Official Report: Minutes of Evidence

The Deputy Chairperson (Mr Sheehan): Good morning. I welcome Dympna McGlade from the Peace Summit Partnership, who is joining us online, and Daniel Holder from the Equality Commission. I invite the witnesses to make a short presentation of up to 10 minutes, after which we will open up for questions.

Mr Daniel Holder (Equality Coalition): I am representing the Equality Coalition rather than the Equality Commission. The Equality Coalition is a network of over 100 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the equality sphere and trade unions that is co-convened by the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ), which is a local human rights organisation that I run, and the public-sector trade union UNISON. We have worked on constitutional reform issues, including a report on Stormont reform with Ulster University, for some time, and we have campaigned for a long time on the rights-based elements of the Good Friday Agreement.

A general view among our membership is that Stormont, under its current structures, does not work. It is not functional in the way that it was intended to be under the 1998 agreement. That is particularly frustrating for a lot of our membership because of blockages to progress on rights and equality issues, but, from my perspective, it goes well beyond that. The Good Friday Agreement envisaged safeguards for executive and legislative power on the British Government as well as on Stormont. Those were objective, rights-based safeguards that could be traced back to jurisprudence and case law to protect the rights of all sections of the community rather than political vetoes. One of our problems is that those safeguards were not fully implemented, particularly the bill of rights, which was to be a cornerstone of that. Compounding that with some of the changes made at the time of the St Andrews Agreement, particularly the significant and controversial veto, has, in essence, placed political vetoes in the hands of larger parties, and that has the potential to grind governance here to a halt. We have examples of rights issues on which there was a majority in the Assembly and the Executive but no progress was made, because we have structures in which disproportionate power is vested that allows one of the larger parties to practically block everything on its own. That was not what the original agreement intended.

One of the Good Friday Agreement safeguards that was implemented and has been successful but is under constant threat is the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into law here. That was successful in protecting us from some of the most extreme policies of the previous Conservative Government: the Legacy Act and the Rwanda Act were found to be incompatible with the ECHR. Furthermore, you cannot make human rights up; they are objective, rights-based standards. You can go into case law and determine what they mean, and you can go into jurisprudence and pick up authoritative interpretation. That is what the other key component of safeguards over power-sharing was meant to be: an expanded version of the ECHR rights that was to be contained in a bill of rights that would have covered a much broader range of rights relating to the particular circumstances, so to speak, of Northern Ireland. It could have covered equality of treatment regardless of birthright choice to have British or Irish citizenship, for example. It could also have covered the right to housing and prevented some of the occurrences of abuse of ministerial powers in that area. Moreover, a lot of things on which a lot of energy has been expended in the Assembly without achieving any results, such as passing single equality legislation, would already have been pretty much in place, at least in a framework sense, had the bill of rights been in place as intended.

The petition of concern, of course, was meant to be tied to the European Convention and the bill of rights. It was always meant to lead to referral to an Ad Hoc Committee to measure whether the issue that had caused the petition to be tabled breached rights. That is how it was supposed to operate. It was meant to be counter-majoritarian. It was not meant to be a veto but, rather, something that looked at rights compliance.

The biggest issue for our membership has probably been the changes at St Andrews that led to what we call the "St Andrews veto" — the Executive veto — which has some case law parameters but is largely grounded in subjective concepts such as something being "significant and controversial". That has allowed a larger party to block a lot of things, including rights and equality provisions. In previous mandates, we saw it used to block, for example, initiatives on marriage equality, on the Irish language and on the outworkings of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ruling on abortion services. It becomes almost farcical at some points. One example is the Rooney case, in which, as everyone will know, a former Minister, in essence, took himself to court over whether he had the power to order the agri-food checks that were prompted by Brexit. We very much see that veto as having derailed the original intention of the Good Friday Agreement.

There is also the issue of what we call the "Executive agenda veto". We are not arguing for a free-for-all — of course, the First Minister and deputy First Minister set the broad parameters of the Executive's agenda — but, in essence, for either to have a veto to repeatedly block ministerial proposals, including those that can constitute either domestic or international legal obligations, has been a significant problem.

