decisions on people's lives in Northern Ireland? You can help people to make decisions, but you should not make them yourself.

As I said, the process for this should have been much longer. Six months was far too short. At least a year would have been helpful to get more depth on the issue. There could also have been some indication at an early stage about how the big issue itself might be resolved. It would not have given answers or the resolution, but it could have said what mechanism there could be to overcome that. If there are any suggestions, I suspect that the Secretary of State would welcome them.

Ms McLaughlin: Do you think that the Labour Government's policy of bringing about closer relationships between the UK and the EU will help to overcome some of the barriers? What can we do to influence that type of decision-making in the Labour Government? Essentially, that is what has to happen in order for us to overcome some of the barriers, particularly the trade barriers. If we had a closer relationship, that would also eventually lead to our having more democratic accountability.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: It is a tricky one, is it not? You have to accept that Brexit is done. What is done is done. However, there is nothing wrong with trying to improve our relations, our trade and the prosperity of our country. What is wrong with that? My former seat of Torfaen in south Wales is now held by my friend Nick Thomas–Symonds, who is the Minister responsible for EU/UK relations. Indeed, I was talking to him only two days ago about all that. You have to tread carefully with how you deal with it, but if there are practical issues, such as the SPS agreement, that would help people out and help lives, the quicker that those happen, the better, frankly. It did not help that the EU would not talk to me, by the way. I never quite understood why. Perhaps there was a breakdown in communication, but there did not seem to be to me. It was a short time frame. Its view, which was relayed to me, was that it was a matter for the United Kingdom. It is — of course it is — but the EU is a big player in all this. I am sure that negotiations between the Government and the EU are always ongoing, including on what happens to the Windsor framework. There is a great big team in Whitehall that deals with that. Tread carefully, because this is a tricky political issue that relies entirely on the practical reasons for why we could improve trade within the confines of the agreement that was made between Parliament and the Government some years ago.

Mr Buckley: Thank you, Lord Murphy. There is much that I could say about the Windsor framework and the subsequent agreements, from the withdrawal agreement right through, and there is much that I have said. It was an affront to me, as a unionist, particularly because of the Irish Sea border. I remember the debate in the House that preceded your report. I will not go over all the points that were made then; I spoke for an hour during that debate. I was able to outline —.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: How long did you speak for?

Mr Honeyford: An hour and seven minutes.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: That is Gladstonian.

Mr Buckley: I put across how I felt constitutionally and that I felt that there was a breach of the consent principle — I know that you may have a different interpretation of that — particularly regarding the concept of cross-community voting on an issue that is so serious. I spoke for an hour, but the debate lasted for five or six hours. In that debate, however, between articles 5 and 10 of the protocol, we essentially signed over more than 300 areas of law to the European Union in one single vote in the Assembly. That was serious and substantial. I talked about over 33 different issues relating to businesses and traders in Northern Ireland where they had been affected by bureaucracy and customs on the Irish Sea and how that was making many of their businesses unviable.

You talked about the Windsor framework. As someone who has had the odious task of being a member of the Windsor Framework Democratic Scrutiny Committee since its inception, I know about the troubles that are caused by both the lack and flow of information. We are placed in the unenviable position of having to make decisions in a short time on things that, in many cases, are way beyond our expertise. Indeed, we are facing some issues for the first time. I will ask one political question, and then I will come to the economy, because that is the context for this Committee. What would you say to those in the unionist community who feel that the review exercise was only ever designed to result in one outcome, that being the retention of the Windsor framework architecture, which, as you have seen from those with whom you have engaged in my community, is totally unacceptable?

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: First, I will talk about the vote before Christmas. I thought that it was puzzling. Over the years, serious work was always being done towards ensuring that there was consensus on everything. That is why I made an issue of parity of esteem. Whatever the technicalities that were involved in all this, the spirit that underpinned all our agreements over the years has been one in which you could get consensus. I can understand the feelings of unionists when they felt that that was not the case. Of course, the opposite could be said; people on the other side of the argument could say, "Ah, that's giving vetoes to one side or the other". It is always the case that you exchange vetoes. The argument is always to do away with the need for them so that you can get agreement on the issue. That puzzled me, but what was, was. There was nothing that I could do about it, and it was what was decided some time previously. I only hope that, in the months and years ahead, there will be serious attempts by government to deal with ways to overcome the divisions on this matter, but that will not be easy.

