Official Report: Minutes of Evidence

The Chairperson (Mr Frew): I inform members that the Assembly's Research and Information Service (RaISe) has produced a Bill paper on the Sentencing Bill that provides an overview of the Bill and a review of costs for the Bill that scrutinises key implications for the public purse of the Bill's provisions. The Committee is receiving a briefing from the research officers who produced those reports.

Providing evidence are Judith Bailie, Kathryn Barr and Nathan Mulholland. You are all welcome to the Committee. I invite you to make an opening statement.

Ms Judith Bailie (RaISe): Thank you, Chair, for the invitation to address the Committee this afternoon. Kathryn and I will talk to the Bill paper that we produced on the Sentencing Bill and then pass to Nathan, who will talk through the key financial considerations associated with it. We are conscious that the Committee has already had a busy session, so we will try to go through things as swiftly as we can.

Members will be aware that the Bill was published on 3 March and passed Second Stage on 16 March. It has eight Parts, 51 clauses and seven schedules covering the range of areas outlined on the current slide. The paper goes through each of those and provides an overview of the legislative change that the Bill would enact, as well as a comparison, where possible, with the current position in other parts of the United Kingdom and in the Republic of Ireland. In general terms, it is worth highlighting the point that sentencing law has continued to evolve and change in these jurisdictions in recent years. Whilst the Sentencing Bill covers the areas outlined here, the Department commenced a further review of sentencing in January 2026, with plans to look at the existing legislative framework governing good character evidence, serious sexual offences, drug-related offences and Harper's law, amongst other things.

I will set out a bit of context. Northern Ireland's legislative framework for sentencing is largely found in the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, within which is a range of sentencing options, including imprisonment, community orders, fines and discharges. There is a lot more detail on that in your packs, if you want more background. Judges decide sentences on the basis of applicable legislation alongside guidance issued through a combination of guideline judgements from the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal and sentencing guidance from the Lady Chief Justice's sentencing group, which was established in 2010.

On the judiciary's approach to determining sentencing in individual cases, judges have to balance a range of factors. The list is not exhaustive, but those factors can include things such as the seriousness of the offence, the harm caused to the victim and the offender's level of culpability, as well as any aggravating or mitigating factors specific to a case. That allows a judge to arrive at what is known as a "starting point" for the sentence, after which the application of a possible reduction in that figure for any guilty plea can be considered.

The content of the Bill follows on from a number of public consultations that have been conducted in recent years. They include the Department's sentencing policy review, Judge Marrinan's review of hate crime legislation and work on Charlotte's law.

Part 1 would introduce into statute a clear statement of the purposes and principles of sentencing for the first time in Northern Ireland. The court must have regard to those, and they are highlighted on the slide. During the sentencing policy review consultation, the "sparing use of punishment" as a principle was included as an option, but respondents were divided on that, and it is not included in the Bill. A reference to victims of crime has been included in the purposes of sentencing as a specific addition since the consultation.

Part 1 also provides that a court must follow any sentencing guidance that is relevant to an offender's case, unless satisfied that doing so would be contrary to the interests of justice. If the court does not follow relevant guidance, it must state its reasons. Similar purposes of sentencing are found in legislation in other parts of the UK, and there is much more detail on that in members' packs. The set-up is slightly different in other jurisdictions, where there has been a shift away from reliance on Court of Appeal judgements, with sentencing council models in England, Wales, Scotland and the Republic of Ireland. Those councils develop sentencing guidelines and monitor their use. As part of the new sentencing review, there are plans to further examine the proposal to provide the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland with a power to provide sentencing guidance of its own accord. That is not included in the Bill.

The clauses in Part 2 would create a new suspended sentence order for adult offenders that can specify one or more community requirements. A court would be able to include in a suspended sentence order requirements relating to activities, residence, curfews and electronic monitoring. The Bill would also create new unpaid work requirements in schedule 1. There is a lot more detail on the specifics of that in our paper, but the number of hours of unpaid work must be specified in an order and be between 40 and 240. That would be supervised by a responsible officer under the authority of the Probation Board (PBNI). A suspended sentence order is not to take effect unless an activation event occurs, so, at the point of sentencing, a court would be required to explain to an offender, in ordinary language, their liability if an activation event occurs. In that scenario, a court must order that a suspended sentence take effect with the original term unaltered, unless that would be unjust. A number of alternative options are open to the court, such as substituting a lesser term for the original term or imposing a fine.

