Official Report: Minutes of Evidence

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I welcome to the meeting Rory Miskelly, who is the stadium programme director; and Andrew Dadley, who is the stadium programme architectural programme adviser. Members have already registered relevant financial or other interests. Rory and Andrew, are there any —

Mr Rory Miskelly (Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure): Yes, I will cover that in my opening remarks, if that is OK.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): OK. If you want to proceed and make your opening statement, that would be fine.

Mr Miskelly: Thank you, Chair and members of the Committee, for inviting me to attend the Committee. I appreciate that it has been a long day. I believe that I have a lot of pertinent points, so bear with me. I welcome the opportunity to further discuss the important matters that have been raised in relation to Casement Park. I am the programme director for the regional stadia programme. Before I start, I would like to point out for the record that I was previously employed by the Irish Rugby Football Union (IRFU) as part of its redevelopment project on the programme. I was a project sponsor employed by IRFU from March 2012 to July 2013 when I left to do other matters. I note that only because Ravenhill forms part of the wider programme. I appreciate that, today, the focus is on Casement. However, in the interests of clarity, it is important to note that.

With regard to my role and responsibility, I was initially appointed as an interim stadium programme director in February to give temporary part-time support to the Department, and to the existing programme manager and the stadia team, and that moved into a full-time position in August of 2014.

I graduated from the University of Ulster with an honours degree in quantity surveying in 1993. I achieved my full corporate membership of the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) in 1997, and obtained a full membership of the Chartered Institute of Building (CIOB) in 1998, all while working for a large multinational contractor. I remain, and have been since, a fully qualified full corporate member of both professional bodies, in the programme and project management specialism faculties of each organisation. I have a family background in construction, which helped to form my formative years and supported my education through local colleges, FE and other vocational night classes for additional qualifications, so I am well versed in the realities of construction on all fronts.

I have nearly 25 years' experience of working in the local construction sector, including a spell in the UK, both in the contracting and consultancy sides of the industry. For the past 15 years or so, I have delivered purely project and programme management duties on a range of commissions involving high-value complex projects, on a project and on a programme basis. Once a year I provide a service to Queen's University Belfast as a guest lecturer, where I give a day's talk to the senior architecture students in their part 3 exams on risk and risk management, and the practical application of these techniques in programme and project management skills as part of their final preparation. I have worked on design-and-build contracts for circa 20 years as a practitioner, both as a client side adviser, an administrator of the contracts themselves and on the contracting side of the industry. I have not only a working knowledge but demonstrable evidence of delivering projects under design-and-build contracts.

Recent projects that I was responsible for include the Kingspan stadium for the period up to July 2013 and, prior to that, Titanic Belfast, on which, from 2008 to 2012, I led the independent technical advisory team, which did the early due diligence work on the project and was responsible for developing and establishing the building contract. The final report of my team, led by myself in the pre-contract era, was the basis of the final Executive approval for the investment decision, prior to the award of the building contract. I then moved and acted as the sole named project manager for the building contract, so I was responsible for the administration of the £73 million New Engineers Contract (NEC3), option A design-and-build contract. As part of that, I led a team of multi-disciplinary professionals, who supported me. I note that, to date, my experience of design-and-build has been successful delivery: all opened and all statutory-compliant. I acknowledge, for the Committee, that it is a technical arena, but that is what I am hoping to shed some light on today.

I say all that in the context of my background in the process of design development, the assessment of designs, the implementation on site, and all associated financial risk and technical matters. Titanic certainly involved complex stakeholder management skills, including, for example, engagement with the PSNI, counter-terrorism security advisors etc, due to the high profile nature of the project.

I am joined today by my colleague, Andrew Dadley. Andrew is a chartered architect and member of the Association of Project Management. He has been acting as the architectural programme advisor to the Department since October 2014. His main activities, aside from supporting me today, are to help to manage, coordinate, monitor and advise on the delivery of some technical aspects of the stadium programmes, working for the governing bodies, development officers and other colleagues in the Department. His primary focus is ensuring that technical aspects of projects conform with departmental, statutory and legislative requirements, as well as advising on social procurement issues, sustainability clauses and regulatory guidance. Andrew's experience will speak for itself, but a sample includes his role in the Maze/Long Kesh Development Corporation as a senior project manager, McAdam Design and private practice, whose projects include the Bangor Olympic leisure centre pool, North West Regional College, Conway Mill refurbishment, Liverpool University Hospital —

Mr B McCrea: Thank goodness there are only two of you.

Mr Miskelly: Sorry?

Mr B McCrea: Thank goodness there are only two of you. We are very impressed. We have got your technical —

Mr Miskelly: Well, that was the end of it — and the Belfast City Hospital cancer centre at £60 million.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I know that we are impressed, but just let them continue.

Mr Miskelly: I say that because the common thread here is technically complex projects in a multi-stakeholder environment, a large number of which were delivered under a comparable contractual framework, which, as we will later see, has been aligned for a number of years to the best practice advice of Central Procurement Directorate (CPD).

Moving on from our background as individuals, I will reaffirm that the stadium programme is a Programme for Government commitment designed to bring social and economic benefits; it has already delivered the Kingspan Stadium project very well for Ulster Rugby. Construction work at Windsor Park for the IFA is moving very well. Members will be very well aware that all focus is on the interim arrangements for the housing of the international fixture on 13 June. That leaves the Casement Park project. It is a large capital project under the programme that offers a key opportunity to create a stadium that not only meets the objectives and strategic needs of the GAA, but makes a positive difference to the lives of people in west Belfast and beyond, providing economic and social benefits to everyone.

The Department's approach to Casement Park has been consistent across the programme, with the same necessary checks and balances built into the process. This will start off at the outline business case (OBC) stage, the legal agreements, the checks that will underpin grant aid, through the various planning, contract selection, tendering, detailed design, delivery and ultimate licensing and operational readiness stages.

At OBC stage, I welcomed the fact that site restrictions were acknowledged and that Sport NI's input was involved in consideration of the site. Indeed, this would help to underpin the development through the subsequent process in the OBC. Whilst it noted the site challenges, the risks did not appear to be disproportionate or reflect the site as not capable of being developed in order to deliver the regional stadia location. Indeed, the justification and subsequent internal processes and approvals of the OBC underpin and give us the confidence that it was right to take it forward.

The planning process itself and all the work leading up to the submission in June 2013 are well evidenced. The work of the safety technical group (STG), again, as of this date, does not present a picture of serious issues. For clarity, I can speak only on my involvement in the programme during my time. After that, I am speaking from a factual position from what the evidence in the Department's files and correspondence reflects. That is just for absolute clarity.

The conditions of contract for the NEC option A building contract with the design-and-build contract itself is a calculated apportionment of risk transfer, again to an experienced contractor, which, again, provides a further level of assurance. A number of measures are built in. We will talk in detail about how construction work cannot start and significant public money be drawn down until the checks and balances have been addressed. Under this programme, ultimate responsibility for the delivery of a compliant stadium rests with the delivery of an expert design-and-build contractor.

Previous members of DCAL have made the Department's position absolutely clear on this issue in respect of DCAL as being absolutely committed to developing and delivering a new stadium in compliance with health and safety requirements. I have noted before that the redevelopment of Casement Park cannot and will not open without a valid and compliant safety certificate process, which has been noted as separate from the planning consent.

I will just make a very short note to acknowledge that, as the Committee is aware, the Minister has instigated a number of independent investigations into the allegations raised by the chair of the STG on 30 April. This investigation into whistle-blowing is being carried out by DFP.

The Minister has also instigated a project assessment review (PAR) by the Cabinet Office. This is under way, indeed with a briefing day having already been held with the panel on Tuesday of this week. The Minister has made it clear from the outset that the output of the PAR shall be made public. I personally welcome this technical review, and we have been putting a lot of resource into servicing it. I think that it will serve the project, the programme and the Committee well. I look forward to the forthcoming engagement with it.

In that context, it is important that my evidence today in no way prejudices the independent investigation into whistle-blowing, in respect of technical matters on my watch or contained in the files. I certainly aim to share as much as feasibly possible, but I will be cautious about straying into areas or speculating on reasons for behaviours, views, etc, that were before my time. I hope that members will understand that in the light of the ongoing whistle-blowing allegation.

I also note that, in the not too distant future, it is the intention of the GAA to submit a further planning application. Again, I will be cautious about anything that could prejudice any forthcoming application.

In my role as a programme director, I am responsible for leading and overseeing the delivery of the regional stadia programme and supporting the SRO, Cynthia Smith, in her role. Integral to this is the development of strategies, structures and policies that will help the efficient delivery of the three stadium projects under the programme within the various constraints of time, cost and quality. I am aided in my role by the programme support team: programme manager, Angela Fitzpatrick; Andrew Dadley, the programme architect and my colleague here whose specialist knowledge we have noted earlier; and a team of programme delivery staff who have a proven track record in the project management of capital projects and, for some of them, specific experience in a range of issues, including governance, finance and legal matters. Some staff, indeed, came from Sport NI under the original transfer of staff to the Department.

As previously noted, under governance structures, the development of any major capital programme is a process. A capital development process involves a series of key people: the organisation commissioning the project, funders, local people, users, economists, technical advisers, legal planners, etc. There is a raft of people who need to contribute to the project. The programme SROs previously noted the principles for managing successful programmes and how the programme has been structured. The governance structures reflect that from the stadium programme sponsor board, the departmental programme board, the project boards for each of the three stadium projects and the steering groups below that.

I fully understand that, on the face of it, it is complex. Any diagrammatic structures that we can share to help with that, we certainly will. I should note that we are due to return a further bundle of information for 8 June. We intend to have that bundle before then. It is unfortunate that we could not get it today. A number of consultations, etc, were required to be done. It is well progressed. I can assure you that, as I go through this, I have a very strong interest in making the Committee well aware of the evidence-based approach to what I am saying.

The agreed programme structure itself was formalised through each project under the programme in respect of memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and legal agreements. The MOU provides clarity with regard to the organisation's structures, roles and responsibilities, and the terms of reference were formalised for each of the programme and project boards. The sponsor board, which we spoke about before, is chaired by the Minister with representation from the three governing bodies, the SRO, the investment decision-maker (IDM), the project director and Sport NI at those meetings. The departmental stadium board, which is chaired by the SRO, includes me as programme director and director of corporate services, my programme manager and other project team members.

Under the three projects, the core aspects include the project steering group, which, again, is aligned to the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) best practice language. It is chaired by a project sponsor. It consists of representatives from key stakeholders and design team members. The purpose of the group is to review, monitor and make representations to the project board in respect of the contractual and technical aspects of the project.

The steering group is really there to support the project sponsor in his day-to-day activities and to agree what goes up the line to project board level.

The project board itself is chaired by the project SRO, and the board provides overall direction and management of the project within the boundaries of the project mandate; that is, under the MOU. The board is accountable for the success of the project with separate investment decision-makers. It is responsible for the overall progress of the project and for it being delivered in the timescale agreed.

I want to make a few pertinent bullet points around the step-through process. I believe that some of this has already been covered. I spoke about the governance structures in place and, originally, about the NEC option A contract — we will come back to it — which is a design-and-build contract on the basis of a fixed-price lump sum. It has the ability to vary, but it is a design-and-build contract for a fixed-price sum. That model of contract selection strategy — again, endorsed by CPD — aligns very well to the preferred route over the past number of years, and, indeed, the final contract selection strategy would have been endorsed by CPD. Therefore I am glad to be sitting in a position as part of another NEC option A design-and-build contract, not only because of the endorsement but because of its proven track record.

On the team itself, the GAA was responsible, with input from the Department and CPD, for the procurement of experts on the consultancy and construction sides. I will come back to that very briefly. DCAL itself built up a dedicated team in the Department with various technical expertise in order to respond to that Programme for Government (PFG) priority. That included programme directors — I and my predecessor —who had success in and experience of delivering large-scale capital construction.

The Department put in place various checks and balances and gates, beyond which the project could not proceed until they were cleared. Those were at various stages: planning; full business case (FBC) approvals; funding agreement; execution of the building contract; construction notice; and so on. Those were relatively straightforward. Thus, the Department protected and built in gates at every point. For Casement, the step-through process and the approval process included obtaining the planning permission; approving FBC; executing the funding agreement; and having an OGC gateway review at investment-decision level, which is paramount. Only then did the Department move to appointing a contractor.

Members will have previously noted the separation in the planning statutory process and the subsequent safety certification by the local council.

It is important to touch on the issue of the building contract, because it will come up later. The contract essentially contains two distinct phases. You have a pre-construction phase, or, as it is sometimes called, a development phase, where the original employer's requirements are worked up in detail by the contractor. Only when various gates are passed do you move into the full construction phase. It is important to note that we are, and always have been, in the pre-construction phase of Casement Park, with ongoing work still to be completed. The trigger for moving from one phase to the other is the construction notice itself. That is issued by the project manager, who is responsible for administering the building contract. That person is an external consultant of a very large, multinational firm that is experienced in contract administration and construction.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): My apologies for interrupting you. Who is the project manager? Who is this person whom you are talking about?

Mr Miskelly: The named individual is Mark Gilluley from a company called Mott MacDonald.