The second point is about the practicalities. Again, they are constrained a bit by the terms of reference, but it should be remembered that I was totally aware of the huge chasm in opinion in Northern Ireland. Again, that was emphasised in the report from last week. If anything, there is even more of a chasm than there was before. Frankly, the democratic deficit side of it does not command sufficient trust and needs to be worked on. That was the basis for my recommendations on the Windsor Framework Democratic Scrutiny Committee, which I think was seriously overwhelmed and, as a consequence, could not do its job properly. You will have noticed in my report that I have quoted a letter from the Chair of that Committee to me and others. I thought that the letter was so good that I put it in the body of the report. The problems that they had in this case were on a reserved matter, but that does not matter. It shows the practical problems that the Committee faces in doing proper scrutiny. My report went beyond scrutiny. Although scrutiny is the job of the Windsor Framework Democratic Scrutiny Committee, and the clue is in the name — democratic scrutiny Committee — there is also a serious case for trying to influence legislation before it gets here. That is why I keep coming back to the importance of trying to influence these things in Brussels. The Lords Committee report goes into more detail on the EU/UK bodies and the fallout on all that that exists in Brussels and London. That has to be looked at seriously, and the recommendations are very good. It is not transparent enough, however; there is not a sufficient role for stakeholders to get involved at an early stage.

Generally speaking, no one would have made this up unless the protocol had been so unpopular and ineffective that they had to find something to put in its place. That suggests to me that there is a strong case for continuing talks between political parties on where we are going on all this. It is not an easy one — I understand that it is not easy. It is a fundamental thing. My point at the beginning of my report on the technical issue of consent as opposed to the spirit of it is still that it has not been bettered. It is up to the people of Northern Ireland to decide what they want to do with their future. Regardless of this agreement or any other agreement or framework, it is you who will decide the future of Northern Ireland — no one else.

Mr Buckley: I believe that the people of Northern Ireland — indeed, the people of the UK, but particularly Northern Ireland — were badly let down by the UK Government in the way in which they negotiated the essential Brexit agreement.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: No doubt.

Mr Buckley: It was terrible. It fell so far short. For a nation that prides itself in statecraft that has been honed over centuries, there were fundamental failings, misunderstandings and untruths. We had the Prime Minister of the day, Boris Johnson, come to Northern Ireland and basically tell business people to their faces to just rip up their customs papers, saying "Rip your customs papers up. Tell them that I said so". It was beyond ridiculous.

Now, the only caveat that I will add to that is the fact that they can be held accountable. They can be scrutinised. I have serious a mistrust of the European Union. You said that it would not even engage with you in the spirit of trying to ease some of the frictions. That tells me that my mistrust is not misplaced. A total of 300 areas of law now sit with the European Union for which there is no democratic oversight. I cannot really get beyond the point of how we can solve the issue because of those Brexit negotiations. I am not talking about the positions that different parties took in the Brexit campaign; they were entitled to those, and that debate has been fought. I am talking about the negotiations. The cardinal sin, essentially, is that, whilst EU law continues to apply in Northern Ireland, we will always have frictions with our internal market in the United Kingdom. The reason why I take such exception to the principle of dual market access and why I believe that the vote that happened pre-Christmas was an "illusion of democracy"— I said that at the time — is because, if the EU had thought about or been able to analyse that the result could have been any different than it was, I do not believe for one moment that that vote would have happened in the first place. Dual market access gives people the impression that there is equal market access. For many of the small and medium-sized businesses, which make up the vast majority of Northern Ireland's businesses, there is no succour in dual market access when they continue to have their supply chains destroyed and their markets decimated.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: My views on dual access came from what people told me. I will repeat that the larger businesses, particularly manufacturing businesses, said that there were advantages to it that they would gladly exploit and that there is a case for trying to ensure that more and more people who can have access to it use it. It would be foolish not to. However, as you rightly say, the majority of businesses that we deal with here tend to be medium-sized and smaller businesses, to which it is less significant than the internal market between you and GB. I entirely accept that.

