Official Report: Minutes of Evidence

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): I welcome you to this morning's meeting of the Committee. I will make the introductions for the sake of the record. We have Emma DeSouza, founder of deliberative democracy platform Civic Initiative; Peter Emerson from the de Borda Institute; Dr Anthony Soares from the Centre for Cross Border Cooperation; and Ann Watt from Pivotal.

We are under a bit of time pressure this morning, given Assembly business, so I would ask that, although we have stated that opening remarks should be no more than 10 minutes, it would be better if they were on the shorter end, in order to allow time for questions, as we have a considerable number of witnesses. I will invite each witness to make a short opening address, starting with Ann Watt from Pivotal, and then we will move on to questions.

Ms Ann Watt (Pivotal): Thank you, Chair, and thank you to the Committee for the invitation. I am pleased to be here.

The issues around potential reforms to the Executive and the Assembly are important, and we welcome the Committee's work in the area. The main arguments for reform are set out well in the University College London (UCL) constitution unit's paper, and the Committee took evidence from representatives of UCL a few months ago. We support and commend that paper as a comprehensive presentation of the options and a consideration of the possibilities.

Pivotal is an independent think tank. Our main interest is in improving policymaking in Northern Ireland, and so we see the question of reform very much through the lens of whether it would help to improve decision-making on policy in Northern Ireland. We at Pivotal have not done any detailed work on potential reforms. We have written a lot of reports that, I hope, the Committee has seen, but those have been more on issues of public finance and public service delivery. We have not looked in detail at reforms or at the pros and cons of potential changes, but we recognise that reform is an important issue and that it is a high priority for many people in Northern Ireland and for certain political parties. It is on that basis that we responded to the inquiry's request for evidence.

I will start with the big question of whether the institutions should be reformed. There are three significant reasons to consider reform, and they are set out well in the UCL paper. The first big reason to consider reform is the frequent collapse of the institutions under the current arrangements. The institutions have been not in place for around 38% or 39% of the time since devolution in 1999.

Connected to that first reason is the failure of the institutions to provide stable and effective government for Northern Ireland. Stable government is the foundation of good government. Without a doubt, frequent collapses of the institutions have impacted on the quality of decision-making. Our assessment is that the threat of collapse also has a big impact. Even when the institutions are in place, therefore, but are unstable or fragile, difficult issues are not grasped properly because there is little time, energy or bandwidth to take on the depth of debate and scrutiny that is needed.

The third reason to consider reforms is the failure of the current system to give the votes of MLAs who designate as "Other" the same value as the votes of those who designate as "Unionist" or "Nationalist". That is increasingly relevant, given the recent growth in the number of "Other" MLAs.

Pivotal very much agrees that those three big reasons for reform are strong and valid. We question, however, whether there are options for reform currently that would have the cross-community support needed to be viable. The case for reform is strong, but is there widespread support for particular reforms? We argue that it is important that there is cross-community support for any changes that are made.

Taking a slight sidestep from the question, we would say that the institutions can work when there is sufficient political commitment to them. There are examples of periods when the institutions have worked reasonably well. I would highlight the 2007 to 2011 period under First Minister Paisley and deputy First Minister McGuinness and then Robinson and McGuinness. The key to effective working during that period was strong leadership; a good relationship and trust between the First Ministers and deputy First Ministers; and a clear commitment to sustaining the institutions and delivering improved public services. That strong leadership and trust and those relationships were extremely important to making the institutions work well during that period.

We would suggest, perhaps, thinking more about making the current systems work better, focusing efforts on behaviours, cultures and ways of working, rather than necessarily reforming those systems. We accept, however, that the practical reality is that the more successful periods have been infrequent and short-lived in the 26 years since devolution. Without a doubt, we need to find ways to make the institutions work better. I would say that we need to return to the spirit of leadership and compromise that underpinned the Good Friday Agreement and all the negotiations and compromises that happened then.

I will make a few more comments, and then I will stop. I know that thinking about removing the veto is at the centre of what the Committee is thinking about and is at the centre of the discussion. I would say — I know that others will disagree with it — that removing the veto should be approached with caution. It feels to me that the settlement and the institutions that we have are the result of a careful and balanced negotiation at the time of the Good Friday Agreement that was then endorsed in a referendum. Changes have been made since then, but the principle of power-sharing involving both the largest parties from the two major designations is a fundamental tenet that we should be careful about removing. I know that others will disagree with that view.

It seems to me also, in practical terms, unlikely that either of the two largest parties would agree to a change that would remove their veto, and that would severely limit the legitimacy and stability of any new arrangements that would be made on that basis. In practical terms, it also seems to me unlikely that a smaller party would agree to be part of an Executive where the larger party of the same designation had decided not to participate, which would, in practice, mean that it would not be possible to form a cross-community Executive.

Those are some notes of caution about removing the veto. I will make a final couple of comments. We would strongly advocate that any reforms be reached by consensus. This inquiry and all of the conversations around it are therefore important. Any reforms have to be reached by consensus and have wide acceptance across all Northern Ireland's main parties. This discussion is helpful, and the conversation needs to develop. We are happy to form a part of that.

My conclusion is that institutional changes may be less important than changes to cultures and attitudes and ways of working. We have looked a lot at how the Assembly and the Executive work here, particularly at how government functions here. Pivotal has done a lot of reviews and studies of how the Executive work. We would say that there are structural issues that could help to make the Executive and the Assembly function better, such as, for example, a greater focus on improving outcomes and much more choosing of priorities rather than trying to do everything. There needs to be more prioritisation between options, encouragement of joint working across Departments and taking on some of the really difficult, longer-term decisions that, unfortunately, are often not addressed and are kicked down the road to be looked at in the future, meaning that we never actually get to them.

On balance, Pivotal's conclusion at present is that time and energy could and would be well spent making the existing institutions work better. There are ways to make changes to behaviours and ways of working that could help to do that, rather than embarking on reform that might not have widespread support.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Thank you, Ann. We will now go to Emma, please.