Sorry, let me clarify. The lead organisation for the client-side consultancy team is Mott MacDonald. A subconsultant of its is Gardiner and Theobald (G&T), and Mark Gilluley is a G&T employee. It is not uncommon that you have one lead economic operator and, below that, a team consisting of a specialist project manager, specialist architect and specialist engineers, all from various subconsultant disciplines. Suffice it to say that, with any large scale project, and, indeed, in that arena, all those firms carry professional indemnity insurance. It is a high-profile project, and a standard industry way in which to do business is to check all those levels of assurance.

The construction notice has not been issued. We will come to having a discussion around that, no doubt. It is issued by the project manager. The building contract that we specifically developed in conjunction with CPD included a number of clauses, one of which included a check around attaining statutory approvals and sign-off by advisory bodies. The STG was established at the behest of DCAL, which clearly views it a key advisory body.

There are works yet to be done on some remaining aspects that we will discuss in detail, specifically around emergency exiting, but I want to drill down into the work that has been done to date, because I believe that there is a misunderstanding around the quantum of work that has been done on emergency exiting. The completion of that is one of the core last elements of the pre-construction activities. I will note as a fact that there were no STG reports issued in 2014. Indeed, all three STG reports were issued in 2013.

I have covered the approvals process. I want to get into the detail of the emergency evacuation. It is important for the Committee to hear that work did commence and was undertaken on the design to address emergency exiting scenarios following discussions with the STG. We will talk about that in detail later. With the subsequent judicial review (JR) outcome, it was clear that that work was not concluded for a number of reasons. The work, in its time, has manifested itself in the form of line drawings, crowd modelling and calculations based on emergency scenarios. One specific piece of work — I will read the scope of it out — looks at the loss of part/all of the Andersonstown Road frontage.

The Department itself, suffice it to say, has put in place, aligned to the conditions of contract and drawdown funds, a number of grant management processes and procedures throughout the funding agreement, and those are reflected in the building contracts, not only for the contractor but for the design team. I have spoken about securing planning permission, the FBC, appointing the design team and the contractor, the funding agreement and the step-through process, which culminated in the completion of the front-end design and the move to the significant construction work.

Again, as with any large, complex capital project, I would like to advise the Committee briefly on the two principal parties involved and the background to them. The design team procured by the Ulster Council of the GAA, with full knowledge and input by us and support from CPD, is led by Mott MacDonald, as I said. It includes a number of specialist consultants, including the Populous sports architecture team. Some of Populous's recent work in the UK and wider afield includes the Emirates Stadium in London in 2006; Wembley Stadium in London in 2007; the Aviva Stadium in Dublin in 2010; the Olympic Stadium in London in 2012; the Etihad Stadium in Melbourne; Soccer City in Johannesburg; and a significant development in Marlins Park in Miami. That is a sample.

On the corresponding contracting side that was procured, you will often hear the phrase "integrated supply team" (IST). That team is made up of architects from AFL Architects, Tenos fire engineers, SKM/Jacobs civil instruction engineers and the Heron Buckingham group as a joint venture contractor. Some of the sporting venues that those high-calibre organisations have also been involved in include — this is only a sample to give a flavour — the Amex in Brighton, which has a capacity of 32,000; the Chelsea Football Club stadium, with a capacity of 42,000; Thomond Park for the IRFU; Leicester Tigers' Welford Road rugby ground, with a 30,000 capacity; the South African one, with a 46,000 capacity; Old Trafford in Manchester, with a 75,000 capacity; and Leicester City Football Club's ground, with a 42,000 capacity. On a local note, the Odyssey project in Belfast, which has a 10,000 capacity, has also had some of that team heavily involved in it.

It is pertinent to get a flavour of the experience and calibre of the teams that ended up being appointed through the standard process to identify the most economically advantageous tender, which was based on a combination of quality and cost assessment. Hopefully, the credentials, calibre and background of the organisations and respective parties are noted. A consistent message from the contractor and the consultants has been the distinction in stadium development between the planning process in GB and Northern Ireland, which is that the assessment of the planning merits of a scheme precedes the pursuance of a subsequent safety certificate for the stadium. Casement Park similarly has two separate regulatory bodies and processes.

I will now tease out some of the detail of some previous comments, which hopefully will lead to practical questioning. I would like to talk about the matter of planning submission without STG sign-off. I say again that this was before my time and that I am speaking on what the files present from an evidence base point of view. The evening of 19 June 2013 saw the submission of the planning application itself. I have an email that is only a matter of lines long, but I think that it is pertinent, as it shows the status at the time. It is only right that it be shared with the Committee and reflected on. It is a note from the chair of the STG to our project architect at the time, Carl Southern, and it states:

I can take from the files only that that was a statement on the day of the planning submission. I will let the words speak for themselves. We will undoubtedly come back to the timing of when emergency exiting plans are developed, when is the right time for them to be developed, who owns them and how they are developed. It is also pertinent to acknowledge that, under the process, the STG was set up to advise on the design development during the delivery period, for want of a better word. Then, on completion of an operational asset — although, ironically, it is the same individual — ongoing regulatory checks and balances fall under a different group, which is the safety advisory group. That is where, when you have it built, a different group carries out the regular checks and has the ability to impose restrictions on the S or P factors. That is reflected in that note. It is consistent with the design evolution, the purpose of the STG and the subsequent ongoing performance from a management and operational point of view.

I really want to hone in on the bricks and mortar aspect of design development and the fact that, in operational life, if it is badly managed and there are not enough stewards, and so on, there is a separate process post-completion that the bodies are duty-bound to work under. In the Casement Park funding agreement, we put in as an express condition that, during the operational phase of the asset over the post-completion period, there is an obligation to run the facility in full compliance continually, as you would expect. Even at that stage, we acknowledged that we were not washing our hands of the stadium on the day of opening, for want of a better word. I believe that that is pertinent, and the information is also included in the bundle.

The next area that I would like to talk about is the ongoing design process itself. It is important to show the Committee that the contractual framework that was set up on the design-and-build basis did indeed carry on with design work as required under it. That is important so as to show that it is not like that of a traditional build-only scheme, as it is called, where the design is fully completed and you then hand it over to a build-only contractor. It is certainly becoming less and less common. Many years ago, the role of the architect was more extensive, in that, traditionally, he or she would have designed every aspect of a project right down to the type of door handle, the detailing on the skirting, and so on. As all this good stuff happened in the industry on value for money and so on, design-and-build has become more prevalent. An industry norm now is that the overarching ethos allows early contractor involvement. It lets the contractor bring to the table the bits that he is good at and lets the architect focus on the bits that are paramount to the client.

I say that while fully accepting that we should see CPD as a procurement and contract directorate for strategy. I fully understand that it is easy for technical people who have been immersed in that world for a long time. It does take some time, and I would fully welcome any further briefing or the Committee to availing itself of any other explanation around the mechanics of this and what it means. A key part of the PAR that I personally and the Department welcome is understanding whether we did the right thing at the right time and whether we were at the right point in the journey. It is imperative to understand the contractual context of that.

There have been a number of notes made around a lack of ongoing evidence, specifically around emergency evacuations. In the file prior to my time, I note a letter from Paul Scott to Ciaran McGurk on 17 February, which I believe shows evidence of ongoing design in the matter.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Sorry. Which year?

Mr Miskelly: It is from 17 February 2014. Apologies. It is a letter from the chair of the STG to Ciaran McGurk, who at that time was the programme manager and had a pivotal role in the project. The letter states:

That confers on me some design latitude within the code, which acknowledges that that can happen as long as the overarching level is not compromised.

Mr B McCrea: What date was that again?

Mr Miskelly: The letter is dated 17 February 2014.

Mr B McCrea: OK.

Mr Miskelly: It continues:

It was looking at existing widths on the existing exits, which I believe were subsequently increased. It was looking at the potential for an additional exit point, possibly in the south-east corner. It was also looking at maximising areas of relative safety within the venue. The letter goes on to state:

It gives consideration to factors outside of the site for vehicular constriction. It notes that Sport NI offers "ongoing support" and continues:

That was as at 17 February 2014, and, in what I found in the files, to me it does not present a picture of imminent failure or a fundamental issue. However, I can deal with the facts only as they were at the time.

On 30 April 2014, the chair of the STG along with another colleague attended the Permanent Secretaries Group (PSG) meeting at which the DCAL architect gave updates to them. When referring to the minutes of the PSG meeting on 16 April, I previously noted that Paul as chair and his colleague would be invited to attend the PSG meetings, either at the beginning or the end of the talk about STG matters. From the file, I note that that was after previous interactions between Sport NI and the DCAL permanent secretary in March. Undertakings were put in place, and the first one happened probably a matter of weeks after that.

On 2 May 2014, there was an email exchange between the Populous architect, the DCAL architect, the GAA, and so on, noting ongoing discussions around the enlarged site, the evacuation scenario during closure of the Andersonstown Road and fire engineering calculations.

A further piece of work — a document — produced by the lead consultant in May 2014, is clearly titled, 'External Emergency Evacuation Crowd Modelling Parameters', and, to me, it is clear evidence of ongoing design work on emergency exiting. I should say this, because it will undoubtedly come up. I firmly believe that very technical documents should be presented by their authors and technical people. I will try to set the context, but in no way I am trying to present the technical content. The title and the introduction to the document outline the input parameters and assumptions for additional crowd modelling of a 38,000-capacity event at Casement Park in the event that exits on to the Andersonstown Road, and so on, are blocked or unavailable for emergency egress.

From May, we move on to the culmination in November, when a report by a specialist engineering firm under the design team Tenos was produced, and that evidences to me that, as late as November 2014, in the final stages of the JR hearing, design work on emergency evacuation was being carried out. The Tenos report looks as though it was issued in late November, just two weeks or so prior to the termination of the JR. It would have been in various drafts, so its exact status is unclear. That report was shared with the chair of the STG, and, indeed, one page of it is included in the STG's previous evidence to the Committee. On the face of the documentation — the pages out of the report — the chair had the report, and I believe that it is pertinent to discuss it.

As I said, I will not comment on the technical nature of the report, because I believe that it is irrelevant in the wider context of setting the scene and of what we are talking about.

Mr B McCrea: Can we just check the date of that report? Or the date that it is in Paul Scott's —

The Assistant Committee Clerk: It is on page 195 of the Paul Scott bundle.

Mr Miskelly: The report itself on the QA page is dated 26 November 2014. There will have been previous iterations. I am trying to give an accurate and evidence-based statement on what was in place. I think it would be pertinent for the Committee to understand the background to the emergency evacuation plan and the critical role that blue light services play in informing the final operational plans, of which the emergency procedures are key. Emergency exiting scenario planning is an aspect of the physical design, but, more importantly, it moves into operational response models. No one disputes that it is a core aspect, and I believe that SNI noted —

Mr B McCrea: Excuse me. I was reading and probably missed that. Are you giving us that full report, particularly annex A.5?

Mr Miskelly: I believe that that is part of a proposed GAA presentation because of its technical nature.

Mr B McCrea: You were going to refer to this report.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We have one page of it.

Mr Miskelly: You have one page already. As part of the consultation that we are doing with the GAA, we are seeing what we can provide. I assure you that I intend to issue the Committee with whatever we can.

The definition of an emergency plan in the glossary in the green guide is that an emergency plan —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Green or red?

Mr B McCrea: We will stick to the red guide, actually, because Oliver has insisted.

Mrs McKevitt: For clarification, in a question to Mr Scott when he addressed the Committee here, I specifically asked him about the red and green guides and the differences between them. I asked whether they are often used similarly to help a project along or to help with advice. He agreed that they were and that that was the case here in the UK. I would like clarification on that before we go on.

Mr Miskelly: On that note, I will let Andrew come in and give a very succinct answer. It underpins a fundamental evidence-based approach of the Department that is about hitting the highest bar possible.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Before Andrew comes in, I will ask a question for the record. I have no concept at all of the difference between the content of the red guide and the green guide. Is the red guide the one that is on your departmental website? It is on the DCAL website. Am I right in saying that?

Mr Miskelly: The red one is the Northern Ireland version. The green guide is —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): And the red one is the one that is on the DCAL website. Is it published by DCAL?

Mr Miskelly: Yes, DCAL is responsible for the website.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): It is DCAL published and is on its website. That is fine. Thank you.

Mr Andrew Dadley (Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure): To be clear, as I think was said this morning, the green guide is used in England, Scotland and Wales, and we have a red guide. They are pretty much the same. In the contract for Casement Park, it was very clear that the design team and the contractor were to use both guides and that they had to design to whichever was the highest and most onerous. In essence, we were taking the best of both.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): That is helpful. Thank you.

Mr Miskelly: Or, indeed, the most onerous. An example is the fire compartmentation. My understanding is that the red guide is more onerous, so we picked the more onerous.

Mr Cree: The higher standard.

Mr Miskelly: I suggest that, in the UK, that is unique. The fundamental principle of investing in the highest possible standard is enshrined in those early principles.

The definition of an emergency plan in the green guide is that it is:

That is pertinent to bear in mind, because as we talk about when the logical time to develop it is, you see that the ownership input of blue light services, etc, from an operational point of view is paramount.

