Official Report: Minutes of Evidence

The Chairperson (Mr Mathison): Joining us from the Assembly's Research and Information Service (RaISe) are Niamh Devlin, Glenn Williams and Nathan Mulholland. The panel will brief the Committee on its research paper, after which we will have time for questions and answers. Sincere apologies for keeping you waiting so long. We understand that this is an important first stage in the process of our scrutiny of the Education Inspections Bill. Over to you for your opening presentation.

Ms Niamh Devlin (RaISe): Thank you, Chair and members. It is good to see you all again. The purpose of today's presentation is to provide an overview of the Education Inspections Bill. We aim to get through the substantive material as quickly as possible. It will take around 15 to 20 minutes, because, although it is a relatively short Bill, there is much relevant background, contextual and comparative information in the paper, which the three of us will refer to at different points in the presentation.

I will cover the detail of the clauses in these opening remarks. I will commence with a summary of the research evidence on education inspection. I will then pass to Glenn, who will consider powers of entry and approaches to the obstruction of school inspection in other jurisdictions. Nathan will close with a consideration of the Bill's potential public purse implications.

I will start with the broader literature on the purpose and effect of education inspection. The OECD and other sources identify school inspection as a main feature of external quality monitoring and the broader school accountability system, alongside measures such as performance data and school self-evaluation. The Northern Ireland Audit Office and the independent review of education have highlighted school inspection as a central mechanism for the accountability and quality assurance of Northern Ireland's education system. The research literature suggests that inspection can enable enhanced processes in schools, such as increased reflection on quality and improvement and the development of school self-evaluation. Some studies suggest that inspection can influence teacher leadership and organisational practice. In some cases, evidence suggests that inspection can contribute to improved pupil outcomes, but there is mixed evidence of those effects. UNICEF and other research studies note that the effectiveness and impact of school inspection is influenced by characteristics such as inspection design, follow-up support, inspector credibility and schools' capacity to implement improvement.

Moving to the Bill, I will recap the purpose of clause 1, which is to extend the definition of a "relevant establishment" that must be open to inspection at all reasonable times to include additional education-providing institutions that are:

Inspection will be progressed only with the consent of the responsible Department. Currently, grant-aided and independent schools, FE colleges and other institutions managed and maintained by the Education Authority fall under article 102(2) of the Education and Libraries (Northern Ireland) Order 1986. As the Committee is aware, the Education and Training Inspectorate (ETI) is commissioned by Departments other than DE to undertake inspection services at institutions outside the Education Orders, including on behalf of DFE and DAERA. Arrangements are governed by a memorandum of understanding and service level agreements between ETI and the respective Departments. We sought information from DE to gain insight into the clause's potential implication for process and resource. DE clarified that inspection activity on behalf of DFE and DAERA is not currently undertaken on a fixed cyclical basis, and that clause 1 would not have any implication on the regularity of inspection activity undertaken on behalf of those Departments. In correspondence, DE noted:

Nathan will consider the potential public purse implications of that clause a little later.

Clause 2 seeks to repeal article 102(7) of the Order, which currently exempts religious education from ETI inspection, unless boards of governors give approval. You will be aware of the background to that clause, specifically the Supreme Court judgement in November 2025, which reinstated the original High Court declaration of July 2022 that the teaching of religious education under the core primary syllabus and the arrangements for collective worship breached certain rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights. In its judgement, the Supreme Court highlighted the absence of structured inspection of RE by the Department of Education, noting that the Department, therefore, had no information on how religious education was being delivered in schools. The absence of inspection was considered in the court's assessment of whether there had been a breach of the applicant's rights. The Bill's explanatory and financial memorandum (EFM) notes that clause 2 has not been consulted on because it would implement the findings of the court. Our paper includes further considerations relevant to that provision, including potential scrutiny points around the intended scope, format and reporting of the proposed inspection of RE, and where that might sit relative to the new inspection framework. It also highlights potential areas for scrutiny regarding how ETI's inspection of RE would operate alongside article 21 of the 1986 Order. To recap, article 21 places statutory duties on grant-aided schools to provide religious education and daily collective worship and contains provisions relating to the inspection of religious education. Article 21(3) states that RE and collective worship in controlled integrated, grant-maintained integrated and voluntary schools shall be:

Article 21(7) enables access by:

to deliver, inspect and examine religious education. The Education Inspections Bill does not make reference to those particular provisions under article 21, or to how they may operate alongside a new power for ETI to inspect RE in grant-aided schools. Our paper contains potential scrutiny points for the Department to clarify any potential interplay between those different articles of the 1986 Order.

