Official Report: Minutes of Evidence

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Are members agreed that, in line with normal practice, the session be recorded by Hansard?

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): We welcome Eóin to the meeting. Good morning, Eóin. Thanks very much for coming in this morning. The procedure when we had party leaders in was for an opening pitch of around 10 minutes, after which we went to members' questions. I invite you to brief the Committee.

Mr Eóin Tennyson (Northern Ireland Assembly): Thank you very much, Chair and Committee, for the opportunity to give evidence on what has been, as you will be aware, a long-standing campaign by the Alliance Party on the need to reform the institutions.

It is fair to say that the Good Friday Agreement was a historic opportunity, in that it created the conditions for peace and provided us with a framework for pragmatic, win-win politics, but the institutions designed in 1998 were designed for a very different society from the one that we live in today. As our evidence notes, the 2022 Assembly election returned a record number of MLAs who designate as neither nationalist nor unionist, and close to 40% of people in our society hold an identity that is not exclusively Irish or British, yet our institutions remain structurally dependent on a set of binary designations and community vetoes that no longer reflect the society that they are meant to serve.

Our society has evolved and changed, but our institutions have not kept pace with that change. The ambition was that, if operated in good faith and in a spirit of goodwill, the very rigid structures that were set out in 1998 could change as our peace process evolved and as confidence was built in the structures. The failure to transform those institutions has resulted in the Assembly's being suspended for almost half of its existence. I think that we can all agree that, even when the Assembly is up and running, it is too often characterised by deadlock and dysfunction, with brinkmanship incentivised over cooperation, vetoes elevated over consensus and collapse prevailing over continuity.

That has undoubtedly caused real harm to our communities and public services. Our written evidence sets out examples of that. In 2016, the report of the Bengoa review set out a 10-year plan to transform our health service, but Stormont has been suspended for half of those 10 years. As a result, Northern Ireland has some of the worst hospital waiting lists anywhere in these islands, with 500,000 people on a waiting list and only one in five satisfied with the quality of local healthcare.

Our economic strategy has been similarly fragmented. Between 2017 and 2024, due to collapse, we have had multiple Economy Ministers from different parties, and there have been three economic strategies. That has undermined long-term planning around productivity and economic inactivity, with that instability undermining our appeal for foreign direct investment. Regular suspensions also meant that we were left without a Programme for Government (PFG) between 2015 and 2025 and that we have been without an agreed multi-year Budget for the past decade.

We have seen mechanisms of the Good Friday Agreement that were intended to protect minority rights being turned on their head and abused to frustrate issues when that was never the intention behind them. For example, they have been used to oppose the introduction of marriage equality in Northern Ireland, despite overwhelming support for it across the community; block vital public health measures during the COVID-19 pandemic; block the creation of an independent environmental protection agency in this mandate, despite that having being agreed in the New Decade, New Approach (NDNA) deal; and stop the introduction of minimum unit pricing for alcohol despite widespread consensus across most of the parties.

The constant cycle of stop-start government and ransom politics is eroding what little public trust remains in the institutions. A poll published earlier this year suggests that over two thirds of the people whom we collectively represent do not believe that Stormont is improving their lives. Therefore, the question facing the Committee is not whether reform is necessary but what type of reform would work and whether we are willing to institute it.
The proposals that we set out in our 'Democratic Renewal' paper last week are intended to deal with those issues and to transform our politics into something that is more open, accountable, stable and focused on delivery. The proposals set out clearly how, while upholding and defending the principles and protections of the Good Friday Agreement, we can remove the ability of any single party to hold to ransom the Executive or the business of the Executive,

First, as you will have seen, our immediate proposals include amending the Northern Ireland Act 1998 so that, if the largest eligible party were to refuse to nominate a First Minister or deputy First Minister, the entitlement to do so would pass to the next largest party under d'Hondt and that all Ministries, including the Justice Ministry, should be allocated on that basis.

Secondly, we recommend replacing the parallel structure model for measuring cross-community support — that, I believe, is the least effective measure of cross-community support possible, in that it excludes cross-community parties — with a weighted majority system of around two thirds of MLAs.

Thirdly, we recommend restricting the use of cross-community votes in the Executive and Assembly and of the petition of concern (POC) to key issues that pertain to national identity, legacy and the constitutional architecture of the agreement, which was its original intent.

Fourthly, we recommend placing on a statutory footing the three-meeting rule agreed during the Fresh Start negotiations, which would remove the ability of the First or the deputy First Minister to anti-democratically block items from the Executive agenda indefinitely.

In the medium term, the Assembly must abolish the outdated system of designations, which requires MLAs to label themselves "unionist", "nationalist" or "other", entrenches division from the outset of any mandate and excludes the growing number of people who do not identify with either of the traditional blocs. Our proposals on a weighted majority entirely remove the need for those designations. We also propose to rename the positions of First Minister and deputy First Minister as "joint First Minister", because the roles are already coequal in law, and, in practice, the titles should reflect that reality.

There is now a crucial window of opportunity. All parties in the Assembly have, at different points, expressed support for some element of reform of the institutions, but such reform cannot be left to local parties alone. In December 2025, the Assembly endorsed calls for an institutional reform process led by the two Governments. Both Governments, as co-guarantors of the agreement, have a duty to lead and drive reform. To argue for reform is not to undermine the agreement but simply to acknowledge that, given the changes in our society and the fact that we have road-tested the institutions almost to the point of destruction on numerous occasions, failure to reform condemns the institutions of the agreement to death by a thousand collapses or by the slow bleeding of public confidence in their ability to deliver.

I welcome the fact that, in recent weeks, the Secretary of State has set out that he wishes to engage with local parties on their proposals for reform of the institutions, and I look forward to engaging in that process. There is now, I think, a window of opportunity ahead of the next election to grasp the potential for reform, if people are willing to grasp it. With that, Chair, I bring my opening statement to a close. I am happy to take any questions.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Thank you, Eóin

Mrs Guy: Eóin, thanks for being here. I will start by revisiting the line of questioning that I put to the former First Minister Arlene Foster, because it is really important that we reflect the findings of an independent inquiry — in this case, the COVID inquiry — on the impact of the Assembly's suspension between 2017 and 2020. The inquiry was very clear that the collapse impacted on our pandemic preparedness and that, when the Assembly was restored and the pandemic began, cross-community votes played a role in blocking vital public health measures. That is absolutely damning, and it makes me angry to say that out loud again today. Do you share my concern that some of our people here in Northern Ireland suffered worse outcomes and that some may even have died because of the combination of those factors?