Shortly, Nathan will talk about the Department's financial estimates for Part 2, and I know that the Probation Board for Northern Ireland will appear before the Committee in the coming weeks to provide more information on that.

Part 3 covers mandatory life sentences for adults. As members will be aware, life sentences are mandatory for murder, meaning that no release date will be given by a judge and that offenders will receive a tariff date, which is the earliest date on which they may become eligible to be considered for release by the Parole Commissioners on lifelong licence. The Bill places a duty on the court, when passing a life sentence, to state in open court its reasons for deciding on such a sentence and to explain the effect of the sentence to the offender.

At present, the starting points used by judges to determine a tariff are found in case law. Those were recalibrated in the 2024 Court of Appeal case of Whitla. The Bill reflects that and includes two starting points for adults: 15 years and 20 years. A court must state which of those starting dates it has chosen and give reasons for that or provide reasons for any departure from that. The Bill's starting point of 20 years for exceptionally serious cases would include a range of case types, such as the murder of a police officer or prison officer, the murder of two or more persons, a murder where the victim and the offender were "personally connected" under the meaning in the Domestic Abuse and Civil Proceedings Act (Northern Ireland) 2021 and the murder of a vulnerable person. The full list is in a table in members' packs.

Aggravating and mitigating factors that may be relevant in a murder case can currently be found in case law. If enacted, the Bill will make provision for those in legislation. Aggravating factors that may be relevant under the Bill include the use of a weapon; concealment or destruction of evidence; and the abuse of a position of trust. Mitigating factors include age, clear evidence of remorse and lack of premeditation. Placing those factors in legislation was not specifically consulted on as part of the sentencing review, but the Department added them to the Bill in an effort to aid public transparency, understanding and expectations of sentencing in murder cases. The Bill includes a regulation-making power to allow the Department to amend some of the provisions in this Part. Such regulations would be subject to the draft affirmative procedure.

Part 4 covers the unduly lenient sentence scheme. Members will be aware that, under existing legislation, the Director of Public Prosecution's (DPP) power to refer a case to the Court of Appeal for undue leniency applies to sentences imposed in the Crown Court for offences triable only on indictment. It also applies to certain hybrid offences that have been specified in a statutory rule made by the Department of Justice. A hybrid offence is one that is punishable on indictment in the Crown Court or on summary conviction in the Magistrates' Court. According to the Department, around two thirds of Crown Court sentences can be referred under existing provisions.

I asked the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) to provide data on the existing scheme. I received some information just recently, so it is not fully reflected in the paper. However, a quick look at the data on the referrals approved by the DPP shows that there are a very small number of them. I have included in the slide a few figures for the past five years to give a sense of that. By way of context, there are about 750 immediate Crown Court custodial sentences a year. The most recent figures available, which are for 2024, show that there were just over 1,700 case disposals through the Crown Court and nearly 29,000 through the Magistrates' Court.

The Bill would provide for a case to fall under the unduly lenient sentence scheme where an offender is convicted on indictment of an offence and sentenced in the Crown Court. That provision could also apply to an offender convicted on summary trial and sentenced for an offence specified in regulations made by the Department using the negative resolution procedure. Replicating existing provisions, the Bill sets out the circumstances in which a sentence may be deemed unduly lenient, which are that the judge:

or "failed to impose a sentence" that was required under certain statutory provisions. That is a high bar. The existing 28-day time limit for a referral to the Court of Appeal is included. The Bill also includes provision for the Court of Appeal to quash any sentence and pass a more appropriate sentence. The new sentence must be one that the court below had the power to pass when it dealt with the offender. The Bill creates, once a review by the Court of Appeal has concluded, a power for the director or the offender to whom the sentence relates to refer to the Supreme Court a point of law of "general public importance".