Overall, our issue is that the intention under the Good Friday Agreement of having rights by safeguards has been flipped on its head over the years, particularly by the changes that were made in St Andrews. We have ended up with subjective political vetoes rather than objective, rights-based standards that were meant to prevent Ministers going on, say, a solo run that would impinge on the rights of others rather than being just a political veto over any ministerial action. For some time, our proposals have been simply to implement what the Good Friday Agreement originally intended, particularly the bill of rights, and to reverse the St Andrews veto over the Executive, given the governance problems to which it has led.

The Deputy Chairperson (Mr Sheehan): Dympna, would you like to make a presentation?

You are on mute.

We are having some technical issues, Dympna.

Try now, Dympna.

She cannot hear us now.

OK. Well, we will kick off with a few questions for Daniel. Apologies, Daniel, first of all, if I said that you were from the Equality Commission. To correct the record: it is the Equality Coalition.

Regarding the obstacles that you have outlined and the difficulties that have arisen, what reforms would remove those obstacles? What reform could take place in such a way that would allow the Assembly and Executive to function in a more streamlined way?

Mr Holder: Thank you very much. We keep on making the same mistake and confusing ourselves between "commission" and "coalition". It happens constantly.

On reforms, the St Andrews veto — the Executive veto — should be repealed, and the Executive should function as was intended under the Good Friday Agreement. The counterargument to that would be, "What about the issue of ministerial solo runs?". Our response to that is, "Well, that is what the bill of rights was for". The bill of rights was to constrain Executive power, ministerial power and legislative power but within the parameters of objective, rights-based standards that would prevent extreme actions from Ministers that would impact on the rights of others. Reforms should include the removal of the St Andrews veto and legislating for the bill of rights as the Good Friday Agreement intended, while, of course, retaining in law the European Convention, which is under threat from both the Tories and Reform.

There should also be reform around the placing of items on the agenda of the Executive. Some were proposed under 'New Decade, New Approach' (NDNA) in a non-binding way that could be undertaken in a binding way. On the petition of concern, again, at the time of 'New Decade, New Approach', the majority of parties proposed giving the Human Rights Commission more of an adjudicatory role over deciding whether a particular measure breached human rights standards within the bill of rights or other standards. That would be the way of ensuring a more functional governance set of arrangements.

The Deputy Chairperson (Mr Sheehan): Regarding issues around designation, at the time of the Good Friday Agreement, "Others" were a relatively small cohort in the Assembly. That has changed considerably, I suppose. It is unfair that the votes of "Others" are of less value than the votes of those designated as "Nationalist" or "Unionist". Can that be changed without undermining the principles and the spirit of the Good Friday Agreement?

Mr Holder: I suppose that you could look at the review mechanisms that are in place in the text of the Good Friday Agreement. Obviously, there is this Committee, but there are also the arrangements for review by the two Governments to improve the functionality of the institution where amendments could be made, just as they were at St Andrews.

As for the issue of whether it could undermine power-sharing, the Equality Coalition has not taken a firm position on the issue of designation, but there clearly are options there that could be explored. We want rid of the St Andrews veto, but one would simply be, particularly if there were a continued issue of cross-community votes of the Executive, allowing "Others" to have a vote in that, as currently their votes count for absolutely nothing in that function. Other options would be to rearrange the petition of concern so that "Others" count or to look at other ways of designating. Was it meant to be a community rather than a political affiliation designation? Could it relate to passports held in relation to British and Irish citizenship to ensure that it is actually on the basis of community background or ethnicity, as the cross-community proposals would have originally implied, given the name? Political affiliation, which is what the current designation is, leaves that gap whereby "Others" are left a bit in the air by the current mechanisms.

The Deputy Chairperson (Mr Sheehan): I have a question about an issue that has not really been covered extensively; I suppose because problems around the role of the Speaker have emerged just recently. The Speaker, as it stands, is accountable to no one. There is no need to give a reason for decisions. If a Speaker decides not to be impartial and non-partisan, they can affect significantly the business going through the Assembly.

