Official Report: Minutes of Evidence

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): Lord Boswell, you are most welcome to the Committee. This is not a formal part of the evidence gathering for the inquiry by the House of Lords European Union Select Committee, but I understand that our discussion may be drawn on in your report, so you may wish to take an informal note for inclusion in the appendices.

Members, you have a paper outlining the areas on which Lord Boswell is most interested to hear from us today. We will begin with questions from Lord Boswell, after which we will have an opportunity to engage.

Lord Boswell, would you care to make some opening remarks?

Lord Boswell of Aynho (European Union Select Committee, House of Lords): Thank you very much, Chair and members of your Committee. It is a great honour to be here. It is always a pleasure to be here as well. I think that we are on a voyage of discovery and seeking information as much as to impart it. When you reflect on this, you find only small areas that you might know about. In relation to the referendum, there are a few known knowns, some known unknowns and quite a lot that you are not quite sure whether you know or not.

The Committee will be aware that we have had an initial bite of the cherry, looking at the whole complex of negotiations, renegotiation, reform generally and the referendum process. Just for the record, I ought perhaps to say that, as we are all aware as citizens, the referendum is a UK domestic matter; it is not strictly an EU or scrutiny matter. The merits and detail of that have been debated in Parliament rather than in our Committee.

Our second report, which we are now thinking about and to which your Committee's input will be very helpful, will go a little beyond the earlier one, which inevitably looked at primary process, in trying to find out more about whether there is some sort of shared vision of where this is all going or whether it is becoming clearer. In a sense, the criteria for having the renegotiation and then having the decision in a referendum are beginning to firm up.

That is all that I wish to say by way of preface, except that I would very much like to emphasise that it is extremely helpful to our inquiry to have this exchange of views. We will, as you say, wish to draw on it in helping to form our thoughts.

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): We will leave you to guide the first part of the discussion with your questions, the proviso being that there is not a lot on which we can say that this Committee has taken a view. However, I certainly encourage members to speak freely about their personal and party positions.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: Thank you. The first point — perhaps, in a way, this is the one that is most general — is to get the Committee's feeling on whether we are a little clearer than we were a week or two ago. I think specifically of the Prime Minister's speech at Chatham House and his accompanying letter to President Tusk, which is seen as the end of the phoney war, to use a phrase that I used yesterday informally. We are not having a proper and material discussion, and we understand the basis of negotiations. Does the Committee feel that that is reasonable — that we are beginning to know better what we are about and can therefore discuss its merits?

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): I think so, in that we now know that there are four baskets, as I think they are being referred to. Nevertheless, we still lack some clarity on what success might look like and on the processes required to achieve that success, particularly whether there would be an impact on treaties or whether it could be done by other means.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: You mention treaties. I do not know whether the Committee would like to say more about that. We have had a quick look at Denmark's experience in 1992 and, of course, the south of this island's experience of the Lisbon treaty. There is an assumption, which you may or may not share, that we are unlikely to achieve treaty change within the timescale set for the referendum. The question is whether it is feasible and/or desirable to have a legally watertight understanding, protocol or arrangement deposited at the United Nations or wherever that would indicate that there is some degree of watertight acceptance. I just wonder how you feel about that.

Mr Attwood: Do you mean following a referendum or separate from a referendum?

Lord Boswell of Aynho: I am talking about a situation in which the Prime Minister goes to negotiate in Brussels, as he is doing now, on the basis of the four areas of interest. He had indicated that he wanted "full-on treaty change" — I think that was the phrase — and I think that that has morphed realistically into saying that, if we cannot have treaty change, we have to have something that is fairly legally watertight. Other member states have run into difficulties in the past and have reached an accommodation that seems to have stood the test of time. Is it your feeling that one could achieve something like that, or would you be suspicious unless and until it was in full treaty form?

Mr Attwood: The SDLP does not support a referendum without treaty change. There might be a working assumption in Britain, in the Tory Party or elsewhere in government that there will be a referendum, but we never signed up to the need for a referendum in the absence of treaty change. We do not see why there should be a referendum on something less than a treaty. We might be arguing against the wall in that regard, but that is our view. Something other than a treaty would need to be very legally watertight because, whatever happens, it will be legally challenged.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: Thank you. Would any other parties like to come in on that?

Mr Lyons: I am reluctant to speak too much on behalf of my party, but our view has been that we wish the Prime Minister well. We want change, and we want that in time for the referendum. However, there is an awful lot of concern currently because it is obvious that there will be no treaty change. It just will not happen before the referendum, so will be asked to trust either that changes will happen subsequent to a referendum or that something will be negotiated in the meantime, and there may be questions about how valid that is.