If I can move on —

Mr B McCrea: I am sorry, can you just draw your conclusion?

Mr Miskelly: Again, the basis is that the emergency evacuation plan and the planning scenario for it is the key chapter in the safety event management plan. Before the stadium opens, or just as it opens, that manual is the fundamental bible of how to run the stadium from an operational point of view.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I will make one other point. I remind all members to speak through the Chair, particularly at this point.

Mr B McCrea: Listen up, you lot.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Yes. Pot, kettle.

Mr Miskelly: On that note, the conclusion of that is that the emergency exiting procedures that the guide says are fundamental with blue light input from the emergency services are in the chapter in the compliance point of view manual on how to run a stadium. That is the manual that contains the section that also shows when control of the ground moves from the safety officer to the police. In the event of a major incident, the police take control and it is their call.

A relevant and interesting point that was presented through the files is that, in 2009 for the old Casement Park site, there was a multi-agency emergency response plan. Again, blue light services are paramount to the ownership of the consultation document. Indeed, in the final throes at Ravenhill prior to operational commencement, the chapter on emergency evacuation was shared by the IRFU and the PSNI. That level of engagement to determine what will happen on a practical basis at various points and where, such as getting contact numbers, etc, can be done only when you are at a relatively advanced stage in planning for operational readiness. No doubt we will come back to that.

I say that in the context that there has been a consistent message that the GAA or the Department did not deliver an emergency evacuation plan. We were inherently party to the ongoing design development work, but the plan itself, as you can clearly see, needs the second half of the equation. I say that purely from the timing of it. Again, in later sessions, I hope that other and wiser people will come back with benchmarked evidence of the timeline on that. I am more than happy that we will get into the detail on what is essentially a risk-based approach and value for money. From a factual point of view, however, it is important to recognise that definition and the parties that play into it.

Mr Cree: I am sorry to interrupt, Chairperson. Just before you go on, are you saying that it was not the case that the GAA did not have to produce this plan?

Mr Miskelly: No. I am setting the context, first, around the definition of the emergency plan.

Mr Cree: Who was going to provide that plan?

Mr Miskelly: This will be the view, which we will touch on later, around the designers. The glossary is prepared and owned by the emergency services. In the event of a major incident —

Mr Cree: That is a slightly different thing, perhaps. It is more about outside than inside.

Mr Miskelly: Or within the site. It states that the plan is for dealing with a major incident at the venue or in the vicinity. It is not restricted to the red line on one side.

Mr Cree: Who was developing the plan? That is what I am asking.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Rather than us interrupting with a lot of questions, can I ask if you are coming to the end of the presentation?

Mr Miskelly: I should not be too long. I will take another five minutes or so.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): OK, five minutes. I ask members to hold their questions until the presentation is finished.

Mr Cree: It conflicts with tab 20.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We will let Rory finish, then we will move to questions.

Mr Miskelly: I tried to share the green guide definition to the emergency plan.

The position of the designers in respect of the Andersonstown Road is again under the context of ongoing work. There is a very important letter given by Populous, who are exemplar architects on the client side. That was a letter to the GAA on 7 April. It clearly states:

Again, from an evidence-base point of view, in April 2014, that was the architect saying, "That was the position, and what we have done around the physical proposals will need to be supported by operational plant and management strategies going forward before you can get your licence".

I believe that it has been previously noted that a PSNI chief inspector noted in October 2014 that the police remained broadly supportive of the proposed traffic management plan. He noted that there were a number of measures that require further refinement to ensure that disruption to the local community life is kept to a minimum. The PSNI confirmed that it remained willing to sit on the event management board, saying that it will continue to take an active role in event management planning.

Again, the file presents to me that, as late as 2014, the PSNI was content with discussions and was happy to look at it. There was reference to an event management board that would be responsible long-term for the final delivery of the asset. That is another deliverable that is still in its infancy, meaning that the time for its establishment is in the early stages, when we move the construction from where you have a year-and-a-half/two-year period to having people in the seats. That, along with the separate community board, I understand, is required to be put in place as envisaged under the funding agreement. That is a logical, clear forum to have in place not only the day before you open but, say, a year in advance. It is a bit like rugby and the appointment of a stadium manager: you do not wait until the last moment but, at the same time, you do not hire him four years before it is ready to open, and you do not hire him, potentially, before you start building. It is a timing issue. To me, it would feel consistent with that.

I have a couple of final points that I need to pick up to clarify a few things. Based on the evidence in the project files, it is clear to me that there were some reports that the Department did not receive from the STG up to a certain point in time. On 4 April 2014, the DCAL architect wrote to Sport NI after it proposed to release STG notes/minutes under an FOI request. That came to light because SNI had written to DCAL on 14 March stating its intention to release information from five separate STG meetings held between February 2013 and January 2014. I presume that, logically, they are the first five out of the total of seven. The note from Carl Southern, the then DCAL project architect, to the SNI officer with the accounting officer copied in, cites that, at the time of receipt, that is, 14 March, that was the first time that DCAL and the stadium team had sight of the documents. It also noted that the Department and the Ulster Council of the GAA are cited in them on several occasions. It notes that there appears to be some confusion regarding the status of the documents as minutes or notes, which they recovered before. The email from the DCAL architect went on to note:

The relevance of that, as presented in the file, is that it was only in late March 2014 — 27 March — that DCAL received a bundle of the previous five STG meetings, which represented the period from February 2013 to 7 January 2014 inclusive. Again, in my view, it is clear from the file that there was an issue around communication.

I believe this was touched on earlier, and it is an excellent point from a technical point of view, that, under PRINCE2, in my and Andrew's world and the world of capital delivery, there is an acceptance that an issue is something that has already happened and that a risk is something that may happen. We need to be very clear in capital delivery on the difference between risks and issues. I welcome that the power will help to bring clarity to that matter and will identify when something was a risk, when it was an issue and when it was a concern and will focus on how concerns were handled. Those are the key questions for me not only from a technical point of view but because it is a large part of the thrust. There have been a lot of submissions, statements and anecdotal statements. In my world, that difference needs to be recognised, and I just wanted to say that I thought that that was an excellent and relevant point.

The Committee should be aware that the work of the STG, DCAL and the project team was being discussed from December 2014. Those discussions were fundamentally aimed at making the STG and the design and development process more efficient and better. An output of a discussion between SNI and DCAL included discussing and circulating a terms of reference and providing STG papers, etc, to DCAL.

There was a further exchange of emails between me and Nick Harkness of Sport NI in March and April that built up to the terminology around the re-engagement of the STG in an advisory capacity to support any new design. I say that from the point of view that there is an allegation that, x number of days before the chair of the STG came to the Committee, there was a spate of activity. I am more than confident about showing — indeed, this was referenced this morning — that the meetings, discussions and drivers behind this from December were about looking forward. That ties in with the period when I came into the Department and took stock of the situation. I was interested only in looking forward; I had no interest in going back over old ground. My focus was on project delivery, and it was clear to me that greater efficiencies could be brought to the process to allow the experts to fulfil their expert role and to allow the maturity of discussion to happen in a factual and methodical way so that it was communicated to the right people at the right time. Again bearing in mind the previous comments on the timings of notes, minutes and reports, etc, I believe that it is fully relevant to make that point.

From a submission that was made this morning, I understand that there was a note in the SNI bundle about there being no reply to two emails from me. From a practical point of view, I want to close that out. I believe that there is a citation about an email of 12 May 2015 from Nick Harkness of Sport NI to me about being very enthused about supporting the offer of second opinion to me but that there was no reply. That note was not sent on 12 May. It was sent on 23 March 2015, and I replied on 26 March. I picked that up in the submission, but on the basis of the presentation, those are just the facts.

Finally, I will pick up a few points from this morning. The interim or middle report of the STG was the subject of a few previous discussions, especially the inference or the fact that there were comments on the report, etc, and the role of the previous DCAL architect. The paper in question is untitled. It states:

It further states that it was reviewed on 4 June 2013 and was:

The report has no note of an author or a date of publication, and there is no covering page. We are clearly all in agreement that it originated from the chair of the STG — there is no issue with that. From going through the file, I can see that that paper was issued to Carl Southern on 19 September from Brenda Artt at Sport NI with the words:

I say that, because I can only accept that it is the same report. The previous report was a year earlier, and the subsequent report was dated October, so it can only be that report.

Immediately — literally that evening — Carl Southern replied back directly to Paul and stated:

It moved to comments the next day from Carl to Paul:

There was some subsequent correspondence throughout that day, and the overarching tone was that we needed clarity and definition on what the facts were, where it was and was not compliant and the recommendations. I am happy to share those, but I think that it is important to set the tone. As I read it, the file sees a relatively swift reaction by the DCAL architect, initially with a note that says, "I have just received this", and a follow-up the next day on some of the technical matters.

I will try to very succinctly close out these few last points, if that is agreeable. To pick up some of the points that were made this morning, from a factual point of view, we spoke about SNI's involvement in the OBC. I see that as a positive, as the OBC was as informed as possible from a practical point of view. I welcome the acknowledgement, because I have struggled to find any documentary evidence that Carl Southern did not want or intend to attend any meetings. I understand that SNI has advised that there was oral communication and that you will have Mr Southern with you in due course. I am glad that Sport NI noted and acknowledged how, in the early stages, my predecessor took on the advice of SNI on the establishment.

I note that, irrespective of where the terms of reference were meant to originate from, clearly SNI set up a defined membership, operated and moved forward.

A point was touched on earlier that comes back to the design and build discussion. For me, certainly as a construction professional, it chimes that, in the original Rosalie Flanagan letter of 2012 thanking Paul for his input, the phrase "will ultimately be compliant" was used. That translates to me as being capable of developing further, with design input, to be compliant, ultimately. It is at a point in time. I think that is very important. At that point, we knew that it was a design and build. We knew, from a construction point of view, that the role of the STG was to provide support. I think that evidence is acknowledgement that the design was in a suitably advanced position, it was capable of further design development, and that it was prudent to move forward.

I have trawled through the sponsor board minutes —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I am loath to —

Mr Miskelly: I will be three minutes, if that is agreeable.

I have gone through the sponsor board minutes, which I believe are on their way to you. I am unable to explain why the serious matter noted by Nick in May and July of 2013 was not raised at the sponsor board meeting with SNI attendance. I spoke about Carl's comments in September around factual correctness. I spoke about how I see a documentary evidence base where Peter May put in place Paul's attendance with the project steering group members.

I am happy to discuss at length — I believe that this was mentioned this morning — the transition between Sport NI and DCAL, and the reasons behind that, which was on the back of a gateway review. I spoke about the STG report of June 2013, which was issued in September. The opportunity to attend is an aspect that you can pick up with Carl. Again, the file presents to me that Carl certainly put a red flag up when he realised that he had received notes from five meetings that had never been issued to him before. I am happy to talk in detail about the discussions around what now seems to be a process/value-for-money, risk-based discussion.

Finally, on the presentation to the board of Sport NI in June 2014, which the stadia department received through an FOI only a matter of two months ago, there is a common thread. I am the programme director. I would expect anyone in the team, internally or externally, certainly in an advisory body, to come to me if there are serious issues or concerns and to give me my place as programme director, be it in formal correspondence to me as programme director, copied to whoever else, or, if matters were raised about projects that I am responsible for, at least a copy of the presentation etc to be issued. Again, I do not think that it is appropriate to expect a stadia team or a director to be aware of matters raised and recorded in another organisation's board, and rely on minutes coming in at a subsequent point.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): OK. Thank you.

Mr Miskelly: Very finally —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I do not dislike being flexible, but —

Mr Miskelly: I will be a couple of minutes.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): You have spoken for an hour and a quarter.

Mr Miskelly: Yes, and I have children to lift at 7.00 pm, so —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): That gives us another couple of hours; that is grand.

Mr Miskelly: I just want to set the scene. As an experienced practitioner, I am happy to delve into D&B. It was the same approach across the Ravenhill and Windsor Park projects in assembling the team. We still have work to do in the pre-construction services around Casement Park. It is important to understand that it is perfectly acceptable historically, under D&B, to go back to planning for some minor amendments. Indeed, that was the case with Ravenhill. Nick made comments earlier that it all has to be done, otherwise you are not compliant with planning. Planning fixes the scale, mass, quantum etc. If you deviate by a door width, there is a flexibility of scope before you need to go for a full resubmission. That is a technical aspect that I am happy to unpick. I am also happy to discuss the final aspects of how we see the process of physical design and operational licensing tying in. I will conclude on that note, Chair. Thank you for your time and patience.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Thank you. I will start with a few questions, and then I will bring Leslie in. You were with the rugby folk from March 2012 until July 2013, and then came across to —

Mr Miskelly: No, I was working from July 2013 until February 2014, and I was employed on another very complex project that successfully secured a very large capital grant from a Heritage Lottery organisation.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): That was from July 2013 until February 2014.

Mr Miskelly: That is right.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): When did you come back into the picture then?

Mr Miskelly: From late 2014, I started giving part-time assistance to the Department.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): So you came back into the Department in late 2014.