Ms Emma DeSouza (Civic Initiative): Thank you very much, Chair and Committee. It is lovely to be here with you this morning. I welcome the opportunity to engage on the topic.

In opening, I would echo some of the remarks made by Ann Watt from Pivotal on the effectiveness and stability of the political institutions. On a personal note, I live in Fermanagh in a rural community, and, of course, when you live in a rural community such as Fermanagh, issues around infrastructure investment are particularly pressing where you have entire communities that are suffering from a lack of investment in infrastructure supports and access to public services. Therefore, the effectiveness of political institutions is always pressing on my mind.

For me, coming at this from the lens of a positive peace versus a negative peace is important. We are a post-conflict society, and, of course, the strength of our peace process is reinforced by the strength of our political institutions. One of the first and most important pillars of the concept of positive peace is effective, stable institutions, and it is hard to say that that is what we have in Northern Ireland. Certainly, it is great to have the Committee and the institutions up and running presently, but we do not have a good history of staying up and running, do we?

Where I can probably bring most value to the discussion this morning is in looking at the concept of citizens' assemblies and their use in addressing particularly knotty issues. As Ann has noted, there is concern about trying to find consensus around any recommendations or changes as to how the political institutions work, and my work in the Civic Initiative really reinforces the importance and effectiveness of using the public to find consensus for difficult political decisions through the use of a citizens' assembly structure.

We actioned a citizens' assembly in Northern Ireland, although we called it a "citizens' forum", always trying to find language in Northern Ireland that is less politicised. We ran one last year on the topic of housing. That citizens' assembly involved 87 citizens selected from across Northern Ireland through a postal lottery system actioned by third-party recruitment via Sortition Foundation, which is a UK-based non-governmental organisation (NGO) and the gold standard for recruitment of citizens in such processes. That gathering of 87 citizens met across three days. They heard evidence from 18 experts across a range of issues related to housing. That is a lot of information to take in for the general public, and, as someone who led that citizens' assembly, it was incredible for me to witness first-hand just how much capacity people had to engage in really complex and challenging policy issues. They brought together and voted on more than 60 policy recommendations, 38 of which passed on a consensus of 80% or more.

The relevance of that structure is particularly pressing for the Committee because the recommendation that got the highest proportion of votes, 94%, was in support of reforming the political institutions. That was not about housing, but it was, of course, relevant to the citizens taking part in the process because effective issues around housing and public services are impacted on by what happens here at Stormont. The citizens who took part in that process were able to recognise that.

A citizens' assembly structure can be effective in finding policy recommendations and solutions. Another good example that is relevant is that we know in Northern Ireland that issues such as water charges and revenue raising are particularly difficult to find consensus on or support for. In the Civic Initiative citizens' forum on housing, over 60% of the people who took part voted for water charges. That is very different from what you get from public polling. They voted for that because they were given the information on why that might be necessary.

My evidence to you this morning is to reinforce the fact that using citizens to engage in policy issues is a really effective way to find solutions and consensus. Yes, you might be talking about bringing together only 100 citizens to engage on an issue, but it also sends a wider message to society that citizens' inclusion and their views matter to the political institutions. Citizens' assemblies are increasingly being used by Governments around the world. They are being recognised as a really effective tool in policymaking and decision-making, and it would be beneficial for this Committee in particular and for the political institutions to work with them. You are dealing with complex options, including removing designations and moving towards the idea of moving from mandatory coalition to voluntary coalition. Those will be difficult to address, but, if you put it into a space such as a citizens' assembly or a civic forum of some kind, you will be able to find some kind of solution that has buy-in from wider communities.

With that, I will close, because I want to give lots of space for questions.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Thank you very much, Emma. We now move to Peter.

Mr Peter Emerson (The De Borda Institute): Thank you very much for today's invitation. As my presentation will make clear, my thanks also go to the late Professor Elizabeth Meehan of Queen's and the late Dr John Robb of the New Ireland Group. I will, of course, mention my first submission, hereinafter called "the reference", but today I confine myself almost entirely to decision-making. I start with a few definitions and observations. I will jump over some of my presentation because of time.

If you look at the second of your PowerPoint slides, you will see the modified Borda count (MBC) or Borda preferendum, which dates from 1770. It is a points procedure. It is multi-optional. Preferential ballots are mainly for decision-making. A voter's first preference gets n points; their second preference gets n-1; and so on. If adopted in what is usually a five- or six-option ballot, as could often be expected in the Assembly, the methodology would encourage all MLAs to state not only their first preference — their favoured option — but their compromise options. At best, if everybody casts a full ballot, the MBC can identify the option with the highest average preference. The vote is inclusive, literally, and ideal for any power-sharing structure. It requires no designations. It disallows any vetoes. As stated, if every voter casts a full ballot, the winning option will be the one with the highest average preference. If one or more voters casts a partial ballot, however, another measure is required: the consensus coefficient, which is defined as the option's MBC score divided by the maximum possible score. In a five-option ballot, it varies from a maximum of 1·0 to a minimum of 0·2.

The quota Borda system (QBS) is an electoral system that is very like proportional representation single transferable vote (PR-STV): 1, 2, 3 and all that. First past the post prevents the voters from casting any preferences. PR-STV allows them to cast their preferences, and, in contrast, QBS, which is also PR and is based on the MBC, encourages them to do so.

As I noted in my first submission, the QBS matrix vote is a PR two-dimensional ballot in which every MLA may nominate, in order of preference, not only those whom he or she wishes to be on the Executive on one axis but the Ministry in which they wish each nominee to serve on the other axis. The QBS count identifies the 10 or 12 most popular MLAs and then, having turned their preferences into points, as in an MBC, allocates each in sequence to the Ministry for which they have the most points. It was used in 1986 in the New Ireland Group's People's Convention with Dr Robb. It was in Queen's in 1998 with Professor Meehan, and, as noted in the reference, it was used through a computerised count at a public meeting in Dublin hosted by 'The Irish Times' in 2016. More recently, it was key to an online exercise in the Center of Conflict Resolution in Munich in 2021.