We had an example recently when a Committee put forward a fairly large number of amendments to a piece of legislation that was going through. My understanding is that there is no record of a Speaker ever having rejected any Committee amendments, but it happened on that occasion. The Committee does not get an explanation of why that happened, nor does the Speaker have to give an explanation of why he made that decision. You can imagine, therefore, how a Speaker could shape legislation passing through the Assembly or any business at all going through the Assembly. The Speaker has unparalleled power and is accountable to no one. Have you given any thought to the role of the Speaker? Are there international examples of where a Speaker is accountable and has to provide a rationale for decisions?

Mr Holder: The coalition has not done a huge amount of work on the issue of the Speaker. Maybe some of those issues are relatively new, but it strikes me that there would be a lot of international learning on that. Often, in parliamentary systems, the Speaker is, after a president and vice president, seen as being almost the third most powerful office in a legislature and will be bound by rules. Most countries have a written set of rules called a "constitution" that a Speaker would have to work within. In the absence of that, there would have to be some other process. Maybe there could be significant international learning from examining how other Parliaments operate and the parameters that are placed on the role of Speaker, which is always seen as a powerful role. It is not an issue that we have engaged on so far, but it may become one whose profile grows.

The Deputy Chairperson (Mr Sheehan): All right; thanks for that.

Mr Stewart: Thanks, Daniel, for the evidence so far. I look forward to hearing from Dympna shortly.

I appreciate that the coalition is coming at this from the human rights aspect, but I want to focus more on the issue of stability. You spoke about the veto that was implemented at St Andrews. Certain aspects of the St Andrews Agreement drove a horse and cart through the principles of the Good Friday Agreement. What do you think of other aspects of the St Andrews Agreement, for example, the nomination of First Minister, how that is done and how that affects stability and block and tribal voting? Is that something that you looked at? Have you looked at how other changes made since the Good Friday Agreement, invariably at times of crisis, have impacted on the delicate balance set up under the Good Friday Agreement?

Mr Holder: In general terms, we would prefer to go back to what was originally in the Good Friday Agreement. That seemed to be a much better set of governance structures, which were negotiated over some time. The key underpinning elements were not fully implemented, such as the bill of rights. We have not probed too specifically into all the elements, but we have had the position, particularly over the Executive veto, that the changes at St Andrews have been unhelpful for stability. We would be happy to go back to the arrangements that were originally under the agreement on the governance issues that you referred to.

The Deputy Chairperson (Mr Sheehan): John, may I stop you for a second to see whether Dympna can join us?

Dympna, do you want to try again? We are still not hearing you. The broadcasting people in the Assembly are of the view that the problem is at your end, whatever the issue is.

Ms Ní Chuilín: Can Sinéad hear us?

The Deputy Chairperson (Mr Sheehan): Sinéad, can you hear us?

Ms Ennis: Yes, Chair, I can hear.

The Deputy Chairperson (Mr Sheehan): Dympna, I am sorry to say that the problem is at your end. If you can resolve it, well and good; if not, can we arrange another date for Dympna to give evidence? If we cannot get you in, Dympna, the Clerk will be in touch with you at some stage maybe to arrange another session for you, if that is OK with you. Thanks for that.

I am sorry for the interruption, John.

Mr Stewart: No, that is OK, Chair.

I have just two more points. Daniel, you talked about the petition of concern and the changes that we have seen to date. I am interested to know how, you think, any amendments to that could look. You mentioned a further consultative role for the likes of the coalition. Could that go further?

Mr Holder: Yes. We are in favour of what was proposed and agreed by a majority of parties at the time of the New Decade, New Approach agreement, which would involve an amendment of Standing Orders that would require, as the Good Friday Agreement originally intended, the Ad Hoc Committee on Conformity with Equality Requirements to be convened to consider a petition of concern. We are also in favour of the role that was envisaged at that time for the Human Rights Commission to have an adjudicatory role; a bit like the legal opinions that are given in a call-in in a council.