There are certainly a lot of changes that we want to happen, such as what the Prime Minister has set out on economic governance and competitiveness, but those are very different issues from the Prime Minister's other two issues of sovereignty and immigration, which would require treaty change. I think that an awful lot of people would be very suspicious of the whole process without having that firm treaty change.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: I am listening to those voices. It seems to me that there would be a certain reluctance to accept what, for shorthand, I might call the Irish protocol approach to the negotiations. If I might, Chair, perhaps I could ask the more substantive question. As you say, we now have four areas of the negotiations, defined by the Prime Minister in his letter to Tusk. Does the Committee feel that those objectives are attainable? Do you think that, before we get to a treaty or any kind of legally binding agreement, he can meet his objectives in the negotiations? That may lead us on to the question about the Northern Ireland input or the input of the Northern Ireland interest to that negotiating process. The simple question is whether it is a quest that he can come back from with a success.

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): That takes me back to the point that the Prime Minister has not defined what success looks like across any of those four areas, or, if he has, I am not aware of it. If I was being cynical, I might suggest to you that it is not about clearly defined outcomes across the four areas but more about the ability of the Prime Minister to come back from Brussels and say, "There you are. I've done a Thatcher. I've stood up to them. This isn't a one-way street going against British interests, and we're now settled that we're a major player in the EU and can effect change for the good of our people". It becomes more about a feeling than concrete deliverables.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: Do I discern from that that it would be for a domestic audience as much as for a Brussels audience, if I can put it that way? Is that felt across the Committee?

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): Yes.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: On the other hand, it would have to have some substance. Let us take, just for the sake of argument, the question of his reservations about an ever-closer union. We can put in the other words that are increasingly coming back into the debate among the peoples of Europe, but, if we take that as a concept — I am thinking aloud a bit — do you see that as something that the European Court of Justice, in a difficult case 20 years down the track, might take account of and say, "We have reached some understanding with the British. They don't have to be driven into an ever-closer union, and this might represent one, so we should take that into account"?

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): Yes.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: Is that the sort of mood music? That is helpful.

Mr Lyons: You are talking about how achievable his objectives are: the one that stands out more than any other relates to immigration and the free movement of people.

It will be exceptionally difficult for any real reform to happen because, whatever your view on it, a significant number of countries will not want any change. Poland has already indicated that it does not want any change to that. How will the Prime Minister get agreement when so many voices among member states are so strongly opposed to it?

Lord Boswell of Aynho: In a sense, we are already exchanging views, which is very helpful to me. First, the Prime Minister has conditioned his remarks by saying, "If you can find a better way of doing this or a way that is more acceptable, it is up to you". He has received some domestic criticism for even making that an option.

I find it interesting that the Prime Minister, even in his correspondence with President Tusk, is, in effect, saying that three of the so-called four freedoms — the movement of goods, services and capital — are OK and that the problematic one is the issue of migration. Members of my Committee may take different views on the weight of that, but it is a serious issue.

It would be helpful to tease out the extent to which that is seen as an issue in Northern Ireland in terms of, for example, cross-border movement to work and the conditions in which people might work alongside each other in the workplace. Is that an area that has concerned your Committee?

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): It is not one that we have —

Mr Lyons: It is not one that has been discussed here during my time.

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): Of course, the fact that we have a land border with a eurozone exercises the Executive and the Assembly regularly, but that is more about devolution than EU membership. We look, for example, at the Republic's 12·5% corporation tax rate and try to assess how that impacts our ability grow a vibrant private sector, hence the drive to devolve corporation tax powers to these institutions.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: I am not trying to gloss your position, but, in a sense, your concern in the public debate on this — one of the things that we want to draw out is a bit of the party feeling on this among the different communities and parties — is the macro level and how we can produce a stable economic situation as much as it is about individual rights and whether people have the same access to benefits. I just want to get a flavour of that.

Mr Maskey: Sinn Féin's position is that, on one level, it is entirely a matter for the British Government to pursue the agenda that they are pursuing. I take no issue with that in principle. I am not sure what the objectives are, so I cannot see how they will measure a successful negotiation, even on the issues that have been identified, because it is, essentially, a domestic political argument. That is fine, but the difficulty for us is that the outcome will have a direct impact on us. There will be people in our community who have different views about the EU and membership of the EU, but a lot of people across both main communities here will recognise the benefits that the EU has brought over a number of years and across a number of issues. I do not think that anyone could contest that.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: If I may interrupt, is it a fairly universal impression across Northern Ireland — neutral to community membership and party affiliation — that most people see positive benefits to the economy from British and Irish membership of the EU?