Mr Tennyson: Yes, I do, and I think that the COVID inquiry makes that abundantly clear. For years, we have been in a position where, largely, it was the Alliance Party alone driving this conversation. We then moved to a position where other parties across the Assembly indicated support for reform of the institutions. During the most recent suspension, we had a discussion with Chris Heaton-Harris, who was very clear that, if the COVID inquiry exposed that structural institutional failings had affected the ability of the Executive to respond, the UK Government would have to take that very seriously. Therefore, it is now not just a political call but a finding of an independent inquiry set up by the UK Government that cross-community mechanisms and vetoes were abused during the COVID pandemic.

The inquiry found that the response to the pandemic was marred by political disputes and that decision-making was chaotic and failed to put the common interests of all of the people of Northern Ireland above the political interests of the two largest parties. Therein lies the fundamental problem. We have a system of government that priorities the rights, privileges and interests of the two largest parties ahead of the common interests of all of the people whom we are here to represent. The most egregious example outlined during the COVID inquiry was the Executive meeting to consider the implementation of a circuit breaker. The Health Minister had taken advice from his officials and brought a recommendation to the Executive to introduce such a measure. That was then vetoed by one of the parties in the Executive, and gridlock unfolded: the Executive meeting lasted for four days, and no consensus could be found on a way forward. In the meantime, members of the public and businesses were crying out for certainty and leadership.

I have heard it argued that the structures are not the problem and that, actually, we just need parties to come to meetings focused on building a consensus and finding agreement. I think that the example that I cited is evidence that, even when we are facing a crisis, even when parties are incentivised and motivated to work together in the common interest of the people whom we represent and even when issues of life and death, frankly, are on the table, the structures prevent our finding agreement and a way forward. Therefore, at a time when the UK Government have that clear evidence of the impact that that had on a public health response, it would be a dereliction of duty not to look at how we can reform our institutions to ensure that we can improve our response should any such situation arise in the future. We must also recognise that such issues are not the preserve of times of crisis and that they pervade our Government at all times.

Mrs Guy: Thank you. I have a couple of other questions, quickly. What impact did start-stop politics and a fragmented Government have on wider public services and finances?

Mr Tennyson: At the moment, we sit here with no certainty that the Assembly will still be here by the end of the mandate, in that it is as stable now as it was before the last collapse. There is no certainty that there will be an Assembly after the next election. We also have no Budget and an ensuing financial crisis, with no certainty for our public services. The crisis that has built up in our public finances has developed over the past 20-odd years, partially but not exclusively due to the austerity policies that have been pursued at Westminster. I think that having a start-stop Government has played a major role in that.

Going back to the early 2000s and the first suspension of the Assembly, at that stage, the then Labour Government were making enormous investments in public services, particularly the Health Service. However, opportunities for us to replicate that investment and take decisions around transformation were taken away from us.

Fast-forward to 2016, the report of the Bengoa review was published, as I said in my opening statement, with a 10-year road map for the reform of our health service. The institutions collapsed a matter of months after that plan was published, and, for five of the 10 years, we did not have a Government overseeing that change. Now, we have a truncated mandate in which the opportunity for reform and change has been limited. We have not had the sustained leadership necessary for the long-term reform of public services.

Another issue is the incentive of parties to take risks and make difficult decisions about the reform of our public services. I can point to two examples in which the Alliance Party has taken genuinely transformational decisions in Ministries. One was the reform of teacher training, which was vetoed. Another is the proposals that were brought forward by David Ford during his time as Justice Minister, which were subsequently reversed. For as long as parties know that difficult decisions that they put on the Executive table can be vetoed by their Executive partners, or blocked from getting on to the Executive agenda, or that the Assembly could be collapsed and an election fought off the back of those difficult decisions, there is no incentive to transform our public services.

Also, a Pavlov's dog mentality has developed whereby politicians in Northern Ireland, because of the structures, are incentivised to elevate every political and financial issue to a crisis. There is an issue of credibility: the NIO and Treasury will engage only when they feel that the institutions are on shaky ground and about to collapse. That, effectively, rewards bad behaviour and incentivises politicians in the Assembly to threaten to use the vetoes that exist to create instability in the institutions. I believe that, if we had reformed institutions, those incentives would disappear, and we would be more likely to get that kind of sustained engagement upstream before those issues develop into wider crises.

Mrs Guy: My last question is about how the mechanisms can be abused. What is your assessment of how petitions of concern have been utilised? In what way do they need to be reformed?

Mr Tennyson: The clear intention of petitions of concern was to protect minority groups in our society from discrimination. I do not think that that is disputed. Since the agreement, however, we have seen examples in which that has been turned on its head; petitions of concern have been used to discriminate against newly visible minority groups, who perhaps were not considered adequately in 1998. The most obvious example of that is equal marriage. Polling suggested widespread public support for equal marriage right across our community — amongst unionists, nationalists and those who do not fit into either box. It is also an issue that would not have had a differential impact on the basis of someone's national identity or constitutional aspiration, but, in 2015, a petition of concern was deployed to frustrate that progress. That is an egregious perversion of those mechanisms, for a start. They have not delivered the kind of protections that were intended.

The use of a petition of concern was also threatened when we debated the Integrated Education Bill in the previous mandate. Integrated education and support for it were explicitly mentioned in the Good Friday Agreement, so it is clear that the intent was never that that would be threatened or that such a petition would be weaponised to seek to prevent progress in that space. Whilst I accept and support the need for minority protections in the structures, I struggle to point to an example of a petition of concern being used appropriately or as intended. Our proposals are not about removing the petition of concern. I accept that there are situations in our politics, given our history and political make-up, in which a petition may well be necessary, but we propose that its use be limited to issues pertaining to cultural identity, constitutional arrangements in the Assembly and the legacy of our past. It is clear that, when the Good Friday Agreement mentioned key decisions, those are the kinds of issues that petitions of concern were intended to deal with.

Mrs Guy: Thank you, Eóin.

Mr O'Toole: Thanks, Eóin, for coming to the Committee and giving us evidence. It is really useful for political parties to engage on this stuff in this context, when we are not just sparring in the Chamber or talking in the media.

There is probably a lot of overlap in the things that your party and my party would say about improving the institutions. There is not complete overlap, but there is certainly a shared view on making progress in that area and on the urgency of doing so. Some of your proposals are long-standing Alliance proposals on ultimately removing designation. Lots of people, when looking at our institutions and society, see that as being a worthy and perhaps even admirable end point but are concerned about the viability of agreeing that in the short to medium term. I think that you or your party alluded to this last week when you published your proposals: is there a gradation to your proposals whereby some are, you think, more achievable in the short term and others will take longer to agree? It would be helpful to get a sense of what is thought to be achievable in the short term.