Mr Miskelly: I came into the Department.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): So, really, all the things that we are talking about and that you referred to were before your time.

Mr Miskelly: That is why I am very clear that I can talk about what happened during my time. Hopefully that is accepted, Chair.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I understand, but if you came only in late 2014, we been talking about a lot of issues that were from 2012, 2013 and early 2014.

Mr Miskelly: But in my current position, I have to —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I understand that. You have to report on what happened.

Mr Miskelly: I am responsible, and this is the information that my team has to assemble.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We are trying to put together a timeline of who was involved, because people come and go, and it is quite movable. Could you give us the dates?

Mr Miskelly: We will undertake that action.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Mr Dadley, are you the replacement for Carl Southern?

Mr Dadley: Yes.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): That is grand. Thank you.

The discussion at the Sport NI board meeting was one of the last points that came up. The Sport NI folk, as is appropriate, send the minutes of their meetings to the parent Department. You are saying that you did not get those. The meeting was on 23 June 2014, which was before your time, obviously.

Mr Miskelly: I think that it was June 2014, from memory.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Yes, it was June 2014, but you only came in in late 2014.

Mr Miskelly: I was in from February 2014 part-time, and then in August —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): So it was February 2014 part-time, and full-time from late 2014.

Mr Miskelly: Yes. From August.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): When did you first see the minutes of the Sport NI board meeting?

Mr Miskelly: Through an FOI request, where SNI issued them to the stadium team. I accept that there is a separate discussion around how the Department is structured etc, but my point is that, if the tone and content of the presentation was so significant, it is not appropriate, in my view and in my world of project delivery, to have to rely on someone picking up and recognising a serious issue from a set of minutes after the event.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We have not got to the bottom of this yet, but I would point out that there are various mechanisms in the system for an arm's-length body to identify issues with the parent Department. It could be through the accountability meetings with the chief executive of the arm's-length body. It could be, in this case, even through some of the sponsor board meetings; there would be an opportunity there because Sport NI was involved. There are a whole series of ways. We need to find out when it sent on the minutes, as it is required to, who took them, what they did with them and whether they saw the significance of it. That is important.

I am sure that you picked this up when you were watching the earlier discussion. You were with us in December — I think that it was 11 December — and then on 29 January. Why did you not mention, at any time, the STG concerns and advice?

Mr Miskelly: This goes back to the question of when a risk becomes an issue. If I was sitting in December, having been informed by the respective parties or the chair of the STG that we had such an alleged showstopper, I would have factored that in. My career has been built on successful project delivery. I do not set out to start a project that —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): So, at that point, you were not aware of the scale of the issue.

Mr Miskelly: As unveiled on 30 April? Absolutely not.

Mr Cree: Thank you very much for that. It is good to have it all on record, as they say. We will not go over it all again.

We have notes from Sports Northern Ireland here from 12 December 2014:

I find that quite hard to understand.

Mr Miskelly: Sorry, what was the date?

Mr Cree: December 2014.

Mr Miskelly: I will come to that, if you give me a second. I just want to set the context of that meeting.

First, I refute the word "argue". I like to think I engage —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): For my own benefit, what paper is this in reference to?

Mr Cree: Tab 22 in ours.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Tab 22, thank you.

Mr Miskelly: Can I ask if that is the sole reference to the output of that meeting? Is that the only context?

Mr Cree: Well, that is the one that I am asking the question on.

Mr Miskelly: Yes. At that meeting, the core aspect discussed between DCAL and Sport NI included — I can only go by the list of actions that came out of the meeting — circulating terms of reference; giving clarity to the role of the STG and of officers; to provide confirmation and minutes of the recent STG meeting to DCAL; to provide a formal list of STG meetings in 2015; to schedule pre-meetings of the STG with DCAL and the SNI officers; for SNI to consider the restructuring of the STG itself; a specific note around allowing the current chair to provide fair and partial technical advice; and for an STG meeting to be held as soon as possible to consider any new material to be provided by the contractor. That is the context. I forget the phrase that was cited.

Mr Cree: Antoinette McKeown and Nick Harkness and quite a few others were at that meeting. There were two bullet points. The one I am asking you about states:

Mr Miskelly: You are reading from something that I do not have and has not been issued to me, so I am unclear about the document. The only output I have from that is a note of the agreed actions, circulated between SNI and ourselves.

Mr Cree: So you are unaware of that. That is a pity, because it is a fundamental question. How could it be done during construction?

Mr Miskelly: The first thing, as you can see from all the other actions, is that the topic of where we are and what we need to do was discussed. But if it is presented that I argued that the technicalities could be done, the inference being at a later date —

Mr Cree: The construction is quite specific. If you did not know that the flow rates were too narrow and you went for certification and were told, "38,000? Sorry friend, we need it to be 15,000", how could you do that?

Mr Miskelly: At that meeting, Cynthia Smith, Fergus Devitt and I were the representatives from Sport NI. That was not a technical meeting, so I would not have been arguing about the status —

Mr Cree: OK, so you deny it then.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): What sort of meeting was it?

Mr Miskelly: It was a meeting, much as I have said, to take stock of what we needed to do to move forward.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): It says here that it was:

What does that mean?

Mr Miskelly: I can only go from the agreed actions. There are two points in a note that certainly allude to potential HR issues. I do not want to talk about that; I do not think it would be appropriate. The other six points are very factual around the STG and —

Mr Hilditch: Chair, that was the meeting that I had asked about previously in relation to minutes being available. I was told that there were no minutes.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): There were no minutes of the meeting? Is that correct?

Mr Hilditch: I remember that exchange between me and Cynthia Smith.

Mr Miskelly: These are not minutes. As Cynthia said, these are notes of actions.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): They are action points.

Mr Miskelly: Yes, just for clarity.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Do you normally go to meetings, Rory, and not take a note of the meeting?

Mr Miskelly: It was not phrased like that. We wanted to come in and have a constructive discussion.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): My personal experience is that, if I go to meet someone or they come in to see me, I usually have a pad in front of me so that I can jot down a few notes. I probably lose them, mind you — someone has seen my room — but the point is that you do take a few notes. Did you take any notes of the meeting?

Mr Miskelly: I would have to check, to be honest. At that time, on the knife-edge of a judicial review, there was a culture of asking what it was that we needed to do to get ready to move forward. I had no reason to believe that it needed copious note-taking.

Mr Cree: Perhaps we could move on, Chairperson. There were several issues outstanding, obviously, when the project went for planning permission. One of those, I presume, because it does not exist yet, was the emergency exiting plan. What other issues, if any, were outstanding when the project went for planning permission? There may have been none.

Mr Miskelly: I would not agree that the emergency exiting planning was outstanding when the planning application was submitted. That has been the subject of earlier discussion.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Was there a final or a complete exiting plan?

Mr Miskelly: An exiting plan or an emergency exiting plan?

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): An emergency exiting plan. That is what we are talking about.

Mr Miskelly: To accompany the planning submission? No. Was it required? No. I think that is important in the context of where we were with planning. Was it prudent to submit the planning application? It was before my time, but the document that was presented — the email that I read out showing the view of the chair of the STG on the day of the planning submission — is materially relevant.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We will come back to that, because we might want to interrogate that a bit more. The plans were submitted on 19 June 2013. Do we have a final emergency exiting plan as of today?

Mr Miskelly: No. As of today, suffice it to say, the scheme has undergone a few significant events. Stocktaking is —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Or there never was one.

Mr Cree: No, there has not been.

Mr Miskelly: No, I do not think that is right, Chair. The components of the emergency exiting plan culminate in a document that goes into the event safety management plan, which states what must be done in the event of an incident. I tried to make clear earlier the evidence base for the front-end work that was done to inform those decisions and the code compliance. The drawings showing potential routes and the crowd modelling work were all based on assumptions. Again, there is evidence of the engagement of the STG asking, "Can you now model it on this scenario?" There is correspondence around confusion as to whether the police said, "Can you model it on the road being closed from either the roundabout to here, or on just one part of the road etc?" I am very happy to make that apparent. The process had started and, certainly through the PAR, we determined where we were in that process, whether it was appropriate and whether there was a fundamental risk to the project's successful delivery, given that point in time.

Mr Cree: I have two or three other quick points to make. How important was the 38,000 capacity to the project?

Mr Miskelly: Again, I will speak to the facts. I always say that you do not invest public money in a project — For example, with Titanic Belfast we did not invest that money just for the anniversary. Yes, you capitalise on the anniversary, but the key reason that underpins the investment is the benefits realisation. The business plan for Casement Park was for a once-a-year event at full capacity. So, the core benefits to be realised through that project are not about the 38,000 attendees; they are about meeting the strategic needs of the GAA. The figure of 38,000 had been identified as a relevant material number at that time. The challenge and the key point for the Department, and for the director delivering the programme, is whether the investment is still capable of delivering the benefits for which the money was pledged. That is what I consistently come back to. In due course, we will see what the final maximum capacity for the major events is.

Mr Cree: But the numbers would be geared, would they not, to the site and the exiting.

Mr Miskelly: At that point in time, absolutely.

Mr Cree: OK. Very quickly, the minutes of the stadium sponsor board meeting in April 2014 — this is at tabs 15 and 16, Chair — state:

Are you aware of that?

Mr Miskelly: I do not have the minutes in front of me. Sorry, what —

Mr Cree: It is talking about what they call the "emergency evacuation plan" here.

Mr Miskelly: Sorry, at what meeting?

Mr Cree: The stadium sponsor board.

Mr Miskelly: Yes, in?

Mr Cree: April 2014.

Mr Miskelly: April 2014. Thank you.

Mr Cree: It states:

It suggests a change there.

Mr Miskelly: Sorry?

Mr Cree: That suggests a change: "new capacity". I know it was not all —

Mr Miskelly: The design team was procured to design and take forward a brief for 38,000 and the contractor was procured to take a maximum capacity of 38,000. I think that the word "new" means new in that it refers to the new, redeveloped Casement Park as opposed to —

Mr Cree: So it should have been "redeveloped" then. OK. The other point refers to tab 20, which states that the GAA is to:

Mr Miskelly: In retrospect, the wording is probably clumsy. The key question is this: does that mean, at that point in time, that we would have envisaged a full emergency exit plan? The answer is no because, as I noted earlier, the input required from the blue-light services etc is just too far in front. The question is whether the design is capable of ultimately aligning to it. That is the question at hand. Again, the PAR will help to clarify that. Perhaps the wording is clumsy, but —

Mr Cree: Was it for the GAA to present these plans?

Mr Miskelly: The reality is that the design work and the ongoing work by the GAA team — I say that from the point of view of the project team members, the designers and contractors' designers — between May and November 2014 was around crowd modelling and scenario planning. That note, captured in October, from memory, urges us to look forward to the output of that being concluded or crystallised.

Mr Cree: Does it not seem unfair that the GAA was expected to produce the plan? Surely it would not have the experience?

Mr Miskelly: Again, I come back to the point that it was the GAA that had engaged the designers and the contractor. It is that piece of work, as opposed to —

Mr Cree: It should be the design team.

Mr Miskelly: It is a combination. At that point, because of the design and build contract, you have the contractor specialists that have taken the client's design and Tenos etc, which I have spoken about. They are the core parties. So, it should have said, "the respective parties engaged by GAA". I accept and understand that —

Mr Cree: When will we have an emergency exiting plan?

Mr Miskelly: Can I break that down into two parts?

Mr Cree: I am sure you will.

Mr Miskelly: I will treat that as a vote of confidence. Thank you, Leslie.

We will need to conclude the design aspect, the bricks and mortar, which will be based on concluding the emergency evacuation modelling. Clearly, that needs input from the STG and the blue-light services. The designers, whether the clients or the contractors, need to conclude that work. Then, the final plan that goes into the manual needs the blue-light operational response done. The conclusion of the first bit really ties into the timeline going forward. It is absolutely clear that, given that this is a perceived issue or risk, it will be a key issue going forward.

Mr Dunne: You said "a perceived risk". What perceived risk are you talking about? The emergency escape —

Mr Miskelly: This 30 April Hillsborough statement.

Mr Dunne: So it is a perceived risk.

Mr Miskelly: No. The member asked me about comments originating back from October 2014, which, as I have explained, was clearly before the events of 30 April 2015. Given the profile of this, I welcome the fact that there is a Culture Committee inquiry and the fact that the Minister has undertaken to hold a separate independent technical review etc. My focus is on moving forward. I do not seek to lessen or trivialise the matter. It is a key issue, from a media point of view and from the focus of the CAL Committee. Suffice to say that, over the last week, significant resource has gone into this matter and will continue to, going forward. However, it would be wrong for me to say that it was a factual risk or issue until this process concludes.

Mr Dunne: We have heard a lot today about your experience in project management, and we do not doubt it. Having heard that, we obviously now expect a clear way forward for moving the project onto the next step. I take it that new plans will be developed and designs and so on brought forward.

Mr Miskelly: Yes.

Mr Dunne: In hindsight, we have learned things, and I am sure that you have picked up on them. If you are still in the position that you are in at the moment, will you follow the same procedures or will you ensure that the STG is involved with the project right through? Will you assure us that the STG will be fully engaged prior to the submission of a new planning application?