That was a quick overview of the main provisions of Part 4. Members may wish to seek an update on the Department's work on expanding the remit of the Magistrates' Court, given the impact that the Bill is likely to have on the unduly lenient sentence scheme.

Part 5 relates to cases in which an offender has been convicted of murder or manslaughter but the court does not know where the victim' s remains were disposed of. There are three stages to how it would work in practice. The first stage is sentencing, during which the court is required to pass a sentence that contains an additional custodial period to take account of the offender's non-disclosure, unless that would be contrary to the interests of justice. The additional custodial period must not be less than 30% of the custodial sentence or the minimum tariff, depending on the type of sentence imposed by the court.

The second stage is post sentencing. If an offender makes a relevant disclosure that is not rejected by the Department, the Bill would provide a calculation to determine a reduction in the additional custodial period. That could be up to a maximum of 50%. The calculation that is in the legislation is on the slide — it works — and I have included a worked example in the Committee pack. In the interests of time, I will not talk through it now, but it is there if you want to look in more detail at how the calculation operates. While it is likely to be relevant in only a small number of cases, members may want to consider whether further guidance or information should be provided to publicly explain the operation of the calculation. Part 5 contains a regulation-making power, using the draft affirmative procedure, that relates to relevant disclosures.

The third stage in this Part is parole. The Parole Commissioners would be required to obtain and consider information relating to a prisoner's non-disclosure when making a public protection decision.

I will cover Part 7, on road traffic offences, before I hand over to Kathryn to cover the statutory aggravators and the new offence of assault on a public worker.

Members will be aware that a broad range of driving offences can be found in the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1995. Serious road traffic offences include causing death or grievous bodily injury by dangerous driving or by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs. Those offences would be tried in the Crown Court, which would undertake an assessment of the defendant's culpability and the magnitude of the harm caused. The Bill would increase the maximum penalty for causing death or grievous bodily injury by dangerous driving from 14 years to 20 years. It would also increase the maximum penalty for causing death or grievous bodily injury by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs from 14 years to 20 years. It would increase the maximum penalty for someone causing death or grievous bodily injury by driving while disqualified from six months to 12 months when tried summarily and from two years to four years when tried on indictment. The Bill would provide for a maximum sentence of imprisonment for life for repeat offenders in cases in which an offender has a previous conviction for an offence of causing death or grievous bodily injury by dangerous driving or careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs. There are also a number of changes to the minimum disqualification period for repeat offences, as members can see on the slide.

I will finish there and hand over to Kathryn, who will talk about the statutory aggravators and the new offence of assaulting a public worker.

The Chairperson (Mr Frew): Thank you, Judith.

Ms Kathryn Barr (RaISe): Good afternoon, everyone. I am the research officer for equality and social justice, and I will take you through Part 6, which relates to particular persons or groups.

Following the review by Judge Marrinan of hate crime law, which reported in 2020, clauses 33 to 35 introduce a statutory aggravation model for hate crime. Currently, under legislation from 2004, there is an enhanced sentencing model, which means that, if an offender is found guilty of an existing crime such as assault, the hate element can be considered at the sentencing stage. In the existing model, an offender has to demonstrate hostility or be motivated by hostility towards a particular group. Currently, the law covers race, religion, sexual orientation and disability. There have been long-standing concerns that the enhanced sentencing models have been underused. In that context, Judge Marrinan recommended the adoption of a statutory aggravation model, which was accepted by the Department.

Clause 33 would keep the same four protected groups and the same two thresholds of demonstration or motivation and would create an aggravated offence. It would mean that an existing offence such as assault could be tried as assault aggravated by hostility. Clause 33(4) sets out how each group is defined and that it would capture those associated with a particular group, such as friends or family.