I will come back repeatedly to the point that I agree with you: the way in which all this was negotiated was very poor. In a sense, Northern Ireland was seen as an afterthought in all that. I did not think so, obviously, but I had no influence in any of it. A hugely greater amount of attention should have been given to it at the time of our leaving. They had plenty of time to do it. Again, it happened in the absence not only of the institutions being up and running but of real consultations, negotiations and discussions with political parties in Northern Ireland, even if the institutions were not up and running. That was a major error. I am not saying that that would have been a panacea, by the way, because the differences were so big. However, it was not even tried, and that was a major error. It may have made a difference.

In the meantime, we have to try to resolve it one way or the other. If the system is not seen to be working properly— I do not think that it is — we have to find ways to improve the operation. As to the wider aspect, which you rightly described, that is above my pay grade, in a sense, so it is for people above my pay grade to engage with it.

I will apply a little caveat to that, however, which is that that should not happen at the expense of this place doing its job in all the other ways in which it does its job. People in Northern Ireland deserve their Executive and their Assembly. I spent a lot of my life trying to ensure that the Assembly was up and running. When I first came here, unionism generally and certainly the Ulster Unionist Party at that stage were opposed to devolution. The fact that Wales and Scotland got devolution was a lever by which Belfast eventually got its Assembly, among other reasons.

I genuinely believe that the best thing for Northern Ireland is for it to be governed as far as it can be by the people of Northern Ireland through this place. I am therefore delighted that the Assembly and the Executive are up and running again. There are huge issues — my God, we know that there are — but that is what elected politicians have to deal with.

Mr Buckley: I agree with that sentiment, but it flies in the face of what happened in the Chamber just before Christmas last year, which precedes your report. Following a six-hour debate, over 300 areas of law were surrendered back to the European Union, meaning that Members would have no say in shaping legislation that governs this place and that affects vast swathes of our economy.

I will finish on this point, as I know that there is so much to talk about, and I have talked about it endlessly. In the pre-Christmas debate, I spoke about the ridiculous examples of restrictions and added costs on certain goods coming from GB into Northern Ireland. They do the most harm and can cover anything from parcels and Christmas presents to chocolates, garments and textiles. We even have at the moment the ludicrous situation in which it is more cost-effective, and by a considerable margin, for somebody from Northern Ireland to travel to GB to buy a car from a GB dealer and drive it home rather than go to their dealership 10 miles down the road to purchase the same vehicle. That is one of the ludicrous examples. I even saw in the report at the time that it included parts for wheelchairs, for example. There was an endless list, yet when we tried to get progress made on the issues, it was stifled or slow. There is no engagement, and there is no desire from the European Union to recognise those issues as problems.

Do your recommendations do anything to encourage businesses in GB to do business with Northern Ireland and to understand the processes better? I accept that some of them do not understand the processes, and the one-stop shop may help with that, but what about the UK Government's action on some of those points? To suggest that certain goods would contaminate the EU market is totally ridiculous, and the European Union or the UK Government will never convince Joe Public the consumer or small businesses that their product is in any way at risk of contaminating a market such as the European Union, and, in this instance, particularly the Republic of Ireland.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: Yes, it is overcomplicated and difficult for people to understand. There is no doubt about that.

Mr Buckley: You are very diplomatic.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: One of my recommendations — I talked to people about this — is that Arlene Foster's body, Intertrade UK, has a big role to play in influencing the British Government to ensure that British firms that trade in Northern Ireland can do so more easily and not have to deal with the bureaucracy and gobbledygook that people in Northern Ireland already have to deal with. The problem sometimes is that Northern Ireland is a smaller market, and, as was said earlier, smaller businesses in Britain just give up. That is not just bad for trade but bad for the opportunities for people in Northern Ireland to buy what they want.