As you will be aware, clause 3 seeks to establish explicit statutory powers for inspectors and associated personnel when conducting inspections. Inspectors would have:

for the purpose of enabling access to premises, obtaining related documentation and observing teaching and/or other activities or facilities. Clause 3 makes it clear that the powers that would be conferred on inspectors would not permit the use of force or affect when establishments are to be open for inspection. Our paper includes potential scrutiny points for the Department, including clarification on some of the terms used in the Bill. For instance, what is the intended meaning of the phrase "to take all reasonable steps" in conducting, or in connection with, an inspection? Will guidance or criteria be provided to designated officials to ensure consistent interpretation?

Clause 3 also seeks to define the intentional obstruction of inspections or failure to cooperate with inspectors as "unacceptable professional conduct" related to potential disciplinary measures. In order to place the clause into context, we sought information from the Department on the extent to which action short of strike has impacted on inspection activity over the past 10 years. Data shared with us was consistent with reporting by the Audit Office earlier this year, which highlighted that only 13 primary and no post-primary schools received a full inspection between 2018 and 2023, and that 80% of inspections between 2016-17 and 2019-2020 were affected in some way by action short of strike. The information provided also highlighted implications for schools that needed additional support through the formal intervention process, and that action short of strike had an impact on the mechanisms used to assess safeguarding arrangements. Our paper further explores some of those implications.

The "unacceptable professional conduct" will be subject to the disciplinary framework established by schedule 1A to the Education (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, which, as you are aware, is a new schedule to be established by the General Teaching Council Bill. Schedule 1A would give the Department the power to make regulations authorising the General Teaching Council (GTC) to impose disciplinary orders where a teacher is found:

or a relevant criminal offence. Disciplinary orders include a reprimand; a conditional registration order, which appears to relate to competence; a suspension order, which may last for up to two years; and a prohibition order, where a teacher must be removed from the register for at least two years, or longer if specified in the Order. The Bill does not provide detail on which of the potential disciplinary orders is intended to be used where a teacher is found guilty of "unacceptable professional conduct" as defined by the Education Inspections Bill. It is not clear whether there will be a singular consistent sanction applied for "unacceptable professional conduct" or a graduated response dependent on the type of conduct. Our paper provides potential scrutiny points on those matters, and on what action might constitute intentional obstruction or non-cooperation with an inspection.

You might recall that, during Committee scrutiny of the General Teaching Council Bill, the Department advised that the proposed regulations would provide the disciplinary framework within which GTC must work when developing its own detailed internal processes. Our paper includes a potential scrutiny point about the process that may be followed where an allegation of unacceptable professional conduct is made against a teacher, with questions such as who would be responsible for reporting an allegation; what notice would be served on a teacher and by whom and when; what the investigatory process would entail; and what the associated timescales would be.

Article 102D, which is proposed to be inserted into the 1986 Order by clause 3, states:

That article refers to regulation that enables GTC to remove teachers from the register if they are found guilty of misconduct. As you will recall, under the 2015 regulations, GTC statutory power is currently limited to removal from the register. Our paper includes potential scrutiny points on that, including whether the Department has considered an alternative disciplinary framework to cover scenarios where the commencement of schedule 1A is delayed or otherwise impeded. We included a further potential scrutiny point to clarify whether, until such times as the regulations under schedule 1 come into effect, the only potential consequence for "unacceptable professional conduct" under the Bill is removal from the register.

I will now pass to Glenn, who will cover powers of entry and the consequences for obstruction of inspection elsewhere.

Mr Glenn Williams (RaISe): Thank you, Niamh. As mentioned, the Education Inspections Bill would introduce new statutory provisions relating to inspection powers and conduct that may impede inspections. To provide context, our paper compares legislative approaches adopted in other jurisdictions: the examples are primarily England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland, but we also give some international examples. Particular consideration is given, first, to obstruction of inspections, and, secondly, to an inspector's powers of entry and access to information. The comparisons are intended to illustrate the extent to which the provisions in the Bill align with existing legislative models.