I move on to observations. Majority voting is used almost everywhere from the UN Security Council via nearly every national parliament. One notable exception is the UN's Conference of the Parties (COP) talks, the most recent of which — COP30 — was in Brazil. Needless to say, you cannot get consensus of up to 200 countries in a majority vote. With PR and so on, there are over 300 electoral systems to choose from. In contrast, there are just about a dozen decision-making systems, yet many politicians, umpteen political scientists and even those running citizens' assemblies seldom consider the suitability of multi-option decision-making. They tend to debate only a few variations of binary voting, such as consociationalism, which dates from 1603 and was used rather ineffectively in Czechoslovakia from 1968.

The Good Friday Agreement proposal for a referendum is, of course, outside your remit. Nevertheless, I note that, although its authors firmly supported the notion, quite rightly, that people should be able to cast their preferences in any Northern Ireland elections, they did not think that the voters should enjoy a similar degree of pluralism in any future referendum. It is strange indeed that a peace agreement should initiate a binary ballot with a stark "option X or option Y" vote without the existence of even one compromise option.

I now come to my presentation. Majority voting can be used in elections — "Candidate X: yes or no" — but the only country to do so regularly is North Korea. However, we use it in decision-making: "option X: yes or no", in singletons or, in pairings, "option X or option Y".

We have probably all had the experience of trying to persuade a bunch of kids to come to a collective choice by agreement: "OK children, what shall we have for lunch: parsnips, turnips, swedes or sprouts?". If that is all that there is in the fridge, there may well be a majority against everything, and such was the case in Brexit. So, "OK, what is for afters? Ice cream, jelly, trifle or chocolate cake?". There may now be majorities in favour of everything. In any multi-option setting, binary voting is, at least, inappropriate.

Now I bring you to the second slide in the PowerPoint presentation. For another example, consider one similar to that used in the reference. A committee of a dozen members is debating three options: A, B and C. Five want A, four want B, two want C and one is the impartial, non-voting chair. Therefore, there are majorities of six, seven and nine respectively against all three options.

Let us assume that five had first, second and third preferences of A-B-C; the four, B-C-A; and the two C-A-B. I am now on your third slide. A is more popular than B; B is more popular than C; and C is more popular than A. So A is more popular than B, which is more popular than C, which is more popular than A, which is more popular than B, which is more popular than C — you go round and round in circles for ever. This is the Marquis de Condorcet's famous paradox of binary voting. This means that, by resolving any three-option conundrum with binary voting — that is, with two ballots — the chair of any meeting can get whatever outcome she wants. If it is (A v B) v C, the answer is C; if it is (B v C) v A, the answer is A; and, if it is (A v C) v B, the answer is B.

Take a similar example, another one. A dispute on the colour of a front door could be reduced to three options as follows: let the door be painted amber, option A. Delete "amber" and insert "blue", option B. Delete "amber" and insert "claret", option C. However, maybe the chair wants the door to be damson, option D. If the five had preferences — we are now on the fourth PowerPoint slide — A-B-C-D, the four prefer B-C-D-A and the couple prefer C-D-A-B, D is not very popular. Furthermore, everybody — all 11 of them — prefers C to D. The chair can nevertheless lay down the following order of voting: {(B v C) v A} v D, which is {B v A} v D, which is A v D, and the answer is D. In a nutshell, majority voting is manipulable and should rarely be used in politics, especially on any topic that is controversial.

Now, preferential voting. In any dispute, let every option be on the table. In the Assembly or whatever, in the above example, A, B, C and maybe D. Let every option be debated in turn, and, if suggestions are made, the said option may be changed or even composited but only if the original proposers agree. We are talking about inclusive decision-making. Then, when all is said and done but nothing is yet done, the chair may ask everybody for their preferences and, if they do an MBC ballot, taking the options that we have already, the answer is option B on a score of 33. Option D gets only 19 and is, indeed, the most unpopular option.

If we use the consensus coefficient as a measure, the maximum possible score in a five-option ballot, with all 90 MLAs voting, would be 90 by five, which is 450 points. That would be all the first preferences. If they all give only fifth preferences, it is the minimum score, which is 90. The average —the mean score — is 270; it might be a mixture of second and fourth preferences or whatever. The chances of all five options getting the mean are probably zero. Something or some things will always be above the mean and some below. If the winning option gets fewer than 300 points, that should be regarded as inadequate. If it gets more than 300, it could be termed the best possible compromise. If it gets more than 350, that is consensus and, if more than 400, a collective wisdom. The figures are arbitrary and may be adjusted by all concerned, as they become more accustomed to the process.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): I am sorry to interrupt, Mr Emerson, but could you draw your remarks to a close?

Mr Emerson: I will, indeed. I emphasise again that cross-community support can be measured without any designations. It has long been assumed that the use of designations helps to perpetuate the very sectarianism that they were supposed to overcome. It is strongly contended, however, that, if the aforementioned MBC voting procedures were to be adopted, cooperation would be more readily effected. Furthermore, it could be relatively easily adopted in other divided societies like the Balkans and the Caucasus. Go raibh míle maith agaibh.

Dr Anthony Soares (Centre for Cross Border Cooperation): Thank you, Chair and Committee members, for inviting me here today. The Centre for Cross Border Cooperation, of which I am director, is a "think and do" tank that researches and analyses public policy of relevance to cross-border cooperation and relations and uses the results of its research to support improved cross-border cooperation and cross-border lives, including through its flagship Border People project.

I admit that the centre was initially reluctant to make a submission to the Committee as part of the review. However, once we took the decision that we would, the centre's approach to the review has been based on the belief that Assembly Members, members of the Committee and members of the Executive are committed to public service, and our input is driven by a desire to maximise the results of that commitment for the benefit of all communities.