Clause 34 sets out the consequences of aggravation, including that the court must state on conviction that the offence is aggravated by hostility and that that is taken into account in the sentencing. The aggravation will also appear on the offender's criminal record. However, if the basic offence is proven but the aggravation is not, an individual can still be found guilty of the basic offence, such as assault. Notably, the Bill does not expand the grounds of protection for hate crime, and members may wish to consider that Judge Marrinan recommended the inclusion of sex/gender, including transgender identity, age and variations in sex characteristics, as well as the sectarian aggravator. Further detail can be found in members' packs.

In that context, clause 35 allows further protected groups to be added by regulation through the draft affirmative procedure. It is important to be clear that Judge Marrinan made recommendations on a wide range of issues relating to hate, and the Department has indicated that some of those issues will be addressed in the forthcoming victims and witnesses of crime Bill. Others will undergo further consultation, with the intention of introducing legislation in the next mandate.

Clause 36 introduces an aggravation by reason of vulnerability, which would operate in a similar way to the hostility aggravation. Currently, vulnerability is referred to in the sentencing guidelines but is not on a statutory basis. The vulnerability aggravator would apply where the victim was a vulnerable person and the offender knew or ought to have reasonably known that fact. A vulnerable person is defined as:

If the fact that the victim was a vulnerable person is an element of the offence — for example, child sexual abuse — the aggravation will not apply. Members may wish to consider the potential breadth of the definition, which might cover many victims of crime, including crimes where exploiting vulnerability was not a motivating factor. Members may also wish to consider how this aggravation will interact with other aggravations, such as the hostility aggravation and other issues, such as domestic abuse.

The third issue that Part 6 deals with is public workers. Clause 37 creates the new offence of assaulting a public worker or someone assisting a public worker. A public worker is defined as:

The work can be paid or unpaid. As was raised in the Second Stage debate, it is potentially quite a broad category. On summary conviction, an offender will be liable to imprisonment for up to12 months and/or a fine or both.

On conviction on indictment, imprisonment can be for a maximum of two years and/or there can be an unlimited fine. By comparison, for common assault, a Magistrates' Court can impose a sentence of six months, while, for a Crown Court, it is two years.

Clause 38 provides for statutory aggravation for an offence against a public worker that would operate largely similarly to the other two aggravations. Unlike the other two, however, it can be applied only to a limited list of basic offences, which include threats to kill, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and sexual assault. For offences outside that list, a court can consider the fact that the offence was committed against a public worker as an aggravating factor when it comes to sentencing.

The Bill will repeal existing assault offences against public workers, covering police, fire and rescue personnel and ambulance workers. Part 6 will commence on the order of the Department.

I hand over to Nathan, who will take you through the financial considerations.

Mr Nathan Mulholland (RaISe): Thank you, Kathryn. Good afternoon, Committee.

The review of costs paper considers the potential costs associated with the Criminal Justice (Sentencing etc) Bill. Sections 1 and 2 of the paper provide background information to and details of the Bill that Judith and Kathryn have already covered. In the interest of time, I will not repeat what has already been said and begin at section 3.

Section 3 of the paper notes that the Bill should be considered in the context of significant financial pressures across the justice system and wider public sector. Those pressures include rising pay and inflation costs, increasing demand for justice services and wider Executive-level funding constraints. Costs associated with the Bill should be considered within those wider public sector funding pressures.

Section 4 of the paper deals with potential public purse considerations of the Bill. The Department states, at paragraph 90 of the explanatory and financial memorandum (EFM):

Paragraph 91, however, continues:

Furthermore, paragraph 92 notes:

As stated in paragraph 91 of the EFM, some provisions will be subject to cost-benefit analysis. RaISe contacted the Department of Justice seeking further detail on which provisions that refers to.

Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of the paper detail the Department's response and other financial considerations. Section 4.2, which relates to general costs associated with the Bill, outlines that there are cross-cutting costs that affect multiple provisions, including IT system updates and training for justice agencies. The Department considers those to be manageable within existing resources. It notes that they would be considered normal line-of-business changes. However, those costs will still require a budget to be allocated to them and represent an opportunity cost, as that resource could have been used elsewhere.