Given that you are dealing with concepts that are justiciable and have a level of legal certainty over them, you could have the independent body that was set up for that purpose to advise on whether a particular measure or piece of legislation breached human rights standards, and then the decision could be made on that basis. That would be binding on the Committee. That would be a better way of the petition of concern operating. We know that it does not operate often nowadays. I am not sure how many petitions, if any, there have been in the current mandate. Regardless of that, it might mean that some of the excesses for the use of the petition of concern might well be behind us, but, at the same time, it is not operating as it was intended, as a rights-based scrutiny tool, because of the lack of that structure being in place. At the minute, that could be voluntarily done under Standing Orders and the role of the commission would have to be done on a voluntary basis but not in the adjudicatory matter that a majority of parties had signed up to at the time of 'New Decade, New Approach'.

Mr Stewart: My last point is this: how should any changes that may or may not be made be made and with what buy-in from parties in participation? How important is it to protect the delicate balance that was set up in the Good Friday Agreement to protect communities?

Mr Holder: There are the review mechanisms in the Good Friday Agreement and, indeed, the obviously important role of the Committee in making recommendations. There are the procedures with the two Governments as well and the intergovernmental conference in making recommendations.

One of the bottom lines is that there are international obligations in the Good Friday Agreement that have not been fulfilled, in particular around a bill of rights. That should not be subject to a veto by a party. It is part of the agreement, and its not being implemented has led to the type of governance difficulties that we have at the minute or has certainly significantly contributed to them.

Overall, it would probably be a mistake for the two Governments to wait for the next crisis before looking at the issues again and coming up with proposals for reform. That should be an ongoing process, rather than something that has to await another crisis.

Mr Stewart: Thanks, Daniel. I appreciate it.

Ms Ní Chuilín: Thanks, Daniel. I want to go back to where, for example, you mentioned failure around implementation of international best practice and standards and said that, in your opinion, that is as a result of the St Andrews Agreement rather than the Good Friday Agreement. You are aware that even issues that were in the Good Friday Agreement still were not met; they were blocked by political unionism. My concern is that to start to review the St Andrews veto in the absence of a bill of rights would be to compound the ability to create an equality. What is your view on that?

Mr Holder: The two things should come together. Implementing the bill of rights and removing the St Andrews veto could be done concurrently. We do not see a functional role for the St Andrews veto at all. The veto was not there at the initial point of the Good Friday Agreement. It was not there for the first seven years of the mandate. It is not a mechanism that allows for something to progress; it allows only for certain things to be blocked.

With that framework in place, there may be a concern that legislation could be used to unpick bits of the Good Friday Agreement, but, if the bill of rights were also in place, it could protect, for example, certain elements of anti-discrimination legislation. That is a good example of something that has not been progressed, and how many times have we been round the houses on age, goods, facilities or services legislation or on single equality legislation in general? A lot of those protections would automatically have been in place had the bill of rights been in place in the way that was advised by the Human Rights Commission. Another part of that agreement was that an independent body would advise on content, rather than it being subject to any sort of political veto.

Ms Ní Chuilín: An independent body on the bill of rights, rather than —?

Mr Holder: Yes. The Human Rights Commission is in the agreement, and it gave its advice in 2008. One particular step along that road, post the Ad Hoc Committee in the Assembly, would be for the Human Rights Commission to refresh its advice, which is now more than 15 years old; 2008 is a long time ago, so that advice is quite dated and probably does not reflect developments since then or even learning that has occurred since then on what would be best to protect in the Stormont framework through a bill of rights.

Let us not forget that the British Government are also subject to the bill of rights. It was never intended to be a mechanism just to qualify the power of the Stormont institutions; it was meant to bind the British Government in the same way as ECHR and the Human Rights Act do.

Ms Ní Chuilín: As a proposal, we could look at asking the Human Rights Commission to refresh its advice. Has the Equality Coalition had any discussions on that with both Governments?

Mr Holder: We have. We have had numerous meetings with Hilary Benn. Those meetings have been primarily on legacy issues, but we have raised these issues at the fringes of the meetings. At the minute, we have not seen an appetite from the British Government to move forward on those issues. We have said that we think that that is a mistake: why wait until the next crisis to start to fix things? Why not look at, scope out and do the research to come up with options while the institutions are at least up and running, even if there is a level of dysfunction in them? The general attitude seems to be, "Well, the institutions are there; they are up and running. Why look at those things?". We think that that is a mistake.