I must say that I am disappointed at how little you have mentioned the STG. All you have done is try to rebuff any evidence that they have given us, but you have not given us any assurance of their engagement, and little or no assurance that they were ever really involved. I must say that I find it most disappointing how the STG has been treated in relation to this whole project. It has been left on the side and brought in occasionally, on and off, when it suited people. When it did not suit, it was left out of it and excluded.

Mr Miskelly: I will respond through the Chair. As I have tried to make clear, I can speak for my engagement during the process; the rest is from what the file presents. My personal dialogue with Paul Scott is evidenced from December, January, February and March, including with Nick Harkness, when we —

Mr Dunne: You said you were part-time doing it in February 2014.

Mr Miskelly: I say that from evidence right up to February/March of this year. I am more than happy to produce a timeline showing the engagement. It is an interesting point. There are schedules of meetings etc that have happened throughout 2014. I am more than happy to bring in clarity. I am confused on the question. The fact that Paul engaged directly with individuals, and that individuals were sent information, reflects that there was professional respect between the specialists. That is not my field. It was never the intention that the programme director would be the gatekeeper, for want of a better word. Sport NI and Nick would openly say that, at times, they need latitude and freedom to explore options and have discussions internally, in a free and impartial arena. So I am happy to —

Mr Dunne: If you were rerunning the project, which, God willing, will happen, will you give us an assurance that you would fully engage with the STG?

Mr Miskelly: I will, and I will tell you why. We will be seeking to have absolute clarity, transparency and efficiency in communication over what is in the existing legal agreements, which includes advisory body sign-off etc.

Today, I have tried to share some of the facts. I appreciate that you got a bundle citing some facts. I have gone through the files and shared other facts. Going forward, suffice to say that it will be every t dotted and i crossed.

Mr Dunne: Would that lead to the STG signing off the plans prior to submission for planning approval?

Mr Miskelly: Again, as per the original intent, sign off that the plans are suitably developed at that point in time, that it is prudent to put in for planning and that they are capable of being further developed at the right time, by the right people, ultimately culminating in attaining a licence —

Mr Dunne: That is not exactly what I am saying. We were told today clearly that the STG had not signed off the drawings or plans prior to submission to the Planning Service. Will you give us assurance that that will not happen in future, if you are in post?

Mr Miskelly: Thank you for the confidence. On the phrase "sign off", clearly, at the time, as the file presents, the acknowledgement in the email exchange was sufficient to generate the confidence between the project architect and the chair of the STG. It should be noted that those two professional people previously worked together for a long time in Sport NI. There was mutual respect, trust and understanding. In terms of what format that documentation will take going forward, yes, I will give an undertaking that it will be very clearly spelt out that the design is at an appropriate stage.

Mr Dunne: But when is the appropriate stage? Surely the ordinary man in the street who goes to the Planning Service to get his house built gets the house designed and then forwards his planning application with the complete design. Why is it different? I know that you are going through the whole design-and-build process, which, to me, is a very loose procedure. It lacks real management. I really do think that is a big risk.

Mr Miskelly: I agree. The design and build allows it, and it is clearly prudent to tie down the fundamentals. I agree, and a key focus will be on making sure that the fundamentals are locked down and protected. To use the analogy, the door is the right width, but we do not know what colour the door will be painted; we will sort that out down the line. I understand that appropriate balance, and I will reflect that.

Mr Dunne: With due respect — and I mean it — that was not the case here. The building could have been built to a specification that would have needed major change, including amending the planning application. Is that true? That could have happened.

Mr Miskelly: That is a hypothetical question on a series of events.

Mr Dunne: No, it is not. You had full planning permission to proceed to build, so that building could have been constructed and would not have been compliant with the requirements of the final safety certificate. Do you accept that that is a real risk?

Mr Miskelly: That is a risk. The question is what scale the risk was. That is why I welcome the PAR that will highlight —

Mr Dunne: I do not think you grasp the significance of that risk.

Mr Miskelly: On every project, culminating with the day and hour of opening, the last inspection by the fire brigade etc, it is a key risk if they turn up to an inspection two days before opening and say, "You've to do x, y and z". The question at hand —

Mr Dunne: Sorry, the Fire Authority would be part of the STG though.

Mr Miskelly: I speak around general project delivery. Again, the Department recognised them and brought them on board through the STG at an early stage. That is the relevance of full build only as a procurement choice. If the answer is to design everything to the nth degree, take six years to design it in a rising market, produce documentation right down to the nth degree and then have a contractor and build only, that is back to the fundamental procurement strategy. What we need to understand through the PAR is whether we were disproportionately at the wrong place and time with the design at that stage.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Just before David comes in, I want to pick up on the point that you made in response to Gordon that some people then transferred. When the thing was handed over from Sport NI to DCAL, did some people move across at that point?

Mr Miskelly: Yes, that is factual.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Who moved across?

Mr Miskelly: My understanding is that a programme gateway review informed the decision of the Department to appoint a project director and establish the capital team. The individuals who, I understand, came down from Sport NI under TUPE, or whatever the exact terminology was, were Ciaran McGurk, who became the programme manager, Carl Southern, the departmental —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): So Ciaran McGurk and Carl Southern were both in Sport NI and then moved across. I was not aware of that.

Mr Miskelly: Along with two other staff officers and an EO. I believe that it is relevant in terms of their background and their working relationship, albeit they were working from a different building and with a different letterhead.

Mr Hilditch: Those people are gone. How many of the five people are still there?

Mr Miskelly: Of the five, three are still in the team now. The two who have left are Ciaran and Carl.

Mr Hilditch: It is getting a wee bit like your office down here, Chair, with the amount of paperwork and whatnot. As far as DCAL is concerned, it reminds me of the story of the hand grenade with the pin taken out; it keeps getting passed on and juggled about. You gave us great examples of all the technical side of it and your personal experience. That is all grand, Rory, but, at the end of the day, as far as the Committee is concerned, it is about the openness of the process and what we should have known and what we were not told. You said that you did not know a terrible lot until 30 April. What did you know prior to that? That would maybe help matters.

Mr Miskelly: I come back to a factual position. If it was such a serious issue, I would welcome evidence from the sponsor board, correspondence with me or whatever was given to me. I have no absolutely no interest, in my profession, in being involved in a job that has a risk of project failure.

Mr Hilditch: Who feeds information to you, at your level, from the likes of STG minutes? In those minutes, it was advised that the emergency exiting figures are significantly below the 38,000, that a redesign would be required and that the Department and Sport NI should be advised of the magnitude of the shortfall. That is all from around 2014. There is language there that people must have picked up on and maybe passed on to you. Did nobody bring that forward at all?

Mr Miskelly: Sorry, when was 2014 mentioned? What document is it?

Mr Hilditch: It was just before you started, in and around January 2014.

Mr Miskelly: Is that notes of a meeting?

Mr Hilditch: Of the STG, yes.

Mr Miskelly: Again, that is notes held by an individual, not minutes. I would expect —

Mr Hilditch: It is a minute, sorry. There is an attendance record, apologies and an introduction.

Mr Miskelly: The context of that is the basis of design development. By the Chair's own admission, once you solve a technical problem, that drawing becomes obsolete and you move on. That process was ongoing. The key question is this: was it over and above the normal level of design development and where was it at? If it was, was it escalated and, if so, how? I will very clearly say that, until 30 April, the perceived scale of the challenge at that time had not been communicated to me.

Mr Hilditch: You referred to a Populous letter to the GAA on 7 April. The middle paragraph is probably the most important. It states:

Did that not flag up this question in April 2014: if the Andersonstown Road has a serious incident on it, where will the people go?

Mr Miskelly: I would expect that — the STG is a logical vehicle to do it, because of the blue-light services — a risk-based approach is taken to it. The design team responds to the broad consensus of the STG that, if it is reasonable, the STG and the blue-light services will agree on the probability and impact of x, y and z. Part of the modelling work reflects that.

Mr Hilditch: That lets the cat out of the bag. If Andersonstown Road is not available, you have a major problem.

Mr Miskelly: May I come back, Chair? If two of the major entrance points at Ravenhill are lost, where are we? A risk-based approach is taken.

Mr Hilditch: I would hope that the emergency exiting plan takes that into consideration.

Mr Miskelly: Again through the PAR, we will see what process was taken.

Mr Hilditch: No, that is another red herring, to be honest. We are dealing with Casement here.

Mr Miskelly: OK, let us stick to Casement. Is it prudent then —

Mr Hilditch: The Andersonstown Road is closed; there is an alert on it. There is a problem that means that people cannot use it. That paragraph let the cat out of the bag.

Mr Miskelly: The true question is this: is it the case that in absolutely no circumstances the Andersonstown Road can be closed? I understand that in the previous management plan there was an agreement to close it 15 minutes before and after a game. Two years ago, and I will come back to Casement, we did not close Mount Merrion at Ravenhill. We do now. That is the importance of seeing the work through and developing it in conjunction with the blue-light services.

Mr Hilditch: That is for ordinary exiting; that is not emergency stuff.

Mr Miskelly: I cannot —

Mr Hilditch: Moving on, how much was the planning application?

Mr Miskelly: I understand that the planning application fee was circa £80,000.

A Member: It was £82,000.

Mr Hilditch: OK. I will wait until some others have had their turn.

Mr B McCrea: You raised a report, 'Casement Park, Belfast: Emergency Evacuation Time Calculations'. You said that there was only one page of it. In paragraph 3.16, it states that:

What does it say for the first condition?

Mr Miskelly: That is the output. Again, I am clear that the Committee has that one page, provided by Paul, that shows the cascading effect of losing increasing numbers of exits.

Mr B McCrea: Well, if you just take the north stand, what does it say?

Mr Miskelly: "All exits unavailable, 29 minutes."

Mr Dadley: On the same page or in other parts of that document, those pure calculations are offered to the STG to carry on the discussion about developing the event management plan in line with the services. They are calculated from —

Mr B McCrea: I am glad, Mr Dadley, that you interjected there. What does either the green or the red book say about the time available for emergency exit?

Mr Dadley: The red and green guide refers mostly to emergency exit as "fire". Nearly all of what it relates to is fire circumstances. It is also made clear that in modern stadiums quite often no exits are discounted in the sense of fire, and in those circumstances people need to be out within eight minutes.

Mr B McCrea: What does it actually say though? What is the guidance? You are an expert; you will be able to tell me. I can hand you the piece of paper, but I presume that you are able to tell me that it is not just up to eight minutes. Eight minutes is for normal. What does it actually say?

Mr Dadley: I could not tell you what the guide says word for word. My understanding of the guide is that exiting is to a place of relative safety, and that is not outside the ground, within eight minutes. It goes on to say that emergency scenarios are to be developed and that it depends on the stadium, in its location, how many exits will be discounted. That is for a group, including the blue-light services, to agree on. It is also for that group collectively to decide on how escape times —

Mr B McCrea: Egress time is at paragraph 9.7. It is emphasised that there is a difference between egress time and emergency evacuation time.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): What page is this on?

Mr B McCrea: I am on page 16 of Paul Scott's papers. I am quoting from the red book, the Northern Ireland guide, and it says that there is a difference between egress time, which is normal, and emergency time. When it comes to the emergency evacuation time, it states:

Eight minutes is at the very top. You have acknowledged that there are papers in here that are 29 minutes, 13 minutes, 10 minutes and nine minutes. Only the bottom one exists.

Mr Miskelly: I need to be clear. This report, which is a snapshot in time, is responding to a "What if?" scenario. There is the "What if?" scenario, and, more to the point, the report clearly says later on that they have made absolutely no allowance for phased evacuation or use of the pitch. That is a separate source of discussion. Chair, I would feel more comfortable that the technical members of the project team come, as I am sure they are scheduled to do, and talk through that in detail.

Mr B McCrea: Let me tell you, I am not a technical member, but even I can read a report that says 29 minutes. Let me tell you, there is not a cat in hell's chance of you getting 38,000 out of that stadium if the Andersonstown Road entrances and exits are not available. It is not possible. I am telling you that. I am not an expert, but I am prepared to go on the record.

Mr Miskelly: Through the Chair, that is where I would come back to say that, with a working document that responded to a "What if?" scenario, the focus should then turn to the risk-based approach by the respective experts in the blue-light services. For example, if we had a shopping centre and four of the five exists were closed off because of bomb scares, what is the risk-based approach to it? We have not concluded that piece of work.

Mr B McCrea: I am telling you that you have taken almost a year and a half to go through this, and you have not come up with an emergency plan. You have taken an hour and a half to talk us through this, and I do not think that you have really addressed the issue. You asked for evidence. I happened to turn to the next page — pages 196 and 197 — which happens to be a letter from the Sport NI chief executive, Antoinette McKeown, to the GAA. It talks at some length about the STG, and it wants to see if we can do away with the issue on the Andersonstown Road. Let me read —

Mr Miskelly: Is the Department copied into that correspondence?

Mr B McCrea: I do not know, but earlier on, I think that part of the evidence —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): It seems that they are. It says here, "From Antoinette McKeown to Peter May". Is that the one?