The centre's written submission focused on the options for reform set out in the constitution unit report that was circulated as part of the Committee's review. I would like to touch briefly on three overarching areas that our submission covers: the status of the current structures; the need for cross-party consensus for any reforms and for any reforms to be consistent with the interdependence of the three strands of the 1998 agreement; and how reforms should promote inclusivity, accountability and delivery.

As others have already said, we cannot escape the fact that instability has been a feature of Northern Ireland's governance since 1999. Repeated collapses of the Executive and Assembly have disrupted not only local governance but North/South cooperation and broader intergovernmental participation. The current design gives major parties the ability to unilaterally block governance, which suggests that reforms are needed to enhance stability and public confidence.

I will illustrate that issue of stability and public confidence. For a five-year period from the first quarter of 2021 to the final quarter of 2025, the centre ran quarterly surveys on the conditions for North/South and east-west cooperation, and a standout feature in the responses was how the absence of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive was seen as undermining the political context for cooperation. In contrast, following the restoration of the institutions in February 2024, the quarterly survey for that period recorded the highest ever percentage of respondents — 90% — who indicated that the political context for North/South cooperation had improved.

When it comes to reform, any changes to the institutions under strand one of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement must be considered in light of their interdependence with strands two and three of that agreement. Any changes should lead to Northern Ireland's having a continuous and effective presence in the North/South and east-west institutions established by the 1998 agreement, as well as in the east-west frameworks that have been created more recently. Sustainable reform requires cross-party consensus and the backing of the agreement's co-guarantors for reforms put forward and agreed by the parties in the Assembly. It should also have the informed backing of civic society. Here, I note the written ministerial statement from the First Minister and deputy First Minister of 4 July 2025 on reconstitution of the Civic Forum. Essentially, institutional design alone cannot ensure functionality and delivery of outcomes without clear political commitment from all sides.

The centre supports the exploration of several specific reforms to achieve greater inclusivity, greater accountability and improved delivery. The first is restoration of the pre-St Andrews nomination process for the First and deputy First Minister, with consideration being given to renaming the posts as "joint First Ministers". Their election could be either through a two-thirds majority or a reformed cross-community threshold. Those roles would then be credited to the relevant parties before the d'Hondt formula was applied for the allocation of the other ministerial roles during the formation of the Executive.

Another reform that could be considered is the introduction of a weighted or reformed cross-community voting threshold to better represent those beyond the nationalist/unionist binary. For parallel consent, the threshold could be either a majority of MLAs present and voting that includes all three designations — "Unionist", "Nationalist" and "Other" — or a weighted consent where the threshold could be a 60% majority of MLAs present and voting that includes 20% designated "Unionist", 20% designated "Nationalist" and 20% designated "Other".

Another potential reform is the development of a robust Programme for Government with measurable targets and cross-departmental accountability. Agreeing a blueprint for government with specific and realistic objectives and measurable targets that align with budget allocations and adhering to it across an Assembly mandate would make a significant contribution to delivering effective governance for citizens. Improving Northern Ireland's social, economic and environmental health cannot be achieved without cooperation between Departments and Executive Ministers, as all three facets are interdependent and solutions to each one cannot be found within a single Department. Therefore, either the Programme for Government itself or an action plan that quickly follows it should clearly set out not only which outcomes each Executive Minister will have responsibility for and be accountable for that are unique to their Department but those that are cross-cutting and that their Department will contribute to. Assembly Committees should scrutinise not only how the Departments and the Executive Minister that they have oversight of are performing in respect of outcomes that are unique to that Department but their performance in contributing to the cross-cutting outcomes. There are examples of Committees that have that sort of cross-cutting or thematic structure. Moreover, either the First and deputy First Minister — or the joint First Ministers — or another Executive Minister must be made clearly responsible and accountable for the achievement of cross-cutting outcomes.

Finally, the use of petitions of concern should be limited, and transparency of Executive meetings should be ensured. Equivalent limitations to the use of the petition of concern that were introduced in the Assembly should be introduced in the operation of the Executive, and the vote that it triggers should be either on a weighted majority threshold or on the basis of a reformed cross-community vote. Additionally, the First Minister and deputy First Minister — or joint First Ministers — must rigorously abide by the convention that, when an item is requested by three Ministers, it cannot be excluded from the agenda for more than three Executive meetings.

The proposals aim to foster effective delivery, collective responsibility and inclusive representation. Whether any of the proposals for reform that are put forward are enacted is entirely a matter for Members of the Assembly, but they should be considered in light of whether the current structures reflect Northern Ireland's society as a whole and whether those structures are delivering the outcomes that communities need.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Thank you very much, everybody, for your evidence.

The Assembly is now in session, and, with that in mind, Carál may be the most pressed to get away. Do you have a question?

Ms Ní Chuilín: No. Thanks.

Mr Sheehan: Thanks for your presentations.

Emma, you majored on the issue of a citizens' assembly. For the first 40 minutes of our meeting, we discussed the mechanics and logistics of setting up a citizens' assembly of some sort to discuss whatever report comes out of the Committee. I want to reassure you on that: the Committee has already agreed to investigate the possibility of carrying out that exercise.

Ann, when you spoke, I almost felt like we were being chastised by the school principal for being naughty. You argue that the Assembly needs to be reformed but accept that there will not be cross-party consensus to do that. You argue that there needs to be a change of behaviour, culture and attitude. What exactly do you mean by that, and how could that be brought about?

Ms Watt: In the work that we have done on how the Executive have functioned over the years, we see recurring patterns in the way that the Executive operate. For example, the Executive do not always grasp the longer-term issues. Among the plans that are in place at the minute, there is no credible, funded plan for investment in our waste water infrastructure. I do not know what the prospect of getting to that point is. There was an anti-poverty strategy that was roundly rejected by experts in the sector, so there does not seem to be a plan on poverty. I challenge whether we have a plan for improving our productivity and growth. Big, longer-term issues are not being properly addressed; we have seen that over the years of the Assembly. That is one thing, and another is the difficulty that Departments have working together. Getting Departments to function in a cross-cutting manner is hard, and that seems to be getting worse, with individual Ministers defending their patch and parties defending their Departments.