I came across a lot of crackpot examples, to be honest, when I went through all of this. One that was particularly revealing and a bit upsetting was that the Royal National Institute of Blind People's shop had to be closed because of all the bureaucracy. That is being looked into again to see whether the situation can be improved.

Some of it is just daft. That is why my report concentrates on the practical stuff.

It all results from the fact that we left the EU, does it not? Whatever our views on it, Northern Ireland has been landed with a huge problem. As an aside, remember that, in 1997-98, the agreement was founded on the basis that both countries — Ireland and the United Kingdom — were members of the European Union. It was therefore easier to deal with such things. The border did not matter so much when we were part of the same club. When the UK left, that inevitably had consequences. As a result, you have been landed with these difficult issues. My only plea is that life should be made easier for people in Northern Ireland, and, for that matter, for those in Britain who trade with Northern Ireland, particularly if they have small to medium-sized businesses. Life should also be made easier for politicians and parliamentarians who try to have oversight of the political gap that has been left by all of that.

There is the wider issue of whether all of this should be in place at all or whether you should have some other system. Some people in the unionist community put forward recommendations on how that could be done, so continue to make recommendations, as long as we can ensure that we can get people's agreement on them.

The Chairperson (Mr Brett): We will move on, Jonathan, because I am conscious that other colleagues need to ask questions.

Mr Buckley: Thank you, Lord Murphy. I will continue to engage with you.

Mr Honeyford: Thank you for your report and its positivity and for the opportunities that are there to be worked through. We did not want the barriers that now exist, but we are where we are. A couple of things that you said triggered me, and I scribbled down a couple of notes, as I do. Jonathan has just talked about the 300 areas of law. Have the UK Government perhaps framed things in the wrong way? Take Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. An international agreement between countries that trade with one another takes on the standards to which items must be manufactured in order to work. Should we therefore reframe this? Rather than it be a constitutional thing, should we instead look at the opportunities that we have to maximise our economy — we are the Committee for the Economy — and our growth?

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: There are wider issues that government will have to discuss in the years ahead. We talked earlier about where we go with Europe. You will remember that one of the suggestions was that there be a single market for the whole of the United Kingdom. Whether that is right or wrong, the reality of it is that none of this would have been necessary, because everywhere would have been in that single market. Remember that the issues that Northern Ireland faces are also faced by businesses in the south of England that trade with France. For example, the agriculture industry in the south of England is affected because of its relations with France. It is similar to what has happened in Northern Ireland. An SPS agreement would also help them.

Should a wider, longer-term look be taken at it? Should we do a Norway? Should we do a Switzerland? Again, that is entirely outside my remit. It may, however, be the case that, in years to come, there will be some genius who can work out how we overcome this. Clearly, regardless of whatever we do to improve the framework's working — that is the essence of what I want to do — it is still unsatisfactory. We therefore have to try to do something to make a better stab at it. Perhaps that will come, and I hope that it will come at some stage. Short of having another referendum, which I do not think is likely for some time, we have to find ways in which we can overcome the issues, not necessarily in satisfactory ways but in ways that will make life easier for people here. Yes, ultimately, people will look at these things — I will be dead and gone by then, I suspect — and try to make sure that we get a better system than we have at the moment. We are where we are, however.

Mr Honeyford: I am fascinated by your framing of consent as it relates to the constitution, if you like, and parity of esteem, which is about how we get on with things and live and work together. You talked about how much Northern Ireland has changed for the positive since the Good Friday Agreement and the change that we have seen from 1998 on. Should parity of esteem not evolve, however? The Good Friday Agreement refers to the two communities, but there is a third now, with us on the centre ground. How do we practically bring that into governance? Do you have any recommendations about consent rather than about parity of esteem so that we can all work together to move forward?

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: That is a big issue. There is no question that things have changed over the past 27 years: of course they have. That has certainly been seen in the fortunes of your party, in that a generation has grown up and decided, "We are neither one nor the other". You have to take that into account in anything that you do politically or constitutionally. What you have to do this time is bring together the three sides, if you like, to decide what should happen. Ultimately, there has to be consent, because you cannot carry on like this. There has to be some sort of agreement about where we are going.