Mr Maskey: That is probably fairly true and fair to say, not only on the economy but on a wide range of social issues. Membership of the EU fast-forwarded some changes in our society and has been immensely beneficial in terms of some of the EU programmes, even in the earlier days of the peace process.

I hope that, when the debate on the referendum takes off, it is not entirely politicised along the normal lines. It is an issue that impacts differently across communities. If it goes beyond the main constitutional issue here to what the impact would have been had the EU not been involved, I do not believe for a second that too many people here will have any influence over that, because this is a political domestic argument in Britain.

Brexit would have major implications here and could be very challenging, to say the least, to communities that have been able to work together through the programmes that have come through the EU. There has been commonality, and differences were set to one side because communities were involved in programmes that were immediately beneficial.

The relationship between here and the rest of the island of Ireland could also be affected. I think that there would be major community and cross-border challenges because people here have different political views, affiliations and so on. However, even now, the relationship between the North and the South, particularly after the Good Friday Agreement, is fundamentally different from what you might deal with in devolved Administrations in Scotland or Wales, for example. It does not equate — it does not compute at all.

Brexit would have major ramifications here, both for the communities in the North and between the North and the South. I do not think that those concerns should be easily dismissed in the way that they have been thus far. People here need to have a voice, and that voice needs to be encouraged and listened to properly.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: Thank you. I take it that there is probably a degree of assent from the different traditions across the Committee on that matter. Do you share that view? Would anyone like to qualify that? I am anxious to get a sense of whether this is a fairly strong cross-community view or whether it is in any sense differentiated between the communities.

Mr Lyttle: I will probably not give you much clarity on that. I am from the Alliance Party, which is a cross-community party, so I do not know how helpful I will be on that front. On the substance of the issue, the Alliance Party does not see a need for a referendum, but, accepting that there will be one, we are strongly in favour of remaining within a strong EU.

The implications of change on a North/South relationship need careful consideration. A core element of the Good Friday Agreement is the North/South strand, which is, I think, a vital element of building peace and reconciliation here, as well as social and economic development. There has been strong commentary from many in the business community that North/South cooperation is vital for economic development in Northern Ireland and that more should be done to develop a very strong eastern corridor between Belfast and Dublin — the two central hubs on the island of Ireland.

Mr Maskey mentioned the peace and reconciliation programme funding from Europe. The INTERREG funding from Europe has been absolutely vital to building peace and economic development here in Northern Ireland. Indeed, the Executive in Northern Ireland and even the UK Government, at times, have struggled to match the investment from Europe in those key areas, so we have concerns that that should not be in any way impacted by proposals for reform in Europe.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: I will just unpack that for a moment. Sometimes, people argue — I have come from an interesting Brexit debate at Queen's University this morning — "Well, if we were not putting the money into Brussels, we might have more money available to spend domestically, and there might be an option of UK funding".

Do you find that plausible or unlikely? Not necessarily you, but maybe other Committee members as well.

Mr Lyttle: I will answer briefly, so you can speak to other members. My concern is that, for whatever reason, those issues have not been the priority for other Governments that they should have been.

Mr Attwood: I think that most people have a sense, in as much as they interrogate the evidence, that we have been a net beneficiary of EU membership, certainly, financially, if not in more broad terms. There is no big sector of our society — community, voluntary, business or farming, farming being our biggest industry — that is gung-ho about exiting the EU. There is no sense of that, although there may be issues with elements of Europe: over-regulation, red tape, EU reform or whatever. A couple of years ago, I was our candidate for the European Parliament. I lost, but I was a candidate. Going round the North, I found that even if people had issues with Europe there was no great appetite for withdrawal. Without anticipating what other parties might say, you get a sense that even those who have been, historically, dubious are becoming more neutral, as opposed to the UKIP approach.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: This is not meant querulously or to question that, but why do you say that? Is it a sense that you get from the public debate or from what constituents say when you meet them? Maybe they do not even articulate it, but what is the feel of it?

Mr Attwood: My comment was more about the parties. It is for other people to speak, but, historically, there have been at least two parties around this table that might have been dubious about European Union membership. I think that they have moved to a point of either being in support of the EU or being more neutral. That might not be the way that it is sometimes articulated, but that is, I think, the sense of things. The farming sector would beat its chest about over-regulation, green tape, the renewables agenda and the green agenda in Europe; nonetheless, it is not making a big argument for exiting the EU.