Mr Sheehan: In an ideal world, that is the way in which the Assembly and the Executive should work. I sit on the Education Committee, where we have been banging on for months, if not years, about the need for the Departments of Education and Health to work together, particularly on children with special educational needs. It is almost impossible to get that to happen. It should simply be a case of two Ministers sitting down together to work out how they can work collaboratively, yet it is difficult to do that.

You rhymed off a range of issues, including an anti-poverty strategy that was widely criticised by the people who work in the sector. It was also criticised by most of the parties in the Assembly. You are not telling us anything that we do not know. From your point of view, reform is out of the question, but you want to see a change in behaviour and attitudes: how do we do that?

Ms Watt: The routes that can be taken to do that include, first, an agreed Programme for Government that contains proper targets; that is properly reported on; and for which there is scrutiny and accountability. We have moved towards that. There is a Programme for Government in place, but —.

Mr Sheehan: You are telling us that you want a utopia: I want that, too. I am asking you how we get that.

Ms Watt: I am telling you some of the routes that you can take. They include an agreed Programme for Government on which there is proper reporting. At the minute, there is not proper reporting.

Mr Sheehan: There is an agreed Programme for Government.

Ms Watt: Yes, but I have seen no plan for how the outcomes from that will be measured and reported on or for how we will see accountability. It is a step forward —.

Mr Sheehan: Is that because the Executive parties did not want to do that, or was it because we could not get agreement?

Ms Watt: I do not know.

Mr Sheehan: Similarly, we wanted a much stronger anti-poverty strategy, but the Minister and the Department decided to produce something else.

Ms Watt: Yes.

Mr Sheehan: How do we get a stronger anti-poverty strategy, for example?

Ms Watt: That comes down to the Executive's prioritisation of issues and what, they say, is important. An anti-poverty strategy is not in the Programme for Government; maybe that is part of the reason why it is not high enough up the agenda. The mechanisms that you can use include a proper Programme for Government for which there is accountability, leadership to drive the improvements and an associated Budget to underpin those things. If you have those big Programme for Government aims, you should work towards them collectively. Doing so should help to break down some of the barriers between Departments. As I said, I have observed that we have an increasingly siloed operation of government here.

Mr Sheehan: I agree with you that there are a lot of things that ought to be done, but "ought" implies "can". That is the difficulty in all of this. Thanks for that, Ann.

Mr O'Toole: My first question is for Ann and follows on from Pat's questions. Thank you, all, for coming along and giving evidence. It is thought-provoking. It is useful that there is a range of views and not simply consensus. To characterise it, nobody is opposed to the idea of making Stormont work better: there are three broad supporters of reform but with different emphases or approaches, and there is a slightly more sceptical view about the practicalities of reform.

Just so that I understand it correctly, Ann, is it your view that it is philosophically wrong or practically too difficult to embark on a major overhaul or any overhaul of how this place works?

Ms Watt: It is a practical point. Any reforms have to have broad consensus. It would not be viable to have a reform that one or both of the two current biggest parties strongly opposed. It is difficult to see how you could have a system of government that operates in this place without broad consensus from the major parties. I know that that view is not shared by others — others will advocate strongly a different view — but that is where we are.

Mr O'Toole: I understand and, to an extent, appreciate the view, although I do not wholly agree with it. The question that I would ask is around how we shift the politics. On the one hand, you rightly talk about the need for our politics to be more focused on delivery and actual outcomes — be that in poverty reduction; dealing with waste water so that we can build houses, create jobs etc; or any number of things that we need to do — but, on the other, clearly, our political system does not incentivise delivery or disincentivise lack of delivery. That is pretty obvious. That is not a dig at the two main parties — I spend a lot of my time doing that — but there is no disincentive for lack of delivery. That is resoundingly clear. In one sense, you could say that political parties that are not incentivised or, more accurately, not disincentivised from doing certain things, because of the structure of the system, will not necessarily respond to that.

Part of our job as the Opposition is to try to bring about change. We have had some success. I do not claim that we have radically revolutionised things, but we have had significant success in starting to change the culture and conversation on specific issues. However, in general, there is still not enough of a disincentive for lack of delivery. That goes so far as to say that you can collapse the institutions for a lock of years and you will not be punished or feel any huge, significant electoral consequences.

If it is too practically difficult to do it — this is similar to Pat's question — how do we change the culture of our politics to incentivise delivery or disincentivise no delivery? If we cannot have structural change, we will need to do something else. We in the Opposition are trying to do our bit. Clearly, we need to change something with regard to the culture, but, if the structures cannot change, how can we do that?

Ms Watt: Your first point was on my position on whether reforms are possible. It is a developing issue, so I do not have a hard and fast view on it. I am listening to the conversation that is going on here and in other places. Those conversations are important and to be encouraged. That is why the work that the Committee is doing is important.

It seems to me that focusing more on the day-to-day issues that matter to people is what government should do, so we need to be having much more of a conversation about what is being delivered; how we report to the public on the Programme for Government and other areas in which things have been achieved or not achieved; and how we spend the money in the Budget. It goes back to the point about the structures. There needs to be a delivery programme — a Programme for Government — that is taken seriously and for which there is proper accountability. I do not see that at present; maybe it will emerge. We have had the Programme for Government for about a year, and we have still not had any reporting on it, as far as I can see. Those structures of government need to be talking about the bread-and-butter issues that affect people day-to-day: health, education, the environment, infrastructure, poverty and so on. There should be more focus on those issues and less on the things that divide us.

Mr O'Toole: I have a particular insight into that, given that a lot of my job is trying to get the public and the media to focus on the day-to-day delivery or lack of delivery. That is a battle, to be honest.