Where parity of esteem broke down was in the way in which the protocol and so on were agreed and, eventually, voted on. That was not a consent issue but one of parity of esteem, which is the spirit of consent. I am not sure that that was taken into account. That would have happened had the Executive and the Assembly been up and running, because people would have pushed the issue all the time. I do not want to make a point about the previous Government — they were not my Government — but they could have tried harder to get an agreement that held better than the one that was eventually made. In the end, they denounced their own agreement. That is the irony in all of this. I spent a lot of time in the House of Lords telling the Government, "It is your agreement, not my party's". Within a year or so, they denounced it, because they realised that it was not going to work and that they would instead have to come up with something that would work.

Ultimately, as I have just said, you will have to come up with something that will work, but you will have to decide that with the Governments. That is my point: you will have to decide. Unless the Governments get that message, the framework will never work, because, when —

Mr Honeyford: My final question is on solutions.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: — it comes to consent as a general principle, how you do things in the Assembly and the Executive is a matter for agreement. When I spoke from the Front Bench, people often asked me, "How is this going to be resolved?" People have different views on how consent works in this place. It is for people here, not Governments, to decide.

Mr Honeyford: Consent is about the constitution, and parity of esteem is just about how we agree to move forward. Is that what you are saying?

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: It is a big principle.

Mr Honeyford: Yes.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: There would have been no agreement without parity of esteem. It is an essential part of the agreement. It is a difficult concept to explain to people, but we know what it essentially means: we have to work together to sort things out.

Mr Honeyford: I appreciate that other members want to come in. You mentioned the one-stop shop. In looking at solutions and at how we can make things better for our businesses and companies, I am a little concerned that some of it has focused on the barriers to English, Scottish or Welsh companies coming across rather than on our guys going over there. I appreciate that we need to work our way through it.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: We do.

Mr Honeyford: Alliance previously asked for there to be an EU office in Belfast. How do we make it easier for that to happen? The one-stop shop that you recommend would be the best way of getting information to small businesses, but is there anything that we, as the Economy Committee, should recommend to the Minister for the Economy or to the Executive as a wider piece of work? I appreciate that the UK Government now have to consider your report, but, as a start, is there anything that we should recommend to happen right now that would help move things forward?

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: You can start to work towards that concept by trying to influence decision makers in government, whether here or in London, to see that they have to come to that conclusion. Brains better than mine can work out how it will work, but, in this highly technical age, it should not be beyond the bounds of possibility to use the internet or the telephone so that people can go online or talk to someone to ask what are sometimes basic questions to which they have not been given an answer. Hundreds of millions of pounds are being spent on the schemes: I suggest that that money could be better spent.

One way is to have somewhere that people can go and listen in language that they understand and do not have to wait forever for people to reply to them, because HMRC is involved in some of the schemes as well. If you are to get people to engage and therefore have a better economic/business life because of it, going with that is the absolute first priority.

What you can do is keep pressuring Ministers and the Executive here to start working towards the form that the one-stop shop would take. I cannot come up with an idea — I am not qualified enough to do that — but I do know that the concept is important, and I could understand what people were telling me. People were telling me, "I do not know where to go. I do not know what to do". It is as simple as that. As I said, they were in tears talking to me, so, if there is a way to overcome that, that will be absolutely wonderful. Again, I underpin that by saying that if the SPS agreement comes in as quickly as possible, that will reduce the number of people who will want to use the one-stop shop in the first place. To think that all is rosy in the garden, however, is absolute nonsense. It certainly is not, given the bureaucracy that people face.

Mr Honeyford: Absolutely. Thank you very much, Lord Murphy. I appreciate it.

Ms D Armstrong: Thank you, Lord Murphy, for coming in to give us your evidence. It is complex. I will raise two points with you, if I may.