I turn first to obstruction of inspections. Several jurisdictions — notably England, Wales, Ireland and Scotland — have introduced statutory provisions relating specifically to obstruction of inspections. In England and Wales, the Education Act 2005 makes it an offence to intentionally obstruct an inspector, and a person guilty of that offence is liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £2,500. Similarly, the Education (Scotland) Act 2025 makes it an offence to intentionally obstruct an inspector, and a person guilty of that offence is liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £2,500. In Ireland, the Education Act, 1998 makes it an offence to obstruct an inspector, and a person guilty of that offence is liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding €5,000 or, on conviction of indictment, to a fine not exceeding €100,000.

Outside the UK and Ireland, two states in Australia, namely New South Wales and Western Australia, legislate specifically for obstructing school inspection, with fines of AU$550 and AU$2,000 respectively. Such legislation also exists in Malaysia, Samoa and Uganda. While those jurisdictions provide for explicit offences and sanctions where an inspector is obstructed, that is not necessarily the dominant international approach. In other education systems — the paper gives the examples of Singapore, Sweden and the Netherlands — legislation grants inspectors broad powers to enter schools, access information and conduct evaluations but does not establish a specific offence and penalty for obstructing an inspection.

It is clear, then, that the Bill is aligned with similar legislation in the rest of the UK and Ireland but that there are key differences, as Niamh touched upon. Article 102C sets out three forms of conduct: first, directly impeding or obstructing an inspection; secondly, failing to cooperate with the intention of hindering or preventing an inspection; and thirdly, encouraging another person to act or refrain from acting in a manner intended to hinder or prevent an inspection. That third form — encouragement of another — does not appear in any comparator legislation that we reviewed.

There is also a difference in the nature of the sanction. As I mentioned, England, Wales and Scotland have a typical fine of £2,500, and the Republic of Ireland fine is slightly higher. They are directly specified fines. In contrast, the Bill does not create an offence. Instead, it provides that the conduct constitutes "unacceptable professional conduct", and refers to "disciplinary powers" that may be conferred on GTC through regulations that are yet to come into operation. Niamh went over what some of those may be. As Niamh also covered, the Bill provides, under new article 102D(4), that, until those powers are conferred, it is to be read under the Education (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, which states that the provision can be made on the removal of entries from the register where circumstances are deemed to be important enough.

I will look now at the inspector's powers of entry and right to access information and compare with other jurisdictions. In Ireland, the Education Act, 1998 does not specifically mention a right of entry but does provide inspectors with:

In England and Wales, the Education Act 2005 provides a right of entry to school premises at "all reasonable times" for the purposes of inspections and also provides the right to inspect, and take copies of, documents that are considered to be relevant to the inspection. The Education (Scotland) Act 2025 states, similarly to the legislation in England and Wales, that the power to enter an educational establishment:

It goes on to state explicitly that it:

and that the inspector —

Section 53 of that Scottish Act places specific obligations on the managers of the educational establishment to facilitate the inspection, which includes making documents available; permitting copies to be taken; securing access to locations where education is provided; and providing inspectors with such assistance and cooperation as they reasonably require. The Act also creates a specific offence:

In broad terms, the Bill reflects the same underlying approach that is found in England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland, in that inspectors are provided with statutory powers to carry out inspections. The Bill provides, under new article 102B, that designated officials take "all reasonable steps", which is similar to the language that is used in those other pieces of legislation, in conducting an inspection, including assessing premises, although specifically not by use of force; obtaining information and documents; and observing or assessing teaching and other activities. Of the jurisdictions that we have reviewed, that approach is arguably most similar to that of the Education (Scotland) Act 2025, which explicitly prohibits entry by force and also includes a separate provision for obstruction and failure to comply with inspection-related duties. Unlike the Scottish legislation, however, the Bill does not contain an explicit defence of "reasonable excuse" for failure to comply with inspection-related duties.

In summary, the Bill is broadly consistent with approaches that have been adopted elsewhere in the UK and Ireland in providing inspectors with statutory powers and addressing conduct that may impede inspections. The principal differences relate to the use of professional disciplinary sanctions, rather than financial penalties, and the broader range of conduct that would be captured by new article 102C.