I have one other quick question for Ann, and then I want to ask questions of a couple of the others. Should we change the structures to, for example, mandate that the Fiscal Council does some reporting? I tabled an amendment on aligning the Budget to the Programme for Government. Is that the kind of thing that would be useful as an interim measure to improve —?

Ms Watt: I am big supporter of the Fiscal Council's work. It has provided independent scrutiny, analysis, data and reporting that has been extremely valuable in the past few years. I have not thought about it in detail, but it seems to me that building on the Fiscal Council's role whereby it reports on what the Executive are achieving would be a completely sensible thing to do. I go back to what I said: the Executive should report on that themselves. That information should go out for those in the Assembly and, indeed, wider organisations, such as Pivotal, to look at, but, so far, we have not had that.

Mr O'Toole: I am conscious that I need to let others in.

Emma, you made the point that eighty-odd per cent of people support the principle of reform: is there a breakdown of that for when you go into more detail on what reform looks like?

Ms DeSouza: Ninety-four per cent supported reforming the institutions. That is an incredibly high percentage to get in any citizens' assembly process. We did not break it down because we were covering the subject of housing. This was not what we were meant to be talking about in the citizens' assembly that we did. However, there is enormous potential to use a citizens' assembly structure to break down what that looks like on designations and so on. All the questions being raised here today could easily be disseminated in a citizens' assembly structure.

On how difficult it would be to get changes, it is important to make the point that change and reform of the political institutions is not just preferable but necessary. We need to look at how we can evolve the political institutions as society evolves. Yes, it will be difficult to find consensus, but it is not impossible to find consensus. Stormont's political institutions — the Executive in particular — have a long history of avoiding difficult decisions. I implore the Committee not to follow that trend and to be ambitious with the recommendations that you make in your report; to look at how you can achieve structural reform; and to use something like a citizens' assembly for those difficult recommendations, because you will find some kind of consensus in wider society.

Mr O'Toole: You might end up doing everything by citizens' assembly; that is the problem. However, that is helpful. Thank you, Emma.

Anthony, I come to your points about cross-border cooperation. Thank you for participating; it is really important. Sometimes, the reform of strand two to improve how that strand works is missed and we focus on strand one. The dysfunctionality of strand two — for example, the DUP's walking away and not making strand two work for years, even when strand one was working — was a symptom of a deep problem in our politics. Are there straightforward things that we could do to make strand two work better? For example, could we get rid of the so-called chaperone Minister?

Dr Soares: I certainly encourage consideration of that, but I go back to the fundamentals: strand two cannot function to its maximum potential unless strand one is functioning to its maximum potential. We want to see a strong presence from the Northern Ireland Executive and Ministers in the strand two institutions. That is what we are looking for. It is not just the strand two institutions but strand three. We want to see an agreed position in strands two and three and the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive driving that agenda forward with genuine leadership from Ministers here.

That is not to say that there is not that already. There is strand two cooperation within the North/South Ministerial Council and, indeed, even cooperation between Departments North and South outside of the structures that are part of the Council, but we want to see more. There is enormous potential there.

Mr O'Toole: That almost proves that it is not working as it should be, because it is happening outwith. It seems to be more effective and dynamic when it does not happen under the auspices of strand two. It is a shame.

Dr Soares: I will put it a different way. It is about doing more; it is not that it is not functioning. We can always do more and look to improve outcomes for people, whether it is within Northern Ireland or the island of Ireland through strand two or across these islands in strand three. It is about always looking to improve outcomes. That is what we are looking for.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): You have all pointed fairly to some of the criticisms of government here and how it has operated over the past period, particularly since the initial restoration in 2007 but even before that.

Ann, I listened carefully to what you said, and I was encouraged, because I thought that it brought a bit of reality to it. Whilst we know that there are problems, we accept that it will not be a utopia. It is not a perfect form of government; it is not designed to be. It is not how you would go about it if you were starting things from scratch and had consensus. There is a deep community division on core concepts from constitutional status through to a fiscal perspective etc. We have to work together in a coalition Executive and try to work on what we can agree but also maybe to shift priorities towards where the focus for the majority of our people is, rather than focusing on niche issues.

CS Lewis once talked about "chronological snobbery", and it is a very interesting concept. Often, that happens when it comes to talking about the agreements, going right back. If we focus on every specific area of reform that has been mentioned — there have been many; you mentioned the point, Ann — we see that there was careful and balanced negotiation around every one. If we go back to the start point, we will see why, at the time, that particular provision was talked about and hard fought for by different perspectives in negotiations and, ultimately, was core to gaining some form of cross-community buy-in. My fear is that, if we look through the lens of today and change some of those basic fundamentals, you could quickly face an agitation or a dishevelment, particularly among political parties' buy-ins to the system.

My question is this: what, do you believe, would command cross-community support to achieve better government? Rather than, as we sometimes do, focusing on the headline points about reform and what it means for First Ministers, deputy First Ministers, Executive vetoes etc, is there anything that the Committee could grasp that has the potential to achieve cross-community support that would deliver better outcomes for government? I am sorry for the long prelude.

Ms Watt: That is fine. Your comment, Chair, was about how it is really difficult to get the system to work. Maybe I should have said that: of course it is difficult. It is a really tough system to operate. Parties are very different in their views on the constitutional status and lots of social and economic issues. It is hard to get it to work, and, therefore, it is a work in progress.

There must be an opportunity to find the common issues that we all want to improve. No matter what your views are on constitutional status, surely we want a better health service, our children to have a better start in life and our older people to be well looked after. The issues of public service delivery and improvement must be common issues where we can find goals that can be agreed on. Therefore, I urge much more focus on the issues where there is a shared ambition and aim. That is not answering your question about reform.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): To develop the concept, I do not doubt the sincerity of anybody from any political party to satisfactorily address the issues that you raised; what I am trying to focus on is the fact that that goes to the heart of the reform of public services. Is there a way to incorporate reform that would allow that to happen, rather than pivoting to the headline issues with reform, which, we know, will not garner cross-community consent? Is there a way to do that? Is there a low-hanging part of reform for which there could be cross-community buy-in? Sorry to put you on the spot; I am just trying to develop that point.