Section 4.3 provides an overview of potential costs arising from individual Parts of the Bill. Part 2 relates to suspended sentences and community requirements. On the basis of the information received, the reform of suspended sentences with community requirements is the most significant cost pressure identified in the Bill. The Department recognises that the introduction of community requirements would require substantial additional capacity in the Probation Board for Northern Ireland. In its response, the Department stated:

The Department outlined that, with almost 4,000 suspended sentences imposed each year, that workload could double. Indicative costs range from approximately £3·1 million, if there was a 50% increase in the current workload based on suspended sentences, to a £6·25 million increase, if 100% of suspended sentences cases were referred for community requirement. Those costs should be considered to be recurring but are also subject to uncertainty as they depend on judicial use of the new powers. The Department noted that there would be additional set-up and enforcement costs that may further increase spending requirements. A figure for those costs has not been identified. With regard to managing the costs, the Department raised the possibility of a phased roll-out for particular types of cases initially. It also raised the potential for cost savings through the new sentencing arrangements being linked to a reduction in reoffending and consequent reduced prison costs.

Part 4 of the Bill is about unduly lenient sentencing. The paper explains that expanding the unduly lenient sentence referral scheme is expected to have relatively modest but ongoing financial implications. It notes that, while case numbers will be low, training will be required; there will be an increased workload for the Public Prosecution Service and courts; there will be a potential impact on prison numbers, although it is considered that that will be minimal; and there will be an estimated additional legal aid cost of around £200,000 per year. While the legal aid bill has been quantified, the other points noted will also have costs associated with them. For example, any resultant increase in sentence length would create cumulative prison costs over time. It is also assumed that, once the Bill comes into effect, some of the potential costs will occur annually.

Part 5 of the Bill relates to Charlotte's law. The paper concludes that the financial impact of Charlotte's law is likely to be limited, due to the very small number of relevant cases. However, any increase in custodial sentence length will carry a higher cost per prisoner over the length of a sentence, and the overall financial effects will depend on how the provisions influence offender behaviour. If they lead to the increased disclosure of information, for example, costs could reduce because of the reduced time that a prisoner will serve. Costs for the PSNI could also decrease, as it would not have to continue to investigate such cases.

Part 6 of the Bill looks at statutory aggravators. The paper explains that the introduction of statutory aggravators is expected to generate costs associated with IT updates and training, which have already been discussed in the general section of the paper. While individual sentence increases may be small, the paper highlights the point that the cumulative impact across multiple cases could become financially significant over time, particularly in the context of rising prison costs.

The offence of assaulting a public worker is also covered in Part 6. It is noted that the creation of a new offence is unlikely to increase the total number of convictions but may lead to slightly longer custodial sentences in some cases. Associated costs relate primarily to training and awareness and to lengthier custodial sentences. While it is anticipated that the additional periods will be relatively short, they will still have an additional cost. However, the Department has noted the possibility of minor savings in court processes if a proportion of those cases were to be prosecuted in the Magistrates' Court rather than the Crown Court, although the number remains uncertain.

Part 7 of the Bill looks at increased maximum penalties for driving offences. The Department considers that increased sentencing for serious driving offences will likely apply to a very small number of cases and will therefore have a limited immediate financial impact. However, as previously noted in the paper, even small increases in custodial time contribute to ongoing costs for the Prison Service.

Section 4.4 of the paper considers other potential costs relating to the Bill that have not been considered in the Department's response to RaISe. I will note some points for the Committee to consider, arising from the table in the paper.

Included in the community requirements are programmes for the treatment of mental conditions and drug and alcohol dependency. Possible increased numbers could have a financial impact on the Department of Justice and the Department of Health, if it is responsible for the delivery of such programmes. Secondly, the table notes that, although we have said that the Department considers the cost of the potential increase in sentence length in a number of parts of the Bill to be minimal, those costs could build up — the increases could range from a few months in some instances to a few years in others — and have a cumulative effect that should be considered.