Mr B McCrea: I am on pages 196 and 197 of Paul Scott's bundle.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Sorry, I am on the wrong page.

Mr B McCrea: This is a letter dated 26 November, and I am told that part of our thing was that you would expect this issue to be brought up at the sponsor board meeting, because Antoinette was on it. I will quote you some of the issues that are raised to the GAA. In the letter, Antoinette states:

She says:

She goes on to say that that was:

She goes on. I asked the permanent secretary about this. There is a list of sponsor board meetings where the emergency evacuation plan was on the plan and did not materialise.

Mr Miskelly: May I respond, Chair? I have tried to set the scene around the ongoing development of it by both the physicality of the design and the long-term management operations. I cannot respond or answer why there was direct correspondence from Sport NI outside of the STG to the GAA without the Department or me or my predecessor being copied in.

I cannot answer that —

Mr B McCrea: So, let me go back —

Mr Miskelly: Sorry, if I can just finish —

Mr B McCrea: I have taken that point, and I am now moving on to a question because —

Mr Miskelly: It is the second point —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Sorry, just —

Mr Miskelly: Secondly, I cannot comment as to why, through the sponsor board minutes, such a serious matter — the minutes will speak for themselves. They are being made available. I cannot explain why, on one hand, such a letter was written, to which we were not party, and, on the other hand, the structures that we put in place to escalate significant issues were not used.

Mr B McCrea: I asked the permanent secretary whether he had been listening to Mr Harkness's submission, and he said that he had. I asked him whether he agreed with the majority of it, and he said that he did. I asked him whether, had he known about the concern of Sport NI, he would have done something about it, and he said that he would have. Her said that he did not know, and yet there is clearly evidence coming out. My biggest concern about what you have said is that this is all about trying to protect; "We didn't know", and, "I wasn't told". The truth of the matter is that we could have built a stadium and not received a certificate for the capacity that we built it for. That could have happened.

Mr Miskelly: The truth — I welcome it — is to find out what was communicated, and when and why, and who it was not communicated to.

Mr B McCrea: Does the Department —

Mr Miskelly: I —

Mr B McCrea: Does the Department give approval before designs go through for planning permission?

Mr Miskelly: The technical process in project delivery is that the Department acknowledges and accept certain milestones and dates. The acceptance or approval of a design in construction delivery infers responsibility for design, so the responsibility for design is never transferred from the designers.

Mr B McCrea: Does the Department give approval before a design goes to planning?

Mr Miskelly: The Department checks to see whether the respective dates have been met. In that particular respect, that is why the position of the STG prior to planning, and that email of 19 June, sets the scene. There is a lot of talk about things being referred to. Where is the fundamental, "This is a potential show-stopper."? Where is the fundamental, "This thing will never be capable of delivering a fraction of the benefits realised."? The answer is that, from a documentary point of view, that has not been found.

Mr B McCrea: Can you tell me — you are an employee of the Department — whether the Department gives formal approval before a design goes to planning?

Mr Miskelly: The planning is submitted by the applicant, which is the Ulster council of the GAA. We make it a condition of funding that, to protect funding eligibility, they must do x, y and z.

Mr B McCrea: Do you give formal approval?

Mr Miskelly: In respect of —

Mr B McCrea: I have a letter from the previous permanent secretary that states:

Does the Department do that? You have given me a long CV about all the projects that you have been involved in and all the issues. Is this a condition?

Mr Miskelly: It is a condition of grant eligibility that x, y and z have been met. The Department was clearly satisfied that, from the position of the STG, there was nothing to materially not submit the planning application.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Basil —

Mr B McCrea: I am sorry. I asked the permanent secretary this, and I want to get —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Just one more question.

Mr B McCrea: OK.

The permanent secretary said:

That is a statement by the permanent secretary before authorisation to go forward for planning. Do you agree with that statement?

Mr Miskelly: I agree with those. Those are the exact parameters.

Mr B McCrea: Was it done?

Mr Miskelly: I can only speak about what I find in the files.

Mr B McCrea: And what did you find in the files?

Mr Miskelly: I found the email confirmation from the chair of the STG on 19 June, the day the planning was in, that there was no material concern that would prevent planning being submitted.

Mr B McCrea: I will conclude on this point. You are telling us that there is no cause for concern —

Mr Miskelly: No —

Mr B McCrea: — this is absolutely fine and that you can see nothing of any worry in this bit here. Is that what your statement is: that he said it is OK and you are saying it is fine?

Mr Miskelly: No, no. There is a difference. I have tried to respond to the concerns that were raised on 30 April. In retrospect, should that have been issued as a certificate and countersigned by all parties etc? Looking back, that is for material consideration going forward. I agree that it relied on an assessment of the status at the time between the working parties. The question was about whether there was any evidence of an underlying issue. When it comes to the formal sign-off and the process and the documentary evidence, I take the member's point going forward. That is why my earlier comment about I's dotted and T's crossed will be borne in mind.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I want to go back to a point that was raised in your answer to Mr McCrea about the letter from Antoinette McKeown to the GAA. You have been working on two projects — we will park the issues around Ravenhill. There was still ongoing work on Windsor Park and Casement Park. You are focused on two big projects, and the GAA is the big partner in the Casement Park project. If it got a letter from Antoinette McKeown, would it have talked to you about that, or did it keep that to itself?

Mr Miskelly: I was aware; I do not want to get into the detail. The GAA has a long-standing relationship with Sport NI. The interface outside of Casement Park has day-to-day dealings through the safety advisory group and ongoing licensing over another 15 or so designated venues.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): On this particular point, this was a letter, from what I can see of it, about Casement Park. That is the title on the letter — "Casement Park Project". The GAA gets a letter from Sport NI with the big title, "Casement Park Project". Did it ever mention that letter to you?

Mr Miskelly: Certainly, at the time of that letter or within a period after it, it was not —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): How long ago did you first come across that letter?

Mr Miskelly: What was the date of the letter?

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): November 2014.

Mr B McCrea: The date of the letter is 26 November 2014.

Mr Miskelly: That was during the final throes of the JR determination. I am sure that we received correspondence on a number of matters. We received project-related correspondence. That is not my recollection —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): You had not seen that letter until the last day or so.

Mr Miskelly: I had not seen that letter until last month, through DCAL etc. I will undertake to factually check what we received and when. That is all I can do, if that is agreeable.

Mr Ó hOisín: Thanks, Rory and Andrew; you have been very comprehensive; we are in here two hours already. Some of the evidence that the Committee has heard to date has been a challenge; we have not dismissed some of it. There has been a lot of emphasis on the role and responsibilities and importance of the STG, because of your role, particularly, in the Ravenhill project, or the Kingspan Stadium, as it is now known. That actually received planning permission before the STG was even constituted. I have been to Ravenhill, and it is an excellent stadium. I was there recently. When the STG was constituted, did it come back and say that anything needed to be rectified? You mentioned the Mount Merrion and Ravenhill exits, and I know that even in recent times there was an experiment with a one-way system and stuff like that to try to improve exiting from Ravenhill. Was there anything that anybody brought back to you subsequently? Safety is an organic development that is based on situations and experience.

Mr Miskelly: That interaction carried on through the build period at Ravenhill, culminating in physical checks and measurements being made three days before the big quarter-final home match. The ongoing interaction with the STG during the construction period is a fact and answers the question about Ravenhill.

Mr Ó hOisín: OK. In terms of stadium development, and thinking ahead, could a degree of future-proofing for capacity be put into any stadium design? Perhaps, after promotion or something else, attendance and whatnot would soar. Would that be accounted for in any plan?

Mr Miskelly: Ravenhill is a very good example of future-proofing, not only in terms of the higher level of code over and above the funding agreement at the time, but the early stages of the inclusive stadia advisory group, where emerging best thought was brought into a lot of practical areas to be an excellent model that was well over and above code with regard to disability and accessibility.

As regards future-proofing: absolutely. This comes back to the design-and-build process. Sometimes, the contractor is best placed to bring this to the table. They might say, "We know that this bit of precast is not in the original plans, but if we put it in now, it will be easier at a future date to go back and turn that into a storeroom." I treat that as incumbent on construction and design professionals, because that is what gets best value for money.

Mr Ó hOisín: Could any safety aspects be future-proofed in the design?

Mr Miskelly: In Ravenhill?

Mr Ó hOisín: In any stadium.

Mr Miskelly: Absolutely: it is best practice. You have statutory compliance, best practice and emerging changes. No one wants to invest a large sum of capital and then find out in five years' time that a change in the legislation is coming down the road. That is why Ravenhill has built in a number of things. That is the best use. At the end of the day, from a financial performance point of view, no one wants spikes or big asks in seven years' time. Maximise and get as much of the top bar over and above basic code compliance that you can through capital investment, and it leaves the long-term cost in use as a relatively flat operating cost.

Mr Dadley: That was the fundamental reason for introducing the green guide, as well: it was ahead of the red guide.

Mr Ó hOisín: Absolutely.

Mr Miskelly: I will just use an analogy. It is a bit like building control requirements. Building control says that you need four inches of insulation. That is the minimum. Building control requirements are the minimum. If I were the house owner, I would say that I want to put in six inches of insulation because, in the long term, I will have better heating bills. It is the same approach.

Mr Ó hOisín: Yes. Obviously, both the red and green guides are updated quite regularly.

Mr Miskelly: Yes. It is a good example actually. Specifically in Ravenhill at the time, the higher forthcoming code of two years' time became the brief. It is a bit like the insulation: you could have gone for the current regs, but why would you do that when you are putting off a risk that, inevitably, down the line, there will be a capital ask and you will need to spend more money to up the current code or get a restriction factor put on you. You are constantly looking to the future — not only how you can get 18,000 in on day one, but how you protect that position in the long term.

Mr Ó hOisín: Is the location of Ravenhill perhaps a tighter position?

Mr Miskelly: All three are existing sports grounds with proven track records. All three have adjacent residential areas of different scale and mass, but similar challenges. At the end of the day, that is why you assemble the right teams. Projects like that are challenging and rewarding.

Mr Ó hOisín: OK. I suppose that central to this inquiry has been the breakdown of the relationship between the chair of the STG and others. I am glad that you are coming forward with a timeline of that engagement. You did give fairly extensive coverage of that. The view of the chair of the STG on the date of the submission has to be materially relevant to this, because there seems to have been a change of mind between November 2014 and, certainly, 30 April 2015.

Mr Miskelly: I can deal only with facts.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Do we have that letter?

Mr Miskelly: That will be in the submission prior to the —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I just want to clarify that we are referring to a letter that we have not seen. That is fine.

Mr Ó hOisín: But the view of the chair would have been materially relevant in any consideration?

Mr Miskelly: I have just read it out verbatim.

Mr Ó hOisín: Ravenhill received planning permission before the STG was constituted. Where did Windsor lie in that?

Mr Miskelly: Ravenhill received planning. There was ongoing design development. Final minor planning amendments etc were subsequently submitted to tidy up — for want of a better term — the design development. It comes back to this design-and-build approach. That is the experience in Ravenhill.

Mr Ó hOisín: Where did Windsor sit with regard to the STG being constituted?

Mr Miskelly: As evidenced by Rosalie Flanagan, again, there was STG input. It was very supportive and acknowledged. Indeed, it is a reciprocal arrangement. The good work of the STG has been acknowledged in various documentation.

Mr Ó hOisín: Andrew, you mentioned that getting people to safety is the first consideration. In the past, we have seen, unfortunately, the previous stadia disasters at Ibrox, Heysel, Bradford and even Hillsborough, where the pitch was actually a consideration in that. Is that part of that?

Mr Miskelly: That — sorry, I will let Andrew come in, but that hits the nail on the head for me. The shutters were pulled down on a process that had not yet been completed. OK, the guys did a model on not using the pitch. For me, wearing my non-technical hat in respect of the legislation, the relevant experts have to agree some of those fundamental principles. We have heard one side saying that they do not believe that the guide allows the pitch as a place of safety. I would just refer to any forthcoming appearance by the other relevant experts on the matter.

Mr Dadley: I agree with that. You could read the guidance. There is certainly a part of the guidance that says that in a newbuild stadium, the pitch should not be used. As Rory said, there are other professionals whom we are talking to and other stadiums. The guide also says that it is on a case-by-case basis. For example, in some of the scenarios that have been run out for Casement Park, by using the pitch you would actually exit the stadium in a much quicker time.

Mr Miskelly: I will just add two things to that. First, that is why I am looking forward to a benchmarked, evidence-based approach under the PAR. What has every other stadium in the UK done? Secondly, the irony is not lost on me that the Gaelic pitch at 140 metres long is a very expansive piece of ground. It is the largest of all three.

Mr Ó hOisín: After the Hillsborough disaster, were the conditions of all stadia not reconsidered and the likes of that pitch-side fencing done away with then?

Mr Dadley: Absolutely. I would also say — I know that there has been talk about this — that if the stadium is used for a concert, 15% of those people would be on the pitch listening to the concert, so they would be exiting from there. As Rory said, that —

Mr Miskelly: We need the experts to conclude the exercise and have a view, as I say, on a benchmarked, evidence-based approach. It is wrong to speculate any further.