Ms Watt: That is OK. I am not sure that this will answer your question, but my sense is that, if there were to be better delivery across the board on the public service issues that improve people's lives, there would be much more confidence in the institutions that we have. Better delivery that improves things for people would hugely boost confidence in government and in the system. If the political focus and debate that people see, primarily in the media, were much more about tackling health inequalities or improving our environment or infrastructure and less about issues that divide along constitutional lines, the public would have much more confidence in our politicians. It is a question of how the time, energy and bandwidth is used from day to day.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): It is not just constitutional lines. I mentioned that as a headline point, but there are also fiscal and social lines, which you mentioned. Those are all dividing lines that should be debated properly.

How do you react to the suggestion that reform, in its very essence, can sometimes look, on the face of things, as though it will bring more accountability but can also inject the potential for destabilisation? You mentioned stability as one of the key parts of good government. I will give the example of the introduction of an Opposition in the Assembly. Many people view that as a legitimate way to hold the Government to account, and I agree with that concept. There is evidence, however, that suggests that opposition may have a destabilising impact on the wider Executive and Assembly, because not everybody in the Executive has a vested interest in making that work. Do you have any thoughts on that, particularly as the Opposition is being developed in the Assembly? He is here in the room, but do not worry; he has asked his question. [Laughter.]

Ms Watt: The principle of proper opposition to a Government is fundamental, and we should promote and uphold it here, and so —.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): I agree. Do you accept, however, that one of the consequences may well be — I say that it is needed — that it also injects instability, because government parties may not wish to make hard decisions on certain issues for fear of being outflanked by an Opposition?

Ms Watt: That is just the Government being held to account and challenged on their decision-making. I would be concerned about anything that led to watering down the Opposition.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): I would be against that too, but you made core points about preventing collapse and providing stability and effective government. I can see how opposition can help to provide effective government, but it may also inject instability into the system, because people may feel that they cannot work together in a power-sharing Executive in a difficult situation for fear of what their opponents might say.

Ms Watt: It is the role of a Government to make decisions that they can justify and back up and to stand up to whatever the Opposition's challenge is. I would be wary of anything that dilutes the role of the Opposition.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): I am the same.

This is the final question from me. Anthony, you mentioned some interesting concepts about how scrutiny Committees can play a valuable part on cross-cutting issues. Pat mentioned the example of special education. I also see that in the case of skills, with the Department of Education and the Department for the Economy being involved. What would be a concrete proposal for injecting something into Committee scrutiny to ensure that there was a level of accountability? To date, it seems that it is ad hoc, in that there can be joint Committee sessions between two Committees, but there is no real delivery beyond that. Do you have anything specific on that?

Dr Soares: It is about looking at examples of Committees in other Assemblies and Parliaments.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Can you point to any?

Dr Soares: The House of Lords has a raft of thematic rather than departmental Committees. Before I come on to that, I will quickly note that one of the things that we do not have in the Assembly that the Scottish Parliament and the Senedd have is an outward-looking Committee on external affairs or European affairs. We are the only devolved institution in the UK that does not have such a Committee.

The House of Lords has a raft of cross-cutting Committees. The Oireachtas has, for example, a Committee on Artificial Intelligence, a Committee on Disability Matters, a Committee on Drugs Use, a Committee on Key Issues affecting the Traveller Community and a series of other Standing Committees that look at thematic issues rather than scrutinising one departmental issue or a single Department. They are effective. They allow Committees to bring in officials from different Departments that are connected with a particular theme and experts from different fields to speak to that theme. They seem to assist by delving into a specific subject in much more depth than a departmental Committee.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): I have seen similar styles of Committee in the House of Commons, such as Grand Committees and the Liaison Committee of Select Committee Chairs, which scrutinise the Government's wider work. Is there merit in that sort of scrutiny, whether it is of the Executive's performance or that of Ministers? Have you considered that?

Dr Soares: A Grand Committee?

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): It could be constituted, as it is in Westminster, by all the relevant Chairs and could scrutinise the work of the Executive by bringing in the First Minister and deputy First Minister or, indeed, other Ministers, as it sees fit for its work programme.

Dr Soares: I absolutely see merit in that, but the other side to it is this: which Ministers will be accountable? Ultimately, with a cross-cutting theme, one Minister or the joint First Ministers have to be responsible for a cross-cutting theme.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Across the Government?

Dr Soares: Yes. Whatever the cross-cutting theme, which should be linked to the Programme for Government, there has to be, at the end of the day, someone who is responsible and accountable for it.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Thank you.

Mrs Guy: Thank you, everyone, for your contributions.

Again, Ann, I will start with you; I hope that you are not feeling picked on today. You have sounded a note of caution, which is healthy for our inquiry to hear. People are giving us their options for reform, but a challenge to the very idea of going for reform is something that we need to hear. I guess that your caution comes from how the institutions were established, but is there a point at which repeated collapse and the threat of collapse undermine the legitimacy of the current arrangements?

Ms Watt: Yes. That is why my thinking on this is definitely open and evolving. I am not taking a firm view. I have said this morning where I am at the minute, but Pivotal has not done any in-depth studies of it. I very much want to hear the conversation, because the three reasons for looking at reform that are set out in the UCL paper — frequent collapse; there not having been stable and effective government; and the votes of those designating as "Other" being of lesser value in some cases — are strong. There is a strong argument for looking at reform, and I know that the institutions have developed in some ways, such as at St Andrews, so I have not taken a final view and am very much keeping an open mind.

Mrs Guy: Ann, you and others have talked about the need for a change of culture and behaviour. I direct the question to you, but anybody who has a view on it should come in. Could reform be a vehicle for achieving better behaviours? If you do not have the option of exerting a veto, you have to get on with the job; you have to do the work. Would that in itself help to create that culture change and those behavioural changes, because it would be about the need for a stable and functioning Government?