Mr Tennyson: Absolutely. In our 'Democratic Renewal' paper, we grade them as immediate and medium-term priorities. The immediate priorities are issues that would, we feel, improve the functionality and stability of the Assembly and on which there is, I believe, already a degree of commonality amongst some of the parties, including your party, Matthew. We have said that Executive formation needs to be an immediate priority, because the biggest public complaint is that there is no guarantee, following any election, that an Executive will be established. Let me be absolutely clear: our proposals are not radical. They protect every party's right to be in the Government by virtue of their mandate. It is not about excluding any party but about removing the ability of one party to exclude everybody else from the Government. Our second immediate priority is to move to a system of weighted majority voting as a measure of cross-community support. A version of weighted majority voting was referenced in the Good Friday Agreement, so, again, it is not a radical departure from what was set out there.

Mr O'Toole: Would it be two thirds?

Mr Tennyson: In our view, it should be two thirds. We believe that that would ensure sufficient consensus in the Assembly on key decisions in a way that would not discount the votes of genuinely cross-community parties and others who designate using different terms. For example, People Before Profit Members sign into the Assembly as "socialist", the Greens, when they were here, as "environmentalist" and Alliance Members as "united community", but our votes in the Chamber are not counted equally with those of nationalists and unionists. That is anti-democratic and treats a section of our community as second class in a way that is unacceptable and must be rectified. I also think that, were we not to act on that in the short term, it could be vulnerable to legal challenge. We have also said that we would restrict the use of cross-community voting in order to prevent abuse and that we would put the "three meeting rule" for the Executive on a statutory footing to address the St Andrews clandestine veto that the First Minister and deputy First Minister have. By convention, the First Ministers are supposed to be able to defer issues for only three Executive meetings. In practice, however, that is not what happens, so there needs to be change.

We think that those things would make a transformational difference. We believe that, given that we are in an increasingly pluralist and diverse society, we should move away from the system of designation and that we should have joint First Ministers. In the very long term, I would love to see us move to a more normal system of democracy, but I accept that we are not at that point. Alliance is optimistic that, if we were to make the practical changes that are set out in the immediate-term section of our paper, we could engender the kind of confidence in the institutions that would allow some of those longer-term transformational steps forward.

Mr O'Toole: In 2022, Alliance got a good share of the vote and a remarkable increase in its representation in the Assembly. It is fair to say that a lot of people backed Alliance in order to disrupt the system. Following the restoration of the Executive after a two-year collapse, or failure to form an Executive, people may have thought that, given that the Alliance Party had had such a huge increase in its representation, it was now, in effect, a third leg of the Executive alongside the two big designating parties. It was not a third wheel but a third force. I know that, historically, that has a different meaning here, but people will understand what I mean. What would you say to the argument — it is worth acknowledging that I have made this point previously — that people might therefore have thought that it would have been reasonable for the Alliance Party to say either that it would not enter the Executive without clear guarantees on Assembly and Executive reform or that its participation in the Executive would be time-limited, meaning that, because the issue is so fundamental to it, it would leave the Executive and join the SDLP and go into opposition if there were not delivery of or some progress on reform after six months or a year?

Mr Tennyson: Context is critical. As you said, in 2022, the institutions were in a period of stasis, and we then had two years without institutions. At that point, the public were simply demanding that there be a Government and were less up for a debate about the complexion or type of Government. Therefore, we believed that it would be irresponsible, frankly, for us not to go in, put our shoulder to the wheel and do our best to make the institutions work within the current structures, whilst arguing from within for change.

That context is slightly different when you are moving from the position where the Executive have been operating from some time. You then start to have the conversation about the conditions for participation and what changes and progress we would need to see. However, I dispute the suggestion that there has not been significant progress. If you go back to 2016, when we were eight MLAs in the Assembly, we were told that this was a niche issue, catnip for the Alliance Party and an academic exercise and that the Government were not interested in it. We then went away and got bigger as a party, and this is a now mainstream conversation.

During suspension, the Government told us that now was not the time and that you could not move the goalposts while the Assembly was suspended. Therefore, we said in good faith that we would make the effort to get the institutions up and running, work them and have this argument in parallel. As a result, the Irish Government have shifted position to being in favour of an institutional reform process, and, indeed, the Secretary of State has suggested to party leaders that he would like to have a round of discussions. There has been a momentum for progress, but, if we feel that that momentum stalls at any point, that will inform our decisions on the way forward.

Mr O'Toole: I will do this: because you argue for your party's influence, I will argue for ours in opposition. I do not disagree that the Alliance Party has been consistent. I would say that our being in opposition and pressing other parties in the Executive has also been part of why that shift has happened. I acknowledge that there is more momentum around the discussion. It was the very first question that I asked as leader of the Opposition, and we have been consistent in pressing it. That has contributed too. However, I come back to this point, which is genuine and sincere one and not a gotcha: given that you had that increased mandate in 2022, in 2024, would it not have been —? For example, you said that the public wanted to see an Executive formed, and that is certainly true. However, I suppose that they wanted to see it formed and working. Now, their level of trust is even lower than it was in 2022 and 2024 because they have seen dysfunction, lack of delivery and everything that we see every day up here. So, why do Naomi Long, Andrew Muir and you not say, "We will be in the Executive to get it up and running, but our participation is contingent on delivery, which is what the public want to see"? If you do not get that delivery, frankly, go into opposition, because that is a legitimate choice. It is important to say that your lack of participation in the Executive would not have brought it down. [Inaudible.]

Mr O'Toole: It is a different situation for Sinn Féin and the DUP. If Michelle or Emma were to resign, the Executive would collapse. That does not happen if the Alliance leaves. Obviously, it is too late now for you to be the official Opposition: I remind you of that. However, should you have so wished, you could have become the official Opposition. Why not simply say, "Our participation is time-limited, and, if we do not get this in the Programme for Government", which might have been an obvious —. That programme was agreed about a year after you entered the Executive. Why was that not used as the opportunity to say, "Thanks, but no thanks. We tried. We will now take our substantial mandate into opposition"?

Mr Tennyson: We feel that our participation in the Executive and our engagement with both Governments are resulting in progress and momentum around this conversation.

Mr O'Toole: Would that momentum not have been greater had you been in opposition?