What happens over the next 18 months will, I think, be quite fluid because, given where we are today compared with two or three weeks ago, the approach to Europe and European issues has changed following what happened in Paris, and the issue of people moving across borders. If you had asked the question three or four years ago, when the crash came — the character of the conversation seems to me to be constantly changing. Therefore, it is hard to anticipate where we will be in a year from now. I think that Cameron will get to the point where, whatever the outcome, he will define it as a success, because I do not think that he has the inclination to pull out. To echo Alex, withdrawal would have a disproportionate impact on our people here, given our land border and the historic benefits that the EU has brought. I think that, when all those facts become clear, there will be a very clear vote in the North in favour of staying in.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: Do I detect any dissent from that general proposition? Gordon, I suspect you might.

Mr Lyons: Yes, slightly. I will go back to a few points that others have made. I see that Alex is on his way out, but I was pleased to hear what he said about agriculture. I would like to say that nearly everyone in this room believes that agriculture is hugely important.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: I ought to declare an interest as a working farmer.

Mr Lyons: It is hugely important to Northern Ireland, and I think that an awful lot of people who work in or who are associated with agriculture have concerns about what will happen to the single farm payment. That is where our concern is. You said that we have put so much money into the EU and that what we would get back, although there is currently a deficit to us, could be spent on other things. I think that, if there was a commitment on some kind of UK single farm payment, that might assuage some people's fears. We had a debate about Trident in the Assembly this week, and the argument was made that if we got rid of Trident we would have £137 billion over the next 30 years to spend on welfare, health and education. I do not think that that would necessarily happen if we were to get rid of Trident, and it is the same for all the money that we are putting into Europe that we are not getting back. I do not think that it would necessarily go on our pet projects or on the things that we want to see happen. I do not think that we should assume that, when that money comes back, we can have it for whatever we want in Northern Ireland.

Mr Maskey: It sounds as if you would be against a Brexit.

Mr Lyons: No, definitely not. Personally, I am wavering on this at the moment. I want the Prime Minister to come back with real reforms, but I am unconvinced at the minute.

I agree with what Chris said about wanting to see good relations with the Republic of Ireland developing; I have no argument with that. However, I do not think that for the UK to be outside the EU would necessarily damage that relationship. I do not think that the common cause that we have found in recent years in wanting to build our economies together and all the rest is dependent on EU membership, although, of course, there may be challenges that come with that.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: Thank you. Before I conclude, I want to have a word or two about the extent to which your interests are represented in the debate at Westminster. Just to wrap up on the issues of substance that we have been talking about, am I right in saying that, across the parties and communities, there is a very strong interest in agriculture because of its strength in Northern Ireland and, indeed, on the island of Ireland? We have not talked about tourism in terms, but there is a question, particularly if there is a physical, hard border, about the extent to which that would be inhibited and any other sectional interests that you might be concerned about. There is the question of the common travel area, for example, which has not been brought out in London yet.

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): We could add in fisheries.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: Yes, please.

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): We are coming to that time of year when the annual quotas are agreed. It is a frustration as a devolved regional government that we do not have the same access and leverage in those annual negotiations because we are playing second fiddle to the UK Government. The Republic of Ireland is a nation-state player, so we feel the disadvantage. We feel that we could make an argument that we should lead, given its disproportionate importance to our economy. The point has been made that if the money that we give to Europe was not being given to Europe, there could be more money for agriculture, but we do not believe for a second that David Cameron's Government would rate agriculture as worthy of the subsidies that we might argue for. On a realpolitik level, we do not see it. Moreover, nobody has ever been able to say that, for every pound that leaves Northern Ireland for Brussels, the exact amount of money coming back is x or y. If you look at Peace I, II and III, and the coming Peace IV, we do very well, but the exact figures are not clear because so much of it goes through Treasury and through London.

The other debate is the non-financial. What are the benefits of a strong European Union when President Putin is flexing his muscles, and we have all the other international threats that leave the threat of violence at extreme levels?