Ms Watt: Certainly, a reform, if it were possible, that would remove the risk of collapse or much reduce the risk of collapse should contribute to a longer-lasting and more stable Government who have more time and energy to look at improving public services and making better policy decisions. So, potentially, yes, but the question that I raise is this: does such a reform exist that would have widespread support? However, the goal would certainly be more stable and effective government.

Mrs Guy: Leading on from that — Emma, this probably comes into your space — we had a conversation, as Pat referenced, about some kind of civic engagement exercise. You have made the case for that to be a citizens' assembly. The Committee will perhaps end up having a debate about that. I think that there is agreement to do something, but, as to what it looks like and what form it takes, there may be a discussion about making the case for a citizens' assembly first. However, if there are other effective methods for delivering civic engagement, what would those look like?

Ms DeSouza: The most effective is the citizens' assembly. To do our citizens' assembly model, we did grassroots community-based work first. The subject was housing. We did not select the subject of housing. The Civic Initiative is a wide range of organisations that work in collaboration to deliver this. Essentially, we were testing the appetite for citizens' assemblies and whether there was the potential for them to be effective in Northern Ireland. Our work surpassed our expectations on the buy-in across communities, the delivery of policy recommendations and just how much appetite there really was. I want to say that at the outset.

As I said, we did not pick the topic of housing. It was selected by people on the ground through a facilitated process in which we had 38 community-based forums across Northern Ireland. We did a three-hour facilitated workshop, and those gave us a lot of rich content on how people really feel. I note that there was a reference in the Committee to the idea of community division: I completely disagree with that. When it comes to issues around housing, healthcare, education and political institutions — just having a better quality of life — that is not evidenced in the work that I have done in grassroots communities. Regardless of someone's political background or preference on the constitutional position, people agree that they want a better life for themselves and their children. There is a lot of agreement and consensus in communities.

The issue here is that we do not have an effective structure to harness their views and suggestions on how to make this place better. A citizens' assembly structure is the most effective way to do that. Our grassroots community-based engagement was the build-up to the citizens' assembly. It gave us the subject matter that we would debate and the issues that were most prevalent in communities. Over 500 people took part in that process, and then we had 87 in the citizens' assembly. We would argue for that system, where you bring together grassroots community-based individuals and the wider public; where you have a civic society widely engaged, bringing in people to give evidence. We brought in all strands of what makes a deliberative democracy process really effective.

There are other methods. For example, we have the Civic Forum in the Good Friday Agreement. I do not agree with bringing back the Civic Forum: any process that prioritises the inclusion of civic society in organisations is the wrong process, because we already have access. We already submit consultation responses. We come in and give evidence. You need to look at having a process that includes regular people on the ground, and a citizens' assembly is the most effective way to do that. Furthermore, you need to do it through a postal lottery system with an external recruiter, so that you have legitimacy over the process, otherwise there will be criticisms around how people were selected and the process involved in that.

That is the most effective way to do it. There are smaller things. Sometimes, these institutions favour engagements that are less effective, have less reach and have less potential to achieve anything. We see that through the watering down of commitments on the Civic Forum to a civic compact group and all the things that we have had since then that have never been effective. Going back to 'New Decade, New Approach', which included a commitment to have one citizens' assembly every year, would be the best thing that the Committee could recommend.

Mrs Guy: I know that we are under pressure for time. My question is for anyone on the panel who wants to respond. We have heard evidence in the Committee around the need to reform political institutions or they will stagnate. They have to move with the times and how society is changing. Northern Ireland is more pluralistic than it was when the Good Friday Agreement was signed. Do you feel that the concept of designations needs to start to be challenged in order to still be legitimate in our Government?

Dr Soares: I will start on a personal note: I will speak as Anthony Soares, not as director of the Centre for Cross Border Cooperation. I am a blow-in. I came over here in 1991, however many years ago that was; I told you earlier that I am not good at maths. It was well before the Good Friday Agreement, and, even in the run-up to the referendum, I was reluctant about taking part, because, to me, it was like a conversation that I was not necessarily welcome into. However, in the end, I voted and got involved.

Northern Ireland and the island of Ireland has changed completely: you cannot divide people up as nationalist and unionist any more. Many people who were born here are neither, and people who have come here from elsewhere and brought their children up here are neither. We are in a different place now. I have heard evidence sessions where it has been said that we are not quite as different as perhaps we might imagine.

In respect of 1998, there is a question around where the institutions are. Where are the politics? Where are communities? It is also sometimes about whether there needs to be leadership. It is not necessarily about where communities are but about whether communities need to be led to a different place. At the end of the day, it is about whether we are satisfied with what we are producing at the moment. Are we addressing all the issues that we have? Are we happy with the outcomes? If we are not, we need to change something.

The Deputy Chairperson (Mr Sheehan): Peter, do you want to come in briefly?

Mr Emerson: Yes, please. In 1985, Ian Paisley said, "Ulster says no". One week later, six of us stood outside Belfast City Hall and said that we had to say yes to something. Six months later, we had a public meeting, and everybody from Sinn Féin to Ulster Clubs was there. There were over 200 people [Inaudible.]

We allowed them to suggest whatever they liked, as long as it complied with the United Nations charter on human rights. Then we had a vote, and people voted yes for something or yes in their order of preference for some things. Nobody voted no. That is how we measured consensus. We did not just find consensus; we measured it.

You were talking about culture. If you have majority voting, you have an adversarial culture. George Washington spoke against it, and Pliny the Younger spoke against it 2,000 years ago. I have no idea why we still have the obsession with majority voting. It is time that we questioned that. We could move to multi-options and have different points of view from everywhere. Let them all be on the table. In the Assembly, you would probably have about five or six options on the table, and then you have a preference vote and you find and measure consensus.

The Deputy Chairperson (Mr Sheehan): OK. Thanks for that.

Thank you all for your evidence here today. It has been very informative.