Mr McMullan: Most of what I was going to ask has been answered. Going back to the pitch question, you said to look at the book. Is not using the pitch in the green book or the red book?

Mr Miskelly: It is complicated. My layman's understanding is that you can use the pitch as a place of safety, which is determined by whether people are stationary, there is pressure behind them, etc. I fully understand. It needs to feed into the wider flow. That is why the crowd modelling and flow is so important. I will come back to it. The guidance is there. There are experts in the field who have delivered a vast number of UK stadiums. They use the green guide and, indeed, the red guide. I need them to conclude that.

Mr Dadley: The point that I would make is that it is a guide. Again, with Casement Park, for example, because of the nature of the pitch, you enter effectively on the first floor and then you come down, whereas if you enter the pitch, particularly from the side entrances, it has been described that you can go through the tunnels and straight out the side entrances at street level.

Mr Miskelly: A very blunt analogy from my frame is that if the guidance document says that you need to get people to a place of safety, designers and experts assess where they think the best places of safety are on your particular project.

Mr McMullan: Is that the interpretation at the minute?

Mr Miskelly: That technical piece of work has not been concluded.

Mr McMullan: Going back to Mr Scott's presentation, he laboured at length on the fact that the pitch was not used in the scenario of the time frame for the flow of exit. He was very specific on that: the pitch was not and could not be used. What you are telling me now is different to what was said there. This is coming down to the whole crux of this inquiry. We can wander away from this inquiry a little bit here. It has got me a little bit confused on the whole thing now.

Mr Miskelly: Absolutely. I want absolute clarity that, with the STG expertise, money was paid to an exemplary worldwide stadium expert for work for the GAA. We have a design-and-build contractor, and they have an exemplary architects team, again, with exemplary experience. I think that they need to come to the Committee and share their facts and opinions in order that the Committee reaches an informed and balanced view as to what the facts are for that position.

Mr McMullan: Another thing is that there is a report in there. We talked about it earlier; forgive me for not remembering. There was no name on it, and it was not signed or anything. We are only concluding who —

Mr Miskelly: That is the particular interim STG report, by itself. When you go through a file, factual things like admin help you to understand.

Mr McMullan: I have just a few last observations. Was the phrase "Hillsborough disaster" ever mentioned, prior to this going into planning application? We found out today, from the correspondence that you have shown there, that everybody was happy with the application.

Mr Miskelly: Again, the facts speak for themselves. I know that other colleagues are struggling to recollect whether the word was used before 30 April.

Mr B McCrea: I think that that is appalling.

Mr Miskelly: Sorry?

Mr B McCrea: I think it is appalling that you insinuate that, because the word is not mentioned. Hillsborough is not on every person's mind.

Mr Miskelly: That was the question through the Chair.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Sorry, Basil. There is a valid point there, which we will come to in a minute. Let him finish his point and then we will deal with it, rather than have a free-for-all.

Mr McMullan: It is same question that I asked before. The word "appalling" never came into it, and I do not see that there should be a difference going into it now. I am trying, for my own benefit, to look at this inquiry because I am trying to focus on why this inquiry is being held, not other side parts of it. Why would anybody come out and talk about a Hillsborough-type scenario when —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): There comes a point, Oliver, where we have milked the Hillsborough name and the use of the word to death. It has been discussed at some length, and it is clear that, prior to a certain point, the word was not used. At a certain point it was used. What alternative words were used prior to that can be looked into, but I think it is time to move on to another question. Have you another question?

Mr McMullan: I am just trying to find out from this gentleman whether, from his point of view, that word was ever used?

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): No. We are clear on that.

Mr McMullan: It was not made clear.

Mr Miskelly: Not to the best of my recollection.

Mr McMullan: OK.

Mrs McKevitt: To say that we should not be mentioning the Hillsborough end does not help me gather information on health and safety. When it was raised at the Committee by Mr Scott, we were all horrified. Some 98 people lost their lives at Hillsborough, and the thought that something like that could have happened on our doorstep, or anyone else's, over health and safety issues, red and green book guidance or anything else — it is very important that I am allowed to ask the question of anybody who is giving evidence to the Committee. If I mention Hillsborough 10 times, it is because it has been mentioned and we have all been horrified.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): And I think that it is absolutely important as well, Mrs McKevitt, that it is noted that the reason we are holding this inquiry, which some members of this Committee voted against, is because of that very same concern. That concern motivated us. It maybe did not motivate everybody, but it motivated some of us. Go ahead.

Mrs McKevitt: Given the fact that there are other inquiries being held alongside this as well, I hope that you are not repeating yourself numerous times, Mr Miskelly. I am quite keen to get some information from you. Mr Ó hOisín has already raised the perceived planning permission before an STG was set up, and the importance of the STG and stuff has already been answered by you, so thank you, because I have listened to that. However, I want to ask about the Ravenhill end, or Windsor for that matter, on health and safety emergency plans. Ravenhill got planning permission before the STG was set up. Was there any guidance given, from the red or green book, to the Ravenhill emergency exit plan that was introduced after full planning?

Mr Miskelly: I think I need to be clear. I had no involvement in the early stages of Ravenhill, in my role in the Department.

Mrs McKevitt: Sorry, I thought you said that you were —

Mr Miskelly: I was employed. I acted for the project sponsor, the IRFU, directly. So it would be wrong of me to comment, sitting here as a DCAL official, on what maybe happened whilst I was on the other side of the fence.

Mrs McKevitt: I thought you said that, two or three days prior to Ravenhill being opened, the health and safety team were going round checking?

Mr Miskelly: That is correct. That was in March 2014.

Mrs McKevitt: Was there a certificate already?

Mr Miskelly: The BCC licence was received at some point in March 2014. My apologies; I thought that your question was around the planning submission stage, which would have been a few years before that.

Mrs McKevitt: No, they have already had planning. It is just a health and safety issue, because that is what this inquiry is on.

Mr Miskelly: Yes, and the measuring was of the final checks around the final STG compliance. The final checks by the chair of the STG and his staff were around physically verifying certain measurements on site.

Mrs McKevitt: OK. As to the fact that the pitch cannot be used, I am only a layperson looking from the outside in, but in the Hillsborough disaster, which was the potential happening described, people were prevented from getting on to the pitch. For me, looking at the TV and reports on that, if people had been able to get on to the pitch, a lot more could maybe have been saved because of fencing and stuff. I am sure, without any shadow of a doubt, that the red and green book guidance, which has probably been re-written several times since the Hillsborough disaster, was brought into stadium guidance on health and safety. Would you agree with that?

Mr Miskelly: I think that the lessons learned and the subsequent —

Mr Dadley: Again, there is debate among the experts on that. I reiterate that, when the red and green guides talk about "emergency", that generally refers to a fire emergency. I know that people have an interpretation of what the red and green guide says, but —

Mr Miskelly: I just want to be absolutely clear. We are talking about the facts : there is a design process and, as I noted earlier, there is the serious body of work to be done in terms of the emergency planning and the procedures, events, safety officer on the day, etc all before. I do not want it perceived that we are not addressing health and safety. We are talking about it from the first stage, as in the design, but I have tried to explain why that is only the first part. There is an overarching narrative, right up to operation and on the day, right down to the events on the day etc. I want to reflect and record those comments. That scenario is fundamentally in it. It is such a key issue to address on any major capital project, and especially on a stadium, so I just want to reiterate that.

Mrs McKevitt: OK. We have Casement, Windsor and Ravenhill. Were the other two based on the red and green books, or just the red book that was indicated earlier on for this part of the region?

Mr Miskelly: Under the building contract, Windsor and Casement are required to comply with the more onerous standard of whatever applies, as is in the red and green guide. As I said in the early stages, certain areas are up and certain areas are down. We are actually striking the highest bar in every section.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): So it applies to all three.

Mr Miskelly: Ravenhill, contractually, from memory —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Maybe it was earlier.

Mr Miskelly: It was earlier; it was only the red in the building contract. However, the physical facilities built have been done 98% or 99% to the green guide.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Certainly, Windsor Park was done to —

Mrs McKevitt: Sorry, I just want to get that. I asked a question. So Ravenhill has been passed as —

Mr Miskelly: Over and above the contractual requirements, and it ties in with the future-proofing, etc. It was eminently sensible, it was the right thing to do, there was no additional cost —

Mrs McKevitt: So it is done at a green? Ninety-eight percent —

Mr Miskelly: It is over and above the statutory compliance under the building contract. I believe that it was by the book — by the letter of the law — red only. Certain other, more onerous, conditions of the green were achieved. I think that it was the vast majority of the overarching onerous standards. Again, on the basis that Ravenhill was let significantly — a year and a half or two years — in advance, that reflected the status of the programme at that time.

Mrs McKevitt: I am not sure what I have; I assume it is the guidance from Sport NI. I am referring to page 24. In that, Nick Harkness said that on two occasions he did not receive things. There is one where he:

But to you he has got no reply, and that is dated 3 February.

The other one, on 12 May, is an email from Nick Harkness to you, Rory. He wants:

and wanted to offer a "second opinion" on safety matters at Casement Park from the SGSA, which is a UK and world expert. Again, he has received no reply. Can I ask why?

Mr Miskelly: Yes. I tried to address that in my presentation, but I will focus specifically on it if you can just bear with me for a moment. This is important, because I overheard it, and I need to find the bit of paper.

From memory, he cites that on 12 May there is an email with the phrase "no reply". I believe that Nick has cited the wrong date for that email, and that there was a response from me. I am looking at my correspondence, where I wrote to Nick on 26 March. I believe I responded to Nick:

Mrs McKevitt: Sorry, are you talking about your second opinion?

Mr Miskelly: That is what Nick cites in an email. My point is, while he cited that his original email was on 12 May, I believe that, factually, it was earlier. If you read the chain, therefore, my response is in advance of the question being asked, and it obviously could not have been. I think it is an admin error. The papers will very clearly show that.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): If we look at the actual emails in your pack, there are two dated 12 May where somebody has forwarded something to somebody. It is a printout or something, presumably.

Mr Miskelly: That would explain it.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We have the 3 February one, which is the right date. The other should be 23 March.

Mrs McKevitt: Have you responded to the one on 3 February, Rory?

Mr Miskelly: I have a raft of stuff here. On 26 March, I responded in respect of the point for the STG and the role of the potential second expert advisory service, so I believe that answered whatever email that related to, and, hopefully, it did so promptly. I believe it was only asked a few days before that. I think somebody forwarded it on after the event.

There were other emails, such as 14 April, to Nick:

There were emails to Paul during February and March, and I think a lot of them are similar, about meeting up etc, so it is hard to [Inaudible.]

. In relation to the one that has been cited about the two matters — the STG going forward and the expert — I have a response from 26 March, which I believe refers to a response to his email of two days before.

Mrs McKevitt: OK. Is communication still to the front between all parties involved in trying to deliver the project at Casement Park, or has it come to a complete halt?

Mr Miskelly: I have to say, up to the 30 April, my personal tone with the chair of the STG was:

That is the spirit in which I engaged with it at the time. I will let the facts speak for themselves. Nick and I have an excellent relationship. Again, there is correspondence between us. Yes, there were busy weeks, and there was stuff that I said we had to think about etc. There was certainly an email in which I said to Nick, "Sorry, Nick. I've a number of matters here. I'm going to try to pick up a few points that we have been kicking around between us". Those are the facts in my time, all prior to the events at the end of April.

Mrs McKevitt: Do we have the email, in whatever pack, where Paul indicated that he would be more or less happy with the exiting plan? Can you give me guidance on where to find it? Those are not the words he used, but —

Mr Miskelly: That has only since been —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We have not received that.

Mrs McKevitt: Can I ask that we get a copy of that?

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): It will be in the pack that is coming from Rory Miskelly or from whomever.

Mrs McKevitt: Have you seen Paul Scott's bundle of papers?

Mr Miskelly: Yes.

Mrs McKevitt: If there is there anything missing from that, or that you could add to it, that you think would benefit this inquiry, could we get that please?

Mr Miskelly: That was a large part of me trying to say that Paul's bundle is factual in the records of documents. I am just providing another document that is in between, not only to show the position but to set the context and the facts.

Mrs McKevitt: Can I formally ask if there is any other information that would help us?

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We are about to get a third bundle. We had the one from Paul Scott, but we also have the bundle from Sport NI, and there is another one to come. You will get a fourth one as well, probably from the depths of the bowels of DCAL.

Mrs McKevitt: If it comes to a conclusion where health and safety issues that have been raised in any inquiry, not just this —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Absolutely. That is what this is about.

Mr D Bradley: Rory, one of the things that surprised me in what you said earlier was that you mentioned Ravenhill ground, and, if I picked you up correctly, you said that measurements were being taken regarding safety issues three days before the STG compliance was issued. Is that right?

Mr Miskelly: To be fair and to set the context to that, you would expect spot checks etc by an independent party.

Mr D Bradley: If you discovered, under those circumstances, that there was non-compliance, and the stadium was already built and ready to open, what could you do about it?

Mr Miskelly: This is the relevant part. Just for clarity, they were STG personnel, so suffice to say —

Mr D Bradley: Sorry?