On the general product safety regulation (GPSR), you will be aware that my colleague Robin Swann MP raised the issue of selling poppies and has since had the decision reversed. Why did it take so long for the Northern Ireland Office to realise that poppies are not covered by the GPSR? If the NIO struggles to understand the regulations, you can see how difficult it is for charities and other small companies to navigate them.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: Yes. I do not know why the NIO took so long to do it, but there is a case to be made for a lot more cooperation between Departments. Very often, government works in silos. If the Irish Sea is in between, it gets more complicated, but that should not be the case. There should be a much quicker response to such issues. I cannot talk about it, because I do not know enough about the detail, but the principle of having government respond to difficult issues, should it respond too slowly, is something that has to be addressed, no question.

Ms D Armstrong: You mentioned the very frustrating the pace of change. Earlier this morning, I was listening to Tina McKenzie from the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB), who spoke to Rachel Reeves yesterday after Rachel Reeves had delivered her pre-Budget address. Tina McKenzie said that the FSB currently has 30% of small to medium-sized enterprises in Northern Ireland indicating that they do not see themselves surviving beyond 12 months, so it is really critical that a message be got out there that the one-stop shop for solutions is there to help those businesses find their way through the process.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: Yes, it is a double whammy for the FSB. It has to deal with the issues that affect small businesses generally in the United Kingdom, such as National Insurance. The FSB, which, by the way, is a great organisation, raises those issues with Rachel Reeves. The last job that I would want to do is that of Chancellor of the Exchequer. If I had ever been offered it, I would have said, "Sorry, it is not for me". Anyway, to return to the point, on top of those issues, the Northern Ireland small business has to deal with all the issues that we have just been discussing: financial issues; issues with running the business; and the bureaucratic burdens that the Windsor framework places on it. Whatever is therefore done in the UK for small businesses is made even more difficult because of the situation in Northern Ireland. I hope that Hilary will make that point to Rachel Reeves — I am sure that he will — because, every time that there is a Budget or a spending review, the territorial Secretaries of State, as that is what they are called — I used to be one — are called in by the Chief Secretary to the Treasury to discuss the details. That is when I will make sure that we raise the matter.

Ms D Armstrong: Thank you very much.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: Not at all.

Mr Middleton: Thank you, Lord Murphy, for your time. I very much appreciate your being here in person as well. One of the things from my colleague Jonny that I want to follow up on concerns the EU engagement piece. Many, many people in Northern Ireland have felt from the outset of the decision of the United Kingdom to leave, that the EU, with the help of some of our closest neighbours, unfortunately, has tried to make things as difficult as possible for Northern Ireland and the wider United Kingdom. That is the feeling that we have, and it is certainly backed up by evidence.

On the ongoing process to resolve the issues, one of the points made in the political declaration of the Windsor framework was that there would be engagement through the Joint Committee. Disappointingly, the European Union has not met you or responded to your work. On the UK side, how do you believe those relationships to be? If we are serious, it is not enough for politicians simply to say, "We need to work our way through this". The reality is that businesses in Northern Ireland are suffering as a result of the Windsor framework, and that is clear from the evidence, as Diana mentioned, from the FSB. How serious do you think that the EU is about helping resolve those issues, which clearly continue to exist?

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: The EU would be very foolish if it were to think that, if life became too difficult here, it would be unaffected. It is important that the EU understand that. I know that negotiations between Nick Thomas-Symonds and Šefcovic in Brussels are ongoing, and I also know that personal relationships, certainly between those two but also among other Ministers, are pretty good. As always, everything that the EU does is determined by what 27 member states decide. That is why the EU is very often so cumbersome to deal with. The recommendations, particularly those made by the House of Lords Committee European Affairs Committee about the EU-UK bodies — I made one, but that Committee made others — are also pretty important. For example, that Committee has meetings and says, "Don't tell anybody about the result of these meetings". That is bonkers when you think about it. There has to be more transparency so that people can see that Ministers in the British Government and, for that matter, those in the Executive, who are working with them, are hearing their views and that their views are known to be heard.