Mr Tennyson: Not necessarily. We have seen what happened, for example, in 2016, when we took that decision, as you put it. We said that there should be some reform and that, if there were not, we would go into opposition. In 2016, that did not deliver the kind of change that we wanted: in fact, it only accelerated the collapse of the institutions, because the DUP and Sinn Féin struggled in an Executive in which Alliance and other parties were acting, effectively, as the meat in the sandwich and bartering between the two.

At our recent conference, we set out that, for us, this is a delicate balance between what we can deliver and the benefits associated with walking out of the Executive and holding the DUP and Sinn Féin to account. However, that is not a decision that we would take simply out of self-interest or to get our hands on an official Opposition title, nor would we be driven by those deadlines. That is a decision that will be based on what is, we believe, best for Northern Ireland.

I will not underplay, Matthew, the risks associated with the Department of Justice. Whilst Alliance's leaving the Executive would not automatically result in collapse, it could well result in a miniature crisis if the DUP and Sinn Féin were not able to agree on who would take up that Ministry. Therefore, there is a very delicate balance and a delicate line to walk on these issues.

Mr O'Toole: That brings me on to the question of Justice, and there is a specific question there. Lots of people think that this strange anomaly whereby the Justice Ministry is carved out of the d'Hondt process is an example of dysfunctionality here. They might say, "With all due respect to Alliance's position on Stormont reform, that actually places you in the middle of this". You have gone along with and acquiesced in that dysfunctional set-up whereby, as it happens, people who designate as nationalist —.

By the way, it affects not just one party. It just so happens that a guy called Alban Maginness, an experienced barrister, was excluded from consideration for that post. That is true. What do you have to say about that? People talk about being excluded from office, but nationalists have been excluded from taking up the Justice Ministry.

Mr Tennyson: I do not think that it is about acquiescing in the system. Rather, it is about being pragmatic. Had Alliance not been willing to step up and step into the Department for Justice, it is unlikely that policing and justice would have been able to be successfully devolved. I fundamentally believe that such decisions are far better being taken by local, accountable Ministers than by Ministers at Westminster. The devolution of policing and justice has been a positive for our society and a step towards its normalisation, but it is a journey. Almost 30 years on from the Good Friday Agreement, that Ministry, like every other Ministry, should be included in the d'Hondt process. There should be no barrier to anybody with a mandate from taking up the position.

I will be absolutely transparent. Under the current structure, which I do not support, there is no bar to a unionist or a nationalist becoming Minister of Justice. It is simply a requirement that the candidate, whomever it is and from whatever party, can command sufficient cross-community consensus across the House. To date, Alliance is the only party that has been able to command that confidence from all sides. I support changing the structures, but it is wrong to say that the Alliance Party has had some sort of strategy to hold on to the portfolio. We are proud of the work that we have done in the Department of Justice, but we are not wedded to holding on to it. If somebody else is ready and willing to step up and take up the position, that should be facilitated.

Mr O'Toole: You therefore do not agree with your party leader's words that the SDLP and perhaps other nationalists need to engage "more constructively" with unionists.

Mr Tennyson: Under the current structure, one has to have the confidence of one's partners right across the Assembly in order to be elected to that position. That is just the reality of the system, although it should not be. Rather, the system should be one in which, on the basis of a party's mandate, a Member can be nominated to the position. The system of cross-community voting was designed, largely by the SDLP and the Ulster Unionist Party, in 1998. Bizarrely, in electing a Justice Minister, my vote and the votes of my Alliance colleagues, including the Justice Minister herself, count for less than yours, those of other nationalists and those of unionists across the Chamber.

Mr O'Toole: What I am saying is that, at times, we end up in a situation in which we defend fairly tortured bits of the system that happen to work for a particular group, but I acknowledge that there are consistent positions taken on that.

I have a final question, and it is about the mechanisms for getting some reforms made. Our position is that there are certain reforms that the British and Irish Governments can implement — they do not really need to hold a massive summit, with cameras outside, to do so — to make this place a bit more stable. We have pressed the two Governments on that. The concern may be that trying to do more than that through convening multiparty talks, which may be something for the medium term, simply gives us all another reason to go into rooms and disagree with one another and then perform for the cameras. What do you say to that? Should the Irish and British Governments move to implement some reforms before the election? When and how should we proceed?

Mr Tennyson: We need to be cautious. I have heard some people refer to the need for short, sharp, keyhole surgery. Keyhole surgery is not appropriate when the patient is flatlining and in need of resuscitation. We need significant and radical reform. The truth is that, in order to get sufficient consensus on what those reforms will look like, a process of engagement with the parties is needed first. That is the reality of the position in which we find ourselves. Were the UK Government to rush ahead with making very small tweaks — for example, requiring a weighted majority vote for the election of a Speaker — such tweaks would not really improve the functionality of the Assembly or the Executive.

Mr O'Toole: They would make it less likely that the whole place would collapse and —.

Mr Tennyson: The likelihood would be that we would have a zombie Assembly, with a Speaker in place but with no policy or legislation being driven by Ministers for us to scrutinise. We therefore need to see a package of measures implemented to ensure not only that we have a guarantee of a stable Government but that that Government can deliver.

Mr O'Toole: I may agree with a lot of what you say about an end point, designation and all the other major reforms that it is now arguable are required. Is there not a concern, though, that if you seek to place everything on huge and substantial reform without staging some of it, you are effectively guaranteeing a big, multiparty-talks process, which will probably take place after an election in which the public have gone out and voted? There would then be a huge, prolonged negotiation. You may have your asks, and my party may have its asks, but the DUP may also have its asks. Jamie Bryson would tweet every five minutes about rewriting border poll criteria, and people would chuck in other complaints. The public looking on would think, "This is a complete joke". That would discredit the process even further. Is that one argument for staging reform and implementing stuff that stabilises things and minimises the risk of a short-term collapse? A longer-term talks process could then be convened.

Mr Tennyson: We have staged our proposals for reform. For example, we have said that designation and changing the titles of the First Minister and the deputy First Minister are probably issues for a longer-term discussion, given that there is unlikely to be consensus among the parties on them. We have prioritised four key issues that, we believe, are worthy of discussion with the two Governments and the other parties.

We should avoid any temptation to window-dress the situation. There is a window of opportunity of almost a year before the next election to guarantee not only that the people of Northern Ireland will have a Government on the far side of that election and that government will be sustained until then but that that Government will be capable of representing the society that we are, rather than the divisions that we inherited, and will be agile and able to deliver for people. That is what is needed in order to instil public confidence. If, after a reform process, the only guarantee that we can give the public is that a Speaker will be elected and that there will be a zombie Assembly here that has Members traipsing in and out every day to knock lumps out of one another and poke one another in the eye but is not capable of delivering anything, there is a risk of bringing the Assembly and the Executive into further disrepute and damaging the reform process even further. We need reform, but it has to be the right reform, and it has to make a difference. Otherwise, we will erode public confidence altogether.