The model that is there may well leave the institutions up and running — hopefully, it will — but it does not provide for a sustainable governance model that will deliver on commitments, a lot of which are unfulfilled commitments from previous agreements. We have a table of all the rights and equality provisions that were agreed in the Good Friday Agreement and the St Andrews Agreement right through to 'New Decade, New Approach' and other agreements but have still not been implemented. Those provisions are a part of the political agreements of the peace and political process between the two Governments that has not been implemented, rather than just broader policy choices. At the moment, it seems to be a question of the political will not being there. If the Committee made a recommendation to the UK Government, however, it would certainly be more difficult for them not to move on that.

Ms Ní Chuilín: Thank you.

Mr O'Toole: Thank you for your evidence, Daniel. I am sorry that we are not hearing from you, Dympna, but I hope that we will hear from you soon.

Daniel, your evidence is extremely well got, as it were. Not only have the rights provisions not been fully implemented, but other forms of what are deemed to be protections, such as the petition of concern, have, ironically — perhaps deliberately — become a means of blocking the rights of other people and a source of instability rather than a means of ensuring stability by ensuring that, where people have genuine concerns about identity or fundamental rights issues, those can be protected.

You mentioned the British Government not really engaging. I presume that you have also been engaging with the Irish Government on legacy. Have they given any indication of having an interest in moving on some of those issues? That is just one part of the reform agenda, but is Dublin any more engaged than London?

Mr Holder: We have engaged mostly with Dublin over legacy issues of late. We have not picked up any appetite for reform of the institutions so far, although we have not pushed it.

Mr O'Toole: OK. On the point about designations, you mentioned some theoretical potentials if you were to replace designation. That is one of the challenges and one of those things that, I would say, is a fairly indefensible situation in that, for people such as Michelle, who is on my right, their vote is differentially counted in certain key votes. That is not defensible 27 years on from the agreement. There is also the fact that we still have a consociational system, so there needs to be some way of creating the option to have as much inclusivity as possible in governance for people who ideally want to govern and choose to govern around a set of priorities in the Programme for Government. Is there any way, for example, of removing designation but ensuring key forms of qualified majority voting? That might ensure sufficiency of consensus and protection where necessary without a formal designation system. I am not necessarily endorsing that position; I am just asking what, you think, the upsides or downsides of that model might be. It could involve, for example, using a two-thirds threshold, which, as you know, already exists. We can dissolve the Assembly by a two-thirds vote already, so I am just interested in your view on that.

Mr Holder: As a coalition, we have not taken a concrete position on the issues of designation or removing designation. We are well up for that discussion. Our membership has taken a consensual position that says that all those things would need to be underpinned by a bill of rights as the safeguard that was meant to underpin petitions of concern, in which you have cross-community votes. That is one of the occasions on which you would have a cross-community vote. Clearly, we agree that there is a deficiency in the current system, particularly with the ongoing existence of the St Andrews veto, where the votes of those designated as "Other" do not count at all for cross-community votes in the Executive as though those in the "Others" designation are not part of any community. All those issues could be looked at to see whether a qualified majority would be a better way of doing it while being underpinned by a strong bill of rights that would protect the rights of everyone.

The other options on designation and where "Other" votes sit is a limited form of political affiliation. Are "Nationalist" or "Unionist" political affiliations really the best indicator of community background if the vote is meant to be cross-community, or could other things come in? The passports that people hold seems to be a more objective indicator than something that is based on a self-designation that could change. Obviously, that leads to the question about what happens if you have both. Can you vote on either side? That might be one option.

Mr O'Toole: Just on that point, it would be interesting to get your thoughts on some of the issues in rights protection. The phrase "cross-community" is, in a sense, often poorly defined. People know what it means in practice a bit, but, for example, if someone is designating as "Nationalist" or "Unionist, that is not defined in detail. That can also apply to those designating as "Other". We presume that, in broad terms, it has a meaning. Certainly, I believe in constitutional change and a new, united Ireland, but, as you said, that is not the same as community background. Is there a flaw there, or is there something that we need to unpack a bit more? For example, I find it frustrating whenever people imply that to designate as a "Nationalist" implies a view of the constitution and what the best constitution for Northern Ireland and the island of Ireland is. It also implies that you cannot be, for example, cross-community. The same would be equally true of unionism and a "Unionist" designation. I am interested in your views on that. Is there a limitation there? I find that that can sometimes be a barrier to political discussion, because the lazy implication is that "Unionist" means one community — let us be honest: it means the Protestant community — and "Nationalist" means the Catholic community. That is not true any more. Certainly, from a political perspective, those are not reasonable ways to think about our society. I am interested in your thoughts on that and whether the designation system slightly traps us into thinking about those in very lumpen ways, if you like.