Mr Miskelly: They were STG personnel, out around pre-match inspections just as we were about to hit operational readiness. I do not want it perceived in any way that they were the designers, Ulster Rugby or the contractor checking their own work, because those checks and balances would have been done a long time before that.

Mr D Bradley: But you said that those measurements were being carried out —

Mr Miskelly: Checked and verified.

Mr D Bradley: You said that they were being carried out for STG compliance to be issued.

Mr Miskelly: Apologies: it was the STG chair and his assistant carrying them out.

Mr D Bradley: Surely the situation that we want to be in here is that we have in place the highest standards of health and safety regarding emergency exiting and so on, so that there are no worries about checks and —

Mr Miskelly: I welcome the question, because I am unclear. If the STG validates designs and gives advice and its assurance levels also require spot checks of what was physically built and to be certified by an architect, and everybody else as a double- or treble-check —

Mr D Bradley: But the impression that you were giving was that, "Ah, this is nothing unusual, two or three days before the stadium opens or a big event is going to take place". You mentioned the match and these checks being carried out.

Mr Miskelly: I certainly found it curious. My response was given in regard to this question: was there ongoing STG input during the construction of Ravenhill? Notwithstanding my current position and my position then, the answer —

Mr D Bradley: Is the physical capacity of Ravenhill reflected in the safety certificate that was issued by Belfast City Council?

Mr Miskelly: Yes. Ravenhill has a current valid safety certificate for 18,180, 18,200 or something like that, with a P value of 1 and an S value of 1. I say that just as a statement of the current position.

Mr D Bradley: So they match exactly: is that what you are saying?

Mr Miskelly: Sorry?

Mr D Bradley: They match exactly.

Mr Miskelly: Apologies. What matches?

Mr D Bradley: The number and the capacity.

Mr Miskelly: They are both 1. They have no restrictions. They have a certificate for 18,100-odd. There are no restrictions. That is the current position. As long as they continue the good practice and the management operation is in place. They need to protect those operational best practices.

Mr D Bradley: OK. One of the aspects of this inquiry is learning lessons. We are seeking to establish what lessons on emergency exiting can be learned from the Casement Park project. When you reflect on what has gone before your being here today, what would your reply to that be?

Mr Miskelly: It is a very good question. Suffice to say, given the timing of my coming into the programme, the position on Casement and the journey that it has been through recently, and having delved very recently into historic matters, I would want to give a constructive answer and thought to that going forward. For me, having clarity, communication and the right people in the right roles, supported with the right reporting structures, is fundamental. If you are asking me what is my view on how to approach such a complex issue, I will say that I am not an expert on the green guide, but we have enough people within the wider programme and project who are. It must come down to communications, clarity and documentation, which is the way that every other capital project is successfully delivered.

Mr D Bradley: OK. What will be your role going forward to ensure that the issues that you have identified will not be problems in the future?

Mr Miskelly: Again, I believe that I started that with the let's-look-forward discussions in December between Sport NI, at senior level, and me and the Department. It was very much along the lines of, "Send us the terms of reference if there is one." After a period of time, it was clear that there was not one. I took the initiative. I sent the first draft. I said, "Here are our thoughts on it." I asked, "Can we have a methodical structure going forward in terms of the regulatory of meetings?" From December to March, I took the practical steps. I have no desire to go through the process of having to come here and read, from a distance, my experience.

Mr D Bradley: I understood from what you said earlier that, when you came in, your attitude was, "The past is the past. Let's forget about it and move forward." Surely you need to take the lessons of the past and ensure that they are learned and that the forward movement and the future is different from the past.

Mr Miskelly: That is exactly why, when it became clear that there were no terms of reference, we said, "Get terms of reference. Groups should not meet without that. If meetings are held, produce full accurate minutes. Support may be needed to produce the minutes. Part of the discussion is the timely flow of information. If a group meeting is called for the 30th and the papers are not issued on the 24th, cancel the meeting. It is not reasonable. That is not the way to do it. That is all that I ask". When I —

Mr D Bradley: But you started in late 2012, is that right?

Mr Miskelly: No.

Mr D Bradley: When did you start?

Mr Miskelly: Part-time in March 2014 and full-time in August 2014.

Mr D Bradley: The terms of reference did not arrive until 29 April.

Mr Miskelly: You heard this morning that Sport NI's expectation was that my predecessor was to send them. I cannot comment. I believe that you will have my predecessor in this chair.

Mr D Bradley: You were already in post well before 29 April 2015.

Mr Miskelly: Yes.

Mr D Bradley: But the terms of reference, or the intention to establish them, only came by email —

Mr Miskelly: No; that discussion started in December. I came in full-time in August. I reviewed the scenario. You have to bear in mind that, from August to December, we were in a judicial review (JR) process. There was a determination in December. Before the JR was even determined, I was saying, "Whatever happens, let us try to get the right structures going forward." My email chain shows that I made the first cut and made the active suggestions going forward. As we have clearly said, they are with the STG for consideration. That will run its course, and I look forward to engagement whenever we can start it again.

In terms of the SNI comment about who should have produced them back in 2012, I will let other people have that discussion, because I was not around. However, I would certainly not run a process and have a panel meet without terms of reference for two-and-a half years. If I did not receive them from someone else, I would write them myself. [Interruption.]

Mr D Bradley: We are struggling a bit against the construction industry in the background here at the moment. Anyway, you have said that communications, clarity and support are key elements going forward. What sort of a structure that is not there at the moment would ensure that those elements are all built in for the future?

Mr Miskelly: Again, that is what informed the discussions in December etc on looking forward. That is the reason for the practical measures around secretariat support for accurate minute-taking. You have to understand that the STG would, in the normal course, receive a volume of information from contractors, the Department etc. That needs to be distributed to all the STG members, so there is an admin function there. It needs to be done in a timely manner. Those are the practical measures that, personally, I feel should have been in place. In terms of looking forward and lessons learned for the STG and the programme, that is what we started to put in place by supporting the experts in their field.

Mr D Bradley: Are you saying that the whole project and all those involved in it at various levels would need a communications manager to manage all the information?

Mr Miskelly: No, I am saying — well, on the basis that I find evidence that five sets of notes were not issued to the Department, whether that was a result of work pressures, time pressures or whatever, something clearly needs to be put in place so that it does not happen again.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I like this idea that, if something does not arrive five days in advance, the meeting is cancelled. It would be interesting if we applied that to the Department.

Mr Miskelly: I take the Chair's point. It is common practice in a terms of reference —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Absolutely.

Mr Miskelly: — to have quorum of meetings, frequency of meetings and circulation of papers. Three working days is the norm, but I take your point.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I have two more members to speak, Basil McCrea and David Hilditch, and then we will call it a day on this. We have papers to clear after this, but that will be concise.

Mr B McCrea: There was some discussion about the use of the pitch. Karen made the point that surely this would be incorporated into the red book. The question was this: what is the issue about the pitch?

Let me quote to you what it says in the red book. This is where I am interested, Mr Dadley, in whether you are going to deviate and do your own, presumably, yellow book. It says: "While in practice" —

Mrs McKevitt: What is the yellow book?

Mr B McCrea: I am just saying that we are going to get a new book. We have had a green book and a red book. This will be the next book.

Mrs McKevitt: White for peace.

Mr B McCrea: So, Karen, here is the quote that, I think, answers your question:

— in other words, you can do it —

It says categorically in the red book and the green book that you cannot use the pitch for calculating your evacuation time. Are we saying —

Mr Miskelly: Will you reiterate the last sentence of that, please?

Mr B McCrea: It says:

Mr Miskelly: Right. "Forward evacuation" is where you get on to the pitch, you walk and you keep walking. You use the pitch in an emergency scenario for forward evacuation. The guide rightly points out that you should not use the pitch if you are going to marshal people onto it and they have nowhere to go. That last sentence —

Mr B McCrea: All I am saying is that I wanted an answer to this bit. What I heard from Mr Dadley was, "Look, there are experts who can put different interpretations on it". All I am saying is that this is the Northern Ireland red book. This is the standard that the Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure brings out. I expect the decisions to be made to it until somebody changes the book.

Mr Miskelly: The last sentence of that says that the pitch may be used —

Mr B McCrea: It is late, but, if I wanted to go into detail about having read all the papers, you cannot use reservoirs if there is no exit from those places.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I suggest that we —

Mr Miskelly: That is the exact point, Basil. Apologies —

Mr B McCrea: There is not a reservoir.

Mr Miskelly: That is the exact point of the guide. I am a layperson, but it can be used as long as people keep moving. That was the subject of detailed discussions with Paul. How will the crowd modelling show that people —

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): The issue —

Mr Miskelly: — keep moving? When they stop, absolutely.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Whatever you call the UK sports special people who look into all these things — I cannot remember their name —

The Assistant Committee Clerk: The UK Sports Grounds Safety Authority.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We should get some independent clarification.

Mr B McCrea: The only point that I wanted to put on the record is that some people said, "Mr Scott said this. Was he right to say it?". My reading is that Mr Scott quoted from this book, which is why —

Mr Miskelly: Those are the facts.

Mr B McCrea: You do not demur from that.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): We will park that issue. We will be coming back to it.

Mr Hilditch: Thank you, again, everybody. Where does what was deemed to be the safety technical group report of 15 October 2013, which was prior to your engagement, sit with you? Do you pay cognisance to that? Have you read it? Is that part of something that you would have picked up?

Mr Miskelly: Yes, I have read through it. Paul, as chair of the STG, would know that. It was its view at that time.

Mr Hilditch: There is quite a substantial piece from that time on emergency exiting.

Mr Miskelly: On the basis of the further work done in 2014, what is the updated position? That is where we need to get to. That is what the enquiry and the power needs to review. Where does the work reflect that it was undertaken in 2014? Where is the updated report from the STG?

Mr Hilditch: I started off with openness; it was my original point. There was a meeting on 17 April 2014 between Nick Harkness, Carl Southern and Ciarán McGurk in relation to options and solutions. Demolition was on the table. However, at the last meeting that you attended here, which was not that long ago, you indicated to me that demolition was not being considered.

Mr Miskelly: Again, I —

Mr Hilditch: I know that it is a sensitive subject, but the residents have left at this stage. That is why I left it to the end.

Mr Miskelly: I was not at the meeting. I understand that guys were saying, "We've a raft of options; for example...". I previously made the point around the context in which that commercial and sensitive information was given —

Mr Hilditch: I do not want to go away this evening thinking that you have misled me badly. You told me that it was not an option the last time that you spoke about it —

Mr Miskelly: No. If you check the record, I was very clear that the Department would not be funding the buying and demolishing of houses. To be absolutely clear — I believe that it is documented through other papers — the Department would not be funding the buying of houses, full stop. That was the thrust of my point at the time. If the GAA wants to consolidate its title, it, like any developer, is entitled to do so. The real question for the process and the power is to tease out whether that is the only solution. Was that the only solution at the time or was it one of a number of solutions that needed to be worked through? I genuinely just wanted to make that point.

Mr Hilditch: That is fair enough. We are dealing with a unique situation; I have said it many times. At the outset, you mentioned a lot of stadia throughout the world. I have been to a lot of them, and most of them have a big walkway around them. We are dealing with something completely different in this situation. It is a real challenge.

Mr Miskelly: I seem to get involved in challenging projects.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Cathal has told me that he will be extremely brief.

Mr Ó hOisín: I will be very brief. It is a technical question more than anything else. If we are using either the green book or the red book — the green book was quoted a number of times — the green book would obviously be written for British situations. We have established that the pitch can be used in an emergency. The green book does not take into consideration that a GAA pitch — certainly a hurling pitch — is twice the size of a soccer pitch, and a rugby pitch is two thirds of the size. There has to be a consideration of size and accommodation.

Mr Miskelly: That is to do with the technical model, and the experts absolutely assess that.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I want to clarify a couple of points, and then we will finish. When Peter May was in, he said that the Minister would previously have been briefed by Noel Molloy and Ciarán McGurk or by you, Rory, and Ciarán. How often would you have briefed the Minister?

Mr Miskelly: There would be submissions in the system, and there would probably be a discussion prior to sponsor board meetings, but they would not be structured, formal sit-down sessions, certainly in my time.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): So, before the sponsor board meetings, which would normally be chaired by the Minister, you would have had a conversation with her? That would not be abnormal or unusual. It would be a sort of pre-brief.

Mr Miskelly: Yes, but it would have been in the context of the papers that had previously been issued.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): Did you have any meetings with the Minister's special adviser (SpAD) in that period?

Mr Miskelly: He would have been in the room with her.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): But you had no meetings with him apart from that.

Mr Miskelly: Certainly not on a project-related technical issue, if that is the question.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): I have a couple more points to make. I will just make an observation again. It concerns me that, when we had the meeting in December, by which time, I think, the scale of the issue should have been identified and brought to the attention of the Committee, it was not, and that was disappointing. You mentioned that you had a long pedigree with the construction industry, and you talked about it in great detail. For the record, do you have any current personal involvement or interest in the construction industry?

Mr Miskelly: I have an appointment as a non-executive director in a modular company that has no material or related interest in the stadia.

The Chairperson (Mr McCausland): OK, thank you. That is us finished.