Mr O'Toole: I do not disagree with that, but —.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): We need to move on.

Mr O'Toole: I will end my questions there.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Eóin, you have made an articulate case for how Alliance has demonstrated its ability to gain cross-community support for the Justice portfolio through the mechanisms that are in place. Your party has often talked about the need for cross-community consensus. Going by your proposals, why should that not apply to who leads the Executive?

Mr Tennyson: It would, in that every party, whether it identifies as nationalist, unionist or neither, would have a guaranteed right to be in the Executive, either leading it or leading Ministries, by virtue of the mandate that is given to it by the public. Every politician, whether they identify as nationalist, unionist or neither, should be on a level playing field and should be protected equally. At the moment, we have a perversion in the system. First, we should not assume that the DUP and Sinn Féin will perennially be the largest parties in the Executive. If we are serious about having a sustainable Executive, we have to plan for all eventualities. We are now in a position in which the Alliance Party or any other party, if it were the largest party, could have the First Minister position. If we were to come second, however, we would not be entitled to have the deputy First Minister position, and that is because of the absurdities of the designation system. It would erode public confidence if the second-largest party in our society were to be deprived of that opportunity. Our proposals do enshrine a cross-community Executive, in that the Executive would have to command majority support in the Assembly in order to get Budgets passed, for example. In practice, that would be with weighted majority support, because that would be a key decision being taken. Again, that would remove the ability of any single party to veto progress in the Executive or to veto the formation of an Executive.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): You may be many things, Mr Tennyson, but you are not naive. You know the history of the Belfast Agreement, have studied it and have articulated it in your paper concisely. You know, however, that the chances of Alliance becoming the largest or second-largest party is probably for the birds, given recent polling and where the representation is at present. That is one point for me to make. My second point is that, in essence, your proposals state that you believe that this place could govern by consensus if neither the largest nationalist party nor the largest unionist party chose to occupy the positions in a joint office. Either that is particularly naive or you do not understand the history of what has been involved to get Northern Ireland to a point at which power-sharing government can exist. What do you believe will be achieved by a shared future if we cannot govern by consensus and do not have both designations represented in the joint office?

Mr Tennyson: The first thing to say to that, Chair, is that we were told that we were naive to believe that Alliance could be the third-largest party in a divided society. We broke through that barrier. I therefore do not rule anything out, and there is no lack of ambition from me for what the Alliance Party can deliver and achieve for Northern Ireland. It is important that we knock the issue of consensus on the head at the outset. The word "consensus" appears in the Good Friday Agreement once. You wanted a history lesson, Chair, so I will give it to you.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Please do.

Mr Tennyson: It appears in reference to the operation of the British-Irish Council. Nowhere in the Good Friday Agreement does it state that the devolved power-sharing institutions are required to operate by consensus. It is therefore a nonsense, and we have never argued that there should be consensus. What we have said is that there should be sufficient consensus on the key issues that relate to legacy, identity and constitutional issues, because that was clearly the intent behind the agreement.

With respect, Chair, I do not think that your party has a particularly good record when it comes to the question of consensus. Consensus requires that you treat your partners in government with respect, that you listen to the proposals that your partners in government put on the table and that you engage with those partners in good faith. What we heard from the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party last week was that he could not even be bothered to read the document that had been put on the table by his partners in government. What hope is there under the current system that consensus and cooperation can be built if that is the level of arrogance and contempt that is being displayed towards partners in the Executive? This is about moving away from a system in which we effectively have minority rule to having a system in which minorities are protected but are not able to dictate the agenda of the Assembly or the Executive.

If you look at our proposals, you will see that there is no differential impact for nationalists, unionists or others. Rather, they are about levelling the playing field and ensuring that there are equal rights and protections for everyone in the Assembly and everyone whom we represent.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Do you also recognise, however, that the mandatory power-sharing system of government that we have in Northern Ireland is in place for good reason? Do you understand that there is a need for parties of all traditions and none to have the ability to be represented in the Executive?

Mr Tennyson: I do.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): I put this to you very clearly. One of your proposals suggests that if either the largest nationalist party or the largest unionist party were to choose not to be in those offices, the office would transfer to the next largest party. Do you genuinely believe that Northern Ireland could be governed without unionist or nationalist representation in a future Executive, given its history and the fact that this place operates on the basis that there are people with distinct democratically held constitutional positions and distinct economic and cultural positions? Do you believe that if a Northern Ireland Assembly is to succeed in future, it must ensure that all sections are represented in that Executive? Is it not naive to believe that it could function without either of those two designations being in those positions?

Mr Tennyson: Do you believe that it could or should function to the exclusion of the other designation, Chair?

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): The other designation is represented in the Executive.

Mr Tennyson: We, however, have the option to leave the Executive. Do you believe that the Executive could or should continue to function on that basis? Fundamentally, this comes back to the principle of equality and to the protections that are applied to nationalists and unionists applying equally to those of us who do not designate. To be clear, and for the avoidance of doubt, I want the most inclusive Executive. I want the largest parties of unionism and nationalism to be represented in that Executive, but, for as long as they have the ability to exclude everybody else from the Executive, they will use the threat of collapse, or collapse itself, to further their own selfish interests and political agendas to the detriment of the wider public, who want to see functioning and stable government.

What we are saying really clearly is that if either the DUP or Sinn Féin, or any other party, knows that if it chooses not to take up its positions in the Executive, they would pass to the next largest party, it is less likely that they will threaten to walk out. I also believe that your party should have the same rights and entitlements as mine in opposition. I believe that, in a democracy, it is healthy that if a party does not agree with the approach to, for example, a Programme for Government or the direction of an Executive, or if a party needs time to rebuild and refresh its ideas and renew its vision, it should have the opportunity to go into opposition and hold the Executive to account. It is therefore not about excluding anyone. Rather, it is about ensuring that there is equality in how we govern and that all parties have the same choice to take up positions or refuse them as they see fit on behalf of their constituents.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): You and your party have often referenced the fact that cross-community votes in the Assembly are a particular worry for Alliance representatives. Do you still hold to that position, and, if so, why?

Mr Tennyson: Will you repeat that question, Chair?

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): You have often said that cross-community votes in the Assembly mean that Alliance votes do not count in the same way as those of its unionist and nationalist coequals. Do you still hold to the position that that is a major issue for the Alliance Party, and, if so, why?