Mr Holder: Every ethnic boundary is complex and artificial, blurred at the edges and difficult to define. We know that we live in a divided society, but it is more complex than a simple binary. The position on independents is slightly different, but, at the minute, the designation system relates to the political party in which you sit rather than your community background. Given the learning from the previous Stormont Parliament and in order to prevent that situation re-emerging, the purpose of cross-community votes is to prevent one community dominating the other and imposing breaches of rights on the other. Obviously, the demography is different nowadays, but you could end up with a nationalist majority in the future.

What protections do you need in there? I sound like a broken record, but, again, our argument is that the primary protection is a bill of rights to ensure that the rights of another community or any group of people cannot be breached. However, the current system of designations is tied to party political affiliation rather than to community background in all its complexities.

Mr O'Toole: That is part of it, because it is difficult to get into community background. We had a debate yesterday about the census. You will find people from, for the sake of argument, a Protestant background who are no longer in any way religious but generally identify as British more than Irish or maybe Northern Irish and are broadly in favour of the status quo. Therefore, they are broadly unionist, but they are not really religious; they do not really belong to that religion in a meaningful sense. Those are all challenges for us to discuss.

Mr Holder: Absolutely. Religion is essentially used as an ethnic indicator and a proxy for community background, not as an indicator of religious practice or religious belief. That is why one of the options is to look at which passport people hold, because, in a sense, that is measurable and slightly more objective, but, again, it is not without its complexities, given that there are those who hold both passports.

Mr O'Toole: This is my final question. Do you have a view on the job titles and whether there should be equality of titles?

Mr Holder: The offices are equal, but we have never taken a position on the specifics of the title. We are open to looking at that, but we are focused more on vetoes and governance, as those are the issues that seem to have driven things to a halt.

Mr O'Toole: We talked about designation. Does having that slight differential create an inevitable political tension or competition for what some people have called "top-dog status", or would you rather not comment on that?

Mr Holder: I have not heard that phrase. Clearly, having a First Minister and a deputy First Minister creates the perception of hierarchy, even though they are joint offices. That was part of the Good Friday Agreement negotiations. Ultimately, they are joint offices. I am up for that discussion, but our focus is more on the substance of governance, given that that seems to be the priority issue in delivery.

The Deputy Chairperson (Mr Sheehan): Thanks for that, Daniel. On that issue, if the titles of the First Minister and the deputy First Minister were changed, in the absence of any other reforms of the Executive and Assembly, would that, in any way, affect the stability or instability of the institutions as they exist currently?

Mr Holder: It would not have a huge impact on its own. Our priorities are the issues on the bill of rights and the St Andrews veto. Those would have a far greater impact on ensuring more sustainable governance than a change in titles. It could be in the mix, but it is not our priority issue.

Mr Middleton: Thanks, Daniel, for your contribution. You talked about vetoes. Obviously, parties across the board have used vetoes over many years. You also mentioned controversial issues for which they have been used. They have been used for many other issues, be that in the Assembly or Executive.

Northern Ireland is unique in the sense of its recent history of violence etc, and there are a lot of unaddressed issues, particularly around victims and the challenges that exist there. Whilst, of course, we have to look at a lot of international best practice, the reality is that our unique challenges mean that they can never be directly lifted across. We want to get away from people feeling that they have to use vetoes, but the focus should surely be on trying to encourage more dialogue among parties. During the last collapse, for example, and the negotiations to come back in, a party leader-type mechanism and forum in which dialogue was encouraged was used. Surely we need to go down that route to ensure that we do not go to a situation in which there is almost majority rule, with people feeling that they can railroad things through, disregarding one section of the community.