Lord Boswell of Aynho: It was interesting that Mr Attwood, I think — forgive me if it was not — mentioned Paris and the events of the other day. I would be interested in the Committee's take on that. This is a personal view, but it seems to me that it could go one of two ways. People could say, "This only goes to prove that, if Syrian migrants are finding their way into the community and blowing up citizens of the European Union in Paris — it could be Brussels and London at any time — that should be stopped". It could harden the approach. On the other hand, you could say, from a community viewpoint, that, if it is revealed that our border security is not very good and that we have not handled the migration problem collectively very well — that is a reasonable inference — we need to do it better. Has anyone here a sense of which way that debate will go? It is not just at the level of policy-making but also in terms of the public debate. Are people agitated because they feel that migrants have been using their situation or, rather, that jihadis have been using the migrant situation as a cover? I appreciate immediately the sensitivity here because people know about violence in the community.

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): I am not sure how many people are very exercised by it, but it is a sufficient number with a very loud voice for it to be perceived as a major issue. Alex, I know that you wanted to come in on this.

Mr Maskey: I am concerned how that could deteriorate. That is my problem. I think that everyone would share that view. In the current situation, we will be hosting a number of Syrian refugees, and we are all on the head of a pin about "Let us be sensible about it. Let us not scare the horses and give further fuel to people in this community who would take issue with that". Some of the language that they have been using has been ridiculous. We are all a bit sensitive that that argument could degenerate along the lines that you suggest. We worry about that.

Mr Lyons: There are a lot of people who are very concerned about it, to varying degrees. Mike is right: there is a small number with a very loud voice, but there are a lot of people who are concerned. In my constituency, I have met people who have raised the issue with me. I have been surprised, as it is very rare that someone raises a foreign policy issue with me; however, a number of people have said to me, "What is going on here? Do these people have free movement once they get into the EU to come straight here?". If people do not think that that is an issue, they are very misguided. That has to influence the debate on EU membership. Rightly or wrongly, it will influence it.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: I suppose, just to close that point, if there is an incident, which by definition would be unplannable or unplanned by us, say, in the week of the referendum campaign, it could have a quite disproportionate impact, one way or t'other. Could we, if I may —

Mr Lyttle: Can I comment very briefly on that?

Lord Boswell of Aynho: Yes, of course, please do.

Mr Lyttle: A creative and powerful cartoon has been circulating in the press in recent weeks showing an EU hand and the knife of a jihadi in it, and the legitimate refugees were stuck between a Europe rejecting legitimate refugees and the knife of the jihadis pressing from the other side.

I think that there is huge, sensible, well-considered compassion in Northern Ireland for people who find themselves in unimaginable situations. The vast majority of people in Northern Ireland want a united EU to have a strong, clear policy in relation to receiving people who legitimately seek asylum. I am concerned. The Assembly, the Government and elected representatives need to recognise that there are issues. We have seen issues in recent weeks in Northern Ireland of racist social media posts and attacks, so we will need clear leadership to ensure that proper controls are in place to make sure that, when people are received, they are legitimately seeking asylum and to debunk a lot of the myths that circulate about the access to services that asylum seekers and refugees receive when they arrive here. I think that the vast majority of people in Northern Ireland want to see an EU that is compassionate, in a sensible way, about receiving refugees.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: Thank you for that. May I have five minutes, Chairman, to touch on relations with your Committee and the Assembly and how we view things? We will have an opportunity of discussing things further at the EC/UK formal machinery tomorrow, but it is useful, when you are in Committee, to talk about this. The British Government have emphasised the role of national Parliaments as part of the European debate, and we are not against that. In fact, we have put forward some rather constructive thinking on green cards, which you may be aware of. My personal take is that, if you want to involve national Parliaments, you should not do it at the expense of the European Parliament because that is not likely to be productive. Secondly, national Parliaments include the devolved Assemblies because they are part of the national parliamentary system. I am not wholly convinced that the Government in London realise that.

That leads on to the question about your concerns and the input of Northern Ireland interests into the negotiations and beyond. I suspect that most residents of England, for example, are just not aware of the extent of the border, which is 500 kilometres, give or take. I wanted to get a sense from the Committee of how much you feel you can make a case, how much Whitehall is prepared to listen and how much difference it will make to the eventual outcome of the negotiations and any ongoing reform process.

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): We had an interesting batch of correspondence in the last couple of weeks from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office indicating that there was good liaison between the UK Government and the Scottish Parliament initially and that that was being replicated in discussions with Wales and Northern Ireland. Yet our Department told us that we have not started negotiating or liaising.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: It is a bit late in the day, isn't it?