I will finish with a point for the Committee to note on the use of secondary legislation. A number of provisions in the Bill will be amended through secondary legislation, which may introduce additional costs that have not yet been fully identified. The paper highlights the fact that the type of legislative procedure — whether affirmative or negative resolution — affects the level of Assembly scrutiny. Reliance on secondary legislation can limit the detailed scrutiny of policy and financial implications at the primary legislation stage, creating the possibility that elements of the financial impacts will become clear only after the secondary legislation comes into effect.

I will leave it there. I went through that a bit quickly, but I hope that that gives you plenty of time for questions.

The Chairperson (Mr Frew): Thank you.

Mr Kingston: Did you say something at the start about "good character" references?

Ms Bailie: That relates to the fact that the Department launched a further sentencing review in January 2026. Good character evidence is one of the things that fall within the review that the Department is undertaking.

Mr Kingston: It is not in the Bill.

Ms Bailie: No.

Mr Kingston: Right. We were discussing that earlier, but it is not expected to be added to this Bill.

Ms Bailie: No.

Mr Kingston: Right, OK. Thank you.

On life sentences, from what I can see, the 12-, 15- and 20-year terms are in the explanatory and financial memorandum but are not in the Bill at Part 3: is that correct? In part 7, on road traffic offences, the sentences are in the Bill. If I am correct, why is there that difference?

Ms Bailie: The starting points on life sentences are provided in the Bill. There are two starting points. There is 15 years, which would be for —.

Mr Kingston: Are those the existing sentences? Is the 15 years a reduction? Is the current life sentence 20 years? What is it?

Ms Bailie: Currently, the starting points are found in case law: the Whitla case that I referenced. That provides for a 15-year starting point for pretty much all cases that involve murder. There is then a 20-year starting point for exceptionally serious cases. The Bill reflects that.

Mr Kingston: So, 15 years and 20 years is pretty much current practice anyway, is it?

Ms Bailie: That is what is in the existing guideline judgement from the Court of Appeal. That is reflected in schedule A1, which would be inserted into the Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 2001 by schedule 3 to the Bill, where you have that exceptionally high starting point of 20 years. A number of relevant case types are listed; I think that I mentioned some of them. They include the murder of two or more persons; the murder of a police officer, prison officer or fire and rescue officer; and the murder of a vulnerable person. They all fall within the category that has the exceptionally high starting point. For all other cases that involve a mandatory life sentence for murder, the starting point is 15 years.

Mr Kingston: OK. I see it there. It is in the schedule.

Ms Bailie: Yes, it is in schedule 3 to the Bill.

Mr Kingston: Right, OK. It is not in the earlier part. Those terms of 15 years and 20 years are therefore not a change to current practice. It is just putting that in legislation.

Ms Bailie: Yes, that is my understanding of it. I suppose that it is intended to bring a bit more transparency to it.

Mr Kingston: OK.

Clause 33 deals with "Aggravation by hostility". You mentioned terms that are not in the Bill. What is the distinction between religious hostility and sectarian hostility? On my first reading, I thought that religious hostility would include sectarian hostility, but I see, in your paper, that the police list those as being different.

Ms Barr: Yes. The police statistics separate out sectarian hate crimes when they go through the court. I think that, most of the time, in practice, they fall under the definition of religious hostility. Concerns have been raised that some forms of sectarian hate crime might fall between the two stools of religion and race; say, if it is because somebody is wearing a sports top or some other symbol that might not be clearly linked to religion but, in our context, we understand what it means. Some people feel that that gap should be filled.

Mr Kingston: Would the religious category include non-Christian religions, or is it most likely to mean Protestant and Catholic?

Ms Barr: At the minute, because there is no separate sectarian aggravator, it would include those groups. If somebody from a different religion or no religion committed a crime against somebody because they are a Christian, that would also be included. It is symmetrical, if you like: every religious group is protected.

Mr Kingston: An offence can be aggravated by religious hostility. Would that apply if someone were attacked, in a Northern Ireland context, because they are Protestant or Catholic, or would it apply only if somebody is, say, Jewish, Hindu or Muslim?