Mr Tennyson: Of course it is, Chair. Take the example of electing a Speaker at the beginning of the mandate. Over 70% of MLAs were in favour of electing a Speaker and getting on with the business of government. That is a similar margin to that which voted for the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, yet it was not sufficient to elect a Speaker and operate the agreement's institutions.

It cuts to the core of your question about consensus, because you seem to imply that a proposition cannot proceed simply because the DUP does not agree with it. The Good Friday Agreement is evidence that it can. The DUP was outside the door in 1998, arguing against the very arrangements that you now profess to defend. In fact, your party has gone further than Alliance in advocating for voluntary coalition. It did so in manifestos in 2004, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2015, 2016 and 2022. To be absolutely clear, our position has been consistent since 1998. With respect, Chair, yours has not.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): You often talk in the Assembly about how Alliance votes count for less on the Assembly Floor. You often cite that position. How many times has a cross-community vote happened in the Assembly since its restoration in 2024?

Mr Tennyson: I do not have the exact number, but it happens every time that a Budget is brought to the House —

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): How many times?

Mr Tennyson: — and when we elect a Minister of Justice.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): How many times?

Mr Tennyson: It happens every time that a report by the Commissioner for Standards is brought to the House —

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): How many times?

Mr Tennyson: — and every time that a petition of concern is deployed.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): How many times?

Mr Tennyson: I do not have a number, Chair, but I have just given you a list of examples of when a cross-community vote has been used.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Out of the hundreds of votes in the Northern Ireland Assembly, you are citing in total probably fewer than 10 votes in the current mandate, yet your party continually wants to manufacture the grievance that, in every vote, your votes count for less. How many POCs have there been since the Assembly was re-established?

Mr Tennyson: I believe that there has been one in this mandate.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): One. Your party —.

Mr Tennyson: They were floating around the Executive and the Assembly like confetti between 2011 and 2015, however. Their use has been limited since.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): What happened post that? Was there reform?

Mr Tennyson: There was a cross-community vote.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Was there reform of the petition of concern?

Mr Tennyson: Yes, it —

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Yes, there was.

Mr Tennyson: — was limited, in that only two parties could trigger it, but it has still been abused.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): I put it to you, Mr Tennyson, that it is also your party's poor performance in polling and in the Assembly that has led you now to pre-manufacture certain crisis points in the institutions, particularly around cross-community votes and POCs, of which we know that there have been only a handful out of the total number of votes held in the Assembly. You want to spend more time talking about those particular points than you do delivering in a cross-community, consensual way in the Assembly.

At the start of your briefing, you mentioned a number of papers that your party has been unable to get through the Executive. Why do Alliance Ministers seem to struggle more than any other Ministers to get papers through, albeit there are some papers that will not find-cross community support? Your party, however, seems to have a particular issue with getting papers through the Executive. Is it a relationship problem?

Mr Tennyson: To paraphrase, equality can sometimes feel like oppression to those who are used to privilege in the current system. You would be aghast if, on 10 or more occasions, your vote as a unionist politician were discounted and I were to argue that that was acceptable. All that I am asking for is —.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): You were happy to do that with the Windsor framework.

Mr Tennyson: Your vote was not discounted. It counted equally and on the same basis as everybody else's, which —

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): You were happy to discount cross-community voting.

Mr Tennyson: — proves my point: you are not satisfied with being treated equally to everyone else. To come to the table and argue that not just my vote but the votes of the people whom I represent should count for less than yours simply because I do not designate as nationalist or unionist, I find absolutely appalling and completely indefensible. It would not be tolerated in any other democracy.

You have asked whether there is a particular issue with Alliance Ministers getting papers through the Executive. That is not simply the preserve of Alliance. The Ulster Unionist Party has faced some of the same challenges.

That is because there is a two-tier system within the structures, in which the DUP and Sinn Féin have disproportionate rights and privileges. For example, if the DUP and Sinn Féin block each other's papers from getting on the Executive agenda, there is a power dynamic there, whereby they can barter, negotiate and horse-trade to lift their vetoes from the table and allow business to continue. The Ulster Unionist Party and the Alliance Party do not do not have those vetoes, so they do not have that power. There is nothing for them to horse-trade and nothing to barter over. We simply have the power of persuasion. That is why we have seen the creation of an independent environmental protection agency — for which there was consensus in 'New Decade, New Approach', but your party resiled from that — be blocked despite receiving sufficient support in the Assembly.

Alcohol minimum unit pricing, which a previous DUP Minister proposed, was suddenly blocked, because the DUP changed its position. When it comes to issues of consistency, consensus and good faith, one therefore has to have a partner who is willing to act with goodwill and in good faith and to keep its word when agreements are made. We have repeatedly seen that that does not happen under the current structures.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): To reference an earlier point from Matthew, Naomi said in the Chamber that she was able to get on with unionists and nationalists and therefore able to command cross-community support to occupy the office. If the Alliance Party is able to garner cross-community consensus for that, why, then, are you not able to get consensus in the Executive? The consensus that is needed around the Executive table is give and take. There are issues with which we will agree and issues with which we will not agree. It is about trying to act for the collective good.

What we see happening now regularly is distraction from what appears to be Alliance Ministers' failure to deliver on their particular mandates and portfolios. Alliance is therefore manufacturing grievances, be they on petitions of concern, which have been deployed only once since reform, or on cross-community votes in the Assembly, which are in the minority of votes held.

Mr Tennyson: Those are very significant issues.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): When we talk to Members from your party, however, they try to present the case that, in every vote, their vote counts less than that of other Members. That is simply not the case.

Mr Tennyson: I never said that.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Perhaps if there were a more collegiate way of working, and if Alliance Ministers had the ability to convince those of different designations to buy into whatever their proposal is, make compromises where appropriate and try to move forward in a collective spirit, their papers would get through the Executive. That may be where their attention should be —

Mr Tennyson: Let me put it —.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): — placed, rather than on ripping up some of the safeguards and protections that are vital to power-sharing.

Mr Tennyson: First, we are not ripping up safeguards and protections. As I have set out, the ability to trigger a weighted majority vote through the petition of concern would still be available to everyone: nationalists, unionists and neither. The right of parties to be represented in an Executive and to have that choice would be protected so that no one could be excluded. It is therefore not true to say that we are seeking to remove minority safeguards. Rather, we are seeking to reform how they would work to ensure that they return to their original purpose, but we are not looking to remove them.