Mr Holder: Thank you. There are a few things in that. I will address international best practice first. There are particular circumstances in Northern Ireland, as you allude to. However, they are not unique, because many other societies have similar community divisions or are emerging from conflict in the same way and have had particular governance structures. The international human rights standards are designed around a lot of those issues. You mentioned victims, for example: that issue would have been an integral part of the bill of rights. Although the ECHR was incredibly helpful in sparing us from the Legacy Act, which all political parties here opposed, had we had a bill of rights in place and codified references to victims' rights and the rights to independent effective investigations and such things, it would have been a lot easier to challenge that legislation in the local courts. Elements of a bill of rights can deal with particular circumstances, especially the issues on victims' rights.

Yes, dialogue is always good, as are mechanisms for dialogue, but there is incredible frustration in our sector because huge amounts of work have gone into dialogue on things such as equality strategies only for them to be blocked and someone saying no at the end of the day. We have had dialogue and more dialogue. Think about all the work that was put into the co-design groups in the last mandate on all the equality strategies only for there to be a change of Minister and someone saying no. We have engaged heavily in dialogue and evidence-based policy building, but, in our view, the current structures hand disproportionate power to one or other of the larger parties. That means that things can be blocked.

Although I am slightly paraphrasing, you said that we need a mechanism that will not simply enable a majority to impose something on a minority of the community. Yes, I totally agree, but we very much see a bill of rights as that vehicle. Anything that impinges on the rights — that means those in human rights standards and around which there is a level of objectivity — of any section of the community would be subject to that vehicle to protect all communities from any abuses of power from a majority. Simply to have a minority veto, which is a political veto, vested in one or other of the larger parties — that is, essentially, the St Andrews model — does not work, because it can mean that a lot of things that have been subject to dialogue over many years never progress.

Mr Middleton: Thanks for that. There has been mention of the issues from the St Andrews Agreement specifically in relation to some of the vetoes not being around politics at that time. However, as is the case with all agreements, we cannot pick and choose, because those will have been delicate, sensitive agreements. Addressing the issues will require a wide discussion about how to get a delicate balance, be that from the Good Friday Agreement or the St Andrews Agreement. The reality is that not everyone will have come away from those agreements having got everything that they wanted or being happy with them, hence the challenges.

I very much value what you have said. Obviously, we do not have complete agreement, but it is important that we hear from you. Thanks for that.

Mrs Guy: Daniel, thank you for the evidence so far. It is a shame that we cannot hear from Dympna, because I definitely had some questions for her.

You focused a lot in your evidence on the bill of rights. We know that there is a campaign by some parties in the UK to abolish the ECHR: what would be the effect of that on the agreement? Do that campaign and threat add to the pressure to progress the bill of rights?

Mr Holder: Yes, is the short answer. If the UK pulled out of the ECHR, what could happen is horrifying. The only other country to do that is, of course, Vladimir Putin's Russia. If the UK were the second country to do so, the rise of right-wing populism means that you could be looking at the risk of a deck-of-cards collapse of the system that was put in place to protect rights at the end of the Second World War. It would also fundamentally damage the Good Friday Agreement. There is a clear commitment in that to the incorporation of the ECHR into Northern Ireland law.

We are now seeing a long-term campaign reach another stage. It is a bit like Trump 1 and Trump 2. Trump tried to do things in his first mandate — his second mandate may be unravelling a bit now — that he had not really thought through; he flailed into them. Some of the arguments that were put forward were fairly easily defeated. That is what happened with Dominic Rabb's British bill of rights, which is the only bill of rights in history that I am aware of whose purpose was to roll back rights rather than incorporate them. That unravelled fairly easily when counterarguments were made against it. What we are getting now, particularly in a political context in which facts do not always matter, is a much better organised campaign to remove the UK from the ECHR.