There is a big job of work to be done to convince people about the framework of committees that has been set up at governmental level: at official level and ministerial level. I know that Northern Ireland can be represented at those committees, certainly through the First Minister and the deputy First Minister, but people need to know that that is happening. There is a case to be made, for example, for the minutes to be made public so that people can understand what is happening. There is certainly a case to be made for major stakeholders — for example, the FSB, about which we have just talked — to be more closely involved in the discussions that are taking place. "Transparency" is the word of the day, and there needs to be continued improvement. I do not think for one second that relationships are particularly bad, but they can always be improved. Again, you have a difficult line to tread, because people's views on the European Union are so different, but that does not mean that we do not use the institutions properly, and, in this case, particularly for the people of Northern Ireland. Relations are therefore good, but there is a genuine case for improving how those EU-UK bodies work for Northern Ireland and for there to be more representation from Northern Ireland itself.

Mr Middleton: Thank you for that answer. On the point about the FSB, we are seeing, day and daily, challenges for GB businesses in trading with Northern Ireland. There are also the impacts on our constituents. In many cases, those GB businesses are the supply chains for our businesses here in Northern Ireland, so —

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: Of course.

Mr Middleton: — they are lifelines.

You mentioned the work of Intertrade UK, and we need to make sure that that body is properly staffed and financed and given the capacity that it needs in order to do the task that it needs to do. [Inaudible.]

Mr Middleton: Do you have any recommendations for how those GB businesses could input into the democratic processes in Northern Ireland? It is important that we in Northern Ireland not only understand what they are going through but fix that problem, because we cannot just write off the businesses that have effectively decided to no longer trade with Northern Ireland within the UK internal market.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: That is mentioned partly in the recommendations about the EU-UK bodies. As you know, the European Union is always cautious about what it calls "regional government", as opposed to national government. You may remember the case of the Walloon Government in Belgium holding up a series of changes to the European Union constitution. That was a regional Government doing that. It is often the case that the British Government acts on behalf of Northern Ireland, particularly through the Cabinet Office but elsewhere as well. There is such a close working relationship between officials in Belfast and officials in London, and there are then relationships between officials in London and officials in Brussels, because the relationship between London and Brussels is acutely important for people in Northern Ireland.

Officials and Ministers must keep biting their tongues and reminding themselves that they are doing it because of Northern Ireland, and they cannot do that unless they get the views of the people here.

It is complicated, but the UK is the sovereign state. The UK Government have to deal with it, but they cannot easily do that without having the views of the Executive and the Assembly. I have noticed that quite significantly. The EU is troubled about that, because there could be, perhaps, 100 regional Governments doing the same thing, but it is different. Nowhere else in the European Union is there the peculiar situation of a geographical island being divided like this, with all of it in the single market but one bit in a different country that is out of the European Union. That is the dilemma that it faces, but it should not be beyond the wit of men and women to resolve.

Mr Middleton: Thank you.

The Chairperson (Mr Brett): Finally but by no means least, Kate.

Ms Nicholl: Thank you, Chair. Thank you, Lord Murphy. Everyone will be relieved to hear that I am losing my voice.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: Join the club.

Ms Nicholl: Like Jonny, I have the joy of being on the Windsor Framework Democratic Scrutiny Committee. Never in my life did I think that I would have the level of knowledge of fertilisers and labelling that I have now. It has been eye-opening.

I agree with you about the caution around engaging with regional Governments. When we visited Brussels last year, what really struck me was that we met policy officers, and I met a business representative in the airport who was there having meetings with senior politicians. There definitely is caution around how the European Union engages with us, but I have noticed that very good relationship between the officials.

You have already talked a bit about dual market access, so I will not labour that. I will just say that we would like to see more done around that.

In your report, you talked about article 2 and the non-diminution of rights:

That is concerning. What needs to happen to improve focus on article 2?

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: Article 2 was not the subject of the majority vote before Christmas. That was article 5(10). Article 2 does not have quite the same resonance for what the review is about, but I could not ignore it. I talked to all the church leaders and to civil society in other respects, as well as to businesses. You will see the list at the back of the report. My point is that that was not put in there for nothing. It was put in for a reason, which was that the British Government and legislature and their equivalents in Belfast should be conscious of it and bear it in mind when they make legislation. It is not for me to tell Ministers and Parliaments what to do. All I can recommend is that they should take note of it, because it is part of the framework and is still an important aspect of it. The Human Rights Commission and the Equality Commission certainly made that point powerfully to me when we met. The reason for making that recommendation was to say, "Don't forget: article 2 is not just part of the various agreements over the years; it is part of the framework as well". The protocol and the framework tried their best to ensure that they would not upset arrangements that had been working over the past quarter of a century. That is why that was there in the first place.