Ms Barr: It would apply if somebody were attacked because of their religious background, whether Protestant, Catholic or anything else. That would clearly fall within the scope of that aggravator. The question that Judge Marrinan raised was around cases where, in our context, it relates more to community background. It captures cases that involve people who might never go to church but are seen as belonging to one community or another. My understanding is that, in practice, if such cases go to court, it is generally the religious aggravator that is applied.

Mr Kingston: Right, so, in practice, there will be an aggravator for what we see as sectarian motivation.

Ms Barr: Yes, but, as I say, there is a concern that it is not clear enough. I do not think that there is evidence that large numbers of sectarian crimes are going to court and facing those issues. That has not been raised, but Judge Marrinan felt that that could be clarified.

Mr Kingston: OK.

My next question is about the offence of assaults on public workers. Sorry, which clause is that?

Ms Barr: It is clauses 37 to 39.

Mr Kingston: Yes. Again, that is an aggravator of an existing offence. There has to be another offence such as:

A "threat of violence" is not there. If, at one end of the scale, someone makes a threat of violence against a public worker — somebody working in a shop, a bus driver or a police officer — would the aggravator apply, as things are worded?

Ms Barr: It does not seem to. I am not sure. It may depend on the exact circumstances of what has happened: whether a crime has been committed and what that crime is. The crime could fall under assault, and there is a separate offence relating to assault. If it does not fall into that list or into the new offence of assaults on public workers, clause 38(6) allows for the fact that the attack is on a public worker and for it still to be treated as a factor that increases the seriousness at sentencing stage. My understanding is that it is not an aggravation but can still be considered by the court in sentencing.

Mr Kingston: Right. A threat of violence offence is not listed at clause 38(3), but the list includes threats to kill. You could end up in a debate in which someone says, "Well, he didn't threaten to kill me but he threatened to punch me", or something like that. It should still apply as an aggravator in circumstances where there is a direct threat of violence, and you say that clause 38(6) might cover that.

Ms Barr: Yes. I am just not sure whether that threat of violence is covered by another law, so I do not want to assume. However, if it was illegal — if there was a criminal act — that could be considered at sentencing stage.

Mr Kingston: I will check that with the Department.

I have one last question, which is on costs. The EFM states:

My reading of the Bill is that, overall, there will be an increase in sentencing.

Mr Mulholland: That is a consideration that I have raised throughout. I give the figure of £57,000 per year per prisoner. There are bits about what that entails; there are building costs and stuff that are consumed within that. That was one of the last points that I made. Remember, from an economic point of view, those services are demand-led, so it will depend on the number of convictions and on implementation: for example, how many judges choose to use the power to put a community requirement on an individual. However, the point that I have been raising is that, if it is individuals who are already committing crime and their sentence is increased, there are costs to that. There are always costs to keeping somebody in prison for longer. No matter whether it is six months, a year or five years, there is a cost to that. Those costs have to be considered.

The Department has highlighted that there is a hope and expectation that, in certain cases, the community requirement will reduce reoffending and reduce the number of people re-entering the prison system. Therefore, there could be a reduction of costs there. Cost savings may develop from other elements of the Bill that I have highlighted. However, as it reads now, any person who is convicted could have their sentence increased, and I can see that being an additional cost to the service, whether or not it is offset later. Any offset or cost saving would be down-system, because it will take time for those savings, if they emerge, to come to the fore.

Mr Kingston: We all have a desire to see crime reduce and acknowledge the need for a reduction in sentencing, but I do not see any sentencing periods being reduced by the Bill. I am a bit concerned about how the Department can stand over its statement that the Bill will:

but we can challenge it on that.

The Chairperson (Mr Frew): OK. No other member has indicated that they would like to ask questions.

In the RaISe papers, there are blue boxes containing questions that we may wish to ask the Department. Are members content that we harvest all those questions from the RaISe papers and send them to the Department seeking answers? Some of the boxes are about exploring an issue further rather than asking specific questions of the Department, but are we content to ask the specific questions?

The Chairperson (Mr Frew): Thank you very much for your presentation and, of course, your research work, which will form the basis for our scrutiny of the Bill. Thank you very much for your efforts.