Over to Nathan.

Mr Nathan Mulholland (RaISe): Thank you, Glenn. Good afternoon, Committee. I will be as concise as possible, as I know that it has been a long session.

Our paper provides a review of costs that examines the potential public purse implications of the Bill. Before I turn to those potential costs, I point out that the paper also provides some context-setting information with regard to the public finance environment. It highlights pressures such as departmental funding gaps, inflation and competing public spending. Any of the potential financial impacts should be considered within that context. We have detailed the Department's position as set out in the accompanying explanatory and financial memorandum. The EFM states:

However, our paper identifies that costs could arise through implementation, training requirements, increased inspection activity and disciplinary processes. The first area of potential cost that we considered is the extension of inspection powers. Clause 1 broadens the definition of establishments that may be inspected by ETI. The Department advised that inspections that are currently conducted on behalf of Departments, such as DFE and DAERA, are already undertaken through existing arrangements and memoranda of understanding. The Department further advised that the Bill would not, in itself, alter the regularity of those inspections. However, it also confirmed that the new provisions could bring additional education-providing settings within inspection frameworks in the future. As a result, there are questions as to whether the number of inspections that are undertaken by ETI could increase over time and whether additional inspector resources may be required should that occur. To explore the issue, RaISe sought information on current ETI staffing levels. The Department advised that, as of August 2026, ETI had approximately 45 full-time equivalent staff, including inspectors and staff at senior management grades. That is relevant when viewed alongside the findings of a Northern Ireland Audit Office report that was published in April 2026. It stated:

full-time-equivalent —

and estimated that rebuilding inspection capacity could require approximately £8·2 million annually. The Department also highlighted the use of associate assessors and Interchange inspectors as additional sources of inspection capacity. However, the extent to which those arrangements could support any future increase in inspection workload is not clear from the available information.

The next area considered in our paper is RE inspection. Clause 2 removes the requirement for a board of governors to approve the inspection of religious education in schools. The policy intent is to allow RE to be evaluated in the same manner as all other curriculum subjects and, therefore, to support a more consistent inspection framework. While that provision does not create direct financial obligations, the paper notes that questions may arise regarding inspector training. If inspectors require additional training or guidance to undertake RE evaluation consistently, implementation costs could arise. It is not clear whether current inspector training arrangements provide coverage of RE inspections for all inspectors.

The next area considered in our paper is the liability of teachers to disciplinary measures. Clause 3 creates new forms of "unacceptable professional conduct" where a teacher intentionally obstructs, impedes or fails to cooperate with an inspection. It also covers circumstances where individuals encourage someone to hinder inspection activity. The disciplinary framework for dealing with such cases is expected to sit within the future arrangements of the General Teaching Council for Northern Ireland, subject to the passage and commencement of the separate General Teaching Council Bill. The paper considers the cost estimates that have already been developed as part of departmental business planning for the GTCNI framework. Those costs were identified in the RaISe briefing that accompanied the General Teaching Council Bill, and we provide a summary in this paper. The previous paper identified approximate costs for investigation panels, appeals panels, High Court appeals and additional annual costs. The estimated costs were based on there being about 15 cases per year. Those figures are not specific to the offences that the Education Inspection Bill creates, but they provide an indication of the scale of the costs that may arise if disciplinary cases increase under the inspection framework proposed by the Education Inspection Bill.

Finally, we consider administration and implementation costs. The paper notes that there may be costs associated with updating guidance, revising documentation, amending IT systems and undertaking awareness activities. The level of such activity that may accompany the Bill once it is enacted is unknown at present. In looking at previous Bills, we have picked up on the fact that Departments may choose to undertake such activity, but we are unaware at present of any activity that the Department of Education will undertake. The types of costs that are often associated with legislative implementation are generally treated as day-to-day departmental business activity and therefore subsumed into business plans that have already been agreed.

I am happy to take any questions from the Committee on that section of the paper.

The Chairperson (Mr Mathison): Thank you, all. The paper is excellent and really helps us to understand what will be the key areas of the Bill for our scrutiny. For a Bill of three clauses, there is a lot going on, and it interacts with another Bill in quite specific ways, which is likely to create some issues. There is also more going on in respect of the 1986 Order than just repealing that section.