Ms Nicholl: Thank you.

You mentioned that the ETA kept coming up. It was not in the scope of your report, but you still noted its unpopularity. What is your sense of the Government's willingness to acknowledge the harm that it is causing to Northern Ireland? What do you feel may come? Can you speak to that at all?

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: I cannot speak for the Government on that, of course. I just hope that they are aware of its seriousness. I understand the rationale behind it, which is to do with security and borders. That is not the easiest subject at the moment. However, there is a unique situation in Northern Ireland and in Ireland where, in things like tourism, they overwhelmingly work together, because people come to Northern Ireland to visit Ireland as a whole. People in the hospitality industry and the tourism industry who I talked to were very troubled about it, and I understood their feelings. I just hope that it could be made much simpler because, if a bunch of tourists from the United States were to decide that it was not worth the bother to do all this and to decide not to come to Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland would be losing out in both of those sectors. As was talked about earlier, those sectors have already been hit by the bureaucracy of the framework. If they are hit again by the ETA, that is another blow that a small business might have. As I said, it was not technically a matter for this report, but it came up so often that I thought that I had to mention it.

Ms Nicholl: Thank you very much, and thank you for all your recommendations. I fully appreciate, especially as a member of that Committee, the message of how we need to address this further upstream. Also, I found it really reassuring to hear your comments around how it is what it is and we have to work on practical solutions to make things better for everyone. I found that really reassuring, and I am really grateful for the work that you have done. Thank you.

The Chairperson (Mr Brett): Jonathan, we have three minutes left. I cut you off before.

Mr Buckley: Very briefly, I understand the need for your work to be time-bound to ensure that there is legitimacy, but you said that the time was too short. Do you think that, if you had had longer, you would have made additional recommendations? Secondly, do you see a role for yourself going forward in dealing with this issue?

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: What about me? That is up to the powers that be, but I do see a role in my being very much involved in trying to ensure that the Government's recommendations as a consequences of these reports are acted on. I will keep a very close eye on it in Parliament and, obviously, its involvement. I just hope that the Government will accept the recommendations of this and of the other Committee.

As to whether anything different would have happened, I cannot say, because it did not happen. However, I think that I could have talked to more people and that I could have talked in more depth to more people. I talked to lots of people — over 100 across Northern Ireland — but I still think that the time was short. I also think that I could have taken into account over a longer period the political side of it. I had a meeting with every political party, and I met politicians, so far as I could do, in Parliament itself. They are in the Lords and the Commons, representing Northern Ireland, and obviously it would have been daft for me not to have talked to them there, and I spent a lot of time doing so. It would have been helpful. At the end, all that I could deliver was a snapshot. If I had had another six months, I could have gone into it in more depth. Of course, I would not have resolved the big issue, because that was not part of the terms of reference and because it is so big, but I think that we could have kept working on those practical issues that affect the lives of ordinary people in Northern Ireland and which are so important.

Mr Buckley: Thanks, Chair, for your indulgence.

The Chairperson (Mr Brett): I will close with my opening remarks, Lord Murphy. Thank you for your continued dedication to the Northern Ireland political process. Even though you are no longer in office, I know that you continue to be very fond of the people here and of this place. On behalf of the Committee, I thank you for all your work, and I hope that you continue to have the same dedication to trying to get an outcome that can command the support of all communities here in Northern Ireland.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: I hope that I can. It has been an absolute pleasure. I was delighted that I was able to come across in person to do it, rather than on this sort of stuff. The other thing that is so welcome and that I find particularly pleasing is to be able to talk to a Committee at all, because you are up and running again and doing your best for the people of Northern Ireland. It is great for this to be operational, and all the best to you. I am happy to talk to you again when the Government come out with their recommendations. At least, I hope that they will.

The Chairperson (Mr Brett): Thank you very much.