On that dynamic, I think that I have set out very clearly that the DUP and Sinn Féin have leverage in the Executive that we do not. I put this to you, Chair: when it comes with the creation of an independent environmental protection agency, the introduction of minimum unit pricing for alcohol or the introduction of a green growth strategy, what compromise would you like to make in order to get those issues onto the Executive agenda? If an issue goes on the Executive agenda, and the Executive then decide that it is a bad idea, that is a democratic decision. What is not democratic and what is clandestine and in bad faith is when the First Minister or the deputy First Minister, without even a discussion being had at the Executive table, prevent papers from being tabled. I do not think that is acceptable. That is not how a parish council would be run. Issues just sit in an inbox and are not addressed.

Andrew Muir has had to maintain a spreadsheet of issues. It is not that they have not been agreed, because I accept that one has to work with colleagues in government to seek agreement, but that he cannot even get them on to the agenda to make the case for agreement. That is not sustainable.

Regarding our record —.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Does Minister Muir have conversations with his ministerial colleagues about that issue?

Mr Tennyson: He has ongoing conversations. He has spoken to some of his colleagues until he is blue in the face, but, while those vetoes exist, there is no incentive for them to negotiate in good faith and reciprocate. I have one Committee member saying that Alliance should precipitate some kind of crisis by leaving the Executive and another saying that I am seeking to distract. The truth is that we are working constructively within the structures that exist. We recognise, however, those structures' limitations and are setting out a case for them to be reformed in order to maintain the protections for everyone so as to ensure that people are treated equally and that we have a Government that is agile and can deliver the change that people in Northern Ireland voted for and not be frustrated for selfish party political interests.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): It does not seem that we will have consensus at this meeting today. Thank you, Mr Tennyson.

Ms Ennis: Unlike Gavin Robinson, I did read the Alliance Party's proposals.

Mr Tennyson: Thank you.

Ms Ennis: From a Sinn Féin perspective, there is a lot of common ground in your party's proposals on which we can work together. I hear Sinn Féin's position misrepresented an awful lot in the media. We will be producing our own position paper on reform. We have engaged collegiately with members of this Committee and with others when the issue has come to the House. Our position is that we are up for doing reform. We have said that consistently. There is a lot in your document on which we share common ground. That will become apparent when we go public with our own reform proposals.

I will pick up on something that the Chair said. If the DUP is now advocating a more collegiate approach to the Executive and the Assembly, perhaps it should start demonstrating that itself before pontificating to others. To follow the line of questioning from Matthew O'Toole, I will say that it is not helpful to propose the type of brinkmanship that you do by holding the issue of reform over whether you are in an Executive or not. Since the Assembly returned in 2024, we have seen the issue of reform gather momentum and attract interest, and that is because we are all around the table. We are not shouting from the sidelines. Everybody realises that reform is an issue. It is almost 30 years since the Good Friday Agreement was signed, and for anybody to advocate that the institutions, and how we operate them, should not be updated and modernised and that we should not keep pace with how society has changed, that is — to use the Chair's phrase from earlier — for the birds. I say that at the outset.

I read the Alliance proposals last week, and, as I said, I agree with a lot of them. Eóin, your reform document refers to removing the veto for electing the Speaker. I would like to see that proposal expanded, and I am interested to hear your take on it, to include greater accountability for the Speaker. Under Standing Orders, decisions made by the Speaker are final and cannot be challenged. We have seen examples of decisions by this Speaker impact on legislation through amendments not being selected. If we are talking about inspiring greater confidence in the institutions and in how decisions are made, I would like us to look at international best practice to see how we increase accountability and transparency of the decisions that the Speaker makes. Your proposals mention the role of the Speaker. What are your thoughts on how we can increase accountability and transparency in the role?

Mr Tennyson: That is a good point. I obviously do not want to stray into the territory of discussing any decisions made by the current Speaker, because the rules of the Assembly do not allow me to do that. In general, the appointment process for the Speaker is critical. At the minute, like with so many other key decisions, there is effectively a veto in the hands of either of the largest parties. Often, in good old Northern Ireland fashion, when we come back after a period of suspension, not much negotiation takes place about who will be Speaker. One of the two main parties will put up a nominee, and that is the decision that is made. Reforming that process through moving to a weighted majority system would increase eligibility and make the process for becoming Speaker more competitive. That would ingrain a culture of accountability in the quality of speakership that we get. Accountability matters as much for the Speaker as it does for Ministers and Members.

One thing that could be done to improve transparency around Speakers' decisions is to have a more detailed log of conventions and of decisions that are made. As an individual Member, I sometimes struggle to follow conventions and decisions made historically and whether they have been challenged or changed. Whips should also have transparency about the nature of the advice that the Speaker receives from officials. Even if that advice were to be shared more widely, with, for example, the Deputy Speakers, that would ensure that there was at least some transparency in that process, without in any way enabling a culture of challenge to the Speaker, which would also be difficult.

Another broader accountability issue relates to motions of no confidence. There is a very high threshold for the Assembly to express that it does not have confidence because of the inherent vetoes that exist. All those changes would change the culture around the speakership and make the process more competitive in different mandates.

Ms Ennis: Would you like the Speaker to have to issue a short note to explain the decision-making process for certain decisions that he makes?

Mr Tennyson: Yes. Some explanation of the basis for decisions would be helpful. It would instil Member confidence in the decision-making process. If Members are informed in more detail about the rationale and conventions behind why the Speaker has arrived at a position, it is less likely that there will be angry exchanges in which Members stray into the territory of challenging the Speaker. I would be entirely comfortable with that, and I think that it would improve the processes.

Ms Ennis: Thanks for your time today, Eóin. Your proposals are very interesting.

Mr Tennyson: No problem.

Miss McIlveen: How do you propose to work with unionists to bring about reform? I get the impression that your plan is to lecture us into compliance. To date, the attitude, tone and rhetoric has been rather patronising and condescending.

Mr Tennyson: I do not share that analysis at all. If you look at the opinion polls on confidence in the Assembly and the Executive and on removing some of the blockages to Executive formation, you see widespread support for that from across our community. It is unhelpful to try to sectarianise it when, actually, the public is far ahead of politicians on these issues. I also say gently that , as I belong to a cross-community party, I represent many people who identify as unionist. There are people who are both pro-Union and pro-reform of the institutions, and who believe in stable political structures and prioritising things such as reconciliation and integration. Therefore, we should shy away from that very simplistic narrative.

Many of our proposals, Michelle, are somewhat influenced by either complaints made by the DUP in the past or issues that the DUP has put in manifestos. I have already listed DUP manifestos from successive elections in which it committed to quite radical reform of the institutions. It is regrettable that that common ground has ebbed away because it is no longer in the DUP's interest to argue for it; that is unfortunate. There was previously common ground, and the DUP has resiled from that. Fundamentally, it is in the interests of all of us — unionists, nationalists and those who do not fit into either of those boxes — to have functional, stable institutions that provide sustained leadership, that focus on improving people's lives and that are not beset by the vetoes and dysfunction that we have experienced.