My questions will, hopefully, be quick. I am minded to adopt all of the scrutiny points that you set out. You specifically highlighted RE inspections. Article 21(3) of the 1986 Order provides that, in controlled integrated schools, grant-maintained integrated schools and voluntary schools, RE and collective worship can:

Article 21(7) enables:

to inspect and examine RE. I have a concern that, by repealing just that one element of the 1986 Order, the Department would create legal uncertainty rather than certainty, because other provisions on what can be done with the inspection regime are in the mix. Is that a fair analysis? You have certainly highlighted the area as needing more scrutiny.

Ms Devlin: It is reasonable to say that there is a lack of clarity in the publicly available information on what inspection actually looks like under those particular provisions, whether it is undertaken, who it is undertaken by and the type of inspection framework that might be employed. In the Supreme Court's assessment of the application for judicial review by JR87, it made some observations on those provisions. It highlighted that article 21(3) extends to, as you said, grant-maintained integrated schools, controlled integrated and voluntary schools and that Catholic maintained schools fall within the definition of "voluntary schools" under article 2(2) of the 1986 Order. It highlighted the fact that controlled schools do not fall within the scope of that. It can be seen from that that the boards of governors of controlled schools do not have the facility to determine the arrangements for inspection of religion as other grant-aided schools have under that provision. In its assessment, the Supreme Court also highlighted the lack of clarity on terminology in article 21(7). It stated:

It further stated that it is not clear what might constitute objection by parents to those individuals. In considering it in the round, it is evident that there are some gaps in what legislative provision may look like and what the interface may be.

The Chairperson (Mr Mathison): Essentially, depending on the school type, there could be two competing inspection regimes at play if the Bill goes forward. I certainly would like to consider in more detail whether there is a need for any amendments to address some of that. It will be appropriate to hear the Department articulate its position.

So that I am completely clear, is it your understanding that, if the Bill goes forward, and if we do not see the provisions of the GTC Bill enacted — we do not know when or if it will move to Consideration Stage — there would be only one measure by which to penalise a teacher for "unacceptable professional conduct": removal from the register?

Mr Williams: Yes, that is a possible punishment. Article 36(3)(f)(iii) of the Education (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 does not explicitly say that that is the only thing that you can do; it says that provision can be made for those sorts of things. I hesitate to say, "Definitely. Yes, that is what is going to happen".

The Chairperson (Mr Mathison): It is certainly not a clear picture. Would it be advisable for the Committee to get legal advice on how the Bill interacts with the GTC Bill, given that, if this becomes law before the GTC Bill, we could be left in a trickier position?

Mr Williams: Yes, absolutely.

The Chairperson (Mr Mathison): We can perhaps take that forward. That is helpful.

Which resolution will the regulations that will be inserted as part of the GTC regulations be subject to: negative or affirmative?

Ms Devlin: Negative resolution.

The Chairperson (Mr Mathison): OK. Is it fair to say that they will not have the highest level of scrutiny attached to them should they go forward?

Ms Devlin: What it is reasonable to say is that, when providing evidence on the GTC Bill, the Department made it clear that the regulations will provide the broad disciplinary framework and that GTC will, essentially, have the scope to define those detailed processes. Those processes are not subject to Assembly procedures.

The Chairperson (Mr Mathison): That is helpful. Do any other members have questions?

Mr Sheehan: Most of the areas that I was concerned about have been clarified. On the sequencing, given the interconnectedness of these two Bills, would it be preferable if the GTC Bill was passed first, or does it not really matter?

Ms Devlin: In order to define what the disciplinary orders may be: yes, as regards sequencing, it would be preferable for that Bill to pass first. The regulations in schedule 1A cannot come into force until the GTC Bill has passed.

Mr Williams: Although the Department stated that, until such time that the GTC Bill passes, this is the stopgap, effectively. It would be helpful, but it should not impede the function of what is happening, if that makes sense.

Mr Sheehan: Thanks for that.

The Chairperson (Mr Mathison): We will need to pick up that theme. Do any other members want to come in? No. OK. Those are all the questions. You are free to go. Thank you for your time and for a really helpful report.