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): Yes. So there is confusion about the degree to which we have undertaken a mature debate with the UK Government about the implications. The border has to be the key. A Brexit would make the border a much more significant line on the map. What is the full range of implications? Some of us are old enough to remember horrendous issues that used to pertain with regard to extradition warrants to transfer wanted people from one jurisdiction to the other. If we are out of the EU and the Republic is in the EU, what are the implications for the transfer of suspects? Is the European arrest warrant still in play?

Lord Boswell of Aynho: May I interpose and say that the evidence that we had from Northern Ireland when one of my Committees was looking at the European arrest warrant was extremely powerful and helpful to us? I mention that, although I do not want to interrupt the flow. There is a concern, and I would like to get a sense of whether we can help at all at our end, as we are doing an inquiry into some of the wider implications of the renegotiation process, in drawing your interests to the attention of Whitehall and, slightly following on from what you said earlier, reflecting the extent to which you feel that the negotiations now taking place and likely to come to a head fairly soon are being driven by what you might call a London-centric agenda or that they adequately represent the constituent parts of the UK. You referred to the correspondence starting with Scotland and rolling out to you and Wales. We have been to Wales and are going to Scotland. How do you see that going? Will it end up with something important being missed?

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): Something important being missed has to be a legitimate fear. Because we have a land border, so many implications pertain that would not pertain to Scotland and Wales.

Mr Lyons: The point that you made about national Parliaments and the role that they should have under any reform is an interesting one.

It could be extremely difficult to figure out exactly how that would work in practice.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: I accept that.

Mr Lyons: It gets even more complicated when you start to involve devolved Assemblies, Germany's federal system, the Spanish regions or whatever it might be.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: I understand that too.

Mr Lyons: If something like that is built in, it becomes very confusing. I completely understand the need for the devolved Assemblies and Parliaments to have their say, and we need to look at how that can be fed into the process. However, ultimately, I believe that this is the job of the sovereign Parliament. We do not have any control over foreign affairs here, and we do not want those powers. Consultation is important, but when you start giving vetoes to devolved Assemblies or Parliaments, you start to get into a lot of difficulty and make an already very complicated process even more so.

Mr Attwood: May I just make a couple of points? I apologise; I had to go out and do something. I was a Minister in the Government here for a short time, and there was always a constant tension between the London Ministers and the Ministers of the devolved regions, especially between Scotland and London, at times between ourselves and London, and certainly between me and London Ministers. Although there was consultation, for example in relation to what Europe was proposing and what the response of the London Government might be to all that, there was a constant tension in trying to get heard or get into the room when it came to EU matters.

The London Government face an issue that the Scottish Nationalists have brought up, which is that, if there is an EU withdrawal, it should be decided by a majority in each of the devolved areas. When it comes to a referendum on the constitutional status of Ireland, the rule is that there has to be a majority in the North and a majority in the South in order to bring about constitutional change. That model has been accepted by the British Government when it comes to Northern Ireland, but a slightly different model is going to be in play when it comes to the constitutional membership of the United Kingdom in the EU. You could have the three regions voting to stay and England voting to go.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: We are all aware that that is not a wholly fanciful or theoretical possibility. I would be genuinely interested in whether that is a view that raises concerns across the parties here. Westminster has, in its own way — it is a domestic decision, not an EU decision — seen fit not to take it on board. How would people here feel if you found that you had a majority for staying at a time when the UK collectively wished to go? Would people just say, "Well, we are part of the UK and that is the way that it has been designed by the Westminster Parliament", or would it cause a kind of constitutional crux?

Mr Maskey: It is all a wee bit speculative but, if you ended up in that scenario, it would be a hugely significant development. The British Government would do well to ponder that, because it could clearly create a major upset here.

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): Our political holy grail is stability. We may define that differently, possibly even significantly differently, but we all aspire to stability politically. It is disturbing to think that you could have a scenario where the UK as a whole is voting to come out but Scotland votes to stay in, sparking another independence debate, while we find ourselves out of Europe, with a land border with a eurozone country and our nearest neighbour across the water wanting to get back in, with England and Wales out. That would be very destabilising in terms of where we are going, who we are and what our relationships will be.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: Thank you, Chair. That message is one that I take loud and clear from the Committee. In terms of our continuing interest, we are grateful for those perceptions. You have identified some areas that are not always well understood in London. We have the machinery tomorrow, of course, and there are detailed consultations that we can have. We have not talked about the operation of two currencies on this island, for example. I flag that up, without going on at length. I hope that your Committee, jointly or severally, will feel able to make representations to us and keep the dialogue going. In that spirit, as you have indicated a number of areas of interest, not all of which I can necessarily give you a complete answer on, I am happy to go straight off and do my best to answer your questions.