I do not see having that conversation bringing any disadvantage for anybody around the table. We have said really clearly that it is important that all parties are involved in talks. I hope that the DUP will be willing to take its seat at the table to engage and share its views, and that both Governments, as co-guarantors of the agreement, will lead and drive the process in order to engender confidence in it. Michelle, if your party comes forward with proposals for reform in the near future, I would welcome the opportunity to read and engage seriously with them. Unlike your leader, I respect the views of my unionist colleagues in the Assembly. I will be happy to engage, critique, analyse and discuss whatever the DUP puts on the table.

Miss McIlveen: You have made a case for limiting the use of the petition of concern, and you identified themes and issues including national identity. From where in the Belfast Agreement do you garner the evidence for that interpretation of the petition of concern?

Mr Tennyson: Strand one of the Good Friday Agreement talks clearly about "key decisions" of the Executive. It lists some of those key decisions, but it is not a comprehensive list. When you look at the issues that are dealt with in the agreement, you see that it is clear that the intention behind the phrase "key decisions" is that it will deal with issues that are relevant to our particular history, culture and political set-up — issues that are unique to Northern Ireland such as the legacy of our past; identity and culture; and the institutional arrangements at Stormont and the Assembly. I see no coherent or cogent argument, nor do I believe that it was foreseen in 1998, why that should extend to other, day-to-day issues that parties are simply ideologically opposed to and that have no relevance to our past or the peace process. Again, that should engender some confidence that we are not saying that we would remove the safeguards; we are simply saying that we should remove the opportunity for people to abuse those safeguards. As I said, we are open to discussing with other parties what exactly the threshold for triggering that should be. We have put a proposal on the table, and we would welcome the opportunity to discuss others' views on what exactly that threshold should look like.

Miss McIlveen: So, it is your interpretation of intention.

Mr Tennyson: It is.

Miss McIlveen: OK. Is it your view that language falls into the category of national identity?

Mr Tennyson: Language falls into cultural issues certainly; yes. Those are issues of particular sensitivity in Northern Ireland. However, we would move to a position where, for example, vetoes in the Executive would be removed so that issues could come to the Executive. Issues could be dealt with on the Floor of the Assembly on a weighted-majority basis rather than single parties having a veto. That is unlike the current situation where, if one party disagrees with a policy, it can block it. You would have to build a consensus on a position across the Assembly Chamber. I believe that that would incentivise cooperation and negotiation on those issues, whereas, in the current position, effectively, if you support the status quo, you do not have to speak to anybody else and you can preserve the situation in aspic. Yes, language is a cultural issue that would fall under the auspices of that use, but the ability of a single party to block progress on the issue would be removed.

Miss McIlveen: OK. You have identified that language should be looked at in that situation. How could my community trust the Alliance Party to honour that, given your endorsement of a 15% threshold for dual-language signage in Belfast?

Mr Tennyson: Michelle, as you know, that is a misrepresentation of the position. In Belfast City Council, the threshold for an application process to be triggered and considered by the relevant committee is 15%. In practice, however, Alliance has taken a position that, when the papers come to that committee, there should be majority support in order for signage to be erected. When it comes to the confidence of people from unionist backgrounds, many of them have moved to the Alliance Party over recent election cycles. I am not complacent that that will continue, but, ultimately, it is the electorate's decision as to whom they return to the Assembly to represent them. That should be respected by all parties, irrespective of the system that we have. Currently, that is not the case. Where there are huge majorities of people in favour of progressive social change in areas such as workers' rights, there is often a risk that that can be frustrated by a minority party. Your former leader said that he did not believe that a party that represents, perhaps, 25% of the people should be able to hold government to ransom, and I agree with him. My position is consistent — there is a degree of consensus on things that the DUP has said in the past — but, unfortunately, your party's position has not been consistent.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): You have talked about how polling substantiates the need for change. Do you apply the same litmus test to polling that shows that Alliance Ministers are the most unpopular Ministers in the Executive? Do you apply the same rationale to suggestions, in the polling that you have talked about, that the lowest level of confidence in Alliance Ministers is among unionist voters? How does that stack up with your suggestion that the polling is evidence that we should go ahead with reform? Do you not accept that, when it comes to enjoying unionist support, many people view your proposals as an attempt not to achieve fairness or progress but to rig the system to your own ends?

Mr Tennyson: I will take that last point first, Chair. If we wanted to simply put proposals on the table that are in the selfish interest of the Alliance Party, we would not have come with this paper. I would have come to the Committee today and argued that the Alliance Party should have the same vetoes and entitlements as the DUP and Sinn Féin. Whilst that might increase our leverage around the Executive table, I do not believe that having more vetoes at the Executive table would create more agile, effective and efficient government. Instead, we have come with a paper — I encourage the public to read it — that very clearly levels the playing field for all parties. It may be difficult for you to comprehend, Chair, but some politicians do act in the public interest and not always for selfish party political interest.

I have not said that the reason that we should do this is polling figures. I have said that that polling demonstrates a feeling and an atmosphere among the electorate. The test of that will be in elections. I have also said that this is now an unarguable case. We have not had government for almost half of the time, and, when we do have government, it cannot function and deliver well and the democratic will of the people we represent is frustrated: that is a very difficult space for us to be in, and it should be a wake-up call for all of us who believe in devolution. The people we represent deserve better than a choice between bad government and no government. This paper sets out a pathway for good government, if, collectively, we are willing to grasp it.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): If, at a subsequent election, the Alliance Party — the cross-community party, as self-designated — drops in its representation, will that diminish the need for the reforms that you have suggested in your paper?

Mr Tennyson: No, I do not believe so. I say that because we are now not the only party that is making these arguments. We have heard at the Committee today that the SDLP previously set out proposals; the Ulster Unionists has made warm soundings about the need for reform; and Sinn Féin is due to publish a paper. Cross-party consensus is building. Frankly, Chair, the case has been won. The question, now, is this: do we have a willingness to grasp the nettle and institute those reforms and changes? There is a real window of opportunity for us to do that over the next year.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Thank you very much, Mr Tennyson, for giving us your time — quite extensively — and for answering the questions. We much appreciate that.

Mr Tennyson: Thank you, Chair.

The Chairperson (Mr Buckley): Are members content to add the submission from Eóin Tennyson to the reform review evidence base?