There are documents, such as Policy Exchange's report and Lord Wolfson's report, that we do not think are credible in their legal arguments, but a future Reform Government or Conservative Government could simply defer to them, regardless of whether they are credible, and say, "Well, we have a document that says it doesn't breach the Good Friday Agreement. Therefore, it doesn't, so we're going to proceed down that route". We see a significant danger and threat to the ECHR if there were a change of government to one of the main opposition parties in the polls at the minute in the UK. Our two academics — Professor Colin Murray and Aoife O'Donoghue — have produced a briefing that is on the CAJ website that goes through the arguments that were used in the Policy Exchange report and unpicks them. That might be a useful resource. Clearly, the central safeguard in the Good Friday Agreement that has function could not function if the ECHR were rolled back on.

It is not always recognised that some of the push at the minute against the ECHR comes from a section of veterans who say, "Well, if the ECHR's there, there have to be proper investigations. Therefore, we have to get rid of the ECHR to get out of proper investigations". It should be noted that, if the UK were to withdraw from the ECHR, it would still be liable for breaches of the ECHR that occurred when it was a party to it, which includes the entire Northern Ireland Troubles. Therefore, although the legal remedies would be different, simply withdrawing at this stage would not get the UK out of obligations.

Mrs Guy: It is an irreconcilable position to state that St Andrews, the Good Friday Agreement and the things that underpinned them are delicate while making an argument to remove yourself from the ECHR and talking about the effect that that would have. You cannot cherry-pick those things: you either support the underpinning of what set those agreements up in the first place or you do not. If you start taking out just the bits that suit political agendas, you are not really being sincere in those arguments, are you?

Mr Holder: It would be taking an absolute sledgehammer to the Good Friday Agreement if the ECHR were removed, which, under the agreement, was clearly meant to apply to the power that the UK Government and the devolved institutions exercised. One of the arguments that those who wish to withdraw from the ECHR have used is that it was somehow meant to apply only to Stormont: that is simply not the case, and it means that a huge sledgehammer would be taken to the whole process if there were ECHR withdrawal.

Mrs Guy: A lot of colleagues have already covered issues on designations. That is, of course, close to my heart. You touched a wee bit on how we can break the deadlock on reform. There are the Governments, and we know that change will come at Westminster, but, in order to move the debate forward as we come up to the anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement, people have suggested things such as constitutional conventions.

This Committee has talked about civic engagement, and I want to pick up on that. What is your view, Daniel, on civic engagement as a mechanism to take forward proposals or to help us to refine proposals? There is an argument for things such as citizens' assemblies. We are the citizens' assembly, but, for us to make good decisions or for governments to make good decisions, any evidence base that can add to the debate and to what we use to evaluate our reform proposals has to be valuable. Is there a place for that and for this Committee?

Mr Holder: There certainly is. We are a civic society outfit. We represent over 100 groups that have engaged heavily on the issues and want to continue to engage on them. In an earlier answer, I mentioned that there is a lot of fatigue and frustration with the institutions over things such as the anti-poverty strategy. In the previous mandate, an enormous amount of evidence-based work from our sector went into building several blueprints for an anti-poverty strategy. The fact that those were binned has led to a lot of despondency in our sector and a reluctance to engage, with people saying, "What's the point?". Engagement on the issues of reform so that there are structures for the evidence base that lived experience in civil society can bring would be valued, contribute to delivery and spark interest.

The other element of it is what the Committee can ultimately recommend. That is a process in which the Human Rights Commission refreshed its advice on the bill of rights, with the Secretary of State trying to move that process forward, and in which the two Governments triggered the process of a sort of formal review that is already in the agreement. That would pick up what the Committee has recommended. I know that there may have been frustration in previous machinations of the Committee with a lot of work having been done and a lot of reports produced and that not moving at the time. Ultimately, however, it led to changes and impacts on things such as the petition of concern. This is a very important piece in the jigsaw; it is just a question of creating the political will for broader movement.

Mrs Guy: Thank you.

The Deputy Chairperson (Mr Sheehan): That is everyone, Daniel. Thanks for that.

Just to update Dympna, if she can hear us: our experts here tell us that your microphone is on but it is not working for some reason, whether that is because it is broken or Zoom has put some sort of block on your microphone. In any event, we will try to schedule another meeting with you at a future date. Thanks for coming and listening anyway.

Daniel, thanks a lot. That was interesting and informative.