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): I have another one before Mr Frew comes in. I do not know whether there are any implications in this, but the agreement that was reached last week between the DUP and Sinn Féin includes an initiative against organised crime associated with paramilitarism. It is a joint-agency task force of an Garda Síochána, the PSNI and the revenue bodies in the two jurisdictions. I do not know whether a Brexit would have implications for that kind of cross-border cooperation. That is something to look at.

Mr Frew: Forgive me for missing most of your presentation, Lord Boswell. It is good to have you here to discuss this very important issue. One thing I would add to the debate — it seems like a strange Committee meeting, by the way, but a very good and healthy one — is that you can talk about the constituent parts of the United Kingdom, but you could break it down into further parts such as south-east England, London and the northern powerhouse, and the chances are that all of those parts would not have the same view. To my mind, it is not as big a constitutional matter as some might say. The question that has to be asked is this: how powerful is a referendum with regard to legislation? Of course it will send a very powerful message and it is the view of the population, but how far does it go towards the Government of the day having to do it?

Lord Boswell of Aynho: Let me trial that one. We have taken legal advice from our legal team. I am a layperson, but it coincides with my view. I will give it to you as we understand it, and Stuart can stand ready to correct me if I misdescribe it. First, you are right, in the sense that a referendum is not, by itself, determinant, as I think the lawyers would call it — I am sure there are lawyers here — and does not automatically create a situation, but government Ministers have made it clear in Westminster that they would accept the result of a referendum. For instance, there could be a scenario where there was a majority of 10,000 across the United Kingdom in favour of leaving, leaving aside the issue that has been identified about different results in different constituent parts. If you look at article 50 of the treaty, which may not be your bedside reading — sometimes, if I want to promote nightmares for myself, I read it — you will see that it was not written for British interest, as I understand it, but was just incorporated in the Lisbon treaty. There is, I think, legally an obligation on Ministers, having accepted that it is a definitive result and there is no question about what it was, to notify the European Union of the member state's intention to withdraw. That would be a single-shot decision; it would be "We're going".

At that point, the Council, which would receive that communication, would meet and formulate a plan for the next event and bring in the European Commission and a negotiation would take place on the terms under which this or any other member state might withdraw. That would be, in a sense, a unilateral negotiation, although the EU would, obviously, want to have a dialogue. The inference of article 50 is that that would be concluded within two years. However, there is provision for extension. I suppose that you could create a situation in which that rolled on for a long time, just as, theoretically, under article 50, there is provision for the re-entry of a member state. You could reapply if you had second thoughts, but you would have had to resign and then come back, which would trigger another negotiation.

The interesting thing is how that would happen. I think that it would be done by the Council and Commission together, obviously in discussion with the withdrawing state but, fundamentally, with the decision taken by the remaining 27. It also has to have the assent of the European Parliament. So, you are into two external jurisdictions and whatever you can input to that. That would then be effected, as the lawyers would say, by three things. First, there would be an agreement of withdrawal, which would be us or another country deciding that it no longer wished to be a member and setting out the conditions for that. A lot of that would be practicalities such as, for example, the terms of service for Members of the European Parliament from the member state and people's pension entitlements and issues like whether social benefits can continue to be accrued or paid in certain member states. Secondly, there would have to be an amending treaty by the 28, saying, "We are going to leave one out and now we are 27", which I think would be fairly straightforward. Thirdly, it is envisaged that there would need to be a separate process of an association or agreement for an association, if desired, of the withdrawing state with the others. That, of course, would have to be negotiated. You then get into issues such as migration where, to secure access to the internal market, we would have to accept, or not, freedom of movement for workers.

A lot of that is pretty speculative. Stuart has reminded me that there is a specific piece in the Prime Minister's Chatham House speech that makes the point about the initial process:

The point is that there is no provision for that. There will pretty well have to be a withdrawal agreement, unless we just shrug our shoulders, throw in the keys and say, "We are off". In theory, that will need concluding within two years or however long it takes. You then have the comparatively minor issue of re-amending the European treaties for the 27 and the major issue of renegotiating — on what terms we know not — an association agreement.

It may be helpful to the Committee if I just mention one thing that was raised in an informal conversation with Czech parliamentarians the other day. We were talking about the fairly amicable so-called "Velvet divorce" in 1993 between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. I do not think that it would be a caricature of the conversation to say that they said, "Well, we have most of it sorted out, but there are a few things like pension rights which aren't quite tied down yet". That is after 22 years.

Mr Frew: We all have our positions on being in Europe or not. The problem that I hear about when I knock on doors and speak to business is uncertainty. Uncertainty is hurting business.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: I will link that, if I may, with the Chairman's remarks about stability. I am getting a pretty clear message on that, I think.

Mr Frew: We will need a settled view, once and for all, after all of this. Thank you very much.

Lord Boswell of Aynho: Thank you. Who would like to ask next?

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): Has the review of competences been widely disseminated and is it really playing into the renegotiation?

Lord Boswell of Aynho: We did a very short review in the immediate run-up to the general election in May. It recorded the fact that the four semesters of the balance of competences had been concluded. They produced 32 reports, which are sitting on my desk. I am probably not the only person in the world to have done so, but I have read every word of them. They are actually quite a good read but they have not hugely influenced the debate publicly. I will leave the Committee to speculate about the motives of setting up the exercise and the Government's motives, having said, "We hope to produce some integrated approach at the end of it", not doing so. We approach some of those in our report. Those are on the table. They have not, on the whole, been rubbished in detail. There may be individual criticisms or emphasis but they are, certainly in our view, a fairly solid body of work.

My overall message is that, often, competences are set at different levels. We, as a United Kingdom, have not found it easy because we do not have a written constitution. We certainly do not have federal arrangements, whereas countries like Germany, which we mentioned, clearly are federal and, as part of their daily working diet, try to sort out the levels of competences. They explain pretty carefully how it works. They have not been subjected to radical and critical reappraisal. The question is then what happens to them. In terms of the initial exercise, that is now substantially a dead letter. Minister for Europe Lidington said that they would take them into account in the negotiations. A lot of staff work has been done; people have thought about issues like the control of tax policy, migration or even some of the benefits system. A lot of work has been done, but they are not centre stage. We will know the extent to which they are actually influencing the negotiations only when we see the result.

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): It is a negotiation, and we focus, rightly, on what the UK is trying to get out of the EU. Do we know what the EU may be coveting in terms of concessions from Downing Street?

Lord Boswell of Aynho: That is a very interesting question, to which I do not know the answer. Most people would say — you do not need a master's degree in international relations to work this out — that, on the whole, if you ask for something, people might want something in return. I have no idea whether that is happening or whether any quid pro quo would be part of the same business or another occasion.

There is a strong history in the EU. I mentioned earlier some of the Danish and Southern Irish accommodations that have been achieved at various stages; it is not just Britain. If a member state has a problem, people will bend backwards to be helpful without necessarily having to say, "Yeah, but that's the deal". It does not quite work like that. This point may be relevant to the eurozone, for example. We probably would not wish — I do not think that the Prime Minister has signalled his wish — to be obstructive to other elements of integration, even if we did not want to share them. Look at the logic of what happens in relation to the euro area as against the non-euro members and how you protect their position while allowing the euro to do what it has to do. That is a real issue. There are also more general issues such as the question of ever-closer union. The logic of saying, "We don't want to go along with that" is to say, "Well, other people might want to, and we're not going to be wilfully obstructive".

I am not sure that that quite answers your question, so I will make a more general point. The extent to which the Prime Minister's negotiating objectives can be seen to be aligned with the European Union reform process, which we are trying to discern a bit more about from looking at the vision of what a future Europe might be, and is coincident with that rather than actually fighting against it, is going to make it more easy to achieve that. If it is seen as Britannia waving her sceptre and demanding things from Europe without any comparable concessions or doing so in a way that will disrupt things that Europe wants to do, that will be less successful.

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): There are no further questions from members. Is there anything that you would like to add?

Lord Boswell of Aynho: All that I would really like to do is, first, thank you very much for your hospitality. I hope that this has been a useful exchange of views for the Committee. It certainly has for me, and we will relay it to my Committee because it will provide background material for our upcoming report. I would like to signal my view more generally — similar to a term from trade negotiations when people talk about a "living document" — that this is a living discussion. It can be resumed at any stage, as far as I am concerned. I will do my best to make sure that people in Whitehall understand that they are not merely dealing with the square mile in which Her Majesty's Government are situated but are actually representing the interests of the United Kingdom. Indeed, I think that we are all aware that the future decision will be for the United Kingdom and its electors as a whole, so the more we can talk together and keep in touch, the more useful and enjoyable it will be for us. Thank you.

The Chairperson (Mr Nesbitt): Thank you very much. I look forward to catching up tomorrow.